“The fresh guidance in EM and others was that, in general, the return of an unsuccessful applicant for refugee status from the UK with no significant MDC profile did not face a real risk of having to demonstrate loyalty to Zanu-PF. There was, however, a difference between urban areas and rural areas. In all but two rural areas there was such a risk. As to Harare, returnees would in general face no significant difficulties if going to a low or medium density area. In a high density area, although the position was more difficult, absent a significant MDC profile or participation in political activities likely to attract adverse attention by Zanu-PF, returnees in general would not face significant problems.”
“First, it is submitted that the Tribunal erred in not finding that the Secretary of State was under a general duty to provide disclosure in an asylum and Article 3 appeal. Secondly, in the light of the decision of the Strasbourg Court in Sufi and Elmi v United Kingdom[2011] ECHR 1045 , it was submitted that the Tribunal erred in relying on wholly anonymous evidence in the report of the fact-finding commission. Thirdly, it was contended that the Tribunal erred in appointing a public interest immunity advocate instead of a specially appointed advocate in respect of the disclosure ordered by the Court of Appeal.”
"3. The Tribunal seeks a procedure that will enable it to complete the task assigned by the Court of Appeal thoroughly, fairly and promptly. The need for promptness arises because of the general importance of the issues raised, which affect other existing appeals, as well as decision-making by the respondent on Zimbabwean cases. Over 700 cases are currently before the First-tier Tribunal or the Upper Tribunal. 4. Given this, together with (a) the substantial representations and responses of the parties in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal, as well as subsequently; (b) the large number of documents that fall to be considered; (c) the other judicial duties of the judges who will be dealing with the appeals; and (d) the start of the long vacation, the Tribunal considers that the appropriate course is to request the respondent to arrange for the Attorney General to appoint PII counsel, who would work under the Tribunal's instructions. 5. In the ordinary course of events, the PII exercise would be wholly undertaken by the Upper Tribunal, in the normal way. But the factors described in paragraphs 3 and 4 above mean there is substantial risks that, without PII counsel's assistance, the task cannot be performed by the tribunal in August and early September, thereby putting the timetable in jeopardy. 6. We understand that the PII counsel would represent the interests of justice, rather than a party; but nevertheless in the light of the appellants’ submissions today, which have been extensive. The PII counsel would be a resource for the Tribunal and would be briefed by its judiciary, not the appellants, as to the issues with which the tribunal would like assistance to help it discharge its duties."
"31. The procedure that we were able to adopt with the assistance of the Attorney General addressed all potential obstacles to our satisfaction. Ms Kate Olley was appointed a PII advocate by the Attorney. She has acted at our direction and has been able to review all the material timeously; make her own independent assessment of the three questions we posed for her to consider [they are set out at paragraph 29]; discuss her conclusions with members of the panel; engage in discussion with the counsel for the Secretary of State about issues that remained unresolved including the extent to which any gist of the material to which PII did apply could be provided to the appellant."
"This task [that is, essentially, assessment of the PII process] included completing the process of reviewing the redactions already made during the Court of Appeal proceedings. It was necessary to review the redactions made on relevant grounds, and if we considered the material to be relevant ascertain whether a PII claim arose in respect of it."
“153. Further, it should be noted that this was part of the assessment of the general background to person security in Zimbabwe and did not form a specific part of the guidance issued. The issue in question was not a free standing assessment of the current state of police discipline and independence but whether the incidence of politically motivated violence had reduced in the urban centres, for which there was near unanimity of view between informants. 154. The Tribunal was not, therefore, giving decisive or undue weight to a single unsupported source. Moreover the interview process elicited details of the extent to which the two organisations referred to were able to operate in Zimbabwe. Organisation 9 was able to operate freely throughout Zimbabwe and the environment had improved over the last 18 months but mostly within a year of the political agreement. Where there were directives from local officials to stop working in limited cases, the problem could be overcome through negotiation. There were a few districts where access was not granted but these were small geographical areas. Organisation 10 said it was able to ‘operate freely in respect of some aspects of its operations but in relation to work with IDPs (internally displaced persons) there are some constraints on physical aspects to some areas. They are often overcome through local explanation and negotiations but concerns remain and the situation is expected to get worse as the next elections approach’. There is thus nothing inconsistent between the use the Tribunal made of the two organisations in question and guidance in NA v United Kingdom repeated in Sufi and Elmi v United Kingdom.”
“156. For the reasons given by the European Court of Human Rights in NA and the passages repeated in Sufi and Elmi, in asylum determination, there are sound reasons why sources who may have valuable information to give to diplomatic missions, international organisations like UNHCR or non-governmental organisations like Amnesty International would wish to do so under conditions of anonymity. In some cases an order prohibiting the publication of the sources may suffice to give re-assurance in others it may not. Where they do not, potential sources of concern may not always be confined to government agents and their supporters. Providing information to an appellant or his legal team on a confidential basis may thus provide the source with satisfactory protection. 157. Anonymous material is not infrequently relied on by appellants as indicative of deteriorating conditions or general risk. The Tribunal should be free to accept such material but will do its best to evaluate by reference to what if anything is known about the source, the circumstances in which information was given and the overall context of the issues it relates to and the rest of the evidence available. 158. The problem is not one of admissibility of such material as forming part of the background data from which risk assessments are made, but the weight to be attached to such data. It is common sense and common justice that the less that is known about a source and its means of acquiring information, the more hesitant should a Tribunal judge be to afford anonymous unsupported assessment substantial weight, particularly where it conflicts with assessment from sources known to reliable. In our judgment it is neither possible nor desirable to be more prescriptive than this, and the task of evaluation of weight is a matter for the judgment of an expert Tribunal that is regularly asked to take into account un-sourced data whether submitted by claimants or respondents. Provided a judge is alert to the problems caused by anonymous evidence and the principles we have summarised above, we do not consider that an issue of law arises. 159. The report of the FFM under consideration in EM was not a model of best practice in a number of respects, many of which were exposed at the hearing. We were, however, satisfied that informants with whom contact was made were selected in good faith by the mission with the assistance of locally based diplomats. We were also satisfied that ultimately the interlocutors (whether they wished to be quoted in an individual or representative capacity) were content with the final version of the summaries of their information and knew the context in which it was being gathered (cf [106] to [107] in EM). 160. By contrast with the position pertaining in Sufi and Elmi, each of the four anonymous organisations had a presence in Zimbabwe and brief descriptions had been supplied of their status and ability to gather information. The informants in the report were not predominantly anonymous. The known sources were all reputable and independent and had the capacity to supply relevant data within the area or field of their operation. We had no reason to suspect that unknown sources were different in kind to known, and in respect of organisation 16 this seems to have been accepted by W66. To reject anything said by informants from the unknown group on the basis that it was possible that they alone were not independent, objective, or had the capacity to acquire the information they were passing on, would be very close to questioning the good faith of the respondent in submitting this data for our assessment. 161. In summary, we are satisfied that the use we made of Organisations 9 and 10 on the passages under challenge was not unlawful, unfair, an irrational exercise of judgment or in breach of the general principles set out in NA v United Kingdom and approved by the AIT and the higher courts in the United Kingdom.”
"(1) Subject to the provisions of the 2007 Act and any other enactment, the Upper Tribunal may regulate its own procedure. (2) The Upper Tribunal may give a direction in relation to the conduct or disposal of proceedings at any time, including a direction amending, suspending or setting aside an earlier direction. (3) In particular, and without restricting the general powers in paragraphs (1) and (2), the Upper Tribunal may— ... (d) permit or require a party or another person to provide documents, information, evidence or submissions to the Upper Tribunal or a party... (n) require any person, body or other tribunal whose decision is the subject of proceedings before the Upper Tribunal to provide reasons for the decision or other information or documents in relation to the decision or in any proceedings before that person, body or tribunal."
"This observation was applied in R(Cindo) v IAT... This was a judicial review of a substantive asylum appeal on the grounds of non-disclosure. Maurice Kay J (as he then was) quoted the passage in Kerrouche and emphasised the words ‘ought to have known’ and said: ‘10. The words I have emphasised point to the inclusion of constructive knowledge. This was taken up by Simon Brown L.J. in Konan v SSHD (CA,20 March 2000 , BAILII:[2000] EWCA Civ 3041 ), who also observed that (para 24): ‘…..the Secretary of State's obligation in a full asylum appeal like this may well be higher than in cases like Kerrouche and …. Abdi and Gawe, cases concerned with safe third country appeals.’ 11. Taking a broad view of the authorities, they appear to illuminate these principles: (1) there is a duty on the part of the Secretary of State not knowingly to mislead in the material he places before the Adjudicator or the IAT; (2) ‘knowingly’ embraces that which he ought to have known; (3) a breach of that duty may found judicial review on the basis that either (a) the decision was reached on a ‘wrong factual basis’ (see Wade & Forsyth, Administrative Law, 8th Ed. Pp.283-284); or (b) the proceedings were tainted with unfairness.’"
“45. In our judgment, in asylum appeals and Country Guidance cases, the duty not to mislead provides a sound basis for evaluation of country material. Where the respondent relies on absence of material risk by reference to Country of Origin Information Service (COIS) reports, UKBA Operational Guidance Notes (OGN), or responses to the evidence of others, she cannot make assertions that she knows or ought to know are qualified by other material under her control or in the possession of another government department. 46. We anticipate that UKBA assessments of risk in foreign countries will frequently be informed by information emanating from the UK diplomatic mission in the region or other data in the possession of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In the case of Zimbabwe we know that this has been substantially the case for some time. The UKBA relied substantially on the expertise of the British High Commission in preparing the fact-finding mission and the evaluation of political circumstances. We would expect the UKBA to ask for and be informed about any reliable material that might qualify a published assessment. We would expect COIS reports to be updated regularly and kept under review. Where new material comes to light an OGN can be issued promptly, even if it is not itself a source of independent evidence. We observe that it was on the basis of an OGN as to enhanced risk of non-Arab Darfuris in Khartoum that the AIT was able to promptly vary previous Country Guidance in AA (Non-Arab Darfuris- relocation) (Sudan) CG[2009] UKAIT 0056 .”
“49 Before the Court of Appeal the respondent accepted that previous disclosure was incomplete and that there was a failure of the duty of disclosure in the light of the issue identified above that had caused the Upper Tribunal to exercise its case management powers. 50. This again was a historic rather than current issue. It went to an issue as to why the respondent had decided to resume removals to Zimbabwe. In the absence of a general duty to place before the Tribunal all contemporary data relating to an assessment on Zimbabwe, we saw no reason to exercise our case management powers to achieve the same result. 51. There was further a risk of a never ending cycle of disclosure requests, PII applications and so on. Disclosure by the Secretary of State of material held by the Foreign Office did involve PII issues, and the process for manual search, evaluation, submission for a certificate, judicial scrutiny of the merits of the certificate and the assessment whether there was a compelling case for disclosure in the interests of fairness was a laborious and time-consuming process. The volume of material in issue far exceeded the slender bundle we were able to assess for ourselves in December 2010. The whole process was bound to be measured in months rather than weeks or days. By the time one application was determined the passage of time might lead to a further application and so on. We consider that the issue of directions requiring either the respondent or a fortiori a third party, to provide material in an asylum appeal is an unusual and exceptional course. If it were regularly and routinely undertaken, it would be likely to significantly delay the listing and determination of any appeal. 52. We recognised that, if there was recent material that was known or ought to be known to the Home Secretary suggesting that, whatever the position in the past, it would now be unsafe to return the appellant to Zimbabwe, her legal representatives had accepted that a duty of disclosure would arise, in the event that it was decided still to oppose the appeal. The discharge of such a duty did not depend on directions from this Tribunal.”