TG and others (Afghan Sikhs persecuted) (CG) [2015] UKUT 595 (IAC)

' The first presence of Hindus and Sikhs in the Central Asian country is said to be roughly 200 years ago. Of the estimated 50,000 Hindus and Sikhs living in Afghanistan 10 years ago, most have left. Only about 1000 Sikhs remain in the country today, half of them concentrated in Jalalabad, the provincial and commercial capital of the eastern Nangarhar Province. Sikhs left Afghanistan en masse, along with thousands of Hindus, after Hindu extremists destroyed the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, in India, in December 1992, in fear of threats from radical Muslims following large scale looting of Hindu and Sikhs temples all over Afghanistan. Their properties were looted, they were tortured and treated inhumanely, particularly in Kabul, with women reportedly raped. Under the Taliban, '

' 4. No precise estimate for the number of Sikhs and Hindus in Afghanistan exists, due to the failure of the government to carry out a census of the population. UNHCR sources estimated that in Kabul in 2005 185 Sikh families were left, with 160 in Jalalabad and 100 in Kunduz, these being the main communities. Sikh community sources estimated the number of families living in Kabul in 2010 to be down to 130, mostly living in the Karte Parwan area. Even some of those left say that they remained only because they were too poor to flee. According to the Department of State, the Sikh community in Afghanistan estimated its size in 2009 at 531 families or 3000 individuals, compared to from up to 200,000 before the war. Another estimate, provided by the Deputy of the Hindu and Sikh Council of Afghanistan, was 5000 Sikhs and 2000 Hindus. More recently the head of the community, Awtar Singh, estimated the size at 372-395 families nationwide, which would indicate a further decline. In any case it is obvious that the Sikh/Hindu population has been declining very much, by over 90%, a fact that should itself be an indication that the conditions of living in Afghanistan for the members of this community are now far worse than those of the rest of the population, which instead has been returning to Afghanistan: 5 million Afghan refugees have returned from mainly Pakistan and Iran between 2002-9. Considering the small size of the community, the sample of episodes of violence, abuse and harassment compiled in this report, which is certainly not exhaustive, indicates a high level of pressure on the Sikh/Hindu community. The episodes which occurred after 2005 amount to a substantial level of violence and harassment when projected into a population of 3000.'

'But the Russian forces wilted in the face of ferocious assaults by the mujahedeen. When they eventually withdrew with their tails between their legs in 1989, chaos reigned, and the Hindus and Sikhs of Afghanistan found themselves in severe difficulty. In the first instance they found themselves facing economic chaos as the various Mujahadeen splinters engaged in an internecine civil war, and yet greater difficulties still when the militantly Islamic Taliban swept to power in 1994. The tolerance of diversity which had hitherto been such a characteristic of Afghan Islam rapidly began to evaporate in the face of the hard line jihadi and fundamentalist attitudes promoted by the Taliban. Hence even though the arrival of the Taliban was welcomed by large sections of the Afghan population because they replaced a smash and grab period of warlordism with a strictly imposed order - albeit of an exceptionally rough and ready kind - their arrival was in no way welcome by members of Afghanistan's Sikh and Hindu minority. Given their training in madrasseh wholly committed to Wahhabi and Deobandi interpretations of the Islamic tradition, the Taliban not only enthusiastically imposed bloody punishments on all those whom they considered to have overstepped their narrow and literalistic interpretations of Quranic injunctions, but also took the view that infidels and idolaters have no place in the Islamic paradise which they had constructed. As a result members of the Hindu and Sikh minority were required to wear yellow stars on their clothing, Muslims at large were strongly encouraged to avoid using their shops, and ever more vigorous efforts were made to 'persuade' them to see the error of their ways and to become Muslims. Such persuasion soon involved much more than verbal threats. Sikhs and Hindus soon found themselves being required to make financial contributions to the jihad, and if they failed to pay up, to find themselves faced with even larger ransom demands if they wanted to see their kidnapped sons and daughters returned home alive rather than as corpses. However it would be quite wrong to assume that all Afghan Muslims were in sympathy with those tactics, which ran wholly contrary to their long-standing commitment to plurality-tolerant Sufi interpretations of Islam. In many respects the Taliban ideology was one which had been imported by a neo-fundamentalist group which had its roots in Pakistan. In the face of these assaults Sikh and Hindu families frequently found themselves provided with a modicum of support and shelter by their Muslim neighbours, and most especially those with whom they had sustained relationships or reciprocity over many generations.'

'5.2 Kabul and Jalalabad: different worlds While Kabul is by far the largest city in Afghanistan, Jalalabad is by no means out in the sticks: rather it lies halfway along Afghanistan's most significant trade route, the road between Kabul and Peshawar. Moreover precisely because of its location, the province in the midst of which it lies has been a key battleground for the various wars in which mujahedeen guerrillas have been active ever since the Soviet invasion more than thirty years ago, and who still tied down a large contingent of ISAF forces to this day. However it would be idle in the extreme to assume that Kabul has been untouched by these developments. Quite the contrary: throughout this period taking control of Kabul has been the ultimate objective of all these insurgents, and if they have only intermittently achieved that objective it is largely the result of violent bickering among themselves on the one hand, and the presence of military forces of external origin - originally Russian, and now largely American - on the other hand, in support of their own favoured regime in Kabul. Hence whilst patches of Kabul - those within which members of what most Afghans regard as the occupying power have taken up residence - are relatively stable, the same cannot be said for the remainder of the country, or indeed the city. Given the weakness of the Afghan state - a historical no less than a contemporary phenomenon - members of every Afghan community routinely look towards their fellow members of their qaum (crudely their tribe) for succour and support, not least as a source of protection in the face of predatory initiatives by members of other rival qaum. In the midst of all this, members of Afghanistan's Sikh and Hindu population have behaved in just the same way; and to the extent that they virtually monopolised a narrow but essential niche in the socio-economically order which did not bring them into serious [competition] with any other qaum, they largely looked after themselves. However not only have four decades of insurgency swept away at all past compromises to one side, but the fact that mujahedeen (of all manner of stripes) have played a leading role in the whole process has left members of the Sikh and Hindu quam ever more exposed. In Afghanistan at least, they were never warriors; and now, in the eyes of the mujahedeen, as well as those affected by their ideology, members of this community are now regarded as kaffirs, unbelievers who have no legitimate place in the Afghan social code. From this perspective the processes which have rendered the position of Sikh communities in the more peripheral towns and cities in Afghanistan's periphery are no different from those at work in Kabul: Afghanistan is one country. Nevertheless that does not mean that there is absolutely nothing distinctive about the situation in Kabul. Precisely because Kabul has long been Afghanistan's commercial as well as its political capital, it has long played host to the largest Hindu and Sikh community in the country. And for just the same reason as the position of Sikhs in outlying towns and cities, as well as outlying parts of Kabul itself, became increasingly untenable, the community began to close ranks around, and seek shelter in, the Gurdwara in Kate Parwan [a district of Kabul located to the northwest of the city centre], which has long been the ultimate hub of the Sikh community in Afghanistan as a whole. However just because such a defensive concentration of numbers facilitated the articulation of the greater degree of mutual support, there was still a sure sense that the community was as vulnerable as ever, not least because its members still had to find a means of living and working in the midst of a wider social order whose members were becoming increasingly hostile to their very presence in their midst. Moreover even though they were gathering together in this way in the heart of the old city, the Karzai regime has had, and still has, many much more challenging issues that confront the difficulties encountered by members of this peripheral and still shrinking qaum. From this perspective on the situation in which members of this community find themselves in Kabul emerges as little different from that of those who once lived in Jalalabad. To be sure it is one which has lasted longer than those which were once to be found in almost all of Afghanistan's more peripheral cities and towns, but in the longer run it seems destined to be faced with the same fate: Afghanistan may be their land of ancestral origin, but recent developments have rendered further residence in their country of birth untenable.'

' Virtually all Sikh families in Afghanistan had businesses in the country and would have had little motivation to leave in the absence of a serious threat. Because the insurgency largely operates in rural areas, while Sikhs all live in towns and cities, they have not been threatened by the Taliban specifically after 2001; however as detailed in the report there are other very significant sources of threat. Relocation options for Sikhs are limited to the few remaining Sikh communities. Nobody apart from a Sikh trade or craftsmen would employ any of them and even that would be difficult as Sikhs would prioritise their own relatives for hiring.'

'9. The defencelessness of Sikhs and Hindus remains true even today as they do not enjoy protection from any of Afghanistan's various factions. They are also too small numerically to matter politically. Therefore, they can be targeted with impunity. Cases of kidnapping of Sikhs have still been occasionally reported after 2001. After 2001 the militias have mostly been incorporated in the police, while criminal gangs are also known to have setup an extortion ring which targets businesses. According to Sikh community leader Atwar Singh, in Kabul alone 250 houses belonging to Sikhs have been illegally occupied when the militia moved into the city at the end of 2001 and it has not been possible to reclaim them, due to the lack of co-operation of the police and the judiciary. At present there are only an estimated 50 Sikh/Hindu properties left in Kabul. Expropriation has almost stopped after 2001 because all the most valuable properties had already been taken away from Sikhs. The main controversy from 2001 onwards has been surrounding the seized properties and efforts by Sikhs and Hindus to recover them. The leader of the Kabul Sikh community wrote to President Karzai several times to ask for the return of seized properties. Although Karzai instructed the Ministry of the Interior to deal with the issue, as of 2007 little has moved on this front. Almost all these militia all were linked to groups like Jamiat-i-Islami, which is strong in the Ministry of Interior. Many shops have also been seized.' 10. There are plenty of criminal gangs in Afghanistan and the most active and famous among them operate in and around Kabul and have often been targeting Sikhs. The network of former militia commanders in control of Parwan is known as the '

'19. As mentioned above, as far as it has been possible to establish no crime committed against Sikhs by Muslim Afghans has been punished; Sikhs can report attacks to the police, but it is very rare for the police to follow them up. For example, the Sikh community complains about police indifference to a wave of crime attacks on Sikhs in Karte Parwan. The case of Rahim mentioned above is the only known exception, but the sentence against him was never implemented. As indicated above, however, no Sikh who tried to recover his property from the authorities has been successful. Despite the end of official persecution, therefore, within the state apparatus hostility to Sikhs and Hindus remains widespread. However, there are direct orders from the President of Afghanistan to protect Sikh funerals and the police have been implementing these orders. As a result of this the Sikh community praises the police for having escorted Sikh funerals in the face of protesting crowds. 20. Carrying long hair and turban in the Sikh fashion of course greatly facilitates identifying Sikhs and therefore exposes them to the hostility of elements of the population, such as Muslim zealots as discussed above. Because it is difficult to recognise Sikhs when they do not carry these distinctive features, it is not possible to estimate how many Sikhs do not dress according to their religious code.'

'35. There are no Sikh employed by the Afghan government at present. Because they are usually only educated to primary school level if at all, they are rarely in a position to apply for jobs in the bureaucracy anyway. There is no official discrimination against them, but hiring in the state apparatus in Afghanistan is driven by patronage and clientelism and lacking connections to power for politicians is probably the main obstacle for Sikhs. Typically Sikhs and Hindus in Afghanistan are self-employed, running their own family businesses. [The fourth appellant] would have to seek employment from another Hindu or Sikh business, but there are relatively few of them left and the owners will always prioritise their own relatives when hiring. It is unlikely that a Muslim business will hire a Sikh in any case. When that happens, they are usually employed servants and paid very low rates. A current estimate is that 20% of the economically active Hindu and Sikh population owns and operates its own shop (mostly grocery shops) and the remaining 80% holds menial jobs. Sikh women do not normally work in public places but rather at home, except in emergencies such as no other family member being able to attend the family shop. Very few Sikh women work outside their homes and usually these are the few who got educated. There is no discrimination against Sikhs in the health service, but should a Sikh need medical assistance, the services provided by the government are limited and not actually free; he would for example have to pay these medicines in most cases. For this reason many Sikhs are today unemployed. The government does not provide any unemployment benefit or assistance of other kind to the unemployed and under employed. For this reason relocation to a different town is very difficult; the Sikhs would need to acquire property there in order to start trading. Renting property is a risky option, as they would have most likely to rent from Muslims, who in turn could come under pressure by religious zealots, who could object to having Sikhs living among them.'

"The Sikh and Hindu communities, although allowed to practice their religion publicly, reportedly continue to face discrimination, including when seeking government jobs. They are also reported to suffer intimidation and harassment during major religious celebrations. Both communities report not being able to cremate their dead in accordance with their customs, due to interference by those who live near the cremation sites. Sikhs and Hindus have reportedly been victims of illegal occupation and seizure of their land, and have also reportedly been unable to regain access to property lost during the mujahideen era. The right to education for Hindu and Sikh children is reported to be severely compromised because of abuse, harassment and bullying by other students. Although reliable data about the size of the Sikh and Hindu communities in Afghanistan are not available, large numbers of Sikhs and Hindus are believed to have left Afghanistan as a result of the severe difficulties they faced. The small numbers of Sikhs and Hindus who remain in Afghanistan have reportedly been left even more vulnerable to abuse."

'3.15 Hindus and Sikhs 3.15.1 Hindus and Sikhs may seek asylum on the grounds that they face societal discrimination and harassment and that they cannot rely on the protection of the Afghan authorities. 3.15.2 Religious Overview: see 3.13.2 3.15.3 Demography : The US State Department in its International Religious Freedom 2012 Report for Afghanistan published 20 May 2013 states that ―Reliable data on religious demography is difficult to obtain because an official nationwide census has not been conducted in decades. Leaders of minority religious communities estimate there are 350 Sikh families and 30 Hindu families. The USSD Religious Freedom report for 2011, published July 2012, stated ― According to self-estimates by these communities, there are approximately 2,000 Sikhs and 100 Hindu believers. The Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) reported in July 2011 that ― Given its proximity to India, Afghanistan historically had substantial Hindu and Sikh minorities, estimated at 20,000 before the factional civil war in 1992-96, followed by Taleban rule under which they were subject to discrimination rules. With most community members long gone, the total number of Hindus and Sikhs in Afghanistan is now estimated at around 3,000. In the US International Religious Freedom Report for July to December 2010, published 13/09/2011 and in the 2010 report, published 17 November 2010 the number of Sikhs is quoted at 3,000 and Hindus at 100. The US 2009 International Religious Freedom report quotes figures of 4,900 Sikhs and 1,100 Hindus. 3.15.4 The Centre for Applied South Asian Studies (Casas) 2011 report ―History and Current Position of Afghanistan's Hindu and Sikh population quotes a UNHCR paper of June 2005 as estimating 600 Sikh and Hindu families (about 3,700 persons) living in Afghanistan with small but steady numbers returning, particularly from India. The majority lived in Kabul (185 families), Jalalabad (160 families) and Kunduz (100 families) with others in Ghazni, Kandahar and Khost. Previously there had been as many as 200,000 Sikhs and Hindus living in Afghanistan. In considering the data the author of the report states ― the only reliable observation that can be made about the current [2011] characteristics of Afghanistan's Sikh and Hindi minority is that it is now only a small fraction of its former size, and that as numbers shrink, it's remaining members are finding themselves ever more vulnerable to aggressive exploitation, against which they have no meaningful defence. Hence their exodus can only be expected to continue. 3.15.5 Treatment: Freedom of religion and the corollary right to manifest one's religion in private or public are guaranteed by the Afghan Constitution. The Constitution contains, however, a repugnancy provision stating that no law can be contrary to Islam and defers to Shari'a law for matters not explicitly stipulated therein. According to some reports, members of the Hindu and Sikh communities continue to face societal discrimination, harassment and, in some cases, violence at the hands of members of other religious groups. Freedom House in its 2013 Afghanistan report noted ― Religious freedom has improved since the fall of the Taliban government in late 2001, but is still hampered by violence and harassment aimed at religious minorities and reformist Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and Shiite Muslims - particularly those from the Hazara ethnic group - have also faced official obstacles and discrimination by the Sunni Muslim majority ― Sikhs and Hindus continued to face discrimination, reporting unequal access to government jobs and harassment in their schools, as well as verbal and physical abuse in public places. In August a Sikh community leader publicly requested assistance to relocate Sikhs outside the country. 3.15.6 Sikh and Hindu communities also experience problems with land confiscation by local authorities and commanders, as well as obtaining land for cremation. Although Hindus and Sikhs had recourse to dispute resolution mechanisms such as the Special Land and Property Court, in practice the communities felt unprotected. 3.15.7 At least two Sikhs served in government positions, including one as a senior economic advisor to President Karzai and one as a presidentially appointed member of the upper house of parliament. Sikh leaders complained that they lacked political representation, noting that most Afghans fail to distinguish between Hindus and Sikhs despite significant religious differences. They also continued to complain about a lack of guaranteed seats in parliament. There are schools for Sikh children in Ghazni, Helmand, and Kabul. There are no Sikh schools in Jalalabad, despite estimates that nearly one-quarter of the Sikh population lives there. The government provides limited funding for Sikh schools, including for teachers for the basic curriculum. A few Sikh children attend private international schools. Hindus do not have separate schools, but sometimes send their children to Sikh schools . 3.15.8 The US Commission on International Religious Freedom Annual Report 2012 notes - In January, media reported on the case of Baljit Singh, a 23 year-old Sikh. Detained in 2010 on charges of falsely claiming Afghan citizenship after the United Kingdom deported him, Singh was in detention for over 19 months until being released on February 1. Singh alleged that during his detention, fellow prisoners and prison guards beat him on multiple occasions, insulted him, and forced him to remove his turban. Singh also alleged that he was deceived into converting to Islam while in prison; officials recorded and later broadcast his conversion on Tolo television. Officials from the attorney general's office disputed the claims of mistreatment and told media that non-Muslim prisoners routinely converted to Islam in the belief they would receive more lenient treatment. Singh was granted asylum and returned to the United Kingdom in July. The Guardian newspaper of 3 July 2012 reported ― Singh said he was being harassed for his religion and pressured to convert. He was verbally and physically abused in prison. One inmate threw boiling water over him, Singh said, pulling out a picture of his bandaged face shortly after the assault. He was also ordered to sleep in a corner of an outdoor courtyard, next to the toilet, he said. Men had to step over him on their way to relieve themselves, and as they did so, some kicked the turban that marked him out as a Sikh. Singh said the conversion angered the country's already beleaguered Sikh community, which has dwindled from thousands of families to just a few hundred over 30 years of war and persecution . See also: Actors of protection (section 2.2 above) Internal relocation (section 2.3 above) Caselaw (section 2.4 above) 3.15.9 Conclusion . Data on religious demography is not reliable as the Afghan Government does not collect such information. Given the disparity of data in public sources, all that can be said with certainty is that the Sikh / Hindu community has significantly reduced from its peak in the pre Taliban era. In view of the importance in Afghanistan of the extended family and community structure, caseworkers need to consider whether adequate support for their needs is likely to be available to an individual returnee. 3.15.10 Whilst there is no evidence that Sikhs or Hindus are at real risk of persecution at the hands of the Afghan authorities solely because of their ethnicity, nor are there indicators of a Government able to provide effective protection to the Sikh/Hindu community. Sikhs and Hindus can be subject to societal harassment and discrimination. Where an applicant claims that they have suffered harassment and discrimination in the past, then careful consideration should be given as to whether their situation meets the threshold for granting protection. 3.15.11 If a Sikh or Hindu man or married woman does establish that they would on return face a localised risk amounting to persecution, it might be possible for them to avoid such treatment by internal relocation to an area where well-established and close knit Sikh and Hindu communities remain. Where internal relocation would avoid persecution and would be reasonable, a grant of asylum will not be appropriate. However see note 3.15.9 above. 3.15.12 Single Sikh and Hindu women and female heads of household without a male support network cannot reasonably relocate within Afghanistan. Therefore, if they would face ill-treatment which amounts to persecution they should be granted asylum unless there are clear case-specific reasons not to do so.'

'36. The figures provided in the letter concerning the size of the Sikh and Hindu community are similar to those discussed in para. 4 of this report. The number of Sikh and Hindu temples is stated as 64, but this figure also included a majority of interactive temples, which have been damaged during succession of wars in the 1980s and 1990s and never repaired. According to the letter, some Sikhs have been able to reclaim their properties after 2001, but the three senior members of the community interviewed for this report have all indicated that they were not aware of any successful case of properties having been recovered. The decree of President Karzai, which was meant to give Sikhs and Hindus a reserved seat in Parliament, has been rejected by the parliament and therefore the information contained in the letter is not up to date. In other regards the content of the letter coincides with the content of this report.'

'(i) The Secretary of State will not make: (a) a grant of asylum if in part of the country of origin a person would not have a well founded fear of being persecuted, and the person can reasonably be expected to stay in that part of the country; or (b) a grant of humanitarian protection if in part of the country of return a person would not face a real risk of suffering serious harm, and the person can reasonably be expected to stay in that part of the country. (ii) In examining whether a part of the country of origin or country of return meets the requirements in (i) the Secretary of State, when making his decision on whether to grant asylum or humanitarian protection, will have regard to the general circumstances prevailing in that part of the country and to the personal circumstances of the person. (iii)(i) applies notwithstanding technical obstacles to return to the country of origin or country of return.'

'Yet some people still have fond memories of a time when Muslims and Hindu communities lived peacefully together. "We shared our happiness and grief" said Badshah, a Muslim shopkeeper in the town of Khost. "When we go to India now, we stay in their homes. They are proud Afghans. They are hospitable. They worked alongside us to address problems. I miss them." Samiterai, a Hindu from Khost currently living in Kabul, said "we were so friendly with our Muslim brothers that we never even thought about who we were or who they were. We were all the same, Afghans.'

' Article 9 Acts of persecution 1. Acts of persecution within the meaning of article 1 A of the Geneva Convention must: (a) be sufficiently serious by their nature or repetition as to constitute a severe violation of basis human rights, in particular the rights from which derogation cannot be made under Article 15(2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; or (b) be an accumulation of various measures, including violations of human rights which is sufficiently severe as to affect an individual in a similar manner as mentioned in (a) 2. Acts of persecution as qualified in paragraph 1, can, inter alia, take the form of: (a) acts of physical or mental violence, including acts of sexual violence; (b) legal, administrative, police, and/or judicial measures which are in themselves discriminatory or which are implemented in a discriminatory manner ; (c) prosecution or punishment, which is disproportionate or discriminatory; (d) denial of judicial redress resulting in a disproportionate or discriminatory punishment; (e) prosecution or punishment for refusal to perform military service in a conflict, where performing military service would include crimes or acts falling under the exclusion clauses as set out in Article 12(2); (f) acts of a gender-specific or child-specific nature; 3. In accordance with Article 2(c), there must be a connection between the reasons mentioned in Article 10 and the acts of persecution as qualified in paragraph 1.'

' Depending on the particular circumstances of the case, UNHCR considers that children falling under the following categories may be in need of international refugee protection: a) Children from areas where either AGEs or elements of the ANSF use underage recruitment; b) Children from social milieus where bonded or hazardous child labour is practised; c) Victims of violence against children, including sexual and gender-based violence, as well as children from social milieus where such violence is practised; and d) School-age children, particularly girls. Depending on the individual circumstances of the case, they may be in need of international protection on the ground of their membership of a particular social group, their religion and/or their (imputed) political opinion. Asylum claims made by children, including any examination of exclusion considerations for former child soldiers, need to be assessed carefully and in accordance with the UNHCR Guidelines on child asylum claims.'

'Despite the bleak prospects that faced Sikhs and Hindus in Afghanistan, a handful of these minorities have endured three decades of conflict to stay in their home country, having forged relationships with Muslims that eclipsed religious persecution. One Sikh family lives quietly in a fortress like home with high in mud walls on the outskirts of Kabul. Guarding it is a Muslim family headed by [....] who has served as chief custodian of their property and 24 hectares of farmland for 17 years. The Muslim family is left in charge when the Sikh family moves to India during the Afghan winter months. A large man with a bushy beard, [...] said that in his employers absence, he had warded off bribes and intimidation by local Mafia groups attempting to take over the land. "We have a special bond of trust between us. I would never work for anyone else" he said.'

' The ministry of Migration and Repatriation Affairs of Afghanistan has decided to reconsider the terms of the existing Memorandum of Understandings' through diplomatic channels and requested partner countries to suspend deportation of Afghan Migrants until decided otherwise, where the Ministry can provide the necessary services to returning Afghans. Until that time the Ministry cannot accept responsibility regarding any Afghan Deportee.'

'...the correct approach when considering the reasonableness of [internal relocation alternative] is to assess all the circumstances of the individual's case holistically and with specific reference to the individual's personal circumstances (including past persecution or fear thereof, psychological and health condition, family and social situation, and survival capacities). This assessment is to be made in the context of the conditions in the place of relocation (including basic human rights, security conditions, socio-economic conditions, accommodation, access to health care facilities) in order to determine the impact on that individual of settling in the proposed place of relocation and whether the individual could lead a relatively normal life without undue hardship.'

'35. I have tried to consider the issue of credibility in the round. I have considered all the factors raised in the preceding paragraphs. When considered together they do fundamentally undermine the credibility of the appellant's account. The issues raised are not peripheral but go to the core of the appellant's account. I find that the appellant is not a credible witness and I find his account of events that occurred to be a fabrication. As such I reject each and every aspect of the appellants claim other than the fact that he is from Afghanistan and may be of the Sikh faith. As such I do not accept that he is at risk from Mr Aziz or from any friends or associates of his. I reject the claimed threat in its entirety.'

"The appellant is a Sikh and had been working in his father's textile shop in Jalalabad. He and his family had long experience of harassment, beatings and discrimination at the hands of the majority population in Jalalabad but the situation markedly deteriorated around ten years ago when the appellant's father was killed in a sectarian attack. The appellant himself was subsequently abducted by the Taliban and only returned to the family after his brother had paid a substantial ransom. In 2006 the appellant and his family came under pressure from a local Muslim who wished to marry the appellant's daughter. They received death threats and decided to sell the family shop and leave Afghanistan."