“ 51. My finding as to Mr De Winter’s involvement in Rangemoor are these. On23 March 2000 (during the working day) Mr Young and Mr Broad went down to Mr De Winter’s business premises in London. They discussed the Rangemoor project. Mr De Winter was to buy the land, Homes would do the development – an evolution of the arrangement that Mr De Winter had with Mr Broad. Mr Young and Mr Broad had prepared documents headed “brief appraisal” setting out the costings and likely profit, showing a margin of 24%. They had also prepared a cash flow projection and the schedule setting out all legitimate charges and expenses. They took with them plans that had been prepared for the development. There were detailed discussions. Following that, on4 April 2000 , Mr De Winter had sent a fax to Mr Young and Mr Broad outlining the risks involved. I regard it as probable that there were then further detailed discussions. On18 May 2000 Mr De Winter sent a detailed letter containing a detailed funding proposal. This gave Mr De Winter 11% interest on his investment, plus the first£225,000 of any profit, plus 50% of the profits over£450,000 . Mr Young and Mr Broad agreed these terms (though at trial neither was very clear what they had let themselves in for). Mr Young, Mr Broad and Mr De Winter all said that there was not really anything else in the way of documents on the Rangemoor development, and that the matter proceeded on the basis of an exceptional level of trust. But I do not consider that I was told the whole truth, and I find that the probability is that there was some written record of the course of the dealings between Mr De Winter and Homes. There are two bases for that finding. First, the probability is that there was a detailed written record of how much was drawn, and when, and for what (since otherwise Mr De Winter’s profit share could not be calculated). Second, an entry in Mr Broad’s diary referring to a letter to Mr De Winter led to the production (in the course of the trial) of such a letter. It did not match up to the diary entry. But it demonstrated a degree of formality in the relationship, the exchange of financial documents, and the copying of solicitors’ correspondence. I therefore find that the arrangement between Mr Young and Mr Broad on the one side and Mr De Winter on the other, whilst in some respects informal, was an arm’s length business relationship, the terms of which were formally recorded and the course of which was charted in correspondence and financial documents. It was supplemented by meetings (three or four of which took place at Mainstream’s offices) and site visits by Mr De Winter, and by regular telephone calls at the end of each month (when the “draw down” against the schedule expenditure would be considered). ” 52. Mr De Winter told me in his evidence what he knew of the circumstances in which the Rangemoor arrangements were made. He told that he knew Mr Broad was Development Director of Mainstream, that he knew Mr Young was a Director of Mainstream, and that Mr Moriarty was the Senior (probably Managing) Director. He was aware that Mainstream bought development sites. He agreed that there was an obvious conflict between Mr Broad and Mr Young acting for Mainstream and in their acting for themselves in the Rangemoor development: and that he certainly realised this. However, he understood that the Rangemoor development had been turned down by Mainstream, and on that basis he proceeded with his relationship with Mr Young and Mr Broad. In his witness statement of May 2003 (though not in either his August or September 2002 witness statements) Mr De Winter said: “I wish to make it clear that I specifically said to Mr Broad that I would only agree to fund the project provided that there was no conflict of interest with regard to his and Mr Young’s employment at [Mainstream]. Mr Broad confirmed to me that there was no question of a conflict of interest and I trusted his reply and was therefore happy to proceed.”
“I would use the expression “conflict of interest” from time to time. I would not take something from somebody whose right it was. I wanted them to be free to do something with me: and to be sure that they had the capability. If I had to share men it would inhibit their work and mine.”
“Good faith as such is no defence if knowledge and intention are proved [Pritchard v Briggs, Greig v Insole]. If thedefendant is in “honest doubt”, he may escape liability, but only where that doubt goes over to the existence of the contract, not to “the legal result of known facts”. [Solihull v NUT, Pritcharrd v Briggs and other authorities]”
“Inferred intention. Intention imports no desire to injure but it is sufficient that there is deliberate conduct by a defendant who appreciates, or is sufficiently reckless in regard to, the probable consequences on the plaintiff. Where knowledge of the existence of a contract is proved on the part of a defendant who induces one party to break it, his intention to do damage to the other party is readily inferred. Belief that the contracts are not enforceable or, a fortiori, indifference whether breach will be caused by the inducement does not excuse the defendant. It has therefore become very difficult to escape liability on the ground that knowledge or intention are absent, if the action of the defendant could be expected to induce a breach of a contract of which he is or must be or can easily be made aware, for example where he interferes with business relationships.”
“[38] In order to find liability [for inference with contractual relations], a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant had an “intent” to induce the breach of contract. The intent component of the tort is the most difficult to understand. Malicious motive, unlawful conduct, hatred or intention to harm are not required elements of intent: Allen v Flood, [1898] A.C.1 9H.L.(E,));Parks West Mall Ltd v Jennett (1996), 36 Alta.L.R. (3d) 44 (C.A.) at 49; and Atcheson v College of Physicians and Surgeons (Alberta), [1994] 6 W.W.R. 239 (Alta.Q.B) at 246. However, what is required is less clear. The requisite intent has been described with “loose, vague and conflicting statements” that sometime appear to be irreconcilable: Ed Miller Sales, supra, at 230. [39] Originally, the tort required the breach to be the result of wilful, deliberate and direct conduct which the defendant knew or hoped would result in a violation of the plaintiff’s contractual rights. See for example, Lumley v Gye (1853), 118 E.R. 749, 2 El. & B1.216 (Q.B); and Quinn v Leathem, [1901] A.C.495 (H.L.(I.)). [40] However, courts soon recognized that intent can also be inferred when the consequences of the conduct were a necessary or reasonable foreseeable result, because “people are presumed to intend the reasonable consequences of their acts”: South Wales Miners’ Federation v Glamorgan Coal Company, [1905]A.C.239 (H.L.(E.)) at 244. In Posluns v Toronto Stock Exchange and Gardiner (1965), 46 D.L.R. (2d) 210 (Ont. H.C) at 267; affirmed (1966), 53 D.L.R (2d) 193 (C.A.); affirmed [1968] S.C.R. 330, 67 D.L.R. (2d) 165, the court held that liability would attach if the defendant’s conduct resulted in the breach of a contract “of which it was or ought to have been aware”
“a) an intention to cause economic harm to the claimant as an end in itself; b) an intention to cause economic harm to the claimant because it is a necessary means of achieving some ulterior motive; c) knowledge that the course of conduct undertaken will have the inevitable consequence of causing the claimant economic harm; d) knowledge that the course of conduct will probably cause the claimant economic harm; e) knowledge that the course of conduct undertaken may cause the claimant economic harm coupled with reckless indifference as to whether it does or not. A course of conduct undertaken with an intention that satisfies test a) or b) can be said to be ‘aimed’, ‘directed’, or ‘targeted’ at the claimant. Causing the claimant economic harm will be a specific object of the conduct in question. A course of conduct which only satisfies test c) cannot of itself be said to be so aimed, directed or targeted, because the economic harm, although inevitable, will be no more than an incidental consequence, at least from the defendant’s perspective. Nonetheless, the fact that the economic harm is inevitable (or even probable) may well be evidence to support a contention that test b), or even test a), is satisfied.”
“Admittedly it was a striking-out action, but what nonsense that it should go to trial, that Miss Bassey should have to defend herself against five people she had never contracted with and did not aim to harm just because she changed her mind about making a recording. Must I perform my contract with you just because a third party may, to my knowledge, suffer if I don’t? Suppose that I agree to buy goods from you knowing that if the sale goes through, your agent will received a hefty commission: am I liable to him for refusing to accept delivery? In such a case there is only one third party: in Millar v Bassey the defendant looked to be liable to a whole orchestra plus the electronic bank. Dear me! Privity come back! – almost all is forgiven. It is easy to see how wrong this decision is, and we shall see later how it came to be possible.” [220] Other commentators have expressed similar, although more moderate, views. We consider that the conclusions of Peter Gibson LJ are to be preferred to those of Beldam LJ. It is often the case that failure to perform one contract will lead to a series of consequent breaches of contracts to which the original contract breaker is not party. To render him liable for these breaches simply because they are consequences which he foresaw would be to undermine the doctrine of privity of contract. [221] Professor Weir and most other writers, including Hazel Carty and Messrs Sales and Stilitz, are of the view that the gist of all the economic torts is the intentional infliction of economic harm. We consider that this is a fair and satisfactory conclusion to draw from the authorities, difficult as some of these are to reconcile. Intention to inflict harm on a claimant is not the same as a wish to harm him. It is, however, very different from knowledge that economic harm will follow as a result of incidental consequences of conduct, when those consequences are not necessary steps in achieving the object of the conduct and are unsought. [222] Three Rivers establishes that foresight of probable injury or subjective recklessness as to whether such injury is caused is the mental element required in relation to the consequences of abuse of power, if the cause of action of misfeasance in public office is to be made out. This is a developing tort, as is the tort of unlawful interference. Is there a case for equating the mental element in the two torts? The House of Lords did not so suggest in Three Rivers, and Clarke J, who sat at first instance in Three Rivers, did not consider that there was – see at[1996] 3 All ER 558 at p 583. We do not consider that there is. The gist of the tort of misfeasance in public office is the deliberate abuse of power. The mental element in the first form of the tort, namely targeted malice, bears strong echoes of the mental element required for unlawful interference, particularly in the early days of the development of that tort. The same is not true of the alternative requirements of foresight of consequences or subjective recklessness. These are not the gist of the tort; they are closer to control mechanisms limiting the liability that flows from the wrongful conduct. [223] The gist of the tort of unlawful interference is the intentional infliction of economic harm. In other words, it must be shown that the object or purpose of the defendant is to inflict harm on the claimant, either as an end in itself, or as a means to another end. If foresight of probable consequences or subjective recklessness sufficed as the mental element of the tort, this would transform the nature of the tort. This, in effect, is what Mr Browne sought to persuade us to do when he advanced tests d) and e) as sufficient to satisfy the mental element in the tort of unlawful interference. Indeed, we take the view that satisfaction of test c) would not be sufficient to establish the requisite mental element. However, as mentioned in paragraph 159 above, establishing that the defendant knew that the claimant would suffer economic loss may well be evidence which can support a contention that test b) or even test a) is satisfied. [224] It might be possible to envisage a case in which an intention satisfying test a) or b) could be established even though the unlawful act was not aimed, targeted or directed at the claimant. Equally it might be possible to envisage a case in which the relevant intention was not established, even though the unlawful conduct was in some way directed at the claimant. These are, however, unlikely scenarios and the decided cases do not provide an example of either. In principle we agree with Hazel Carty, and what she describes as ‘most commentators’, that it is necessary to prove targeted or directed harm. The essence of the tort is that the conduct is done with the object or purpose (but not necessarily the predominant object or purpose) of injuring the claimant or, which seems to us to be the same thing, that the conduct is in some sense aimed or directed at the claimant.”
“Nor [in] my view can a consequence be properly regarded as unintended or accidental if a deliberate action is taken knowing that it must inevitably bring about the consequence desired or not. In truth in such a case the actor intends to bring about both the undesired and the desired consequence, and is willing to bring about the one to achieve the other.”
“There are strong policy reasons why the law should restrict the ambit of the tort in this way. The tort gives the plaintiff a right of action in respect of a failure to comply with the terms of a contract against a person who is not a party to the contract. This is inconsistent with contractual principles, in particular in breaching the privity rule (see Cane: Tort Law and Economic Interests (1991) pages 122-5). As Hobhouse J said in Rickless v United Artists Corp.[1986] FSR 502 at page 524 of the tort of wrongful interference with contractual relations: Unless the tort is to become virtually equivalent to the enforcement of contracts against third parties, it must remain an essential element of the tort that the interference occurs with the requisite actual intent [sc. To cause a breach of the plaintiff’s contract]. Further, without the limiting of the scope of the tort by the requirement of actual intention, freedom of action would be unduly restricted by liability for incidental consequences (see Fleming: The Law of Torts 7th edn (1987) 656). Interference with contracts may flow from competition and is the normal and expected consequence of industrial action. It would not be right for the law to discourage competition by encouraging actions by unsuccessful competitors or to allow tort actions by those who suffer only incidentally form another person’s activities.”
“The common law has always been jealous of any interference with trade.”