“Once it is accepted, as for the reasons we have given it must be, that the First-tier Tribunal has only that jurisdiction which has been conferred on it by statute, and can go no further, it does not matter whether the Tribunal purports to exercise a judicial review function or instead claims to be applying common law principles; neither course is within its jurisdiction. As we explain at paras 36 and 43 above, the Act gave a restricted judicial review function to the Upper Tribunal, but limited the First-tier Tribunal’s jurisdiction to those functions conferred on it by statute. It is impossible to read the legislation in a way which extends its jurisdiction to include—whatever one chooses to call it—a power to override a statute or supervise HMRC’s conduct.”
“The UT is not saying that the FTT has an independent jurisdiction to consider judicial review claims or public law points. The UT is stating only that the FTT may consider public law points, including legitimate expectations, where the section granting the right of appeal, properly construed, permits. Further, in Birkett, the UT held that the FTT had no jurisdiction to consider a legitimate expectation argument in an appeal brought pursuant to paragraph 47(a) and (b) of Schedule 36 to theFinance Act 2008 which, as in this case, provide a right of appeal against a decision of HMRC that a penalty is payable and against a decision as to the amount of the penalty.”
“… Even if that were wrong, I consider that the decision in Birkett, which is binding on me, in relation to materially identical provisions shows conclusively that the FTT does not have jurisdiction to consider public law points such as Mr Stenhouse’s arguments based on legitimate expectations.”