“Compliance with the Prevent duty requires that properly thought through procedures and policies are in place. Having procedures and policies in place which match the general expectations set out in this guidance will mean that institutions are well placed to comply with the Prevent duty. Compliance will only be achieved if these procedures and policies are properly followed and applied. This guidance does not prescribe what appropriate decisions would be - this will be up to institutions to determine, having considered all the factors of the case.”
“… when deciding whether or not to host a particular speaker, RHEBs should consider carefully whether the views being expressed, or likely to be expressed, constitute extremist views that risk drawing people into terrorism or are shared by terrorist groups. In these circumstances the event should not be allowed to proceed except where RHEBs are entirely convinced that such risk can be fully mitigated without cancellation of the event. This includes ensuring that, where any event is being allowed to proceed, speakers with extremist views that could draw people into terrorism are challenged with opposing views as part of that same event, rather than in a separate forum. Where RHEBs are in any doubt that the risk cannot be fully mitigated they should exercise caution and not allow the event to proceed.”
“vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.”
“(1) [RHEBs] shall take such steps as are reasonably practicable to ensure that freedom of speech within the law is secured for members, students and employees of the establishment and for visiting speakers. (2) The duty imposed by subsection (1) above includes (in particular) the duty to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that the use of any premises of the establishment is not denied to any individual or body of persons on any ground connected with— (a) the beliefs or views of that individual or of any member of that body; or (b) the policy or objectives of that body. (3) The governing body of every such establishment shall, with a view to facilitating the discharge of the duty imposed by subsection (1) above in relation to that establishment, issue and keep up to date a code of practice setting out— (a) the procedures to be followed by members, students and employees of the establishment in connection with the organisation— (i) of meetings which are to be held on premises of the establishment and which fall within any class of meeting specified in the code; and (ii) of other activities which are to take place on those premises and which fall within any class of activity so specified; and (b) the conduct required of such persons in connection with any such meeting or activity; and dealing with such other matters as the governing body consider appropriate. (a) the beliefs or views of that individual or of any member of that body; or (b) the policy or objectives of that body. (a) the procedures to be followed by members, students and employees of the establishment in connection with the organisation— (i) of meetings which are to be held on premises of the establishment and which fall within any class of meeting specified in the code; and (ii) of other activities which are to take place on those premises and which fall within any class of activity so specified; and (b) the conduct required of such persons in connection with any such meeting or activity; (4) Every individual and body of persons concerned in the government of any such establishment shall take such steps as are reasonably practicable (including where appropriate the initiation of disciplinary measures) to secure that the requirements of the code of practice for that establishment, issued under subsection (3) above, are complied with. … (8) Where a students' union occupies premises which are not premises of the establishment in connection with which the union is constituted, any reference in this section to the premises of the establishment shall be taken to include a reference to the premises occupied by the students' union.”
“(a) monitoring, observing or listening to persons, their movements, their conversations or their other activities or communications; (b) recording anything monitored, observed or listened to in the course of surveillance; and (c) surveillance by or with the assistance of a surveillance device.”
“(2) Subject to subsection (6), surveillance is directed for the purposes of this Part if it is covert but not intrusive and is undertaken– (a) for the purposes of a specific investigation or a specific operation; (b) in such a manner as is likely to result in the obtaining of private information about a person (whether or not one specifically identified for the purposes of the investigation or operation); and (c) otherwise than by way of an immediate response to events or circumstances the nature of which is such that it would not be reasonably practicable for an authorisation under this Part to be sought for the carrying out of the surveillance.” (a) for the purposes of a specific investigation or a specific operation; (b) in such a manner as is likely to result in the obtaining of private information about a person (whether or not one specifically identified for the purposes of the investigation or operation); and (c) otherwise than by way of an immediate response to events or circumstances the nature of which is such that it would not be reasonably practicable for an authorisation under this Part to be sought for the carrying out of the surveillance.”
“(a) that the authorisation is necessary on grounds falling within subsection (3); and (b) that the authorised surveillance is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by carrying it out.” 36.The grounds in subsection (3) are, as follows: “(a) in the interests of national security; (b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder; (c) in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom; (d) in the interests of public safety; (e) for the purpose of protecting public health; (f) for the purpose of assessing or collecting any tax, duty, levy or other imposition, contribution or charge payable to a government department; or (g) for any purpose (not falling within paragraphs (a) to (f)) which is specified for the purposes of this subsection by an order made by the Secretary of State.”
“5 In Rotaru v Romania(2000) 8 BHRC 449 , para 43, the Grand Chamber held that “public information can fall within the scope of private life where it is systematically collected and stored in files held by the authorities.”
“There are a number of elements relevant to a consideration of whether a person's private life is concerned by measures effected outside a person's home or private premises. Since there are occasions when people knowingly or intentionally involve themselves in activities which are or may be recorded or reported in a public manner, a person's reasonable expectations as to privacy may be a significant, although not necessarily conclusive, factor. A person who walks down the street will, inevitably, be visible to any member of the public who is also present. Monitoring by technological means of the same public scene (for example, a security guard viewing through closed-circuit television) is of a similar character. Private-life considerations may arise, however, once any systematic or permanent record comes into existence of such material from the public domain. It is for this reason that files gathered by security services on a particular individual fall within the scope of article 8, even where the information has not been gathered by any intrusive or covert method.”
“6 These cases, and others like them, all have particular features which differentiate them both from each other and from the present cases. But it is clear that the state's systematic collection and storage in retrievable form even of public information about an individual is an interference with private life.”
“84In the leading case Von Hannover v Germany(2004) 40 EHRR 1 , concerning press photographs of the applicant engaged in various informal activities with members of her family or friends in locations outside her own home, the Strasbourg court said, at paras 50–52: “50. The court reiterates that the concept of private life extends to aspects relating to personal identity, such as a person's name (see Burghartz v Switzerland(1994) 18 EHRR 101 , para 24) or a person's picture (see Schüssel v Austria (Application No 42409/98) (unreported) given21 February 2002 ). Furthermore, private life, in the court's view, includes a person's physical and psychological integrity; the guarantee afforded byarticle 8 of the Convention is primarily intended to ensure the development, without outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations with other human beings: see, mutatis mutandis, Niemietz v Germany(1992) 16 EHRR 97 , para 29, and Botta v Italy(1998) 26 EHRR 241 , para 32. There is therefore a zone of interaction with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of 'private life': see, mutatis mutandis, PG v United Kingdom(2001) 46 EHRR 51 , para 56, and Peck v United Kingdom(2003) 36 EHRR 41 , para 57. “50. The court reiterates that the concept of private life extends to aspects relating to personal identity, such as a person's name (see Burghartz v Switzerland(1994) 18 EHRR 101 , para 24) or a person's picture (see Schüssel v Austria (Application No 42409/98) (unreported) given21 February 2002 ). Furthermore, private life, in the court's view, includes a person's physical and psychological integrity; the guarantee afforded byarticle 8 of the Convention is primarily intended to ensure the development, without outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations with other human beings: see, mutatis mutandis, Niemietz v Germany(1992) 16 EHRR 97 , para 29, and Botta v Italy(1998) 26 EHRR 241 , para 32. There is therefore a zone of interaction with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of 'private life': see, mutatis mutandis, PG v United Kingdom(2001) 46 EHRR 51 , para 56, and Peck v United Kingdom(2003) 36 EHRR 41 , para 57. 51. The court has also indicated that, in certain circumstances, a person has a 'legitimate expectation' of protection and respect for his private life. Accordingly, it has held in a case concerning the interception of telephone calls on business premises that the applicant 'would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy for such calls': see Halford v United Kingdom(1997) 24 EHRR 523 , para 45. 52. As regards photos, with a view to defining the scope of protection afforded by article 8 against arbitrary interference by public authorities, the Commission had regard to whether the photographs related to private or public matters and whether the material thus obtained was envisaged for a limited use or was likely to be made available to the general public: see, mutatis mutandis, Friedl v Austria(1995) 21 EHRR 83 , Friendly Settlement, Commission opinion, at paras 49–52; PG v United Kingdom 46 EHRR 51, para 58; and Peck v United Kingdom 36 EHRR 41, para 61.”
“The Court recalls that it is well established in its case-law that the mere storing of information amounts to an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for private life as secured byArticle 8(1) of the Convention (see S. and Marper, cited above, § 67 and Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v. Sweden, no. 62332/00, § 73, ECHR 2006-VII with further references).”
“72. The Court, having regard to the scope of the notion of “private life” as interpreted in its case-law (see, in particular, Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, § 65, ECHR 2000-II, and Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 43, ECHR 2000-V), finds that the information about the applicants that was stored on the Security Police register and was released to them clearly constituted data pertaining to their “private life”
“67. The mere storing of data relating to the private life of an individual amounts to an interference within the meaning of Article 8 (see Leander v. Sweden,26 March 1987 , § 48, Series A no. 116). The subsequent use of the stored information has no bearing on that finding (see Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, § 69, ECHR 2000-II). However, in determining whether the personal information retained by the authorities involves any of the private-life aspects mentioned above, the Court will have due regard to the specific context in which the information at issue has been recorded and retained, the nature of the records, the way in which these records are used and processed and the results that may be obtained (see, mutatis mutandis, Friedl, cited above, §§ 49-51, and Peck,cited above, § 59).”
“is the chief editor of Islam21c, a publication that hosts material contrary to British values, and has himself expressed views of concern in this publication and on social media, appearing to compare homosexuality to paedophilia as a sin and supporting FGM. He has spoken alongside CAGE and used social media to support CAGE’s position on Mohammed Emwazi (“Jihadi John”), which has been to try to justify his resort to violence.”
“I do not consider that what they did in this case reached the level of “surveillance” at all, and certainly not directed surveillance. I have considered the frequency of examination, the circumstances, the public nature of the data, its mode of collection, the lack of what I regard as the sort of exercise, to which the comments and concerns are addressed, of drawing conclusions about personal matters from the systematic assembly of data from multiple sources; the absence of focused monitoring of the Claimant or of a group to which he belonged.”
“As a general rule it is understandable and justifiable (and reasonable) that a suspect would not wish others to know of the investigation because of the stigma attached … The fact of an investigation, as a general rule, will of itself carry some stigma, no matter how often one says it should not.”
“Being drawn into terrorism included being drawn into support for terrorism. There was no clear dividing line between extremism and terrorism; the two were closely related. Preventing people being drawn into terrorism required the extremist ideologies used to legitimise terrorism to be challenged, and their promotion disrupted, …. "Non-violent extremism" was always "caveated" in Guidance by the concept of a "risk of being drawn into terrorism".”
“The whole context of the Guidance, the CTSAand the Prevent strategy is to reduce the risk of people being drawn into terrorism by extremism, violent or non-violent. The Guidance did not apply to “non-violent” extremism however intrinsically undesirable, which does not create a risk that others will be drawn into terrorism.”
“140. I regard it as plain that if non-violent extremism does risk drawing people into terrorism, then a degree of consideration, which may lead to RHEBs countering, mitigating or restricting that effect on its students towards whom they owe some safeguarding duty, (and ultimately that effect on the wider society of which they form part) is a legitimate objective for government to set for achievement through guidance. I am far from clear that Mr Bowen submitted otherwise.”
“Furthermore, when deciding whether or not to host a particular speaker, RHEBs should consider carefully whether the views being expressed, or likely to be expressed, constitute extremist views that risk drawing people into terrorism or are shared by terrorist groups. In these circumstances the event should not beallowed to proceed except where RHEBs are entirely convincedthat such risk can be fully mitigated without cancellation of theevent. This includes ensuring that, where any event is being allowed to proceed, speakers with extremist views that could draw people into terrorism are challenged with opposing views as part of that same event, rather than in a separate forum. Where RHEBs are in any doubt that the risk cannot be fullymitigated they should exercise caution and not allow the eventto proceed.”
“56. I entirely understand why the last and second last sentences of paragraph 11 can be seen as very restrictive. The RHEB must be "entirely convinced" that the risk is "fully mitigated", or "fully mitigated" without any doubt. Otherwise, the RHEB should exercise caution and not allow the event to proceed. In this context, I would have thought that was a nighon impossible task with some speakers, though the suggestion that it was a requirement that all who opposed fundamental British values should be banned is rather wide of the mark. 57. Mr Sanders' interpretation of the guidance is close however to submitting in effect that the proper interpretation of the guidance, albeit in context and read alongside other guidance, is not what an ordinary reading of the words would yield. His analysis was more nuanced, less absolute, and more reflective of the fact that the HEPDG concerned but one strand of the duties to which the institutions were subject. 58. In my judgment, paragraph 11 of the HEPDG means what it says on a straightforward reading of its quite simple language. The notion of "full mitigation" could mean mitigation as far as reasonably practicable or mitigation so that there was no significant risk, and without doubt could mean without any reasonable or significant doubt. But in the context of cancellation if full mitigation cannot be achieved beyond doubt, I do not think that that Mr Sanders' more nuanced reading is right. If the guidance meant what Mr Sanders said, it should have said so. But I have to add, that where RHEBs have interpreted the HEPDG as Mr Sanders submitted they should have done, it will lie ill in the mouth of the SSHD to complain. And if she wishes to revise the wording to reflect his submission, she can always do so. Even on Mr Sanders' reading, though some of the sting might be removed, many of the issues about the relationship between the guidance and the section 31 duties would remain.”
“98. But the Guidance needs to be read and understood for what it is. It is just that: guidance. It does not direct an outcome, let alone "ban" or "direct" the banning of speakers. It must be considered, but "following it" in the absence of good reason can be a misleading approach, notwithstanding Mr Sanders' apparent concession. "Following it" requires no particular outcome but a consideration of factors, processes and steps. The guidance leaves it to the judgment of the RHEB as to whether the event should not proceed or proceed in whatever format or with whatever organisation it chooses. 99. As I have already explained, the balancing act, which Mr Bowen said failed to give due weight to the rights of the individual, does not need to be carried out within the guidance itself. The balancing act is for the RHEBs, having considered the Guidance, and their duties in s31 CTSA and s43 EA 1986. Mr Bowen said that the Guidance contained no explicit recognition of the importance of freedom of speech or political and religious matters. I do not agree with that, but the specific provisions of the CTSA show that when RHEBs reach decisions, they have to have particular regard to those issues. It is at that stage in the decision-making process that the balance is to be struck, and it is struck by the decision-maker not the SSHD.”
“the HEPDG could have set out more fully what I concluded the position is; but it was not unlawful to say what it did, and leave the institutions to make the clear judgment that the other interests overrode its application in any particular case.”
“the guidance had to be applied in the absence of good reasons not do so … based on R (Munjaz) v Merseyside Care NHS Trust[2005] UKHL 58 ,[2006] 2 AC 148 .”
“Guidance cannot be unlawful simply because, through misunderstanding their duties, others may act unlawfully.”