“(2) The Secretary of State may by order deprive a person of citizenship status if the Secretary of State is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good. (3) … (4) The Secretary of State may not make an order under subsection (2) if he is satisfied that the order would make a person stateless. (5) Before making an order under this section in respect of a person the Secretary of State must give the person written notice specifying – (a) that the Secretary of State has decided to make the order, (b) the reasons for the order, and (c) the person’s right of appeal under section 40(A)1 or undersection 2B of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (c. 68).”
“(1) When exercising its functions, the Commission shall secure that information is not disclosed contrary to the interests of national security, the international relations of the United Kingdom, the detection and prevention of crime, or in any other circumstances where disclosure is likely to harm the public interest. (2) Where these rules require information not to be disclosed contrary to the public interest, that requirement is to be interpreted in accordance with paragraph (1). (3) Subject to paragraphs (1) and (2), the Commission must satisfy itself that the material available to it enables it properly to determine the proceedings.”
“The proviso that due regard must be had to European Union law does not compromise the principle of international law previously recognised by the court … that the member states have the power to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality, but rather enshrines the principle that, in respect of citizens of the Union, the exercise of that power, in so far as it affects the rights conferred and protected by the legal order of the Union, as is in particular the case of a decision withdrawing naturalisation such as that in issue in the main proceedings, is amenable to judicial review carried out in the light of European Union law.”
“37. I have with great respect found some difficulties with the reasoning in the Rottmann case. On the one hand there are passages which appear to suggest that national courts must "have due regard to European Union law" in adjudicating upon a question of deprivation of citizenship (because that entails the deprivation of EU citizenship) even where there is no cross-border element in the case: … But there are also elements suggesting that the particular history – the applicant's having lost his Austrian nationality upon moving to Germany and seeking naturalisation there – informed the court's reasoning, notably at para 42 … 38. Moreover this uncertainty as to the decision's scope betrays, to my mind, a deeper difficulty, which may be explained as follows. The distribution of national citizenship is not within the competence of the European Union. So much is acknowledged in the Rottmann case itself (para 39, cited by Advocate General Sharpston in her Opinion in the Zambrano case[2012] QB 265 , para 94), as is "the principle of international law... that the Member States have the power to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality": the Rottmann case para 48. Upon what principled basis, therefore, should the grant or withdrawal of State citizenship be qualified by an obligation to "have due regard" to the law of the European Union? It must somehow depend upon the fact that since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 EU citizenship has been an incident of national citizenship, and "citizenship of the Union is intended to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States": see Rottmann para 43, and cases there cited). 39. But this is surely problematic. EU citizenship has been attached by Treaty to citizenship of the Member State. It is wholly parasitic upon the latter. I do not see how this legislative circumstance can of itself allocate the grant or withdrawal of State citizenship to the competence of the Union or subject it to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. Article 17(2) of the EC Treaty ("Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby"), referred to in the Rottmann case, at para 44, does not purport to have any such consequence. A generalised aspiration to the enjoyment of a "fundamental status" can surely carry the matter no further. In the result I am none the wiser as to the juridical basis of an obligation to "have due regard" to the law of the European Union in matters of national citizenship. 40. Nor is it clear what is meant by such an obligation, or by the proposition that decisions as to the loss or acquisition of citizenship are "amenable to judicial review carried out in the light of European Union law": the Rottmann case, para 48. Some passages … suggest that the court has in mind, primarily at least, only the application of general principles: proportionality and the avoidance of arbitrary decision-making. But if that is right, I apprehend it would not be enough for Mr Southey. His argument was grounded on provisions of black-letter EU law: TFEU Article 18, Article 21 of the Charter, and Article 31(4) of the Citizens Directive. 41. In these circumstances I consider with respect that Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern (Case C-135/08 )[2010] QB 761 has to be read and applied with a degree of caution. It cannot in my judgment be applied so as to require that in a case such as this the adjudication of a decision to deprive an individual of citizenship must be conducted subject to any rules of law of the European Union. On the facts, as Mr Eicke submitted, there is no cross-border element whatever. There has been no actual, attempted or purported exercise of any right conferred by EU law. From first to last this is a domestic case. Quite aside from the difficulties as to the scope of EU competences, see McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Case C-434/09 ) [2011] All ER (EC) 719, para 45: "it is settled case-law that the Treaty rules governing freedom of movement for persons and the measures adopted to implement them cannot be applied to situations which have no factor linking them with any of the situations governed by European Union law and which are confined in all relevant respects within a single Member State..." 42. For all these reasons the Rottmann case cannot in my judgment be read as importing any part of Mr Southey's panoply of black-letter EU law into the process of the appellant's appeal under s.40A. The effectiveness of the appellant's available remedies is given by the standards of the common law. Those standards, to be found in the principles of our public law, are well apt to vindicate "the general principle of international law that no one is arbitrarily to be deprived of his nationality": see the Rottmann case para 53. 43. There is a further dimension to which I ought to refer. The conditions on which national citizenship is conferred, withheld or revoked are integral to the identity of the nation State. They touch the constitution; for they identify the constitution's participants. If it appeared that the Court of Justice had sought to be the judge of any procedural conditions governing such matters, so that its ruling was to apply in a case with no cross-border element, then in my judgment a question would arise whether theEuropean Communities Act 1972 or any successor statute had conferred any authority on the Court of Justice to exercise such a jurisdiction. We have not heard argument as to the construction of the Acts of Parliament which have given the Court powers to modify the laws of the United Kingdom. Plainly we should not begin to enter upon such a question without doing so. That in my judgment is the course we should have to adopt if we considered that the Court of Justice, in the Rottmann case or elsewhere, had held that the law of the European Union obtrudes in any way upon our national law relating to the deprivation of citizenship in circumstances such as those of the present case. But I do not think it has. 44. For the reasons I have given the law of the EU cannot, in my judgment, assist Mr Southey.”
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.”
“52. Therefore, the interpretation of articles 30(2) and 31 of Directive 2004/38, read in the light of article 47 of the Charter, cannot have the effect of failing to meet the level of protection that is guaranteed in the manner described in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment.”
“57. However, if, in exceptional cases, a national authority opposes precise and full disclosure to the person concerned of the grounds which constitute the basis of a decision … by invoking state security, the court with jurisdiction in the member state concerned must have at its disposal and apply techniques and rules of procedural law which accommodate, on the one hand, legitimate state security considerations regarding the nature and sources of the information taken into account in the adoption of such a decision and, on the other, the need to ensure sufficient compliance with the person’s procedural rights, such as the right to be heard and the adversarial principle.”
“64. …If it turns out that state security does stand in the way of disclosure of the grounds to the person concerned, judicial review, as provided for in article 31(1) of Directive 2004/38, of the legality of a decision taken under article 27 thereof must, having regard to what has been stated in paras 51, 52 and 57 above, be carried out in a procedure which strikes an appropriate balance between the requirements flowing from state security and the requirements of the right to effective judicial protection whilst limiting any interference with the exercise of that right to that which is strictly necessary. 65. In this connection, first, in the light of the need to comply with article 47 of the Charter, that procedure must ensure, to the greatest possible extent, that the adversarial principle is complied with, in order to enable the person concerned to contest the grounds on which the decision in question is based and to make submissions on the evidence relating to the decision and, therefore, to put forward an effective defence. In particular, the person concerned must be informed, in any event, of the essence of the grounds on which a decision refusing entry … is based, as the necessary protection of state security cannot have the effect of denying the person concerned the right to be heard and, therefore, of rendering the right of redress as provided for by article 1 of that Directive ineffective. 66. Second, in weighing up the right to effective judicial protection against the necessity to protect the security of the member state concerned – on which the conclusion set out in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment is founded – is not applicable in the same way to the evidence underlying the grounds that is adduced before the national court with jurisdiction. In certain cases, disclosure of that evidence is liable to compromise state security in a direct and specific manner, in that it may, in particular, endanger the life health or freedom of persons or reveal the methods of investigation specifically used by the national security authorities and thus seriously impede, or event prevent, future performance of the tasks of the authorities. 67. In that context, the national court with jurisdiction has the task of assessing whether and to what extent the restrictions on the rights of the defence arising in particular from a failure to disclose the evidence and the precise and full grounds on which the decision taken … is based are such as to affect the evidential value of the confidential evidence. 68. Accordingly, it is incumbent on the national court with jurisdiction, first, to ensure that the person concerned is informed of the essence of the grounds which constitute the basis of the decision in question in a manner which takes due account of the necessary confidentiality of the evidence, and, second, to draw, pursuant to national law, the appropriate conclusions from any failure to comply with that obligation to inform him. 69. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred is that articles 30(2) and 31 of Directive 2004/38, read in the light of article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as requiring the national court with jurisdiction to ensure that failure by the competent national authority to disclose to the person concerned, precisely and in full, the grounds on which a decision taken under 27 of that Directive is based and to disclose the related evidence to him is limited to that which is strictly necessary, and that he is informed, in any event, of the essence of those grounds in a manner which takes account of the necessary confidentiality of the evidence.”
“Specifically the Security Service assesses that: a) They have sought to provide LeT with financial support whilst based in the UK; b) They have maintained contact with LeT members and other extremist associates including those linked to AQ; c) They may have undertaken terrorist training; d) T1 and U1 have expressed extremist views; e) [All four] are committed Islamist extremists whose fundamentalist views and ideology range wider than LeT’s traditional and primary focus of Kashmir. The Security Service assesses that [S1, T1, U1 and V1] have engaged in and supported terrorist related activity.”
“[S1, T1, U1 and V1] are members of LeT, a proscribed organisation in the UK, and have been involved in support for LeT for several years both in the UK and whilst residing in Pakistan. Their activities have included the raising of funds in the UK in support of LeT. The Security service assesses that were [they] to return to the UK they would pose a significant threat to national security.”
“I really do not know what to do. I do not want A to continue to suffer, but I also do not want my family to continue to be split up. I hope they will be allowed to return to fight the case and I can come back at the same time with A [and my daughter].”
“12. It is common ground and obvious that national security is a vital public interest. It is the only interest with which we are concerned or, in future cases, likely to be concerned. No good purpose would be served by our attempting to define a test applicable to other circumstances.”
“But for the conclusion which we have reached about the threat to national security posed by S1, those circumstances would have given rise to difficult questions underArticle 8 ECHR and Chapter VI of [the 2004 Directive]. It is unnecessary for us to set out and analyse the conclusions which we would have reached on those issue, because Miss Harrison accepts that if the United Kingdom was entitled to deprive S1 of British citizenship because he posed a threat to national security, the unavoidable incidental impact upon the rights of his wife and youngest son would be justifiable underArticle 8 ECHR , as an interference necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security; and under, or by analogy with, Article 28(3) of the Directive, as a decision based on imperative grounds of public security. We are satisfied that her concession was properly made and have acted upon it.”
“42. … article 20 FEU …precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the European Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the European Union … 43. A refusal to grant a right of residence to a third country national with dependent minor children in the member state where those children are nationals and reside … has such an effect. 44. It must be assumed that such a refusal would lead to a situation where those children, citizens of the European Union, would have to leave the territory of the European Union in order to accompany their parents. … 45. Accordingly, the answer to the questions referred is that article 20FEU … is to be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a member state from refusing a third country national on whom his minor children, who are European union citizens, are dependent, a right of residence in a member state of residence and nationality of those children ... in so far as such decisions deprive those children of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights attaching to the status of European Union citizen.”
“68. Consequently, the mere fact that it might appear desirable to a national of a member state, for economic reasons or in order to keep his family together in the territory of the Union, for the members of his family who do not have the nationality of a Member State to be able to reside with him in the territory of the Union, is not sufficient in itself to support the view that the Union citizen will be forced to leave Union territory if such a right is not granted.”
“If they were to refute the national security allegations and give a full account of their actions, the Security Service assesses that this would not put their safety at risk. The statements could carry the same anonymity as the Security Service statement and they would not, with a bare denial, be raising any new aspects to the case that may potentially raise their profile with the Pakistani authorities. The Security Service considers it telling that that the appellants have refused to refute the case against then on even the simplest terms. Furthermore, the Security Service assesses that even if the appellants gave a full response this would not put their safety at risk.”
“(i) Whether the respondent, in depriving the appellants of their British citizenship whilst they were out of the jurisdiction by service of deprivation orders and/or in refusing to facilitate their return and entry to the UK, pending the appeal, has acted unlawfully on the basis that it is: a) contrary to the statutory provisions and purpose in particular section 40A(3)(a); and/or b) procedurally unfair at common law and/or underArticle 8 ECHR because the appellants are deprived of a fair hearing and/or effective remedy under community law; and/or (c) is an abuse of process; (ii) If contrary to the above the statutory provisions do permit a British citizen to be deprived of their legal status in the UK pending appeal and notwithstanding the right to an in-country appeal, the question arises as to whether this constitutes unlawful discrimination by reason of nationality contrary to the right to equal treatment in community law (Article 12 TFEU) and/or Article 8 and 14 of the ECHR; (iii) Whether the notice of the decision was invalid given that it did not inform the appellants of their in-country right of appeal and/or it was served on an address in the UK despite the known whereabouts of the appellants (any or all of them) in Pakistan; (iv) Whether, for any of the reasons set out above, the respondent should now be directed to withdraw the decision to make the deprivation order and/or the orders depriving the appellants of their British citizenship thereby allowing the appellants to return to the United Kingdom forthwith pending the appeal process and for the purposes of preparing, presenting and being present at their appeals.”
“None of these questions can be determined without a hearing at which the various propositions would be tested. How is that hearing to occur? Would the appellants be permitted to return to conduct it and to participate in it in the United Kingdom? The proposition creates an unbreakable circle or procedural maze through which there is no path or exit.”
“It follows that the appellant’s case must inhere in the proposition that the Secretary of State’s actions have frustrated the policy or purpose of the measures conferring the right of appeal. Such a case would certainly be made out if it were shown that the Secretary of State had acted so as to deprive the appellant of an in-country appeal for reasons of tactical advantage in the appeal process. That would be an improper motive, and the illegality of such a motive in the context of statutory decision making by a public body needs no authority ... But that is not the factual position here.”
“23. Might the dictates of procedural fairness nevertheless generate a right to be present in the circumstances of this type of appeal, or indeed this particular appeal? … [S]ection 92(1) of the 2002 Act indicates a view on the part of legislature that out-of country-appeals to the First-tier Tribunal are in principle neither unfair nor ineffective and while, as I have also accepted, the common law will supply the want of the legislature where a statutory scheme lacks fair procedure, it is also the case that the requirements of fairness are shaped by the statute in question.”
“10. The live question is whether the claimant can travel to a safe third country. … If there is a legal principle which requires that the claimant can give evidence in a manner which permits SIAC to observe him which, for the reasons expressed above, I doubt, it must, as a matter of principle, be for the claimant to demonstrate that that course is not open to him. The material which he has deployed is, at best, equivocal. On balance it seems that he can obtain a Sudanese passport. … 11. … the step which the claimant suggests is required of the Secretary of State would, if he were found to pose a threat to national security, frustrate a decision which would, by then, have been established to be lawful and justified. In my judgment the Secretary of State cannot be criticised for refusing to take a step which would, in all probability, have the effect of frustrating an decision which, if upheld on appeal, would have been lawfully and properly taken in the interests if national security.”
“… even if the Secretary of State had never made the exclusion decision the appellant would be outside the United Kingdom with no realistic prospect of obtaining an entry clearance to return, his case must be that the Secretary of State is required (under this ground by reference to the dictates of procedural fairness or the right to an effective remedy) to facilitate his return, outside the immigration rules, to conduct his appeal.”
“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in section 1 of this Convention.”
“A state’s jurisdictional competence under article 1 is primarily territorial. Jurisdiction is presumed to be exercised normally throughout the state’s territory. Conversely, acts of the contracting states performed, or producing effects, outside their territories can constitute an exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of article 1 only in exceptional circumstances.”
“26. Moreover, and contrary to the applicant’s submission, there is no principled reason to distinguish, on the one hand, someone who was in the jurisdiction of the Contracting State but voluntarily left that jurisdiction and, on the other, someone who was never in the jurisdiction of that State. Nor is there any support in the Court’s case-law for the applicant’s argument that the State’s obligations under Article 3 require it to take this article into account when making adverse decisions against individuals, even when those individuals are not within the jurisdiction.”
“The transportation of that limited Article 8 obligation to Article 3 would, in effect, create an unlimited obligation on Contacting States to allow entry to an individual who might be at real risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3, regardless of where in the world that individual might find himself.”
“26. The United Kingdom’s diplomatic and consular agents in Indonesia have of course been active in relation to Mrs Sandiford’s predicament … But their support for her and their activity in this regard have hitherto excluded any involvement in instructing or funding lawyers on her behalf. A deliberate refusal to instruct or fund lawyers on behalf of Mrs Sandiford cannot constitute an exercise of authority or control over her. It is the opposite – a decision not to undertake or exercise any relevant authority or control.”
“For the reasons set out in the closed and confidential judgments, we are satisfied that, if the United Kingdom owed to the appellants, when making and implementing the deprivation decision, duties under articles 2 and 3 ECHR, it did not breach them.”