“A person who alleges that a copy of the notice should have been given to him, but was not, may refer to the Tribunal the alleged failure and – (a) the decision in question, so far as it is based on a reason of the kind mentioned in subsection (4); or 25 (b) any opinion expressed by the regulator giving the notice in relation to him.”
“4.14. It was common practice during most of the Relevant Period for G10 spot FX traders at firms to use electronic messaging services, such as chat rooms, to communicate with traders at other firms. Whilst such communications are not of 20 themselves inappropriate, the frequent and significant flow of information between traders at different firms increases the potential risk of traders engaging in collusive activity and sharing, amongst other things, confidential information. It is therefore especially important that firms exercise appropriate control and monitoring of such communications.” 25 16. The following example of an attempt to manipulate the fix was given at paragraph 4.39 and 4.40 of the UBS Notice as follows: “4.39. An example of UBS’s involvement in this behaviour occurred on one day within the Relevant Period when UBS attempted to manipulate the ECB fix in the EUR/USD currency pair. On this day, UBS had net client sell orders at the fix which meant that it 30 would benefit if it was able to move the ECB fix rate lower. The chances of successfully manipulating the fix rate in this manner would be improved if UBS and other firms adopted trading strategies based upon the information they shared with each other about their net orders. 4.40. In the period between 12:35pm and 1:08pm on this day, traders at four different 35 firms (including UBS) inappropriately disclosed to each other via a chat room details about their net orders in respect of the forthcoming ECB fix at 1:15pm in order to determine their trading strategies. The other three firms are referred to in this Final Notice as Firm A, B and C. UBS then participated in the series of actions described below in an attempt to manipulate the fix rate lower. 40 (1) At 12:36pm, Firm A disclosed that it had net sell orders for the fix. At 12:37pm, Firm A disclosed that these net sell orders were EUR200 million. At 12:40pm, Firm A updated this figure to EUR175 million. 5 (2) At 12:36pm, UBS disclosed that it had net sell orders for the fix of EUR200 million. At 12:44pm, UBS disclosed that its net sell orders had increased to EUR250 million. Since UBS needed to sell Euros at the fix it would profit to the extent that the fix rate at which it bought Euros was lower than the average rate at which it sold 5 Euros in the market. (3) At 12:36pm, Firm B disclosed that it had net sell orders for the fix of EUR100 million and that another of its offices also had net sell orders. (4) At 12:48pm, Firm A disclosed that its net sell orders had reduced to EUR100 million, but that it was “…hopefully taking all the filth out for u…”
“4.55. These traders used this information to determine their trading strategies and depending on the circumstances to attempt to manipulate the fix in the desired direction. They did this by undertaking a number of actions, typically including one or more of the following (which would depend on the information disclosed and the 35 traders involved): (1) Traders in a chat room with net orders in the opposite direction to the desired movement at the fix sought before the fix to transact or “net off” their orders with third parties outside the chat room, rather than with other traders in the chat room. This maintained the volume of orders in the desired direction held by 40 traders in the chat room and avoided orders being transacted in the opposite direction at the fix. Traders within the market have referred to this process as “leaving you with the ammo” or similar. 7 (2) Traders in a chat room with net orders in the same direction as the desired rate movement at the fix sought before the fix to do one or more of the following: (a) Net off these orders with third parties outside the chat room, thereby reducing the volume of orders held by third parties that 5 might otherwise be transacted at the fix in the opposite direction. Traders within the market have referred to this process as “taking out the filth” or “clearing the decks” or similar; (b) Transfer these orders to a single trader in the chat room, thereby 10 consolidating these orders in the hands of one trader. This potentially increased the likelihood of successfully manipulating the fix rate since that trader could exercise greater control over his trading strategy during the fix than a number of traders acting separately. Traders within the market have referred to this as “giving you the ammo” or similar; and/or 15 (c) Transact with third parties outside the chat room in order to increase the volume of orders held by them in the desired direction. This potentially increased the influence of the trader(s) at the fix by allowing them to control a larger proportion of the overall volume traded at the fix than they would otherwise have and/or to adopt particular trading strategies, such as 20 trading a large volume of a currency pair aggressively. This process was known as “building”. (3) Traders increased the volume traded by them at the fix in the desired direction in excess of the volume necessary to manage the risk associated with the firms’ net buy or sell orders at the fix. Traders within the market have 25 referred to this process as “overbuying” or “overselling”.”
“4.57. An example of Barclays’ involvement in this behaviour occurred on one day within the Relevant Period when Barclays attempted to manipulate the WMR fix for a 30 particular currency pair. On this day, Barclays had net buy orders for a particular currency pair at the fix which meant that it would benefit if it was able to move the WMR fix rate upwards. The chances of successfully manipulating the fix rate in this manner would be improved if Barclays and other firms adopted trading strategies based on the information they shared with each other about their net orders. Information they 35 shared with each other about their net orders. 4.58. In the period between 10:06am and 3:52pm on this day, traders at five different firms (including Barclays) inappropriately disclosed to each other through chat rooms details about their net orders in respect of the forthcoming 4pm WMR fix in order to determine their trading strategies. The other four firms are referred to in this Final 40 Notice as Firms A, B, C and D. Barclays then participated in the series of actions described below in an attempt to manipulate the fix rate higher. (1) At 10:06am, Barclays commented in a chat room with Firms A and B that it had a net buy order for the WMR fix for USD150 million. Barclays disclosed that the order was for another Barclays desk which was rebalancing its portfolios 8 at month-end (“…my rebal guys are paying me for 150…”). Firm A replied stating “first of my fixings is a buy but guess long way to go”
“4.66. During its investigation, the Authority identified instances of Barclays 15 attempting to trigger client stop loss orders. These attempts involved inappropriate disclosures to traders at other firms concerning details of the size, direction and level of client stop loss orders. The traders involved would trade in a manner aimed at manipulating the spot FX rate, such that the stop loss order was triggered. 4.67. An example of Barclays’ involvement in this behaviour occurred on one day 20 within the Relevant Period when Barclays attempted to trigger a client stop loss order. On this day, a client had placed a stop loss order to buy GBP77 million at a rate of 95 against another currency. The triggering of this order would result in Barclays selling GBP77 million to the client. Barclays would profit from the stop loss order if the average rate at which it bought GBP in the market was lower than the rate at which it 25 sold GBP to the client pursuant to the stop loss order. 4.68. In the period between approximately 10:37 and 11:37, Barclays attempted to trigger the client stop loss order. During this period, Barclays inappropriately disclosed, through chat rooms, the details of the client stop loss order to traders at other firms and provided commentary to them regarding Barclays’ attempts to trigger the stop loss 30 order. The other firms are referred to in this example as Firms X, Y, and Z. (1) At 10:38, Firm X asked Barclays and Firms Y and Z if they had any stop loss orders (“u got…stops ?”). Barclays responded that it had a stop loss order for “80 quid” at a level of 95. Barclays noted it was “primed like a coiled cobra…concentrating so hard…[as if] made of wax…[haven’t] even blinked”. 35 (2) At 10:46, the rate increased to 84 and Firm X commented “…is higher sint it”
“hahahah…hardly [Barclays]…thats not holding him in…gd work though”
“helkd him in…with a lot of cursingf…u tried to carve him…and eventually succeeded”
"As I have already said, it is clear that it has to be the "matter" or "matters" referred to in the relevant notice which "identifies" the third party. But, as in the defamation cases, that does not mean that the third party has to be mentioned by name. As long as the relevant description in the "matters" (whether by reference to an office, a job 20 description or simply "
“Are the words used in the "matters" such as would reasonably in the 25 circumstances lead persons acquainted with the claimant / third party, or who operate in his area of the financial services industry, and therefore would have the requisite specialist knowledge of the relevant circumstances, to believe as at the date of promulgation of the Notice that he is a person prejudicially affected by matters stated in the reasons contained in the notice?”” 30 29. At [51] of the judgment, Gloster LJ emphasised the objective nature of the test as follows: “The objective test, which I have formulated, clearly limits external material to what, objectively, persons acquainted with the claimant/ third party, or persons operating in the relevant area of the financial services industry, might reasonably have known as at 35 the date of the promulgation of the relevant notice. That is a workable test. As Mr Herberg submitted, by the time the Authority served the Notice it would have been well aware of the information publicly available to the relevant sector of the market. It follows that I reject Mr Stanley's arguments to the contrary that, only if Mr Macris could have been identified from the "matters" exclusively contained in the Notice, 40 would he have been "identified" for the purposes of section 393. I reject that approach. It is not consistent with the language of the Act or with the ordinary every-day meaning of the word "identifies". It is also unrealistic because, in effect, it pays no regard to knowledge which persons acquainted with the third party, or persons operating in the relevant area of the financial services market, might well have over and above the 45 information which they read in the notice, which necessarily would contribute to their 13 ability to identify the third party. If, as Mr Stanley submitted, the purpose of the third party procedure is to ensure the fair treatment of the reputation of third parties by the Authority, then in my view it is unrealistic to disregard what already is known to the market over and above the information stated in the notice. Mr Stanley's approach would require the court to perform the artificial task of asking the 5 wholly hypothetical question whether, putting on one side the knowledge available to the market, the third party could be identified by what was stated in the notice alone.”
"As they check prices and complete deals, some traders participate in as many as 50 online chat rooms. Messages from salespeople and clients appear on their monitors, get pushed up by new ones, and vanish from view. Now regulators from Bern, Switzerland, to Washington are examining evidence that a small 20 group of senior traders at big banks had something else on their screens: details of each other's client orders. Sharing that information may have helped dealers at JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, UBS, Barclays, and others manipulate prices to maximise their profits, say five people with knowledge of the probes who asked not to be identified because the matter is pending. 25 At the center of the enquiries are instant-message groups with names such as The Cartel: The Bandit's Club: One Team, One Dream; and The Mafia, in which dealers exchanged information on client orders and agreed how to trade at the fix, according to the people familiar with the investigations."
"One specific chatroom, whose group was known alternately as the Mafia or the Cartel, was used by some of the most influential traders in London. Among them are Mr Usher, a former Royal Bank of Scotland trader who went to JPMorgan, as head of spot 20 foreign exchange trading in 2010, Mr Ramchandani, Citigroup's head of European spot trading, Matt Gardiner, who recently joined at Standard Chartered after working at UBS and Barclays, and Chris Ashton, head of voice spot trading at Barclays. All of these senior traders are on leave. Neither they, nor Mr O’Riordan, has been formally accused of any wrongdoing and none could be reached for comment. 25 Regulators are looking into allegations that traders might have used chat rooms to get a view about overall order flows and to use this information to build up positions just ahead of and during the fix. By buying and selling a currency before the fix, a trader can try to influence the final fix price to profit from the whole range of client orders he is handling that day." 30 51. On16 February 2014 the Financial Times published a detailed article under the heading "
"A handful of the most senior traders are under particular scrutiny for their membership in a specific chatroom known ultimately as the Mafia or the Cartel, a powerful group 40 that was widely respected in the trader community."