“(1) There shall be a body corporate known as the Council for the Regulation of Health Care Professionals (2) The general functions of the Council are- (a) to promote the interests of patients and other members of the public in relation to the performance of their functions by the bodies mentioned in subsection (3), and their committees and officers, (b) to promote best practice in the performance of those functions, (c) to formulate principles relating to good professional self-regulation, and to encourage regulatory bodies to conform to them, and (d) to promote co-operation between regulatory bodies; and between them, or any of them, and other bodies performing corresponding functions.” (a) to promote the interests of patients and other members of the public in relation to the performance of their functions by the bodies mentioned in subsection (3), and their committees and officers, (b) to promote best practice in the performance of those functions, (c) to formulate principles relating to good professional self-regulation, and to encourage regulatory bodies to conform to them, and (d) to promote co-operation between regulatory bodies; and between them, or any of them, and other bodies performing corresponding functions.”
“The only information provided to us is that contained within the charge itself. We have received no evidence as to the circumstances or context of any relationship with Mrs A, nor of any treatment you provided to her. The Committee are entitled to draw logical conclusions from such facts as are admitted. However, the Committee are acutely aware of the dangers of making unsupported assumptions to fill the void resulting from a lack of evidence and we have therefore not done so. Having in mind that the standard of proof required is that we should be sure, the Committee have determined that such facts as have been found proved are insufficient to support a finding of serious professional misconduct. We have accordingly recorded a finding that you are not guilty of serious professional misconduct. That concludes the case.”
“Assume (for the purposes solely of argument) that, whether because the facts were opened at a slightly higher level or because some evidence was called or for some other reason, the PCC had concluded that the doctor’s conduct did represent serious professional misconduct (perhaps only because it was likely to bring the medical profession into disrepute) and that, in the circumstances, a suspension of 6 months was an appropriate penalty. It then transpired (as is alleged here) that the true picture was never put before the PCC. There can be no doubt that the Council could argue that the finding of serious professional misconduct had been unduly lenient and that the failure to find other heads of serious professional misconduct had been unduly lenient. This would be quite apart from any submission as to penalty and would require the Court to unpick and analyse issues going to the extent of the finding of guilt. To use the language of the criminal law, the Court would have to examine whether the conviction should have been on a totally different basis.” “ … if Parliament had not been concerned about the way in which the PCC carried out its duty, there would never have been a power to refer in any circumstances: in any event, it may not be the fault of the PCC but rather in the process so that the relevant panel was not acquainted with all the facts. Take the facts of this case; I repeat that I have not examined the merits in any way but assume hypothetically that, because of some failure within the prosecution process, evidence that should have been put before the PCC was not. The decision of the PCC, on the information before it, might be perfectly justifiable but, in the light of the true facts, not merely inappropriate but clearly wrong. If desirable for the protection of the public, there would be every reason to justify re-opening it without in any way impugning the actual decision of the PCC.”
“9. It is important that the grounds of appeal specify clearly which of the provisions in s.29(4) are being relied on. If it is intended to argue that any finding was unduly lenient, whether or not in addition to the contention that the penalty was unduly lenient, the particular finding must be identified and the matters relied on in support of the argument specified. In cases where, because of under prosecution, relevant aggravating material was not put before the Committee, a finding made in the absence of such material is capable of being unduly lenient. In those circumstances, the material must be identified. If the appeal is based solely on a claim that the penalty was unduly lenient, the appellant can only rely on what was put before the Committee. 10. Before going to the facts, I should deal with an argument put forward by Mr de la Mare as to the approach I should adopt in viewing this appeal. He submits that the unduly lenient and desirable for the protection of members of the public tests set out in s.29(4) are purely internal and that the appeal is to be determined as if it were an appeal underCPR 52.11 (3). If it is to be said that the CRHP should not have decided that there was undue leniency, an application for judicial review will have to be made. That submission was to my surprise not resisted by Mr Lawson. In my judgment it is clearly wrong. Since an appeal comes before a judge of the Administrative Court, it would be somewhat absurd and an unnecessary incurring of costs if judicial review to the same tribunal were needed. But more importantly, the general rule is that an appeal in aggravation of penalty will only be allowed if it is shown that the original penalty was unduly lenient: see Lomas v Parle[2004] 1 All E.R 1173 . I see no reason to doubt that the true construction of s.29 requires that the Court will only allow the appeal if satisfied that undue leniency and desirability for the protection of the public is made out. If undue leniency is established, it will only be in the rarest of cases that a different view to that of the CRHP is likely to be appropriate in respect of desirability. 11. I see no reason not to apply mutatis mutandis the same test as the Court of Appeal applies in deciding whether a sentence in a criminal case is unduly lenient. That is whether the penalty falls outside the range of penalties which the Committee, applying their minds to all the relevant factors, could reasonably consider appropriate: see AG’s Reference No.4 of 1989 (1990) 90 CAR 366 at p.371. … 29. The burden rests on the CRHP to establish that the action in question was unduly lenient. There is an element of double jeopardy of which account must be taken. It is of less importance in the context of s.29 of the 2002 Act because the emphasis is on the protection of the public rather than punishment of the individual concerned.”
“10. Since s.29(4)(a) distinguishes between findings and penalties, it must in my view cover acquittals as well as the imposition of inadequate penalties. This means that ‘direction’ in s.29(1) (or step or corresponding measure) must be construed to include a direction not to impose a penalty or to make a finding which might lead to a penalty. While I do not doubt that this is a purposive construction, it avoids the anomalies to which I have referred and does not in my view amount to an unacceptable construction of the language used in a section which, because of the attempt to deal with the disparate provisions relating to the various health care bodies, is not easy to construe sensibly. What this means is that where the relevant body or person has taken disciplinary proceedings which have resulted in an unduly lenient decision, whether an acquittal or an inadequate penalty, s.29(4)(a) will apply. S.29(2)(a) and (b) will apply where there has been a failure to take proceedings at all. The relevant committee is whichever committee has the responsibility to make a final decision as to whether proceedings should be brought and the provision referred to is the enactment in question, not the specific section or provision of that enactment. This means that a sensible distinction is drawn between s.29(4)(a) and s.29(4)(b), the latter dealing with two discrete matters and the former with all possible outcomes of a disciplinary hearing.”
“(1) Permission is required from the Court of Appeal for any appeal to that court from a decision of … the High Court which was itself made on appeal. (2) The Court of Appeal will not give permission unless it considers that – (a) the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice; or (b) there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it.”
“Where an appeal is made to a county court or the High Court in relation to any matter, and on hearing the appeal the court makes a decision in relation to that matter, no appeal may be made to the Court of Appeal from that decision unless the Court of Appeal considers that- (a) the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice, or (b) there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. ” (a) the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice, or (b) there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. ”
“Where a fully registered person – … … (b) is judged by the Professional Conduct Committee to have been guilty of serious professional misconduct, whether while so registered or not; the Committee may, if they think fit, direct – (i) that his name shall be erased from the register (ii) that his registration in the register shall be suspended (that is to say shall not have effect) during such period not exceeding twelve months as may be specified in the direction; or (iii) that his registration shall be conditional on his compliance, during such period not exceeding three years as may be specified in the direction, with such requirements so specified as the Committee think fit to impose for the protection of members of the public or in his interests.” (b) is judged by the Professional Conduct Committee to have been guilty of serious professional misconduct, whether while so registered or not; the Committee may, if they think fit, direct – (i) that his name shall be erased from the register (ii) that his registration in the register shall be suspended (that is to say shall not have effect) during such period not exceeding twelve months as may be specified in the direction; or (iii) that his registration shall be conditional on his compliance, during such period not exceeding three years as may be specified in the direction, with such requirements so specified as the Committee think fit to impose for the protection of members of the public or in his interests.”
“163. Section 29 gives the Council the power to refer a fitness to practise decision by a regulatory body to the High Court where this seems to it to be desirable for the protection of the public. It is envisaged that the Council would do this in extreme cases where the public interest in having a clearly perverse decision reviewed by a Court outweighs the public interest in the independent operation of self-regulation.”
“… but a sentence should not be increased under that Act unless the court is satisfied that it is not merely lenient, but ‘unduly’ lenient. And, what is more, if the court reaches that conclusion, when deciding the appropriate level of sentence the court must also reflect the element of what is sometimes described as double jeopardy.”
“The first thing to be observed is that it is implicit in the section that this Court may only increase sentences which it concludes were unduly lenient. It cannot, we are confident, have been the intention of Parliament to subject defendants to the risk of having their sentences increased – with all the anxiety that this naturally gives rise to – merely because in the opinion of this Court the sentence was less than this Court would have imposed. A sentence is unduly lenient, we would hold, where it falls outside the range of sentences which the judge, applying his mind to all the relevant factors, could reasonably consider appropriate. In that connection regard must of course be had to reported cases, and in particular to the guidance given by this court from time to time in so-called guidelines cases. However it must always be remembered that sentencing is an art rather than a science; that the trial judge is particularly well-placed to assess the weight to be given to various competing considerations; and that leniency is not in itself a vice. That mercy should season justice is a proposition as soundly based in law as it is in literature.”
“Some people may find this website extremely offensive due to the content. We have sick pictures of death, raw gore, smashed up heads, disgusting diseases, mutilation, general sick pictures and some other whacky shit! If you don’t agree with the crap on this site do not enter.”
“deliberately setting himself adrift on a sea of internet porn that is out there and that he did deliberately and repeatedly put himself into a position where he knew he was going to be accessing sexually explicit and offensive material.”
“By using hospital equipment for your own purposes you put a record on the computer of unsuitable material. This was done in a workplace and on a mobile computer in circumstances where access by a vulnerable patient group was possible, as was access by other members of staff. This abuse of hospital equipment undermines the public trust and confident in the profession.”
“Because, reflecting on it, I can see that if the computer was moved round to anywhere else for a child to work on and they saw it, it would be distressing. It would be distressing for the patients’ families, for my colleagues, for anybody who saw it.”
“As we had established earlier, the pictures are small and maybe ten or whatever on screen and they were on there for seconds and so although I was looking, I did not look at every individual picture and see what was there.”
“There is also the issue of how many sites there were on the screen over what is a relatively short period of time given the thousands of sites, or hits, that are illustrated in the bundle that you have before you and it should be clear from that bundle that over periods of seconds a large number of hits would be occurring and I ask you to accept Mr Truscott’s evidence that there was an element of cascading, that he was pressing the cross button and that there were sites that were popping up and, indeed, in the time when you see a large number of pictures that he could not physically have taken on board, all of those pictures at all of those times, although it is quite apparent that he accepts that he would have seen what the nature was. But I do ask you to accept that he was not spending hours looking at specific pictures and this was more in the form of surfing for general, inappropriate but general interest or amusement, whatever the reason he was doing it, it was quiet, he was doing something inappropriate but he did not enter the sites, he did not download anything, he did not pay for anything, there is no evidence of that whatsoever.”
“27. I do not doubt that the penalty was lenient. I am sure that if the PCC had decided that he should be removed from the register, an appeal against sentence would have been unlikely to succeed. But that is not the test and the adverb ‘unduly’ must be given its proper weight. Accessing adult pornography is not criminal and the circumstances in which Mr Truscott accessed it demonstrates poor judgment but is perhaps more material to whether he could remain in his employment. It fully justified his dismissal. 28. This is very much a borderline case and I am satisfied that the CRHP was correct to refer it. However, the lack of deliberate accessing of what can be termed child pornography persuades me that undue leniency has not been established.”
Showing the 50 most senior of 59.