"(1) The landlord may only bring an introductory tenancy to an end by obtaining an order of the court for the possession of the dwelling-house. (2) The court shall make such an order unless the provisions of section 128 apply. " "(1) The landlord may only bring an introductory tenancy to an end by obtaining an order of the court for the possession of the dwelling-house. (2) The court shall make such an order unless the provisions of section 128 apply. "
"(1) The court shall not entertain proceedings for the possession of a dwelling-house let under an introductory tenancy unless the landlord has served on the tenant a notice of proceedings complying with this section. (2) The notice shall state that the court will be asked to make an order for the possession of the dwelling-house. (3) The notice shall set out the reasons for the landlord's decision to apply for such an order. (4) The notice shall specify a date after which proceedings for the possession of the dwelling-house may be begun. The date so specified must not be earlier than the date on which the tenancy could, apart from this Chapter, be brought to an end by notice to quit given by the landlord on the same date as the notice of proceedings. (5) The court shall not entertain any proceedings for possession of the dwelling-house unless they are begun after the date specified in the notice of proceedings. (6) The notice shall inform the tenant of his right to request a review of the landlord's decision to seek an order for possession and of the time within which such a request must be made. (7) The notice shall also inform the tenant that if he needs help or advice about the notice, and what to do about it, he should take it immediately to a Citizens' Advice Bureau, a housing aid centre, a law centre or a solicitor." "(1) The court shall not entertain proceedings for the possession of a dwelling-house let under an introductory tenancy unless the landlord has served on the tenant a notice of proceedings complying with this section. (2) The notice shall state that the court will be asked to make an order for the possession of the dwelling-house. (3) The notice shall set out the reasons for the landlord's decision to apply for such an order. (4) The notice shall specify a date after which proceedings for the possession of the dwelling-house may be begun. The date so specified must not be earlier than the date on which the tenancy could, apart from this Chapter, be brought to an end by notice to quit given by the landlord on the same date as the notice of proceedings. (5) The court shall not entertain any proceedings for possession of the dwelling-house unless they are begun after the date specified in the notice of proceedings. (6) The notice shall inform the tenant of his right to request a review of the landlord's decision to seek an order for possession and of the time within which such a request must be made. (7) The notice shall also inform the tenant that if he needs help or advice about the notice, and what to do about it, he should take it immediately to a Citizens' Advice Bureau, a housing aid centre, a law centre or a solicitor."
"Where a court makes an order for the possession of any land … the giving up of possession shall not be postponed ... to a date later than fourteen days after the making of the order, unless it appears to the court that exceptional hardship would be caused by requiring possession to be given up by that date; and shall not in any event be postponed to a date later than six weeks after the making of the order."
"If one were to treat the provisions of section 128 as a form of Scylla and those of section 127(2) as Charybdis, the channel in between available for navigation is remarkably narrow but I see no escape from that analysis even though it does reduce the functions of the court to that of ascertaining that it does have jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings at all. Once it has done so it is required to make a possession order and that, in my view, necessarily involves that it has no discretion in the matter at all." "
"It is common ground that the council's duty to comply with section 129(2) is subject to judicial review. Equally it is clear that this duty is a public law duty and the correlative right in the tenants to have it lawfully performed must be a public law right. The county court must in my view have at least jurisdiction to grant an adjournment if satisfied that there is a real chance of leave to apply for judicial review being granted." "
"Parliamentary sovereignty means Parliament can, it if chooses, legislate contrary to fundamental principles of human rights.The Human Rights Act 1998 will not detract from this power. The constraints upon its exercise by Parliament are ultimately political, not legal. But the principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost. Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words. This is because there is too great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the democratic process. In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts, therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual. In this way the courts of the United Kingdom, though acknowledging the sovereignty of Parliament, apply principles of constitutionality little different from those which exist in countries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a constitutional document." . . . . "
"None the less, in such circumstances the Convention calls at least for one of the two following systems: either the jurisdictional organs themselves comply with the requirements of article 6(1), or they do not so comply but are subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of article 6(1)." 87 The reference to "full jurisdiction" has been frequently cited in subsequent cases and sometimes relied upon in argument as if it were authority for saying that a policy decision affecting civil rights by an administrator who does not comply with article 6(1) has to be reviewable on its merits by an independent and impartial tribunal. It was certainly so relied upon by counsel for the respondents in these appeals. But subsequent European authority shows that "full jurisdiction" does not mean full decision-making power. It means full jurisdiction to deal with the case as the nature of the decision requires. 88 This emerges most clearly from the decisions on the English planning cases, which I shall analyse later in some detail. But the leading European authority for the proposition that it is not necessary to have a review of the merits of a policy decision is Zumtobel v Austria(1993) 17 EHRR 116 . The Zumtobel partnership objected to the compulsory purchase of their farming land to build the L52 by-pass road in the Austrian Vorarlberg. The appropriate government committee heard their objections but confirmed the order. They appealed to an administrative court, which said that the government had taken proper matters into account and that it was not entitled to substitute its decision for that of the administrative authority. They complained to the Commission and the European court that, as the administrative court could not "independently assess the merits and the facts of the case", it did not have "full jurisdiction" within the meaning of the Albert and Le Compte formula. The European court said at para 32, that its jurisdiction was sufficient in the circumstances of the case, "
"None the less, in such circumstances the Convention calls at least for one of the two following systems: either the jurisdictional organs themselves comply with the requirements of article 6(1), or they do not so comply but are subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of article 6(1)." 87 The reference to "full jurisdiction" has been frequently cited in subsequent cases and sometimes relied upon in argument as if it were authority for saying that a policy decision affecting civil rights by an administrator who does not comply with article 6(1) has to be reviewable on its merits by an independent and impartial tribunal. It was certainly so relied upon by counsel for the respondents in these appeals. But subsequent European authority shows that "full jurisdiction" does not mean full decision-making power. It means full jurisdiction to deal with the case as the nature of the decision requires. 88 This emerges most clearly from the decisions on the English planning cases, which I shall analyse later in some detail. But the leading European authority for the proposition that it is not necessary to have a review of the merits of a policy decision is Zumtobel v Austria(1993) 17 EHRR 116 . The Zumtobel partnership objected to the compulsory purchase of their farming land to build the L52 by-pass road in the Austrian Vorarlberg. The appropriate government committee heard their objections but confirmed the order. They appealed to an administrative court, which said that the government had taken proper matters into account and that it was not entitled to substitute its decision for that of the administrative authority. They complained to the Commission and the European court that, as the administrative court could not "independently assess the merits and the facts of the case", it did not have "full jurisdiction" within the meaning of the Albert and Le Compte formula. The European court said at para 32, that its jurisdiction was sufficient in the circumstances of the case, "
"the uncontested safeguards attending the procedure before the inspector: the quasi-judicial character of the decision-making process; the duty incumbent on each inspector to exercise independent judgment; the requirement that inspectors must not be subject to any improper influence; the stated mission of the Inspectorate to uphold the principles of openness, fairness and impartiality. 115 It went on to say, at para 47, that, if Mr Bryan had pursued his appeal on ground (b), the High Court, while not being able to substitute its own findings of fact, "had the power to satisfy itself that the inspector's findings of fact or the inferences based on them were neither perverse nor irrational"
" Such an approach by an appeal tribunal on questions of fact can reasonably be expected in specialised areas of the law such as the one at issue, particularly where the facts have already been established in the course of a quasi-judicial procedure governed by many of the safeguards required by article 6(1). It is also frequently a feature in the systems of judicial control of administrative decisions found throughout the Council of Europe member states." "114 On ground (b), (issues of fact) the European court noted what, in para 46, it described as: "the uncontested safeguards attending the procedure before the inspector: the quasi-judicial character of the decision-making process; the duty incumbent on each inspector to exercise independent judgment; the requirement that inspectors must not be subject to any improper influence; the stated mission of the Inspectorate to uphold the principles of openness, fairness and impartiality. 115 It went on to say, at para 47, that, if Mr Bryan had pursued his appeal on ground (b), the High Court, while not being able to substitute its own findings of fact, "had the power to satisfy itself that the inspector's findings of fact or the inferences based on them were neither perverse nor irrational"
" Such an approach by an appeal tribunal on questions of fact can reasonably be expected in specialised areas of the law such as the one at issue, particularly where the facts have already been established in the course of a quasi-judicial procedure governed by many of the safeguards required by article 6(1). It is also frequently a feature in the systems of judicial control of administrative decisions found throughout the Council of Europe member states."