“HFEA (00) 6 FORM FOR CONSENT TO STORAGE AND USE OF SPERM AND EMBRYOS”
"15. …there were, of course, a number of different options as to the fixing of the 'point of no return', at which consent to use of an embryo could no longer be withdrawn… It was, however, decided that the Bill should permit an individual to withdraw consent to the use of an embryo which was in storage, at any point prior to the transfer of an embryo to a woman, and that was clearly reflected in the terms of Schedule 3. 16. The provisions of the Bill dealing with consent did not prove controversial during the passage of the Bill through Parliament. So far as I have been able to ascertain, the approach taken in Schedule 3 commanded widespread approval in Parliament, in that the text of Schedule 3 as enacted remained as the Government had intended when the Bill was introduced."
"That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament."
"In the Secretary of State's view, the provisions of Schedule 3 to the Act … serve to promote a number of inter-related policies and interests."
"21…In the Secretary of State's view it would be undesirable and unfair to insist that either party to IVF treatment be held to a consent which they may have given several years before when the circumstances of their lives were rather different." "24. The Secretary of State therefore takes the view that a male partner should be able to withdraw his consent to IVF treatment up to the point at which that possibility becomes inconsistent with the bodily integrity of the woman concerned."
"31…. That is why the Secretary of State opposes the private law claims of Ms Evans based on contract and estoppel. If such claims could be made, the consent regime in Schedule 3 to the Act, and all of the policies which underlie it, would be fatally undermined."
“[61]… As to the objective of the statute, at one level this will be coincident with its effect…. But that it not the relevant level for convention purposes. What is relevant is the underlying social purpose sought to be achieved by the statutory provision. Frequently that purpose will be self-evident, but this will not always be so. [62] The legislation must not only have a legitimate policy objective. It must also satisfy a 'proportionality' test. The court must decide whether the means employed by the statute to achieve the policy objective is appropriate and not disproportionate in its adverse effect. This involves a 'value judgment' by the court, made by reference to the circumstances prevailing when the issue has to be decided. It is the current effect and impact of the legislation which matter, not the position when the legislation came into force. [63] When a court makes this value judgment the facts will often speak for themselves. But sometimes the court may need additional background information tending to show, for instance, the likely practical impact of the statutory measure and why the course adopted by the legislature is or is not appropriate. Moreover, as when interpreting a statute, so when identifying the policy objective of a statutory provision or assessing the ‘proportionality’ of a statutory provision, the court may need enlightenment on the nature and extent of the social problem (the ‘mischief’) at which the legislation is aimed. This may throw light on the rationale underlying the legislation. [64] This additional background material may be found in published documents, such as a government white paper. If relative information is provided by a minister or, indeed, any other member of either House in the course of a debate on a Bill, the courts must also be able to take this into account. The courts, similarly, must be able to have regard for information contained in explanatory notes prepared by the relevant government department and published with a Bill. The courts would be failing in the due discharge of the new role assigned to them by Parliament if they were to exclude from consideration relevant background information whose only source was a ministerial statement in Parliament or an explanatory note prepared by his department while the Bill was proceeding through Parliament. By having regard to such material the court would not be ‘questioning’ proceedings in Parliament or intruding improperly into the legislative process or ascribing to Parliament the views expressed by a minister. The court would merely be placing itself in a better position to understand the legislation. [65] To that limited extent there may be occasion for the courts, when conducting the statutory 'compatibility' exercise, to have regard to matters stated in Parliament.”
“[111] One of these principles, which has repeatedly been emphasised, is that legislation is the exclusive responsibility of Parliament…. Another is that it is the intention of Parliament that defines the policy and objects of its enactments, not the purpose or intention of the Executive.”
“[139] …Once one departs from the text of the statute construed as a whole and looks for expressions of intention to be found elsewhere, one is not looking for the intention of the legislature but that of some other source with no constitutional power to make law.”
“Assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the various legislative alternatives is primarily a matter for Parliament. The possible existence of alternative solutions does not in itself render the contested legislation unjustified... The court will reach a different conclusion from the legislature only when it is apparent that the legislature has attached insufficient importance to a person's Convention right… The more the legislation concerns matters of broad social policy, the less ready will be a court to intervene.”
“Consent 3.5 We feel it to be very important that time and consideration should be devoted to explaining fully to prospective patients and, where necessary to their partners, the details of any infertility treatment they are to undergo. No such treatment should be undertaken without the fully informed consent of the patient and this should, in the case of more specialised treatment, normally be obtained in the presence of someone not associated with the procedures …”