“29.27 I have reached a firm conclusion having regard to reasonableness, proportionality and decided case law that an immediate possession is not appropriate in this case. That would be a truly draconian course of action bearing in mind the length of the tenancy and Mr Pinnock’s blameless life looked at from his own lack of direct involvement in criminal activity. 29.28 Mr Manning has argued that before the Court can order a suspended possession order there must be a sound basis for thinking that the behaviour or Orreon and/or Orraine and/or Devon will not deteriorate as it has done before. Also the Court would have to be confident that Mr Pinnock and Christine Walker were prepared to exercise parental control. I agree with that analysis. 29.29 Bearing in mind my findings of fact it seems to me that the most appropriate course in this case is to make a Demotion of Tenancy order in favour of the Claimant. The consequences of this for Mr Pinnock will undoubtedly be serious and I agree it is a draconian step, but it is a step which is entirely justified by the evidence. 29.30 In my judgment the Pinnock family has now reached a significant watershed in their lives. Mr Pinnock and Christine Walker are not powerless and need to face up to their own responsibilities. It is now up to them to exercise parental control over their three sons who have caused people living in the neighbourhood difficulties and upset and also difficulty to them as parents. They need to impress on their sons that the situation is now critical and unless they behave in a socially responsible manner and avoid all criminal and anti-social behaviour then there is a strong likelihood that their parents will lose their home. 29.31 Applying the criteria of “reasonableness”
“4.1 You are responsible for the behaviour of every person (including children) living in or visiting your home. You are responsible in your home, on surrounding land, in communal areas (stairs, lifts, landing, entrance halls, paving, shared gardens, parking areas) and in the locality around your home. 4.2 You (or anyone living with you, or visiting your home) must not cause a nuisance, annoyance or disturbance to any other person. Examples of nuisance, annoyance or disturbance include: loud music; arguing and door slamming; dog barking and fouling; offensive drunkenness; selling drugs or drug abuse; rubbish dumping; playing ball games close to someone else’s home. 4.3 You (or anyone living with you, or visiting your home) must not harass any other person. Examples of harassment include: racist behaviour or language; using or threatening to use violence; using abusive or insulting words or behaviour; damaging or threatening to damage another persons home or possessions; writing threatening, abusive or insulting graffiti; doing anything that interferes with the peace, comfort or convenience of others.”
“(1) On22nd September 2007 , the Tenant’s son, Clive Pinnock whilst at the property caused a nuisance, annoyance and disturbance, by resisting and/or obstructing a Police Constable. (It is understood that on19th December 2007 , Clive Pinnock was convicted of the related Criminal Offence in this regard). (2) On18th January 2008 , the Tenant’s son Devon Pinnock caused nuisance, annoyance and disturbance by causing death by dangerous driving and driving a vehicle whilst disqualified and uninsured. This very serious offence took pace in the locality of the property and in or around the junction of Burnage Lane and Mauldeth Road in Manchester. (It is understood that Devon Pinnock has pleaded guilty to the related offence at Court).”
“She has a strong unjustified sense that her sons have been and are being victimised. She has sought to excuse or make light of her sons’ criminal behaviour”.”
“70. Earlier in my judgment, I referred to a demotion order being a sort of probation. I have since noticed that Waller LJ in Gilboy used the same terminology at paragraph 51 and he refers to tenants being “on their last chance”
“It should not be forgotten that in an appropriate case, the range of considerations which any public authority should take into account in deciding whether to invoke its powers can be very wide: see R v Lincolnshire County Council ex parte Atkinson (1995) 8 Admin LR 529; R (Casey) v Crawley Borough Council[2006] EWHC 301 (Admin) .” 52. Having said that the question whether the council’s decision was unreasonable has to be decided by applying public law principles as they have been developed at common law, it is to be remembered that those principles are not frozen. Even before the enactment of the HRA, our public law principles were being influenced by Convention ways of thinking. Since its enactment, the process has gathered momentum. It is now a well recognised fact that the Convention is influencing the shape and development of our domestic public law principles, whether one uses the metaphors of embedding, weaving into the fabric, osmosis or alignment. (See the judgment of Lord Walker in Doherty at para 109.) “It should not be forgotten that in an appropriate case, the range of considerations which any public authority should take into account in deciding whether to invoke its powers can be very wide: see R v Lincolnshire County Council ex parte Atkinson (1995) 8 Admin LR 529; R (Casey) v Crawley Borough Council[2006] EWHC 301 (Admin) .”
“But it is clear that under domestic property law the appellants have no right to occupy their respective premises, of which the local authority has an unqualified right to possession. The appellants fall outside the categories to which Parliament has extended a measure of protection. The local authority has no duty to accommodate the appellants, but has a power and duty to manage its housing stock. The appellants have not pleaded or alleged facts which give them a special claim to remain. I am satisfied that if these cases were remitted, possession orders would necessarily be made.” 60. The premises at issue here are not, of course, part of the Council’s housing stock, since it is not a housing authority, but they are part of its assets which it has a power and a duty to manage in the interests of ratepayers and council tax payers, and so as to enable it to perform the duties and functions which it does have. Equally, the fact that some of the Appellants are not people to whom a relevant housing authority would owe duties underPart VII of the Housing Act 1996 does not seem to me to put this Council under a higher duty towards them, as it were to make good the omission of Parliament to impose more extensive duties under that legislation. 61. The Appellants do not have any right to stay on the land and, by the time of the trial, they had been there for almost 2 years after the date as at which HAZ, on whom any rights they had had previously had depended, had been told to leave. It does not seem to me that the Respondent could have been expected to do more, in order to respect the fact that parts of the property were the homes of the several Appellants, than to allow them some time which would give them a reasonable opportunity to make such alternative arrangements as might be open to them for their housing. I regard as unarguable any contention that the Respondent should have taken them on as tenants. 62. Given the period that had elapsed by the time of the trial since the original demand for possession in June 2006, it seems to me clear that the Respondent’s decision to press for a possession order at the trial was a proper and valid public law decision. Such time as should, at best, have been allowed to the Defendants would have run from the effective date of the demand for possession from HAZ, in July 2006, and would have expired well before the trial in June 2008. That may not have been enough for the Defendants, even if they had been trying to find alternative accommodation during the whole of that period, given the difficulties they may face, but that would not entitle them to any further time. The Council cannot be obliged to allow them as long as they may turn out to need. 63. In those circumstances, I do not see that the decision to press for a possession order at trial could be regarded as one which no reasonable person would consider justifiable. There would be no point in remitting the case for further investigation of the facts. Those are the reasons for my conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed. “But it is clear that under domestic property law the appellants have no right to occupy their respective premises, of which the local authority has an unqualified right to possession. The appellants fall outside the categories to which Parliament has extended a measure of protection. The local authority has no duty to accommodate the appellants, but has a power and duty to manage its housing stock. The appellants have not pleaded or alleged facts which give them a special claim to remain. I am satisfied that if these cases were remitted, possession orders would necessarily be made.”