AT and Others (Article 15c; risk categories) (CG) [2014] UKUT 318 (IAC)

“The decision-maker, taking account of all relevant circumstances pertaining to the claimant and his country of origin, must decide whether it is reasonable to expect the claimant to relocate or whether it would be unduly harsh to expect him to do so…. There is, as Simon Brown LJ aptly observed in Svazas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 1 WLR 1891 , para 55, a spectrum of cases. The decision-maker must do his best to decide, on such material as is available, where on the spectrum the particular case falls … or must depend on a fair assessment of the relevant facts [5].” 83. For those in the risk categories that we have identified below we do not consider that there would be a viable alternative of internal relocation as a means of avoiding the risk of harm. Whilst, for the reasons we have given, we consider that it is possible to travel by road or air in Libya, both for men and women, the reasonable likelihood of being stopped at a checkpoint means that it could not be ruled out that a person’s background will be discovered en route to the destination and at the point of being stopped a risk would arise. 84. In addition, we have regard to the evidence of Dr George that attitudes to former members of Qadhafi’s security agencies do not vary from one part of Libya to another. It seems to us that the same attitude is reasonably likely to prevail in respect of others in the risk categories we have identified, for example Tawurgans, who are at risk because of their actual or perceived association with the former regime. 85. In relation to others who are able to establish a risk of persecution or Article 3 harm in a particular locality (and against which they cannot effectively be protected) it is as well to note that there was little specific evidence before us of who else, apart from the groups we have considered, this could encompass. However, there is sufficient evidence of the current situation, including the fact that Libya is in a post revolutionary phase, taking into account issues of revenge, lawlessness and criminality, to envisage that an individual may be able make out a case for fearing proscribed ill-treatment in a particular area. 86. We have already given our conclusions in terms of the possibility of travel within Libya, those conclusions being plainly relevant to the question of whether a person at risk in one area could safely travel to another. Depending on the facts, for the reasons we have given, we consider that it is in the main viable for a person to be able to travel to another area to seek safety. 87. The route to ‘safety’ is, however, of potential relevance, depending on the facts. This is because of the reasonably likelihood of being stopped at a checkpoint or otherwise, by a militia. Thus, a person at risk in a particular town or city may not be able to access safety in another part of the country because a militia that he has a well founded fear of controls the entry and exit routes. Of course, in that instance the issue of internal relocation would in fact be purely academic since the risk would in fact arise on the route home (see HH (Somalia) [2010] EWCA Civ 426 ). 88. In another case, however, an individual may be able to establish that he would not be able to reach an alternative location because the evidence establishes, for example, that a militia from whom the risk arises would be encountered by him en route from his home location. This could conceivably arise where the evidence is to the effect that the particular militia controls, or has a presence in, a particular area. 89. There was some inconsistency in the evidence in terms of the extent to which an individual would be able, in practical terms, to establish him or herself in a locality that is not that person’s home area. Dr George’s written evidence was that in recent years tribalism, whilst still important, has become less significant than it had been in the past. He goes on to state that while particular tribes have traditional territories where they are the dominant element in the population, most if not all Libyan communities have a populace that is at least to some extent mixed. In the largest cities a significant proportion of the population never belonged to any tribe. On the other hand, it is stated that with the uprising against the Qadhafi regime there has been a general resurgence of primordial loyalties to family, clan, tribe and locality. He continues, that the tribe and extended family, or clan, remain the key social, economic and political units to whom loyalty lies in preference to the state. 90. Dr George also wrote that families, extended families, religious and ethnic groups form the basis of Libyan society and people in such communities display a strong tendency to live together in relatively well-defined districts, looking to their immediate communities for social, economic and political support. Against that background he states that “it is neither the general practice nor is it easy for individuals to relocate to parts of Libya remote from members of their families and communities.”

“serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict." 105. There was no dispute amongst the parties in terms of how Article 15(c) is to be interpreted. We were referred to the decision in Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2009] ECR I-921 in which context we bear in mind what is said at [39] namely that: “the more the applicant is able to show that he is specifically affected by reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances, the lower the level of indiscriminate violence required for him to be eligible for subsidiary protection.” 106. We were also referred to QD (Iraq) [2009] EWCA Civ 620 in which the Court of Appeal at [40] summarised the issue in relation to Article 15(c) as requiring determination of whether there is in [the country] or a material part of it such a high level of indiscriminate violence that substantial grounds exist for believing that the applicant would, solely by being present there, face a real risk which threatens his life or person. 107. Subsequent to the hearing, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) gave judgment in Diakité (Case C-285/12) in which it was held that: “on a proper construction of Article 15(c) of Directive 2004/83, it must be acknowledged that an internal armed conflict exists, for the purposes of applying that provision, if a State’s armed forces confront one or more armed groups or if two or more armed groups confront each other. It is not necessary for that conflict to be categorised as ‘armed conflict not of an international character’ under international humanitarian law; nor is it necessary to carry out, in addition to an appraisal of the level of violence present in the territory concerned, a separate assessment of the intensity of the armed confrontations, the level of organisation of the armed forces involved or the duration of the conflict.” 108. We have not had the benefit of submissions from the parties in relation to the decision of the CJEU, but consider that for the purposes of this appeal we do not consider such submissions necessary in order for us to resolve the issues before us. 109. In the appellants’ skeleton arguments, to a greater or lesser extent, an Article 15(c)/Article 3 risk is asserted generally, in terms of the situation in Libya. In final submissions the position of the appellants’ representatives was as follows. Mr Ficklin on behalf of AT said that he had no instructions to and did not concede the Article 15(c) point but said that he would not make submissions on it. Ms Patel on behalf of AMH stated that it was a matter for the Tribunal and she did not intend to make any (further) submissions in relation to Article 15(c). Ms Harrison for the remaining appellants adopted the same position. 110. The first question we must address is whether, in the whole of or in parts of Libya there is a general Article 15(c) risk, that is, is there a serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence because of a situation of armed conflict. As regards whether or not there exists a situation of armed conflict, it is clear from Diakité that to meet that requirement there is a low threshold. We consider that in broad terms significant parts of the country could be said to be in a state of armed conflict. 111. In terms of “indiscriminate violence”, in our consideration of risk for particular categories of people we have referred to various aspects of the background and expert evidence some of which relates to the general situation. 112. As to country background evidence in relation to incidents of violence in Libya and the extent to which civilians are caught up in it, a flavour of it is provided by the following reports. The report by Amnesty International (“AI”) of July 2012 refers to the reckless use by militias of machine guns, mortars and other weapons during tribal and territorial conflicts “killing and maiming bystanders”. 113. A Reuters report dated 8 November 2013 refers to fighting by rival militias in Tripoli describing it as a four hour battle with anti-aircraft guns and grenades, and as “the worst fighting for months in the Libyan capital”

“Given the generalised attitude of resentment towards perceived Col. Gaddafi supporters and fighters, and the force with which the Gaddafi regime previously sought to subdue the opposition, it is likely that applicants in this category will be able to show a need for international protection. Perceived supporters of Gaddafi and his regime are at risk of extra-judicial execution, arbitrary detention, torture, ill-treatment and death in detention, both by authorities of the Interim Government or its armed affiliates, as well as by armed militias operating without government control.”

“Consideration should be given to the particular circumstances of the individual, including ethnicity, age, and the nature and degree of the perceived relationship to the Gaddafi‘s regime. Where it is accepted that an individual applicant was closely involved with Gaddafi and the regime, or his particular circumstances indicate a likely risk of attracting the adverse interest of militia brigades allied to the Libyan authorities, a grant of asylum will generally be appropriate, subject to any exclusion considerations under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention.” 131. All three experts were in agreement, either expressly or by implication, that open loyalty to the former regime of Colonel Qadhafi is reasonably likely to result in detention and ill-treatment. It is clear from the evidence that such treatment would amount to persecution, serious harm and a breach of the individual’s human rights under Article 3 of the ECHR. 132. The evidence does not support a contention that any resurgence of the former regime is likely. As Dr Porter put it, “Libya’s revolution-cum-civil war is over”

“The indigenous, semi-nomadic Tabu, marginalised by Gaddafi under his Arabisation campaign, staked out a leading role during the 2011 revolution with a goal to secure their civil rights. Combining their intimate knowledge of the Sahara with a tribal network spanning both sides of the borders, they forged a successful blockade against pro-regime reinforcements. When the revolution was won, a grateful transitional government controversially awarded the Tabu commander Issa Abdel Majid Mansour oversight over vital desert crossings to the detriment of Kufra‘s majority Arab Zwai tribe. The Zwai, whose ties stretch over oil-rich territory to Ajdabiya, 150km south of Benghazi, previously benefited from Gaddafi‘s divide-and-rule tactics”. 186. Whilst Professor Joffé would include the Tibu as being amongst those who would be in a risk category, his view is on the basis that the Tibu are black African. However, the background evidence does not support the suggestion that this group would be at risk, either in their own right, or, for the reasons we have given, on the basis that they are part of a group that has been described as Black Libyans. Women 187. Background evidence indicates that despite constitutional guarantees in relation to equal rights, these were not enforced by the interim governments, particularly in relation to women and minorities. Militias and extremists are said to have used violence and intimidation against women they considered in violation of religious law and cultural norms. The COI and OGN both describe the problems faced by women in terms of domestic violence and discrimination. During the revolution thousands of women were raped. 188. In rural areas societal discrimination restricted women’s movements, according to the OGN, even to local destinations. Most women will not travel unless accompanied by a husband or male relative. Members of the elite, however, have more freedom in this regard. We also note what is said about unmarried or divorced women living on their own. 189. There were some news reports of the government’s intention to address the issue of violence against women. A BBC news report of 13 December 2011 refers to women heading two ministries; health and social affairs. It nevertheless goes on to describe Libyan society as a deeply conservative, male dominated society where public gatherings are often segregated. There is stated in that report to be an assertive new generation of women’s rights emerging. 190. Dr Porter thought that it is possible for a woman to travel overland from Tripoli to Benghazi, but would need to be accompanied. In written evidence he said that it was not necessarily dangerous for a woman to travel alone but it would be unusual. She would be subject to additional questioning at checkpoints. Since the revolution Libyan society has become more socially conservative. In oral evidence he said that a woman’s ability to navigate checkpoints would depend on the purpose of the travel and he was not aware of a woman having suffered ill-treatment at a checkpoint. He said that a single woman with no links to the community would have “tremendous difficulty” accessing accommodation and that it was very rare for a woman to arrive in a community without knowing a single person in the community, or to rent a room by herself because of the suspicion that would arise of her being a prostitute. There would be no difficulties specific to women in flying from Tripoli to Benghazi. If a woman were travelling with her brother, that would overcome the difficulties she might face in overland travel if alone. 191. The expert evidence was consistent with the background evidence in terms of the difficulty of accessing accommodation as a single woman. 192. The OGN at 3.11.15 refers to the inability of the government to provide women protection against harm. Some women and particular sub-categories of women will be able to demonstrate the need for international protection but taking into account all relevant factors. It is as well to set out in full what the OGN says about the potential for risk to women in Libya. 193. At 3.11.15 it states the following: “Given the generalised discrimination towards women in Libya, and the inability of the current Government to provide protection against harm, it is likely that some women and especially particular sub-categories of women (e.g. women of African ethnicity, victims of sexual violence, and women perceived to have been allied to the Gaddafi regime) will be able to demonstrate a need for international protection. All relevant factors should be taken into account, including the age, health, educational and economic status, and the individual circumstances of the applicant. Female applicants able to show they are at real risk of persecution because they are accused of sexual ‘misdemeanours‘ or offences against family honour are likely to be able to show that they fall into the category of a particular social group (PSG).”

“61…Aside from the fact that the SOS has undertaken not to remove failed asylum seekers to Libya at present, I take account of the fact that the UK government has not accepted, even at the height of the conflict, that Libya is in a state of internal armed conflict. 62. I conclude therefore that there are not substantial grounds for believing that the Appellant would face a real risk of suffering serious harm if he is returned to Libya…” 4. With respect to the FTT judge, the fact that the Secretary of State had undertaken not to remove failed asylum seekers to Libya at that time was irrelevant to his task. He was obliged to consider the position hypothetically in terms of whether, if returned, the appellant would be at risk. Further, the FTT judge was not conducting a mere review of the respondent’s decision and so the fact that the respondent did not consider there was an armed conflict in Libya at that time was no more than one aspect of the evidence and did not without more warrant the conclusion that “therefore” the appellant was not at risk. 5. I observe that at the date of hearing there was still a No-fly zone in force in Libya and fighting was still continuing. It was certainly arguable on the available evidence that there was a state of armed conflict in the country as a whole or parts of it and it is also the case, of course, that in QD (Iraq) the Court of Appeal did not appear to consider that for Article 15(c) to be engaged it was even necessary for there to be an armed conflict; the essential matter was the existence of a high level of indiscriminate violence. 6. For these two reasons I consider that the FTT judge materially erred in law and that his decision is to be set aside. I should clarify, however, that there was no challenge in this case to the judge’s primary findings of fact, only to his application to those findings of correct legal criteria. Hence his primary findings of fact shall stand. 7. It may assist if I comment on a further aspect of the FTT judge’s decision. 8. In his treatment of the issue of risk on return, the FTT judge appeared to consider that the Court of Appeal judgment in HH and Others (Somalia) [2010] EWCA Civ 426 established that so long as the precise route of return to a country was not ascertainable, it was not necessary for the decision to deal with whether there would be risk on return arising from the precise point of entry. However, in relation to Libya, the reason for the inability to identify a point of return was arguably a concern that there was no safe part of the country. That being so I consider it at least arguable that HH & Others cannot be prayed in aid to prevent assessment of risk on return. Further, if it is the case that the respondent has only ever identified Tripoli as a point of return for returnees to Libya (and Tripoli was at the relevant time still affected by a no-fly zone), it is at least arguable that there was no proper basis for considering the route of return uncertain. 9. I raised with the parties whether this case would be suitable to be joined with other cases that have been identified as potential country guidance case on Libya (one of them also having Jackson and Cantor as representatives - AA/04789/2011 AT). Both representatives said they considered this case would be a helpful addition, enabling the Tribunal to consider not just generic risk but risk to significant categories of returnees. I explained to them that the decision on whether to join this case would be for the Country Group Convenor but that the parties would be notified one way or the other as soon as possible. 10. For the above reason the FTT judge materially erred in law and his decision is set aside, with a notice concerning a continuation hearing to be sent to the parties shortly. Signed Date Dr H H Storey Judge of the Upper Tribunal APPENDIX B ERROR OF LAW DECISION-HKA Heard at Field House Determination Promulgated On 16 September 2011 ………………………………… Before SENIOR IMMIGRATION JUDGE STOREY Between [hka] Appellant and THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT Respondent DECISION AND DIRECTIONS 1. The appellant is a national of Libya. In a determination notified on 12 May 2011 the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration Judge Duff) dismissed the appellant’s appeal against a decision of the respondent on 24 March 2011 to refuse to grant asylum and to remove her as an illegal entrant. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal having been granted, the matter came before me to decide whether the FTT materially erred in law. 2. Both parties were in agreement with me that the IJ had materially erred in law in failing to address the potential difficulties the appellant would have on a hypothetical return to Tripoli in early May 2011 when the Gaddafi regime was still in power and when it was not in dispute that the appellant is from Benghazi and is of the A tribe. The IJ based his decision on an assessment of likely risk to the appellant on the basis of her return to Benghazi and further on his assessment that she and her brother “could make a claim for Egyptian nationality, because of the nationality of their mother”

“I was also in touch with my friend HH by telephone. HH told me that there were four tribes who are in control of different areas of Zawiya; Awlad Salkar, Awlad Sowlah, Awlad Ajinah, Iwlad Abdulmula. He told me that sometimes these tribes work together and sometimes they fight each other, but they are all using violence to keep control of their areas of Zawiya, and they are all persecuting black Libyans. HH told me that my father had been beaten up by the rebels. He said that my father had been taken to hospital and this was at the end of January 2012. That is the last I spoke to HH. He told me that the rebels came to my father’s house in Zawiya and beat him and that my wife and children have fled Zawiya, he did not know where they had gone. All my family have left, my father, my mother, wife, children, brothers and sisters. The house is completely empty. HH has been to visit them and found the house been abandoned.”) 15. As to whether up until that point his family had stayed in Zawiye, he does not know as this is what H told him. He said they are not there. They were there when the rebels came to the house and beat his father. 16. It was put to the appellant that on this account his family had stayed in Zawiya up until January 2012. He said he believed they stayed until August 2011. He received a call from his wife saying that they were all planning to escape. The call lasted for five minutes and she was scared. He did not know where they stayed until he was told by HH. 17. He agreed that he had contacted the Red Cross. He had lost contact with all his family members. It was put to the appellant that he had not mentioned in his witness statement having lost contact with his brothers and sisters. He explained that they all had his telephone number. As to why he had not mentioned in his witness statement that he had lost contact with his brothers and sisters, there was no contact but they have his telephone number. 18. The appellant was then referred to page 158 in relation to his contact with the Red Cross. S is his wife, Mu is his father, Ma is his mother, H is his daughter and A is his son. He was asked why the letter only referred to these members of his family and he said he had meant all his family, especially his parents. He was referred to pages 156 and 155 of the bundle. He explained that he had no further documentation because one of the people is called Sarah and he has met her more than once at a place where she meets asylum seekers and she has said that there is no news. 19. He was referred to para 42 of his witness statement dated 17 August 2011, in relation to his claim that people had been arrested in Libya as a result of his encouraging them to demonstrate. He agreed that the paragraph was accurate. HH told him that the reasons his friends H and J had been arrested because of him. This is the same HH he had previously referred to. They had been actively demonstrating against Qadhafi. The appellant had encouraged them by phone to demonstrate more. The appellant did not know when they were arrested because he was not there. HH was warning the appellant about going back. The appellant had been one of the reasons why H and J had been arrested. HH remained in Libya until the appellant’s last call in January 2012. 20. It was pointed out to the appellant that he had said that HH had fled. The appellant responded by saying that HH went to Tunisia. He went there to make calls and then went back. He received a call from HH while events were taking place. It was some time before 17 th August, 2011 and the appellant did not know when HH returned. 21. The appellant said that he had said that HH remained in Libya because he was there the last time he had spoken to him. It was put to the appellant that his account was contradictory in terms of the level of contact with family and friends in Libya. The appellant said he did not understand why it was said to be contradictory. It was only one person he knew who had spoken to him and the second time was his wife. It was suggested to him that he had a wide number of family in Libya apart from his wife and friends. He had three brothers and three sisters, uncles and aunts. However, he does not appear to have given any information about his efforts to contact them. The appellant said that when he came to the United Kingdom he did not inform any of them that he was coming. Everyone was scared and black people especially were being targeted because they cannot really speak. 22. Even if his brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts knew that he was coming here, they were all living separately. They could get his telephone number from his wife or anyone else. As to his previous evidence that they had his number, did not have all the numbers to contact everyone. 23. It was suggested that if his account was true he would have made efforts to find out from his wider family what had happened. The appellant said that his account was true. His wife was not a Libyan citizen so he could not contact her family. He was thinking of his family and he was worried and because of this he has become diabetic. It was HH who told him about his family. Again it was suggested to him that if he had been worried and anxious to find his family after 20 August 2011 it would have been possible by one of those routes, particularly his family in Zawiye, to find out that they had remained in his father’s house at least until January 2012. The appellant said that HH was the closest to him and he contacted him and he told him about what had taken place. 24. In re-examination he said that Zawiye is 45-50 kilometres away from Tripoli, and HH went to Tunisia and then returned. Tunisia is 70 to 100 kilometres away from Zawiye. The appellant’s wife is from Yemen. 25. In answer to questions from the Tribunal he said that that he had not tried to make any contact with his wife’s family in Yemen to see whether they might have heard from her because he does not have their telephone number. He does know their address but had not written to them as there are troubles in Yemen as well and that the post was not working. As to whether he had made any contact with his brother in Egypt, he has no telephone number or address for him. 26. In further cross-examination he said that his brother was not a famous preacher in Egypt but a normal person. He was only studying engineering in Egypt. He was referred to the witness statement of ESMA (page 344). His brother, S, had been a famous preacher and advised people on Sharia law before he went to Egypt. He met that witness in Bournemouth. 27. The appellant said that before his brother went to Egypt this witness had known the appellant’s brother but there was no contact between the appellant and his brother now. The witness had not given the appellant his brother’s telephone number. He did not ask him for his brother’s number. 28. As to how it was that his brother was a famous Sheikh in Libya but went to being just an engineering student in Egypt, he was not entirely sure what his brother was studying. He thought it was engineering. His brother went to Egypt to study before events took place in Libya. 29. In answer to a further question put by the Tribunal in relation to the witness statement of ESMA (page 344) who states that the appellant's brother had had serious problems in Libya and had to flee to Egypt, it may be that the government was making it hard for him and which is why he thought of going to Egypt to study but he did not go during the troubles. He did not know that, as the witness statement says, Mr A had spoken to his brother twice. He was not aware that this was in Mr A’s witness statement. He knew that he knows his brother and was in contact with his brother. As to why he did not contact his brother in Egypt to see if he had any news of his family. Mr A left the UK and the appellant has lost all contact with him. 30. In answer to further questions in re-examination he said that his wife is a Yemeni citizen and ethnically she is “close to black”

“Other important human rights abuses included: arbitrary and unlawful killings, including politically motivated killings by groups outside government control; kidnappings; torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; harsh and life-threatening conditions in detention and prison facilities, some of which were illegal; arbitrary arrest and detention; lengthy pretrial detention; denial of fair public trial; an ineffective judicial system staffed by intimidated judicial authorities; arbitrary interference with privacy and home; use of excessive force and other abuses in internal conflicts; localized restrictions on humanitarian aid to civilians; limits on the freedoms of speech and press, including violence and harassment of journalists on several occasions and in certain areas; restrictions on freedom of religion; abuses of internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and migrants; social discrimination against and societal abuse of women and ethnic and racial minorities, including foreign workers; legal and social discrimination based on sexual orientation; trafficking in persons; killings related to societal violence; and breaches of labor rights in practice, including forced labor.” 11. Further, in relation to accountability, the effectiveness of the judiciary and security it is stated that: “Impunity was a serious problem. Although militias detained abusive Qadhafi-era officials, the scarcely functioning criminal courts struggled to try them, and when they did attempt to conduct trials, judges often faced threats of violence. In the same vein, with the judiciary not fully functioning, the government had not taken concrete steps by year’s end to advance transitional justice. There were rarely investigations and still fewer prosecutions of those believed to have committed abuses. With the disappearance of the authoritarian Qadhafi regime, militias that spearheaded his overthrow filled a security vacuum in many parts of the country. During the year militias and their supporters--at times nominally but not fully under the control of the interim and later the elected government’s authority--violated human rights and humanitarian norms, committing unlawful killings, physical violence, and other abuses. Hostility to real and perceived Qadhafi loyalists permeated the country, the principal targets of which were actual or suspected former Qadhafi soldiers or supporters. Nongovernmental actors, including autonomous militias and armed tribal groups, committed human rights abuses. Disappearances, illegal detentions, and imprisonment of persons on political grounds occurred, as did looting and further violence. Vulnerable civilian populations, including ethnic minorities and migrants, faced ongoing violence and discrimination.” 12. Particular targets of arbitrary and unlawful killings were real or suspected Qadhafi supporters, Qadhafi soldiers, possible sub-Saharan mercenaries, dark-skinned Libyans, former members of the security forces, as well as foreign diplomats. 13. Page 3 of the USSDR reports that there were at least 21 killings in Benghazi alone of current and former security officials, many of them defectors from the Qadhafi regime. Militias/detentions 14. An example of the human rights abuses that are said to have been committed by militias is that reported by the UN Support Mission in Libya, at page 5 of the USSDR: three detainees died on 13 April as a direct result of torture, and at least seven other persons were tortured in the Zaroug detention facility in Misrata. The Supreme Security Committee (“SSC”) which was under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, controlled the facility. The USSDR continues that: “Treatment varied from facility to facility and was typically worst at the time of arrest. Reported abuses included beatings with belts, sticks, rifles, and hoses; administration of electric shocks; burns inflicted by boiling water, heated metal, or cigarettes; mock executions; suspension from metal bars; and rape. Abuses against detainees, particularly alleged Qadhafi loyalists and sub-Saharan Africans aligned with Qadhafi, were similarly reported at other militia-run facilities throughout the country.” 15. According to a report by the UN Secretary General’s special representative for Libya, on 10 May 2012 there were approximately 3,000 people held in 31 Justice Ministry facilities and approximately 4,000 held by various militia groups at formal or secret detention facilities. At year’s end the ICRC estimated that several thousand persons remained detained with the greatest concentration of detainees being in greater Tripoli, Misrata and Benghazi. The vast majority were Libyans accused of fighting for the Qadhafi regime. The other main category was foreigners of which a majority appeared to be irregular migrants. 16. As to the types of informal detention facility and the conditions within them: “makeshift facilities appeared throughout the country to accommodate detainees collected by all sides. These facilities’ conditions were uneven and varied widely, but consistent problems included overcrowding, poor ventilation, the lack of necessities such as mattresses, and poor access to hygiene and health care. Militias reportedly detained persons at schools, former government military sites, and other informal venues, including private homes and, in one case, a soccer club. Many prisons and detention centers were outside of central government control, and the conditions in some prisons and detention centers were harsh to the point of being life threatening. Access to food in Ministry of Justice prisons was generally adequate, although access to potable water was a critical problem in Joodayem, Salah Aldeen, and Dafniya prisons. Men and women were reportedly held separately. In some instances minors were held in Ministry of Justice prisons with adults. Human rights organizations reported that militias also held minors with adults. Administration: Information about the administration of prisons and detention centers was generally not available due to the lack of government control and improvised solutions that were required to accommodate the large increase of detainees in the course of the revolution. There was no information on adequacy of recordkeeping, alternative sentencing practices, permission for religious observances, investigation of allegations of inhumane conditions, or access to visitors. There was no credible ombudsman for prisoners and detainees.” 17. On page 15 of the USSDR, in relation to freedom of movement it states that on 16 December 2012 the GNC voted to declare much of the southern part of the country a “closed military zone”

“Prison and detention centre conditions in Libya are very poor; overcrowding, lengthy pre-trial incarceration, torture and deaths in custody are particular problems. The Libyan authorities have yet to gain authority over the hundreds of militias currently holding several thousand detainees outside any legal jurisdiction.” 26. At 3.13.15 it states that: “There is evidence of security personnel and members of militia groups acting with impunity with regard to inhuman and degrading treatment. Reports indicate that those perceived to have been pro-Gaddafi loyalists, and those perceived to have been working or fighting on his behalf, particularly those of African ethnicity are at particular risk of ill treatment. In such cases the risk of mistreatment will be sufficient to make removal a breach of Article 3.” 27. Finally, it is said at 3.13.16 that w here applicants can demonstrate a real risk of imprisonment on return to Libya, a grant of Humanitarian Protection is likely to be appropriate, going on to conclude as follows: “However, the individual factors of each case should be considered to determine whether detention will cause a particular individual in his particular circumstances to suffer treatment contrary to Article 3. Relevant factors include the likely type of detention facility, the reasons for detention, with particular regard to the individual‘s political profile, and the individual‘s age, gender, ethnicity and state of health.” 28. In its summary of the report “Torture and deaths in detention in Libya” the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (“UNSMIL”), dated October 2013, states that: “Torture and other ill-treatment in Libya is an on-going and widespread concern in many detention centres, despite the efforts of the Libyan authorities which are committed at the highest level to ending torture and to ensuring the proper functioning of the criminal justice system.” 29. Since 2012, the report states, the government has sought to bring under the authority of the state the armed brigades which are in control of most of the detention facilities where torture takes place. In April 2013 Libya adopted a law criminalising torture, enforced disappearance and discrimination. A new law in September 2013 requires all conflict-related detainees to be released or referred to the public prosecutor within 90 days of the promulgation of the law. Nevertheless the report states, torture continues and is most frequent immediately on arrest and during the first days of interrogation as a means to extract confessions or other information. Detainees are usually held “without access to lawyers and occasional access to families, if any.”

“You would consider the SSC as a mix of sheikhs, students and graduates from prison!”

“There was societal discrimination and violence originating in ethnic differences. Racial discrimination existed against dark-skinned Libyans, including those of originally sub-Saharan descent, in part due to allegations that Qadhafi used African mercenaries during the conflict. There were reports of dark-skinned Libyans as well as Tuaregs being removed from their homes in Tripoli and held in detention centers and prisons. There was also societal discrimination and violence originating in attitudes toward the previous regime. For example, fighting began April 1, reportedly involving heavy weapons, between the largely Amazigh and anti-Qadhafi western town of Zuwara, on one side, and the mostly Arab and pro-Qadhafi towns of Al-Jimail and Regdalin on the other. There were also clashes reflecting a conflict between Tebou and Zway tribes over smuggling rivalries in the southeast of the country. On March 26, Arab government-affiliated militia clashed with Tebou tribal groups in the region near Kufra. According to reports from local contacts and NGOs, the fighting was largely one sided and targeted at Tebou civilian neighborhoods in attempt to push Libyan Tebou out of the country into Chad. On April 21, the conflict had escalated to the point that government forces were sent to Kufra to restore order.” 60. The AI report of 16 February 2012 entitled “Militias Threaten Hope for New Libya” states that a challenge for the new regime is to tackle “the widespread discrimination and xenophobia against sub-Saharan Africans and dark-skinned Libyans from Tawargha and other parts of Libya where support for al-Gaddafi forces during the conflict was reportedly high.”

“People from the Tawargha area, who are black Libyans, are at particular risk of reprisals and revenge attacks by Misratah militias, because the area was a base for al-Gaddafi troops when they were besieging Misratah and because many Tawargha allegedly supported al-Gaddafi forces during the conflict. The number of Tawargha people among the detainees appears disproportionately high and most of those interviewed by Amnesty International said they had been tortured or ill-treated.”

“Members of the Mshashiya and from Qawalish tribes in the Nafusa Mountain area have similarly been targeted by militias because of their alleged support for al-Gaddafi forces during the conflict. People from the Mshashiya tribe and Qawalish village are particularly targeted by militias from Zintan.”

“People from sub-Saharan Africa who have been detained by militias have been particularly vulnerable to abuse. While many Sub-Saharan Africans were detained during and in the weeks after the conflict because of the belief that al-Gaddafi forces used African mercenaries to fight pro-NTC forces, many are now being held because of their suspected “illegal” status or related issues. When Amnesty International delegates visited Ain Zara Prison in January 2012, about 400 out of approximately 900 detainees were foreign nationals, mainly from Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the prison administration, about 10 per cent of the foreign nationals were accused of having fought during the conflict. Several Sub-Saharan Africans interviewed by Amnesty International in detention and after release said they had been tortured or ill-treated.” 62. Specifically in relation to Zawiye, the same AI report describes the town as one that saw violent confrontations between supporters of the uprising and Qadhafi forces and where revenge attacks and reprisals by local militia have taken place against those who are known to have or are suspected of having supported the former regime. 63. The OGN of May 2013 in relation to particular categories of persons states that Tawurgans and the Mashashiya are vulnerable to arrest by the Misrata and Zintan militias, as suspected supporters of Qadhafi and of having committed crimes during the conflict (3.10.4). At 3.10.5, referring to Amnesty International reports it states that militias take persons suspected of having supported Qadhafi forces and committed crimes during the conflict captive from the streets or at checkpoints. Easily identifiable targets, such as black Tawurgans or Sub-Saharan African nationals, are particularly vulnerable to such practices, severely impeding their freedom of movement. Displaced Tawurgans have been subjected to arbitrary arrest and torture in detention. 64. Paras 3.12.1-3.12.32 consider ethnic groups stating that the principal minorities were Amazigh, Tuareg and Tebou. Although under Qadhafi the Amazigh faced discrimination, including limitations on the use of their language, by the end of 2012 they used their language publicly, publishing journals and using their language Tamazight on public signs and on the radio. They encouraged the government to make Tamazight one of the official languages. 65. Racial discrimination existed against dark-skinned Libyans, including those originally of sub-Saharan descent, in part due to allegations that Qadhafi used African mercenaries during the conflict. There were reports of dark-skinned Libyans as well as Tuaregs being removed from their homes in Tripoli and held in detention centres and prisons. 66. Allegations that mercenaries were recruited from Chad, Nigeria and Sudan appeared to be heavily exaggerated. Many Africans worked in civilian jobs. There have been reports of harassment and violence towards sub-Saharan African migrant workers, by rebel fighters and civilians. HRW reported that Africans were held in overcrowded cells with appalling hygiene standards and no access to clean drinking water. Many sub-Saharan Africans have been displaced by the fighting and for fear of reprisals. Many noted with horror how revolutionary brigades had exacted revenge against largely unarmed Mashashiya and Tawurga, two communities that had largely backed Qadhafi in the conflict. 67. Thousands of non-Arabs, like Tuaregs, have no official documentation attesting to their citizenship. The main proof of citizenship is the “family booklet” in which all members of the family are listed and which is presented when applying for jobs, university, or when taking out a loan from a bank. Tuaregs who have been in Libya “for 100 years” have managed to obtain a family booklet but those who settled in the country 40 or 50 years ago were denied one and possess neither Libya nor any other citizenship (3.12.10). 68. Many Tawurga have moved to Benghazi, Tripoli or southern Libya. They remain displaced and live in camps and with host families, though some are held in detention. “The generally dark-skinned Tawurga” were accused by the brigades of siding with Qadhafi and of killing and raping residents of Misrata during the revolution. According to community groups, about 18,000 Tawurgans are in Benghazi, 13,000 in Tripoli and 7,000 in and around Sebha in the south. There are smaller numbers in other places. In Tripoli they are mostly based in four camps: at the Naval Academy in Janzur, and in the al-Fallah and Sarraj neighbourhoods. Basic humanitarian assistance comes mostly from LibAid, a Libyan government agency. Security has improved, with fewer raids by the Misrata militias who claim they are searching for wanted men. In January 2012 militias from Misrata raided the Janzur camp and shot dead a man, three women and three children (3.12.15-3.12-16). 69. At 3.12.17 it states that about 1,300 Tawurgans are detained, missing or dead according to HRW which also said that crimes committed against the Tawurga may amount to crimes against humanity. 70. Para 3.12.23 refers to members of the Tebu and Tuareg communities having long complained about discrimination, racism and the inability to renew identity documents or obtain new ones for their children. Such communities also tend to be among the poorest and live in informal settlements with little access to services. 71. The Tuareg number some 100,000. Some opposed Qadhafi while others found employment in the regular army. Many Libyans tend to identify all Tuareg as regime supporters. At least 1,500 Tuareg fighters joined Qadhafi’s loyalist forces. Sources inside the Libyan city of Ghadames told a news agency that the Tuareg tribes have been subjected to ethnic cleansing for the previous eight months since May 2012, the Ghadames tribe apparently being responsible. Many Tuareg are said to have been detained in illegal places of detention in secret locations in inhumane conditions. They are said to be being searched for everywhere, including in hospitals, to be killed and tortured. As of January 2013, 2,400 who had fled Ghadames remained internally displaced in Libya (3.12.24-3.12.27). 72. The COI report 2012, from 19.10, quoting a report of the UN Human Rights Council ‘International Commission of Inquiry on Libya’, released on 2 March 2012, describes the targeting of Tawurgans by the Misratan thuwar [7] , and of Mashashiya towns regarded as loyalist (to Qadhafi) by thuwar from Zintan. Mashashiya detainees have been tortured, towns looted and property burnt. Those who have attempted to return to their homes are reported to have been beaten. 73. As regards the Tuareg, at 19.19, the report of the UN Human Rights Council ‘International Commission of Inquiry on Libya’ dated March 2012 is quoted as stating that three interviewees indicated that an indeterminate number of Tuareg men were recruited to fight alongside Qadhafi forces. 74. The Tebu are said in an article from Al-Jazeera dated December 2012, quoted at 19.20 of the COI, now to dominate Libya’s southern desert, guarding remote checkpoints, oil fields and weapons stockpiles. Before the revolution against Qadhafi they had been marginalised for decades. Dislike for Qadhafi led the Libyan Tebu to rise up against him whereby they provided crucial southern support to the coastal rebels’ fight. 75. At 19.21-19.22 the section of the COI on “Black Libyans”, referring to a report of August 2011 states that since the early days of the Libyan uprising there have been reports of organized racist attacks on so-called “Black Libyans” and foreign workers, particularly in rebel-held areas. Officials of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees related that refugees arriving from eastern Libya at the Egyptian border reported that armed Libyans had been going from door to door, forcing sub-Saharan Africans to leave. Tens of thousands of refugees arriving at camps in Tunisia and Egypt said that they were accused of being mercenaries hired by the government. 76. The HRW report dated 20 March 2013 gives many examples of detentions, torture and killings of people from Tawurga by Misrata militias, as well as the destruction of Tawurga. 77. Various reports and news articles, in particular from the background bundle in respect of AMH refer to historic racism in Libyan society, as well as discrimination, intimidation, detention and ill-treatment of sub-Saharan Africans and Black or dark skinned Libyans. Several of the reports refer to the claims that such individuals were Qadhafi mercenaries as being exaggerated. 78. A report from Amnesty International (“AI”) entitled “Scapegoats of Fear”, dated June 2013 states in the opening paragraph that the human rights of tens of thousands of foreign nationals, including asylum seekers, refugees and migrants, continue to be violated. The report goes on to state that: “In a context of political instability and lawlessness, foreign nationals, mainly from sub-Saharan Africa, are at constant risk of exploitation, arrest and indefinite detention pending deportation. Those without “proper documentation” are particularly vulnerable as Libyan legislation criminalizes entering, staying in or leaving Libya irregularly. When Amnesty International delegates were in Libya in April and May 2013, approximately 1,700 detained asylum-seekers were held indefinitely in poorly resourced “holding centres”

“Once again, the country is a magnet destination for people, particularly sub-Saharan Africans and North African and Middle Eastern nationals, who are looking for economic opportunities or for international protection as they flee persecution, violence and armed conflicts in the region and beyond .” 80. Many thousands are said to arrive every year in the hope of continuing their journey to Europe. In addition to the Department of Combating Irregular Migration (“DCIM”), militias and in some cases ordinary citizens motivated by xenophobia and misguided fears about diseases, detain foreign nationals on an almost daily basis, driven by what they believe is their national duty. Arrests are said to take place at any place and at any time, although most often from their homes, at checkpoints or on the streets. The AI report describes the conditions of detention as in most cases falling short of international standards, and at times amounting to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. 81. A recent report dated 14 October 2013 entitled “ Racism and revolution: the plight of black Africans in Libya” by Equal Times states that the end of the Qadhafi regime opened up huge divisions in Libyan society, stating that in particular the lid was lifted on “a fervent undercurrent of racism which has resulted in the detention, torture and murder of thousands of black Libyans and sub-Saharan migrants since 2011.”

“A group of former anti-Gaddafi militias who operate as a de facto army and police force under the country’s newly formed Ministry of Defence, one of its responsibilities is ‘securing’ the refugee camps and its residents. In reality, this means stopping anyone from leaving, even if it means using extreme violence.”

“Given the generalised attitude of resentment towards perceived Col. Gaddafi supporters and fighters, and the force with which the Gaddafi regime previously sought to subdue the opposition, it is likely that applicants in this category will be able to show a need for international protection. Perceived supporters of Gaddafi and his regime are at risk of extra-judicial execution, arbitrary detention, torture, ill-treatment and death in detention, both by authorities of the Interim Government or its armed affiliates, as well as by armed militias operating without government control.” 85. Para 3.10.19 goes on to state that consideration should be given to the individual’s circumstances, including “the nature and degree of the perceived relationship to Gaddafi’s regime”, and that: “Where it is accepted that an individual applicant was closely involved with Gaddafi and the regime, or his particular circumstances indicate a likely risk of attracting the adverse interest of militia brigades allied to the Libyan authorities, a grant of asylum will generally be appropriate, subject to any exclusion considerations under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention.” 86. The OGN concludes that it is unlikely that such a person would be able to relocate internally given that the interim government would not be able to provide effective protection, that torture is carried out by officially recognised security entities and that persons suspected of having supported Qadhafi’s forces are taken captive on the streets and at checkpoints. 87. The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada report dated 7 December 2012 in relation to the “Situation and treatment of those perceived to be loyal to Qaddafi since his fall; state protection”

“Given the generalised discrimination towards women in Libya, and the inability of the current Government to provide protection against harm, it is likely that some women and especially particular sub-categories of women (e.g. women of African ethnicity, victims of sexual violence, and women perceived to have been allied to the Gaddafi regime) will be able to demonstrate a need for international protection. All relevant factors should be taken into account, including the age, health, educational and economic status, and the individual circumstances of the applicant. Female applicants able to show they are at real risk of persecution because they are accused of sexual ‘misdemeanours‘ or offences against family honour are likely to be able to show that they fall into the category of a particular social group (PSG).”

“Given the circumstances and cultural factors set out above, female applicants who have been raped by soldiers loyal to Gaddafi or other combatants are also likely to be able to show that they are at real risk as members of a PSG. Evidence suggests that even where the rape victim‘s father or husband does not attach personal blame to her, as is the case with other categories of sexual dishonour, she is still at risk of being the subject of an ‘honour‘ killing, in order to save her and her family from dishonour.” 93. Libya Herald on 23 September 2013 reported that the government intended to clamp down on violence against women, while presenting legislation to the GNC to guarantee equality between men and women, backed up by legal sanctions. Justice Minister Salah Bashir Al-Marghani said that the issue of violence against women had to be addressed. 94. A BBC news report dated 13 December 2011 refers to women heading two ministries in the new government, health and social affairs. The report describes Libya as a deeply conservative, male-dominated society where wedding parties and public gatherings are often segregated and men traditionally take the political decisions. An assertive new generation of women’s rights is emerging, gathering every day in homes, offices and Tripoli’s smarter hotels, to discuss and set out their demands. Referring to a protest outside the prime minister’s office, it states that dozens of women covered their mouths with tape to symbolise the silence with which rape victims were greeted by the interim government. Security/policing/judiciary 95. Under the heading “Safety and Security”, The Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya dated 5 September 2013, the report refers to the bombing of the French embassy in Tripoli in April 2013, the targeting of an Italian diplomatic vehicle in June and the firing of a rocket-propelled grenade at the UAE embassy in July. In June UN staff in Sabha were temporarily relocated to Tripoli after armed clashes between rival tribes and the closure of the city airport. 96. In a Security Council Briefing dated 16 September 2013 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNSMIL, at para 16 it reports that progress in integrating revolutionary fighters into the police and army remains very limited, as is their reintegration into civilian life. However, to encourage such fighters to enlist in the army and to improve salary for current uniformed personnel, salary increases were to take effect from January 2014. The training outside Libya of 12-15,000 soldiers was also announced. The Briefing goes on to state that the Libyan police continue to integrate individuals from the armed brigades. 97. In a detailed report entitled “Searching for Justice in Post-Gaddafi Libya” described as a socio-legal exploration of people’s concerns and institutional responses at home and from abroad, it states at 2.2.3 that the development of an active civil society has been supported by government policy and NGOs have in many cases become a vehicle for policy initiatives. Para 3.3.1 notes that Law 37/2012 outlawing the “glorification” of the Qadhafi regime was struck down as being unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 98. The OGN of 9 May 2013 at 2.2.3 states that Libya continued to make efforts to form national security services. The numbers in the security services are said to be unclear although in March 2012 Libya’s Interior Minister said that the police force numbered 25,000 “and was able to provide security”

“The current limitations of Libya‘s legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm mean that in general claimants would not always be able to access effective protection.” 101. Regarding internal relocation, paras 2.3.3-2.3.9 refer to the closed military zone in the south of the country and difficulties with land border crossings, including threats from criminal activities in areas bordering Sudan, Chad, Niger and Algeria. With the exception of the official land border crossings to Tunisia and Egypt, visitors and residents are not permitted to travel in the interior or to border areas without an officially sanctioned guide or specific permission from the authorities. 102. Referring at 3.9.8 to FCO travel advice for Libya, updated in January 2013, it states that violent clashes between armed groups are possible across the country, particularly at night, and even in those places that have previously avoided conflict. These often include the use of heavy weapons. There is a high threat from terrorism. Attacks could be indiscriminate, including in places frequented by expatriates and foreign travellers and there is a threat of kidnapping (3.9.9). 103. At 3.9.13 it is stated that: “Libya has become a patchwork of factions whose continued presence - one that appears to be empowering warlords over elected officials - makes it difficult to ensure the establishment and maintenance of a single body of law that can apply equally and to all.” 104. The OGN assesses at 3.9.20 that: “There continue to be outbursts of internal armed conflict in parts of Libya, but it is not at such a level, either in Libya generally or a material part of it, that substantial grounds exist for believing that any civilian would, solely by being present there, face a real risk of serious harm. The security and humanitarian situation in Libya remains fluid, and some individuals may fall into an enhanced risk category on the basis of certain characteristics. Each case must be considered on its individual merits.” 105. A number of reports deal with what on the face of them could be described as political acts of violence. BBC news Africa on 10 October 2013, reporting on instability in the country noted that the Italian Consulate in Benghazi was attacked in January 2013, the French embassy in Tripoli in April, the EU’s convoy in August and the Russian embassy in October (2013). AI reported on 8 March 2013 on the attack on a TV station which had broadcast a debate about the proposed Political Isolation Law. During the attack Al-Assema TV, a private news channel in Tripoli, was stormed by armed men who abducted four people. 106. BBC news Africa reported on 30 April 2013 that the offices of the Libyan Justice Ministry in Tripoli were surrounded by armed men demanding the expulsion of officials who worked for the government during the Qadhafi era. The report goes on to state that armed groups have targeted state buildings in the past. 107. In a report dated 8 August 2013 Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) state that at least 51 people have been killed “in a broadening wave of apparent political assassinations” in Benghazi and Derna in eastern Libya, although it later states that the actual number is probably higher. The victims included a political activist, two judges and at least 44 serving members of the security forces, most of whom had held positions in the Qadhafi government, at least six having been high ranking officers under Qadhafi. Such political assassinations are said in the report to have peaked in the second half of 2012 and again in January and July 2014. No groups or individuals had claimed responsibility for the assassinations and the only person known to have been arrested escaped. 108. HRW information was to the effect that 12 victims were apparently killed by explosive devices targeting their cars and the rest were shot, mostly in drive-by shootings in front of their homes, workplaces or in their cars. The suspect who escaped was shown in an on-line video apparently confessing to having killed several people stating that commanders of Islamist militias operating in eastern Libya gave orders for the killing of former officers and that they had said that it was acceptable to kill army officers and people affiliated with the current government. In a second video he stated that he had confessed under torture. 109. Given the fact that most of the attacks targeted Qadhafi-era officers in the Benghazi and Derna area and the planned and efficient manner of the killings, it is suggested in the report that they are related and part of a pattern or campaign against individuals with a particular profile. 110. HRW stated that Benghazi has experienced large-scale attacks by various militias on state security forces facilities and army positions as well as armed clashes between militia factions and attacks on foreign diplomatic missions. There is reference to an attack on the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) in May 2012, with a militia accusing the ICRC of proselytising for Christianity including distributing Bibles. 111. Reuters reported on 5 October 2012 that at least 12 soldiers were killed in an attack on a checkpoint near the city of Bani Walid. In a further report dated 9 November 2013 the killing of two policemen in Benghazi by gunmen is referred to, and stating that this was a day after the army had vowed to restore order in the city. The report goes on to state that security in the city has deteriorated in the past few months “with militants and Islamists roaming unchallenged”. 112. The blockade of an oil port by Berbers in western Libya in October 2013 is reported by the Society for Threatened Peoples on 28 October 2013. It is said to have been a form of protest against the ongoing exclusion of ethnic or racial minorities. 113. In an article in Libya Herald dated 14 October 2013 there is a report on the conference on the Transitional Justice Law, held in Tripoli on 30 September 2013. The President of the GNC is said to have explained the aims of the law which include provision for compensation for victims of the Qadhafi regime and of the revolution, to provide justice and compensation for victims of injustice since the revolution and promote national reconciliation. A Fact-Finding and Reconciliation Board is to be set up. Amongst its tasks will be to look at the position of internally displaced persons, such as the Tawurga, missing persons, those imprisoned, and to investigate attacks on people by militias, individuals or state bodies. The rights of those accused of human rights crimes will be guaranteed in the proposed law, and no civilian will be tried in a military court. 114. A further Libya Herald article dated 24 October 2013 refers to a newly passed legislation against torture, kidnapping and discrimination, including with reference to holders of public office, bureaucrats and members of the security forces being subject to the law and to ensure that the prohibited offences did not take place. 115. A report from No Peace Without Justice dated 25 October 2013 describes details of a series of activities and workshops between 5-8 October 2013 “to strengthen the capacity of Libyan national institutions and civil society actors on accountability, human rights and the rule of law.”

“You have communal clashes…militias fighting over control of airports or smuggling routes…shutting down oil production facilities…kidnappings.” 121. Libya Herald reports dated 4 August 2013 and 20 July 2013 refer to a Qatar airways flight being unable to land at Tripoli airport because of specific security concerns in relation to the flight, and clashes around the airport in July. 122. The HRW report dated 17 November 2013 states that militias from Misrata fired assault rifles, machine guns and heavy weapons at overwhelmingly peaceful protestors in Tripoli on 15 November, Ensuing clashes between armed groups and militias left 43 people dead and at least 460 wounded. State security forces present at the initial protest are said to have failed to protect protestors or to arrest and disarm the militias. The report goes on to state that the 43 people killed included people who were apparently not involved in the protest or the clashes. Two of the victims appear to have been medical personnel who were trying to retrieve wounded people. 123. In what is described as a related incident, HRW was told that armed men from Misrata entered Tripoli’s al-Fallah camp for displaced residents of Tawurga on 16 November 2013 and fired indiscriminately at residents, leaving at least one man dead and three injured. 124. Deutsche Welle reported on 17 November 2013 that the Deputy Head of Libyan Intelligence was abducted in Tripoli. 125. A former Coventry University student has, according to a report in the Coventry Evening Telegraph dated 12 September 2013, been in custody in Libya having been arrested on his return there in 2012. He is said to have been accused of taking part in demonstrations and spreading false information on the internet about the Libyan uprising. At the time he was studying mechanical engineering at Coventry University on a Libyan government scholarship. His trial was adjourned because the judge did not turn up for the hearing having been adjourned several times before. A Libya Herald report of 10 September 2013 carries a similar report in relation to the student’s expected appearance at court the following day. An AI news report dated 10 September 2013 deals with the same case. APPENDIX H INDEX OF COUNTRY MATERIALS DATE SOURCE DESCRIPTION 2013 1 17 November Human Rights Watch Libya ; Militias kill unarmed protestors 2 17 November Deutsche Welle Libya ’s deputy Head of Intelligence abducted 3 16 November Deutsche Welle Militia take aim at Tripoli protestors 4 16 November Deutsche Welle Fighting rumbles on in Tripoli in wake of militia attack 5 12 November Al Arabiya Libyan PM promises aid for security forces 6 9 November Reuters Two policemen killed in Libya’s Benghazi 7 9 November Inter Press Service News Agency ‘Libya’s Berbers Close the Tap’ 8 8 November Deutsche Welle Rival militia clash, terrorize Libyan capital 9 8 November Telegraph News Heavy Fighting on Streets of Libyan Capital 10 8 November Libya Herald Misrata breaks with Rogue Militia 11 8 November BBC News Rival Libyan Militias exchange gunfire in Tripoli 12 8 November International Criminal Justice program Supporting Libya’s democratic transition 13 7 November NPR Militias rule whilst Government flounders 14 6 November Wall Street Journal BP to cede control of Libyan Oil venture 15 6 November Reuters Chaos in Libya brings trouble importing food 16 6 November Libya Herald BP to slash Libyan plans 17 6 November Libya Herald Congress Decision still awaited on LROR 18 5 November AKE Libya Update 19 5 November Libya Herald No obstruction to creation of Army 20 4 November United Nations News Centre UN mission condemns assassination attempts in Benghazi 21 4 November Air Transport World Etihad suspends Tripoli flights 22 4 November Voice of America News Libyan Federalists raise tensions 23 3 November Libya Herald GNC disbands the Libyan Revolutionaries’ Operations Room 24 1 November AKE Libya Update 25 1 November Libya Herald Etihad Airways suspends Tripoli flights 26 31 October Libya Herald Over 1000 new officers graduate from police academy 27 31 October Libya Herald Libya military to be sent for training in Italy in weeks 28 28 October Society for Threatened Peoples (Germany) Berbers occupy an oil port in western Libya 29 27 October Al Jazeera NTC: a vision of democratic Libya 30 24 October Libya Herald Saif Al-Islam, Abdullah Senussi and others committed for trial 31 22 October Amnesty International Displacement and persecution in Libya 32 22 October Libya Herald Benghazi Islamists reach out to local tribe and moderate federalists 33 21 October Magharebia ‘Benghazi killings escalate’ 34 18 October Reuters Militia rivalries threaten new war in post revolt Libya 35 17 October Magharebia Terrorists hijack Libyan Revolution 36 17 October Voice of America News Chaos continues in Libya where militias rule 37 14 October Equal Times Racism and Revolution; The Plight of Black Africans in Libya 38 12 October Deutsche Welle Tribal feuds, local conflicts engulf Libya 39 11 October BBC News Libya PM Zeidan’s brief kidnap was ‘attempted coup’ 40 11 October International Criminal Court Decision of International Criminal Court Prosecutor v Saif Gaddafi 41 11 October Eurasia Review Libya responds to UN Torture Allegations 42 10 October Foreign and Commonwealth Office Libya ; travel advice 43 10 October BBC News Might of militias challenge Libya’s fragile government 44 10 October BBC News Guide to Libya’s militias 45 9 October Libya Herald New Tunisia Libya bus service announced 46 8 October No Peace Without Justice NWPJ supports justice sector reform 47 5 October Reuters Libyan checkpoint ambush kills at least 12 soldiers 48 5 October Al Jazeera America Libyan soldiers killed in ambush of military checkpoint 49 4 October Human Rights Watch Suspend death sentences against Gaddafi loyalists 50 3 October Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Two Libyans killed in Russian Embassy Attack 51 2 October Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Two Libyans killed in Russian Embassy Attack 52 2 October Libya Herald More instances of torture and killings in prisons 53 1 October UNSMIL Torture and Deaths in Detention in Libya 54 30 September Libya Herald Conference on transitional justice law explains aims 55 30 September Libya Herald GNC agrees uncompromising law on torture 56 26 September Libya Herald Tripoli jail stormed, illegally detained prisoners found. 57 23 September Libya Herald Marghani pledges gender equality legislation 58 18 September RP Defense Multi-national training to rebuild Libyan army 59 Undated Representative of Secretary General and Head of UNSMIL Security Council Briefing 60 13 September Libya Herald SSC still necessary - Abdel Raouf Kara 61 12 September Coventry Evening Telegraph New trial setback for ex city student accused over demo 62 10 September Amnesty International Libyan who attended protests in London could face life in jail 63 10 September Libya Herald Protest charges against pro Qaddafi student violation of human rights 64 5 September United Nations Report of the Secretary General on UN Support Mission Libya 65 3 September Amnesty International Latest abduction highlights ‘dysfunctional’ justice system 66 28 August AJIDIL project Searching for Justice in post Gaddafi Libya 67 25 August Al Jazeera Tribal groups clash in Libya’s Az Zawiya 68 20 August Libyan Intelligence Group The no.27 law: a renewed public order? 69 13 August Foreign and Commonwealth Office Travel Advice 70 13 August Foreign and Commonwealth Office Security Situation 71 8 August Human Rights Watch Wave of political assassinations 72 4 August Libya Herald Gunmen at Tripoli Airport prevent plane landing 73 2 August Amnesty International Al-Gaddafi loyalists at risk of ‘revenge’ death sentences 74 30 July United Nations United Nations Support Mission in Libya 75 27 July CBC News More than 1000 escape in Libya prison break 76 21 July Magharebia Air officers killed in eastern Libya 77 20 July Libya Herald Clashes leave two dead and four injured 78 12 July Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor Vol XI 79 11 July Action on Armed Violence The Libyan revolution in the protection of victims of rape in war 80 5 July Asylum Research Consultancy Libya Country Report 81 27 June Human Rights Watch Libya displaced people Tawergha barred return 82 25 June Magharebia Fighting resumes in Kufra 83 21 June Foreign Policy Website Libya ’s judges confront the past 84 20 June Amnesty International Scapegoats of Fear 85 20 June Amnesty International Refugees and migrants held in deplorable conditions 86 19 June Lawyers for Justice in Libya Lawyers for Justice in Libya concerned by attacks on judges 87 18 June Australian Refugee Review Tribunal Magharebia 88 13 June Libya Herald Qatar Airways suspends Benghazi flights 89 11 June Training Rule of law and Transitional Justice for Libyan Judges 90 10 June Libya Herald Being Hashim Bishr 91 9 June BBC News Libya army chief resigns after deadly clashes 92 3 June Society for Threatened Peoples Victims of Racism in Tawergha need special protection 93 23 May Amnesty International Annual Report 2013 94 22 May Temehu Libya Tourism News 95 12 May Libya Herald BP pulls out international staff 96 10 May BBC News UK withdraws some embassy staff from Libya 97 8 May Home Office Operational Guidance Note: Libya (v 9.0 May 2013) 98 5 May Voice of America Libya MPs pass law barring Gadhafi-era officials 99 1 May BBC News Why Libya’s militias are up in arms 100 30 April BBC News Libyan gunmen surround justice ministry in Tripoli 101 25 April BBC News Jordan begins Libya police training programme 102 19 April US Department of State Libya ; Country Report on Human Rights Practices 103 16 April UK Government Website New UK boost to economy and policing in Libya 104 13 April International Crisis Group Trial by error: Justice in Post-Qadhafi Libya 105 11 April Institute for War and Peace Reporting Prosecuting Gaddafi era crimes in Libya 106 8 April Amnesty International Amnesty International welcomes the release of Hisham Ben Khayal 107 2 April Integrated Regional Information Networks Thousands of Libyan families displaced in Nafusa Mountains 108 26 March Magharebia Libya jails Kadhafi officials 109 20 March Human Rights Watch Stop revenge crimes against displaced persons 110 20 March Sky News Libya : Legacy of the Uprising Two Years On 111 18 March Noref Report Longing for a State 112 8 March Amnesty International Media attacked as tensions rise over Political Isolation Law 113 1 January UNHCR 2013 UNHCR Country Operations Profile - Libya 2012 114 19 December Home Office Country of Information Report December 2012 115 13 December All Africa Rocky Road ahead of Tawergha Minority 116 7 December Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Situation and treatment of those perceived to be loyal to Gadaffi 117 28 November Refugee World Australia : Refugee Review Tribunal 118 2 November Libya Herald Malaysia student protests highlight problems in Libyan Government 119 31 October Amnesty International Safety concerns for loyalist’s daughter: Anoud Abdallah Al-Sanussi 120 28 October Human Rights Watch The Murder Brigades of Misrata 121 22 October Refugee World Australia : Refugee Review Tribunal 122 18 October Magharebia Libyan forces clash with Kadhafi diehards 123 12 October Amnesty International Libyan authorities urged to protect Bani Walid 124 17 September Amnesty International Libyan authorities must protect two sisters from harassment 125 14 September International Crisis Group Divided we stand: Libya’s Enduring Conflicts 126 14 August Inter Press Service Gadaffi loyalists up in arms 127 5 July Amnesty International Libya : Rule of Law or rule of Militias? 128 1 July International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed conflict database 129 27 June International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed conflict database 130 26 June International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed conflict database 131 25 June New York Times List of unexploded arms in Libya is seen as limited 132 24 June International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed conflict database 133 22 June International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed conflict database 134 21 June International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed conflict database 135 20 June International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed conflict database 136 19 June International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed conflict database 137 18 June International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed conflict database 138 16 June International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed conflict database 139 15 June International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed conflict database 140 12 June International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed conflict database 141 11 June International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed conflict database 142 10 June International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed conflict database 143 09 June International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed conflict database 144 08 June Amnesty International We are not safe anywhere.’ Tawarghas in Libya 145 08 June International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed conflict database 146 04 June International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed conflict database 147 June Norwegian Peace building Resource Centre Rivalries for Authority in Libya 148 24 May Integrated Regional Information Networks Analysis: Libyan minority rights at a crossroads 149 14 May Integrated Regional Information Networks Libya : Uneasy calm in Sebha after clashes 150 3 May Home Office Operational Guidance Note: Libya 151 1 May Integrated Regional Information Networks Libya : Thousands still afraid to return home 152 19 April Amnesty International Central government must protect Kufra resident from militia clashes 153 19 April Al Akhbar Black Libyan tortured to death during detention 154 19 April Amnesty International NTC must investigate death of another Tawergha man 155 January - March International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed conflict database 156 23 March International Committee of the Red Cross Libya : unexploded munitions scar bodies and minds 157 09 March OCHR War crimes committed by both sides 158 7 March Home Office Libya : Country of Origin Information Report 159 6 March Foreign Policy in Focus Risks for dark skinned Libyans 160 5 March COI Response Forced army conscription from the Al-Mesheshia/Muishashya tribe 161 28 February OCHR Statement of the Society for Threatened Peoples 162 27 February UN News Service Tense conditions prevail in Libyan town after deadly ethnic clashes 163 23 February Jamestown Foundation The battle for Kufra Oasis and Ongoing war in Libya 164 21 February BBC News Libya crisis: what role to tribal loyalties play? 165 16 February Amnesty International Militias threaten hopes for new Libya 166 14 February BBC News Timeline: Libya 167 13 February Fox News New Libyan leadership takes harsh stance at UN against gays 168 9 February Associated Press Libya issues election law for national congress 169 7 February Magharebia Black Libyan refugees killed near Tripoli 170 7 February International Centre for Prison Studies World Prison Brief 171 5 February AFP Libya opens trial of 41 Kadhafi loyalists 172 3 February Human Rights Watch Press Release 3 February 2012 173 3 February Reuters Libya enjoys political flowering ahead of elections 174 2 February OCHR Report of the International Commission of Inquiry 175 31 January Libyan Human Rights Commission Libyan Human Right’s Commission: Our History 176 28 January BBC News Libya ’s prisoners make new torture allegations 177 25 January Reporters without Borders Press Freedom Index 178 25 January The Guardian A guide to Libya’s new political landscape 179 24 January World Health Organisation Health System Profile: Libya 180 23 January Freedom House Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa 181 23 January Medea Institute Libya , elections and Parliament 182 23 January The Telegraph British Airways is to resume flights to Libya 183 22 January Human Rights Watch Libya : Lagging Effort to Build Justice System 184 19 January The Independent Nato accused of war crimes in Libya 185 18 January Shabab Unofficial list of Political Parties in Libya 186 17 January Handicap International Libya Page 187 17 January The Social Institutes and Gender Index The Social Institutes and Gender Index, Libya 188 15 January Reuters Slow start for Libya drive to disband militias 189 13 January Reuters Libyan central bank starts withdrawing old currency 190 13 January United Nations Security Council Conflict related sexual violence 191 12 January COI Response - People returning to Libya from west 192 11 January Freedom House Countries at the Crossroads 2011: Libya 193 09 January Amnesty International Year of Rebellion 194 07 January BBC News Libya ’s ex rebels reluctant to down arms 195 06 January Foreign and Commonwealth Office Travel Advice to Libya 196 06 January Foreign and Commonwealth Office Travel and Living Abroad 197 06 January UNICEF 1.2 million children return to school in Libya 198 05 January Reuters Libyan Soldiers Demand Salaries 199 05 January Tripoli Post Libya ’s New Leaders Legalise Political Parties 200 04 January Think Progress Liberated Libya might not improve life for gay community 201 03 January Feb 17 Information Former Colonel appointed chief of Libya new army 2011 202 2011 Wikipedia 2011 Libyan War 203 2011 Libyan Crisis Group Reports of forced recruitment by Gadaffi 204 2011 Wikipedia Az Zawiyah 205 2011 Wikipedia Libyan Uprising 206 30 December Human Rights Watch In Libya: Building the Rule of Law 207 29 December Integrated Regional Information Networks Libya ’s long road to disarmament 208 22 December Voice of America Growth of Civil Society Groups 209 21 December Human Rights Watch Libya : Ensure Gadaffi Son’s Access to Lawyer 210 21 December UN Treaty Collection Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 211 21 December UN Treaty Collection Convention on the rights of the Child 212 20 December UN News Centre Libya : UN Panel encouraged by commitment to tackle rights abuses 213 17 December International Medical Corps Libya Response External Situation 214 16 December Reuters Libyan Rapper finds his voice 215 16 December COI Response - Senior military figures under Gaddafi Regime 216 14 December Women on the Web Abortion laws worldwide 217 13 December BBC News Libyan women battle for empowerment 218 12 December IRCC Libya Libya : over a hundred surgeons to hone skills 219 11 December CBS News Libyan army, militia clash, leaving 1 dead 220 07 December The Telegraph Libyan authorities give rebel militias two weeks to hand in weapons 221 04 December UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Libyan Response, Situation Report 67 222 01 December COI Response - Dark Skinned Libyans 223 01 December COI Response - Internal Security Service (family members) 224 01 December USA Today Women frustrated about lack of representation in Libya 225 28 November UN News Service Most pressing task for Libya is consolidation of Security 226 26 November Economist Hard to control the cocky gunmen 227 24 November Human Rights Watch The Women’s Libya movement in Libya sees surprising twist 228 22 November BBC News Libya ’s Interim PM unveils new government lineup 229 22 November Reuters Libya ’s NTC unveils new government lineup 230 22 November UN Security Council UN Report on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya 231 21 November New York Times Libya tries to build an army that can march straight 232 19 November BBC News Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam captured in Libya 233 17 November Defense News Libya ’s old army appoints new chief 234 12 November The Huffington Post New Radio Stations bring Voices of Freedom to Libyan People 235 12 November The Huffington Post Armed clashes intensify in divided Tripoli 236 10 November Freedom House Countries at the Crossroads 2011 - Libya 237 10 November UNICEF Libya UNICEF provides support to Libyan Youth 238 09 November NPR Radio In post Ghadafi Libya, Enmities Continue to Smoulder 239 09 November Reuters Tense reconciliation begins with Libya’s Saharan Tribes 240 08 November Refugee Documentation Centre (Legal Aid Board, Ireland) Information on those who now wish to return to Libya 241 08 November Euromonitor International Libyan Economic Prospects Strong following Civil War 242 04 November UN Department of Public Information Activities of Secretary General in Libya 243 03 November International Media Support Libya ’s new found freedoms explored 244 02 November International Criminal Court Second Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC to the UNSC 245 01 November The Wall Street Journal Libya chooses a new Prime Minister 246 31 October Reuters In Tripoli, NATO chief hails ‘free Libya’ 247 30 October Human Rights Watch Libya : Militias terrorizing residents of ‘loyalist’ town 248 26 October Reuters Gadaffi killed in hometown, Libya eyes future. 249 26 October UN News Service After liberation, election and security top priorities Libya 250 25 October Women Living Under Muslim Laws Statement on Libya 251 23 October Reuters Newspapers multiply as Libya enjoys press freedom 252 23 October UN News Centre UN renews commitment to support Libya 253 18 October Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights Rebuilding Libya 254 13 October Amnesty International Detention abuses staining the new Libya 255 13 October COI Response - Ex employees of Gadaffi regime 256 10 October World Health Organisation Partners supporting provision of essential health care in Libya 257 29 September UN News Centre UN Human Rights Council recommends reinstating Libya 258 28 September BBC News Libyan ‘prison massacre grave’ revives painful memories 259 23 September Freedom House Freedom of the Press 2011 260 20 September LGBT Asylum News In Libya, mistreatment of black migrants includes gays 261 13 September United States Department of State July-December 2010 International Religious Freedom Report 262 04 September Human Rights Investigations Human Rights Watch and the persecution of black people 263 03 September Gay World News Libya ; What about the LGBT Rights Now? 264 01 September Associated Press Libyan rebels round up black Africans 265 31 August HJT Research African Union warns Libyan rebels 266 31 August Bloomberg Black Libyans and Africans targeted by rebels 267 30 August Amnesty International Fears for detainees held by anti-Gadaffi forces 268 30 August Guardian Libya ’s spectacular revolution has been disgraced by racism 269 30 August Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Qaddafi family members turn up in Algeria 270 24 August All Africa Will a new Libya bring racial violence against black Africans 271 22 August BBC News Libya starts to reconnect to Internet 272 19 August Human Rights Watch Stop Arbitrary assets of Black Africans 273 19 August Human Rights Watch 10 protestors apparently executed 274 16 August Voice of America News NATO condemns Libya’s use of Scud missile 275 11 August Institute for War and Peace Reporting Opposition leadership under strain 276 11 August Tunisia Live NTC announces constitutional declaration 277 10 August Amnesty International NATO urged to investigate civilian deaths 278 01 August Foreign and Commonwealth Office Geographical names and information 279 01 August Minority Rights Group International World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 280 01 August Minority Rights Group International Libya Overview 281 01 August Save the Children Sweden Children’s Rights situation analysis Middle East 282 01 August United States Social Security Administration Social Security problems throughout the world 283 25 July Home Office Country of Origin Information Report Libya 284 25 July United Nations News Centre UN mission to Tripoli finds areas in urgent need of aid 285 25 July Telegraph On the front line during the bloody battle for Zawiya 286 23 July Al Jazeera Central Tripoli ‘rocked by five explosions’ 287 22 July The Hindu US not to insist on Qadhafi’s departure 288 20 July Magharebia Armed civilians raise concerns in Libya 289 20 July Home Office Advice to Libyan Visa Holders 290 2011 Associated Press Libya City torn by tribal feud 291 20 July Voice of America News Deadly clashes continue in Brega 292 20 July Magharebia Armed civilians raise concerns in Libya 293 18 July The World Health Organisation Country Cooperation Strategy for WHO 294 17 July Voice of America News Street fighting engulfs Brega 295 17 July Inter Press Service News Agency Hidden bombs hit Libyans 296 13 July Voice of America News Rights group calls on Libyan rebels to protect civilians 297 13 July Human Rights Watch Opposition forces should protect civilians and hospitals 298 12 July UNICEF 2 million children at physical and emotional risk as conflict drags on 299 07 July United States Department of State Background Note - Libya 300 01 July Medecins San Frontieres Trapped in conflict - The neglected victims of the war in Libya 301 01 July Medecins San Frontieres Between a rock and a hard place: neglected victims of war in Libya 302 29 June Human Rights Watch Gaddafi forces occupy hospital 303 29 June Temehu International and Internal Flights and Schedules in Libya 304 29 June Temehu Libyan Sea Ports 305 27 June United States Department of State Trafficking in persons report, Libya. 306 26 June Voice of America News Libyan rebels claim advances in western mountains 307 24 June Amnesty International Renewed rocket attacks target civilians in Misratah 308 21 June New York Times Blacks in Libya face danger from rebels 309 21 June Black Star News Ethnic cleansing of black Libyans 310 20 June Shabab Libya Fierce fighting near to Tripoli 311 16 June Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Qaddafi’s options narrow as Libyan stalemate continues 312 14 June Child Soldiers International The Coalition to stop the use of child soldiers 313 13 June BBC News Libya ‘repulses rebels’ in Zawiya 314 13 June Ethnologue Language map of Libya and Egypt 2009 315 13 June Ethnologue Languages of the World 2009 316 11 June Reuters Fighting in Zawiyah shuts Libya road to Tunisia 317 09 June The UN News Service Ban calls for continued aid to Libyan civilians as crisis continues 318 08 June UN News Service Evidence emerging of use of rape as tool of war in Libya 319 05 June Human Rights Watch Libya : Opposition Arbitrarily detaining suspected Gadhafi Loyalists 320 01 June Temehu Libyan People 321 01 June UN News Service Libyan Government forces and opposition committed war crimes 322 31 May France 24 International News Libyan rebels rename themselves National Liberation Army 323 18 May NBC News Gadhafi rebels vie for loyalty of Libyan tribes 324 13 May Amnesty International Amnesty International Annual Report 2011 325 12 May Freedom House Annual Report Libya 2011 326 12 May Freedom House Freedom in the World Libya 2011 327 12 May Foreign and Commonwealth Office Head of the Libyan National Transitional Council visits UK 328 11 May Amnesty International Annual Report 2011 Libya 329 11 May BBC News Key Maps of Libya 330 11 May Maps of World Libya Political Map 331 07 May Reuters Fear of crackdown, conscription haunts Libyan capital 332 06 May Amnesty International Detainees, disappeared and missing 333 06 May Amnesty International Attacks against Misratah resident point to war crimes 334 06 May WHO Sit Report 19 335 05 May International Lesbian and Gay Association State Sponsored Homophobia 336 03 May CIA World Factbook Libya 337 20 April OHCHR Indiscriminate attacks on civilians in Misrata 338 17 April Human Rights Watch Indiscriminate attacks kill civilians 339 15 April Guardian With Tripoli’s rebel underground 340 15 April Telegraph Gaddafi using schoolboy conscripts on front line 341 12 April Voice of America Libyan conflict seen as stalemate 342 09 April Al-Jazeera Migrants forced to fight for Gaddafi 343 08 April The United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2010 Libya 344 04 April The New Yorker Who are the Rebels? 345 10 March Guardian Zawiya town centre devastated and almost deserted 346 29 March Amnesty International Campaign of disappearances must end 347 31 March The Foreign and Commonwealth Office Human Rights and Democracy: Libya 348 29 March UNHCR Protection considerations with regard to people fleeing Libya 349 28 March Inter Press Service News Rebels facing tough fight for Sirte 350 28 March Amnesty International Death Sentences and Executions in 2010 351 28 March BBC News Key Figures in Libya’s Rebel Council 352 24 March OHCHR Wave of enforced disappearances 353 21 March Inter Press Service News Agency Uprising revives entrenched racism towards black Africans 354 20 March FT Q&A Who are the Libyan Rebel Fighters? 355 18 March Foreign and Commonwealth Office Prime Ministers Statement on Libya 356 17 March United Nations Security Council Approves ‘no fly zone’ over Libya 357 17 March UN Security Council UN approve ‘no fly zone’ over Libya 358 15 March Hansard House of Commons Questions 359 13 March Human Rights Watch End violent crackdown in Tripoli 360 11 March Reporters without Borders Internet Enemies 2011: Countries under surveillance - Libya 361 10 March Reuters Zawiya town centre devastated and almost deserted 362 10 March BBC News Q&A: Libyan National Council 363 10 March FIDH Colonel Qaddhafi forces enrolment of African migrants in army 364 10 March International Federation for Human Rights Colonel Qaddhafi forces enrolment of African migrants in army 365 10 March The Foreign and Commonwealth Office Country Profile of Algeria 366 05 March Reuters Gaddafi ‘tightens grip’ on Zawiya 367 03 March Jamestown Foundation Special report from inside Libya: Assessing Libyan Rebel Forces 368 28 February Al-Jazeera African migrants targeted in Libya 369 28 February The International Centre for Prison Studies Report of 28 February 2011 370 24 February The Foreign Desk Is Al-Jazeera TV complicit in the vilification of Libya’s Blacks 371 23 February Magharebia Libya lashes out at demonstrators 372 22 February Asharq Alawsat Network of loyalties that will determine Gadhafi’s fate 373 17 February Human Rights Watch Security forces fire on ‘Day of Anger’ demonstrations 374 24 January Human Rights Watch World Report 2011: Libya 375 18 January United States Office of Personnel Management Citizenship Laws of the World 376 04 January The Libyan-European Partnership for Infectious Disease Control 2008 Document 2010 377 14 December Amnesty International Seeking Safety, finding fear. Asylum seekers in Libya and Malta 378 13 September The International Federation for Human Rights Annual Report 2010 North Africa/Middle East 2009 379 12 November Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Libya : Process for Libyan citizen wanting to exit airport in Tripoli 2007 380 01 January UNDOC Penal Code (2007) Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 2005 381 01 April The Library of Congress Country Profile - Libya 2002 382 19 September Right to Education Project National Law and policies on minimum ages 1998 383 07 August War Resisters International Libya - Conscription [1] See paragraph 6 for comment on nomenclature [2] Spelling as in the report of Dr George [3] The COI at 10.6 describes Libya Shield as a coalition of militias from the east, Misrata, and Zintan that acts in parallel with Libya's national army. [4] At 10.06 the COI in relation to the SSC states “The force is estimated to consist of 90,000 to 100,000 fighters. These men, ostensibly revolutionaries, act as a sort of national gendarmerie, providing transitional security at the local level, particularly during the election period. But ominously, the SCC has not managed to break down the fighters' old allegiances: entire brigades have joined en masse and their commanders have simply switched hats.” [5] Described by Professor Joffé as a generic title for “ a shadowy network of salafi-jihadi militias”. [6] Also spelt Tabu, Toubou and Tubu-See OGN 9 May 2013 at 3.12.18 [7] Translated in various reports as “revolutionaries” and otherwise spelt as “thuwwar”

“70 In order to arrive at the conclusion that the refugee’s fear of being persecuted is no longer well founded, the competent authorities, by reference to Article 7(2) of the Directive, must verify, having regard to the refugee’s individual situation, that the actor or actors of protection of the third country in question have taken reasonable steps to prevent the persecution, that they therefore operate, inter alia, an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution and that the national concerned will have access to such protection if he ceases to have refugee status. 71 That verification means that the competent authorities must assess, in particular, the conditions of operation of, on the one hand, the institutions, authorities and security forces and, on the other, all groups or bodies of the third country which may, by their action or inaction, be responsible for acts of persecution against the recipient of refugee status if he returns to that country. In accordance with Article 4(3) of the Directive, relating to the assessment of facts and circumstances, those authorities may take into account, inter alia, the laws and regulations of the country of origin and the manner in which they are applied, and the extent to which basic human rights are guaranteed in that country. 72 Furthermore, Article 11(2) of the Directive provides that the change of circumstances recorded by the competent authorities must be ‘of such a significant and non-temporary nature’ that the refugee’s fear of persecution can no longer be regarded as well founded… . 74 It must be pointed out that the actor or actors of protection with respect to which the reality of a change of circumstances in the country of origin is to be assessed are, under Article 7(1) of the Directive, either the State itself or the parties or organisations, including international organisations, controlling the State or a substantial part of the territory of the State. 76 In view of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 11(1)(e) of the Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that: - refugee status ceases to exist when, having regard to a change of circumstances of a significant and non-temporary nature in the third country concerned, the circumstances which justified the person’s fear of persecution for one of the reasons referred to in Article 2(c) of the Directive, on the basis of which refugee status was granted, no longer exist and that person has no other reason to fear being ‘persecuted’ within the meaning of Article 2(c) of the Directive; - for the purposes of assessing a change of circumstances, the competent authorities of the Member State must verify, having regard to the refugee’s individual situation, that the actor or actors of protection referred to in Article 7(1) of the Directive have taken reasonable steps to prevent the persecution, that they therefore operate, inter alia, an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution and that the national concerned will have access to such protection if he ceases to have refugee status; - the actors of protection referred to in Article 7(1)(b) of the Directive may comprise international organisations controlling the State or a substantial part of the territory of the State, including by means of the presence of a multinational force in that territory.”

“lack of enforcement capability, lack of competency of the courts, and confusion over the applicability of new and old laws…. The most significant human rights problems resulted from the absence of effective justice and security institutions…. The new government fell short of establishing a consistent rule of law.”

“Other important human rights abuses included: arbitrary and unlawful killings, including politically motivated killings by groups outside government control; kidnappings; torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; harsh and life-threatening conditions in detention and prison facilities, some of which were illegal; arbitrary arrest and detention; lengthy pretrial detention; denial of fair public trial; an ineffective judicial system staffed by intimidated judicial authorities….”

“Impunity was a serious problem. Although militias detained abusive Qadhafi-era officials, the scarcely functioning criminal courts struggled to try them, and when they did attempt to conduct trials, judges often faced threats of violence. In the same vein, with the judiciary not fully functioning, the government had not taken concrete steps by year’s end to advance transitional justice. There were rarely investigations and still fewer prosecutions of those believed to have committed abuses.”

“The current limitations of Libya‘s legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm mean that in general claimants would not always be able to access effective protection.”

“The decision-maker, taking account of all relevant circumstances pertaining to the claimant and his country of origin, must decide whether it is reasonable to expect the claimant to relocate or whether it would be unduly harsh to expect him to do so…. There is, as Simon Brown LJ aptly observed in Svazas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 1 WLR 1891 , para 55, a spectrum of cases. The decision-maker must do his best to decide, on such material as is available, where on the spectrum the particular case falls … or must depend on a fair assessment of the relevant facts [5].”

“the more the applicant is able to show that he is specifically affected by reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances, the lower the level of indiscriminate violence required for him to be eligible for subsidiary protection.”

“on a proper construction of Article 15(c) of Directive 2004/83, it must be acknowledged that an internal armed conflict exists, for the purposes of applying that provision, if a State’s armed forces confront one or more armed groups or if two or more armed groups confront each other. It is not necessary for that conflict to be categorised as ‘armed conflict not of an international character’ under international humanitarian law; nor is it necessary to carry out, in addition to an appraisal of the level of violence present in the territory concerned, a separate assessment of the intensity of the armed confrontations, the level of organisation of the armed forces involved or the duration of the conflict.”

“Given the generalised attitude of resentment towards perceived Col. Gaddafi supporters and fighters, and the force with which the Gaddafi regime previously sought to subdue the opposition, it is likely that applicants in this category will be able to show a need for international protection. Perceived supporters of Gaddafi and his regime are at risk of extra-judicial execution, arbitrary detention, torture, ill-treatment and death in detention, both by authorities of the Interim Government or its armed affiliates, as well as by armed militias operating without government control.”

“Consideration should be given to the particular circumstances of the individual, including ethnicity, age, and the nature and degree of the perceived relationship to the Gaddafi‘s regime. Where it is accepted that an individual applicant was closely involved with Gaddafi and the regime, or his particular circumstances indicate a likely risk of attracting the adverse interest of militia brigades allied to the Libyan authorities, a grant of asylum will generally be appropriate, subject to any exclusion considerations under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention.”

“Given the generalised discrimination towards women in Libya, and the inability of the current Government to provide protection against harm, it is likely that some women and especially particular sub-categories of women (e.g. women of African ethnicity, victims of sexual violence, and women perceived to have been allied to the Gaddafi regime) will be able to demonstrate a need for international protection. All relevant factors should be taken into account, including the age, health, educational and economic status, and the individual circumstances of the applicant. Female applicants able to show they are at real risk of persecution because they are accused of sexual ‘misdemeanours‘ or offences against family honour are likely to be able to show that they fall into the category of a particular social group (PSG).”

“61…Aside from the fact that the SOS has undertaken not to remove failed asylum seekers to Libya at present, I take account of the fact that the UK government has not accepted, even at the height of the conflict, that Libya is in a state of internal armed conflict. 62. I conclude therefore that there are not substantial grounds for believing that the Appellant would face a real risk of suffering serious harm if he is returned to Libya…” 4. With respect to the FTT judge, the fact that the Secretary of State had undertaken not to remove failed asylum seekers to Libya at that time was irrelevant to his task. He was obliged to consider the position hypothetically in terms of whether, if returned, the appellant would be at risk. Further, the FTT judge was not conducting a mere review of the respondent’s decision and so the fact that the respondent did not consider there was an armed conflict in Libya at that time was no more than one aspect of the evidence and did not without more warrant the conclusion that “therefore” the appellant was not at risk. 5. I observe that at the date of hearing there was still a No-fly zone in force in Libya and fighting was still continuing. It was certainly arguable on the available evidence that there was a state of armed conflict in the country as a whole or parts of it and it is also the case, of course, that in QD (Iraq) the Court of Appeal did not appear to consider that for Article 15(c) to be engaged it was even necessary for there to be an armed conflict; the essential matter was the existence of a high level of indiscriminate violence. 6. For these two reasons I consider that the FTT judge materially erred in law and that his decision is to be set aside. I should clarify, however, that there was no challenge in this case to the judge’s primary findings of fact, only to his application to those findings of correct legal criteria. Hence his primary findings of fact shall stand. 7. It may assist if I comment on a further aspect of the FTT judge’s decision. 8. In his treatment of the issue of risk on return, the FTT judge appeared to consider that the Court of Appeal judgment in HH and Others (Somalia) [2010] EWCA Civ 426 established that so long as the precise route of return to a country was not ascertainable, it was not necessary for the decision to deal with whether there would be risk on return arising from the precise point of entry. However, in relation to Libya, the reason for the inability to identify a point of return was arguably a concern that there was no safe part of the country. That being so I consider it at least arguable that HH & Others cannot be prayed in aid to prevent assessment of risk on return. Further, if it is the case that the respondent has only ever identified Tripoli as a point of return for returnees to Libya (and Tripoli was at the relevant time still affected by a no-fly zone), it is at least arguable that there was no proper basis for considering the route of return uncertain. 9. I raised with the parties whether this case would be suitable to be joined with other cases that have been identified as potential country guidance case on Libya (one of them also having Jackson and Cantor as representatives - AA/04789/2011 AT). Both representatives said they considered this case would be a helpful addition, enabling the Tribunal to consider not just generic risk but risk to significant categories of returnees. I explained to them that the decision on whether to join this case would be for the Country Group Convenor but that the parties would be notified one way or the other as soon as possible. 10. For the above reason the FTT judge materially erred in law and his decision is set aside, with a notice concerning a continuation hearing to be sent to the parties shortly. Signed Date Dr H H Storey Judge of the Upper Tribunal APPENDIX B ERROR OF LAW DECISION-HKA Heard at Field House Determination Promulgated On 16 September 2011 ………………………………… Before SENIOR IMMIGRATION JUDGE STOREY Between [hka] Appellant and THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT Respondent DECISION AND DIRECTIONS 1. The appellant is a national of Libya. In a determination notified on 12 May 2011 the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration Judge Duff) dismissed the appellant’s appeal against a decision of the respondent on 24 March 2011 to refuse to grant asylum and to remove her as an illegal entrant. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal having been granted, the matter came before me to decide whether the FTT materially erred in law. 2. Both parties were in agreement with me that the IJ had materially erred in law in failing to address the potential difficulties the appellant would have on a hypothetical return to Tripoli in early May 2011 when the Gaddafi regime was still in power and when it was not in dispute that the appellant is from Benghazi and is of the A tribe. The IJ based his decision on an assessment of likely risk to the appellant on the basis of her return to Benghazi and further on his assessment that she and her brother “could make a claim for Egyptian nationality, because of the nationality of their mother”

“I was also in touch with my friend HH by telephone. HH told me that there were four tribes who are in control of different areas of Zawiya; Awlad Salkar, Awlad Sowlah, Awlad Ajinah, Iwlad Abdulmula. He told me that sometimes these tribes work together and sometimes they fight each other, but they are all using violence to keep control of their areas of Zawiya, and they are all persecuting black Libyans. HH told me that my father had been beaten up by the rebels. He said that my father had been taken to hospital and this was at the end of January 2012. That is the last I spoke to HH. He told me that the rebels came to my father’s house in Zawiya and beat him and that my wife and children have fled Zawiya, he did not know where they had gone. All my family have left, my father, my mother, wife, children, brothers and sisters. The house is completely empty. HH has been to visit them and found the house been abandoned.”) 15. As to whether up until that point his family had stayed in Zawiye, he does not know as this is what H told him. He said they are not there. They were there when the rebels came to the house and beat his father. 16. It was put to the appellant that on this account his family had stayed in Zawiya up until January 2012. He said he believed they stayed until August 2011. He received a call from his wife saying that they were all planning to escape. The call lasted for five minutes and she was scared. He did not know where they stayed until he was told by HH. 17. He agreed that he had contacted the Red Cross. He had lost contact with all his family members. It was put to the appellant that he had not mentioned in his witness statement having lost contact with his brothers and sisters. He explained that they all had his telephone number. As to why he had not mentioned in his witness statement that he had lost contact with his brothers and sisters, there was no contact but they have his telephone number. 18. The appellant was then referred to page 158 in relation to his contact with the Red Cross. S is his wife, Mu is his father, Ma is his mother, H is his daughter and A is his son. He was asked why the letter only referred to these members of his family and he said he had meant all his family, especially his parents. He was referred to pages 156 and 155 of the bundle. He explained that he had no further documentation because one of the people is called Sarah and he has met her more than once at a place where she meets asylum seekers and she has said that there is no news. 19. He was referred to para 42 of his witness statement dated 17 August 2011, in relation to his claim that people had been arrested in Libya as a result of his encouraging them to demonstrate. He agreed that the paragraph was accurate. HH told him that the reasons his friends H and J had been arrested because of him. This is the same HH he had previously referred to. They had been actively demonstrating against Qadhafi. The appellant had encouraged them by phone to demonstrate more. The appellant did not know when they were arrested because he was not there. HH was warning the appellant about going back. The appellant had been one of the reasons why H and J had been arrested. HH remained in Libya until the appellant’s last call in January 2012. 20. It was pointed out to the appellant that he had said that HH had fled. The appellant responded by saying that HH went to Tunisia. He went there to make calls and then went back. He received a call from HH while events were taking place. It was some time before 17 th August, 2011 and the appellant did not know when HH returned. 21. The appellant said that he had said that HH remained in Libya because he was there the last time he had spoken to him. It was put to the appellant that his account was contradictory in terms of the level of contact with family and friends in Libya. The appellant said he did not understand why it was said to be contradictory. It was only one person he knew who had spoken to him and the second time was his wife. It was suggested to him that he had a wide number of family in Libya apart from his wife and friends. He had three brothers and three sisters, uncles and aunts. However, he does not appear to have given any information about his efforts to contact them. The appellant said that when he came to the United Kingdom he did not inform any of them that he was coming. Everyone was scared and black people especially were being targeted because they cannot really speak. 22. Even if his brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts knew that he was coming here, they were all living separately. They could get his telephone number from his wife or anyone else. As to his previous evidence that they had his number, did not have all the numbers to contact everyone. 23. It was suggested that if his account was true he would have made efforts to find out from his wider family what had happened. The appellant said that his account was true. His wife was not a Libyan citizen so he could not contact her family. He was thinking of his family and he was worried and because of this he has become diabetic. It was HH who told him about his family. Again it was suggested to him that if he had been worried and anxious to find his family after 20 August 2011 it would have been possible by one of those routes, particularly his family in Zawiye, to find out that they had remained in his father’s house at least until January 2012. The appellant said that HH was the closest to him and he contacted him and he told him about what had taken place. 24. In re-examination he said that Zawiye is 45-50 kilometres away from Tripoli, and HH went to Tunisia and then returned. Tunisia is 70 to 100 kilometres away from Zawiye. The appellant’s wife is from Yemen. 25. In answer to questions from the Tribunal he said that that he had not tried to make any contact with his wife’s family in Yemen to see whether they might have heard from her because he does not have their telephone number. He does know their address but had not written to them as there are troubles in Yemen as well and that the post was not working. As to whether he had made any contact with his brother in Egypt, he has no telephone number or address for him. 26. In further cross-examination he said that his brother was not a famous preacher in Egypt but a normal person. He was only studying engineering in Egypt. He was referred to the witness statement of ESMA (page 344). His brother, S, had been a famous preacher and advised people on Sharia law before he went to Egypt. He met that witness in Bournemouth. 27. The appellant said that before his brother went to Egypt this witness had known the appellant’s brother but there was no contact between the appellant and his brother now. The witness had not given the appellant his brother’s telephone number. He did not ask him for his brother’s number. 28. As to how it was that his brother was a famous Sheikh in Libya but went to being just an engineering student in Egypt, he was not entirely sure what his brother was studying. He thought it was engineering. His brother went to Egypt to study before events took place in Libya. 29. In answer to a further question put by the Tribunal in relation to the witness statement of ESMA (page 344) who states that the appellant's brother had had serious problems in Libya and had to flee to Egypt, it may be that the government was making it hard for him and which is why he thought of going to Egypt to study but he did not go during the troubles. He did not know that, as the witness statement says, Mr A had spoken to his brother twice. He was not aware that this was in Mr A’s witness statement. He knew that he knows his brother and was in contact with his brother. As to why he did not contact his brother in Egypt to see if he had any news of his family. Mr A left the UK and the appellant has lost all contact with him. 30. In answer to further questions in re-examination he said that his wife is a Yemeni citizen and ethnically she is “close to black”

“Other important human rights abuses included: arbitrary and unlawful killings, including politically motivated killings by groups outside government control; kidnappings; torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; harsh and life-threatening conditions in detention and prison facilities, some of which were illegal; arbitrary arrest and detention; lengthy pretrial detention; denial of fair public trial; an ineffective judicial system staffed by intimidated judicial authorities; arbitrary interference with privacy and home; use of excessive force and other abuses in internal conflicts; localized restrictions on humanitarian aid to civilians; limits on the freedoms of speech and press, including violence and harassment of journalists on several occasions and in certain areas; restrictions on freedom of religion; abuses of internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and migrants; social discrimination against and societal abuse of women and ethnic and racial minorities, including foreign workers; legal and social discrimination based on sexual orientation; trafficking in persons; killings related to societal violence; and breaches of labor rights in practice, including forced labor.” 11. Further, in relation to accountability, the effectiveness of the judiciary and security it is stated that: “Impunity was a serious problem. Although militias detained abusive Qadhafi-era officials, the scarcely functioning criminal courts struggled to try them, and when they did attempt to conduct trials, judges often faced threats of violence. In the same vein, with the judiciary not fully functioning, the government had not taken concrete steps by year’s end to advance transitional justice. There were rarely investigations and still fewer prosecutions of those believed to have committed abuses. With the disappearance of the authoritarian Qadhafi regime, militias that spearheaded his overthrow filled a security vacuum in many parts of the country. During the year militias and their supporters--at times nominally but not fully under the control of the interim and later the elected government’s authority--violated human rights and humanitarian norms, committing unlawful killings, physical violence, and other abuses. Hostility to real and perceived Qadhafi loyalists permeated the country, the principal targets of which were actual or suspected former Qadhafi soldiers or supporters. Nongovernmental actors, including autonomous militias and armed tribal groups, committed human rights abuses. Disappearances, illegal detentions, and imprisonment of persons on political grounds occurred, as did looting and further violence. Vulnerable civilian populations, including ethnic minorities and migrants, faced ongoing violence and discrimination.” 12. Particular targets of arbitrary and unlawful killings were real or suspected Qadhafi supporters, Qadhafi soldiers, possible sub-Saharan mercenaries, dark-skinned Libyans, former members of the security forces, as well as foreign diplomats. 13. Page 3 of the USSDR reports that there were at least 21 killings in Benghazi alone of current and former security officials, many of them defectors from the Qadhafi regime. Militias/detentions 14. An example of the human rights abuses that are said to have been committed by militias is that reported by the UN Support Mission in Libya, at page 5 of the USSDR: three detainees died on 13 April as a direct result of torture, and at least seven other persons were tortured in the Zaroug detention facility in Misrata. The Supreme Security Committee (“SSC”) which was under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, controlled the facility. The USSDR continues that: “Treatment varied from facility to facility and was typically worst at the time of arrest. Reported abuses included beatings with belts, sticks, rifles, and hoses; administration of electric shocks; burns inflicted by boiling water, heated metal, or cigarettes; mock executions; suspension from metal bars; and rape. Abuses against detainees, particularly alleged Qadhafi loyalists and sub-Saharan Africans aligned with Qadhafi, were similarly reported at other militia-run facilities throughout the country.” 15. According to a report by the UN Secretary General’s special representative for Libya, on 10 May 2012 there were approximately 3,000 people held in 31 Justice Ministry facilities and approximately 4,000 held by various militia groups at formal or secret detention facilities. At year’s end the ICRC estimated that several thousand persons remained detained with the greatest concentration of detainees being in greater Tripoli, Misrata and Benghazi. The vast majority were Libyans accused of fighting for the Qadhafi regime. The other main category was foreigners of which a majority appeared to be irregular migrants. 16. As to the types of informal detention facility and the conditions within them: “makeshift facilities appeared throughout the country to accommodate detainees collected by all sides. These facilities’ conditions were uneven and varied widely, but consistent problems included overcrowding, poor ventilation, the lack of necessities such as mattresses, and poor access to hygiene and health care. Militias reportedly detained persons at schools, former government military sites, and other informal venues, including private homes and, in one case, a soccer club. Many prisons and detention centers were outside of central government control, and the conditions in some prisons and detention centers were harsh to the point of being life threatening. Access to food in Ministry of Justice prisons was generally adequate, although access to potable water was a critical problem in Joodayem, Salah Aldeen, and Dafniya prisons. Men and women were reportedly held separately. In some instances minors were held in Ministry of Justice prisons with adults. Human rights organizations reported that militias also held minors with adults. Administration: Information about the administration of prisons and detention centers was generally not available due to the lack of government control and improvised solutions that were required to accommodate the large increase of detainees in the course of the revolution. There was no information on adequacy of recordkeeping, alternative sentencing practices, permission for religious observances, investigation of allegations of inhumane conditions, or access to visitors. There was no credible ombudsman for prisoners and detainees.” 17. On page 15 of the USSDR, in relation to freedom of movement it states that on 16 December 2012 the GNC voted to declare much of the southern part of the country a “closed military zone”

“Prison and detention centre conditions in Libya are very poor; overcrowding, lengthy pre-trial incarceration, torture and deaths in custody are particular problems. The Libyan authorities have yet to gain authority over the hundreds of militias currently holding several thousand detainees outside any legal jurisdiction.” 26. At 3.13.15 it states that: “There is evidence of security personnel and members of militia groups acting with impunity with regard to inhuman and degrading treatment. Reports indicate that those perceived to have been pro-Gaddafi loyalists, and those perceived to have been working or fighting on his behalf, particularly those of African ethnicity are at particular risk of ill treatment. In such cases the risk of mistreatment will be sufficient to make removal a breach of Article 3.” 27. Finally, it is said at 3.13.16 that w here applicants can demonstrate a real risk of imprisonment on return to Libya, a grant of Humanitarian Protection is likely to be appropriate, going on to conclude as follows: “However, the individual factors of each case should be considered to determine whether detention will cause a particular individual in his particular circumstances to suffer treatment contrary to Article 3. Relevant factors include the likely type of detention facility, the reasons for detention, with particular regard to the individual‘s political profile, and the individual‘s age, gender, ethnicity and state of health.” 28. In its summary of the report “Torture and deaths in detention in Libya” the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (“UNSMIL”), dated October 2013, states that: “Torture and other ill-treatment in Libya is an on-going and widespread concern in many detention centres, despite the efforts of the Libyan authorities which are committed at the highest level to ending torture and to ensuring the proper functioning of the criminal justice system.” 29. Since 2012, the report states, the government has sought to bring under the authority of the state the armed brigades which are in control of most of the detention facilities where torture takes place. In April 2013 Libya adopted a law criminalising torture, enforced disappearance and discrimination. A new law in September 2013 requires all conflict-related detainees to be released or referred to the public prosecutor within 90 days of the promulgation of the law. Nevertheless the report states, torture continues and is most frequent immediately on arrest and during the first days of interrogation as a means to extract confessions or other information. Detainees are usually held “without access to lawyers and occasional access to families, if any.”

“You would consider the SSC as a mix of sheikhs, students and graduates from prison!”

“There was societal discrimination and violence originating in ethnic differences. Racial discrimination existed against dark-skinned Libyans, including those of originally sub-Saharan descent, in part due to allegations that Qadhafi used African mercenaries during the conflict. There were reports of dark-skinned Libyans as well as Tuaregs being removed from their homes in Tripoli and held in detention centers and prisons. There was also societal discrimination and violence originating in attitudes toward the previous regime. For example, fighting began April 1, reportedly involving heavy weapons, between the largely Amazigh and anti-Qadhafi western town of Zuwara, on one side, and the mostly Arab and pro-Qadhafi towns of Al-Jimail and Regdalin on the other. There were also clashes reflecting a conflict between Tebou and Zway tribes over smuggling rivalries in the southeast of the country. On March 26, Arab government-affiliated militia clashed with Tebou tribal groups in the region near Kufra. According to reports from local contacts and NGOs, the fighting was largely one sided and targeted at Tebou civilian neighborhoods in attempt to push Libyan Tebou out of the country into Chad. On April 21, the conflict had escalated to the point that government forces were sent to Kufra to restore order.” 60. The AI report of 16 February 2012 entitled “Militias Threaten Hope for New Libya” states that a challenge for the new regime is to tackle “the widespread discrimination and xenophobia against sub-Saharan Africans and dark-skinned Libyans from Tawargha and other parts of Libya where support for al-Gaddafi forces during the conflict was reportedly high.”

“People from the Tawargha area, who are black Libyans, are at particular risk of reprisals and revenge attacks by Misratah militias, because the area was a base for al-Gaddafi troops when they were besieging Misratah and because many Tawargha allegedly supported al-Gaddafi forces during the conflict. The number of Tawargha people among the detainees appears disproportionately high and most of those interviewed by Amnesty International said they had been tortured or ill-treated.”

“Members of the Mshashiya and from Qawalish tribes in the Nafusa Mountain area have similarly been targeted by militias because of their alleged support for al-Gaddafi forces during the conflict. People from the Mshashiya tribe and Qawalish village are particularly targeted by militias from Zintan.”

“People from sub-Saharan Africa who have been detained by militias have been particularly vulnerable to abuse. While many Sub-Saharan Africans were detained during and in the weeks after the conflict because of the belief that al-Gaddafi forces used African mercenaries to fight pro-NTC forces, many are now being held because of their suspected “illegal” status or related issues. When Amnesty International delegates visited Ain Zara Prison in January 2012, about 400 out of approximately 900 detainees were foreign nationals, mainly from Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the prison administration, about 10 per cent of the foreign nationals were accused of having fought during the conflict. Several Sub-Saharan Africans interviewed by Amnesty International in detention and after release said they had been tortured or ill-treated.” 62. Specifically in relation to Zawiye, the same AI report describes the town as one that saw violent confrontations between supporters of the uprising and Qadhafi forces and where revenge attacks and reprisals by local militia have taken place against those who are known to have or are suspected of having supported the former regime. 63. The OGN of May 2013 in relation to particular categories of persons states that Tawurgans and the Mashashiya are vulnerable to arrest by the Misrata and Zintan militias, as suspected supporters of Qadhafi and of having committed crimes during the conflict (3.10.4). At 3.10.5, referring to Amnesty International reports it states that militias take persons suspected of having supported Qadhafi forces and committed crimes during the conflict captive from the streets or at checkpoints. Easily identifiable targets, such as black Tawurgans or Sub-Saharan African nationals, are particularly vulnerable to such practices, severely impeding their freedom of movement. Displaced Tawurgans have been subjected to arbitrary arrest and torture in detention. 64. Paras 3.12.1-3.12.32 consider ethnic groups stating that the principal minorities were Amazigh, Tuareg and Tebou. Although under Qadhafi the Amazigh faced discrimination, including limitations on the use of their language, by the end of 2012 they used their language publicly, publishing journals and using their language Tamazight on public signs and on the radio. They encouraged the government to make Tamazight one of the official languages. 65. Racial discrimination existed against dark-skinned Libyans, including those originally of sub-Saharan descent, in part due to allegations that Qadhafi used African mercenaries during the conflict. There were reports of dark-skinned Libyans as well as Tuaregs being removed from their homes in Tripoli and held in detention centres and prisons. 66. Allegations that mercenaries were recruited from Chad, Nigeria and Sudan appeared to be heavily exaggerated. Many Africans worked in civilian jobs. There have been reports of harassment and violence towards sub-Saharan African migrant workers, by rebel fighters and civilians. HRW reported that Africans were held in overcrowded cells with appalling hygiene standards and no access to clean drinking water. Many sub-Saharan Africans have been displaced by the fighting and for fear of reprisals. Many noted with horror how revolutionary brigades had exacted revenge against largely unarmed Mashashiya and Tawurga, two communities that had largely backed Qadhafi in the conflict. 67. Thousands of non-Arabs, like Tuaregs, have no official documentation attesting to their citizenship. The main proof of citizenship is the “family booklet” in which all members of the family are listed and which is presented when applying for jobs, university, or when taking out a loan from a bank. Tuaregs who have been in Libya “for 100 years” have managed to obtain a family booklet but those who settled in the country 40 or 50 years ago were denied one and possess neither Libya nor any other citizenship (3.12.10). 68. Many Tawurga have moved to Benghazi, Tripoli or southern Libya. They remain displaced and live in camps and with host families, though some are held in detention. “The generally dark-skinned Tawurga” were accused by the brigades of siding with Qadhafi and of killing and raping residents of Misrata during the revolution. According to community groups, about 18,000 Tawurgans are in Benghazi, 13,000 in Tripoli and 7,000 in and around Sebha in the south. There are smaller numbers in other places. In Tripoli they are mostly based in four camps: at the Naval Academy in Janzur, and in the al-Fallah and Sarraj neighbourhoods. Basic humanitarian assistance comes mostly from LibAid, a Libyan government agency. Security has improved, with fewer raids by the Misrata militias who claim they are searching for wanted men. In January 2012 militias from Misrata raided the Janzur camp and shot dead a man, three women and three children (3.12.15-3.12-16). 69. At 3.12.17 it states that about 1,300 Tawurgans are detained, missing or dead according to HRW which also said that crimes committed against the Tawurga may amount to crimes against humanity. 70. Para 3.12.23 refers to members of the Tebu and Tuareg communities having long complained about discrimination, racism and the inability to renew identity documents or obtain new ones for their children. Such communities also tend to be among the poorest and live in informal settlements with little access to services. 71. The Tuareg number some 100,000. Some opposed Qadhafi while others found employment in the regular army. Many Libyans tend to identify all Tuareg as regime supporters. At least 1,500 Tuareg fighters joined Qadhafi’s loyalist forces. Sources inside the Libyan city of Ghadames told a news agency that the Tuareg tribes have been subjected to ethnic cleansing for the previous eight months since May 2012, the Ghadames tribe apparently being responsible. Many Tuareg are said to have been detained in illegal places of detention in secret locations in inhumane conditions. They are said to be being searched for everywhere, including in hospitals, to be killed and tortured. As of January 2013, 2,400 who had fled Ghadames remained internally displaced in Libya (3.12.24-3.12.27). 72. The COI report 2012, from 19.10, quoting a report of the UN Human Rights Council ‘International Commission of Inquiry on Libya’, released on 2 March 2012, describes the targeting of Tawurgans by the Misratan thuwar [7] , and of Mashashiya towns regarded as loyalist (to Qadhafi) by thuwar from Zintan. Mashashiya detainees have been tortured, towns looted and property burnt. Those who have attempted to return to their homes are reported to have been beaten. 73. As regards the Tuareg, at 19.19, the report of the UN Human Rights Council ‘International Commission of Inquiry on Libya’ dated March 2012 is quoted as stating that three interviewees indicated that an indeterminate number of Tuareg men were recruited to fight alongside Qadhafi forces. 74. The Tebu are said in an article from Al-Jazeera dated December 2012, quoted at 19.20 of the COI, now to dominate Libya’s southern desert, guarding remote checkpoints, oil fields and weapons stockpiles. Before the revolution against Qadhafi they had been marginalised for decades. Dislike for Qadhafi led the Libyan Tebu to rise up against him whereby they provided crucial southern support to the coastal rebels’ fight. 75. At 19.21-19.22 the section of the COI on “Black Libyans”, referring to a report of August 2011 states that since the early days of the Libyan uprising there have been reports of organized racist attacks on so-called “Black Libyans” and foreign workers, particularly in rebel-held areas. Officials of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees related that refugees arriving from eastern Libya at the Egyptian border reported that armed Libyans had been going from door to door, forcing sub-Saharan Africans to leave. Tens of thousands of refugees arriving at camps in Tunisia and Egypt said that they were accused of being mercenaries hired by the government. 76. The HRW report dated 20 March 2013 gives many examples of detentions, torture and killings of people from Tawurga by Misrata militias, as well as the destruction of Tawurga. 77. Various reports and news articles, in particular from the background bundle in respect of AMH refer to historic racism in Libyan society, as well as discrimination, intimidation, detention and ill-treatment of sub-Saharan Africans and Black or dark skinned Libyans. Several of the reports refer to the claims that such individuals were Qadhafi mercenaries as being exaggerated. 78. A report from Amnesty International (“AI”) entitled “Scapegoats of Fear”, dated June 2013 states in the opening paragraph that the human rights of tens of thousands of foreign nationals, including asylum seekers, refugees and migrants, continue to be violated. The report goes on to state that: “In a context of political instability and lawlessness, foreign nationals, mainly from sub-Saharan Africa, are at constant risk of exploitation, arrest and indefinite detention pending deportation. Those without “proper documentation” are particularly vulnerable as Libyan legislation criminalizes entering, staying in or leaving Libya irregularly. When Amnesty International delegates were in Libya in April and May 2013, approximately 1,700 detained asylum-seekers were held indefinitely in poorly resourced “holding centres”

“Once again, the country is a magnet destination for people, particularly sub-Saharan Africans and North African and Middle Eastern nationals, who are looking for economic opportunities or for international protection as they flee persecution, violence and armed conflicts in the region and beyond .” 80. Many thousands are said to arrive every year in the hope of continuing their journey to Europe. In addition to the Department of Combating Irregular Migration (“DCIM”), militias and in some cases ordinary citizens motivated by xenophobia and misguided fears about diseases, detain foreign nationals on an almost daily basis, driven by what they believe is their national duty. Arrests are said to take place at any place and at any time, although most often from their homes, at checkpoints or on the streets. The AI report describes the conditions of detention as in most cases falling short of international standards, and at times amounting to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. 81. A recent report dated 14 October 2013 entitled “ Racism and revolution: the plight of black Africans in Libya” by Equal Times states that the end of the Qadhafi regime opened up huge divisions in Libyan society, stating that in particular the lid was lifted on “a fervent undercurrent of racism which has resulted in the detention, torture and murder of thousands of black Libyans and sub-Saharan migrants since 2011.”

“A group of former anti-Gaddafi militias who operate as a de facto army and police force under the country’s newly formed Ministry of Defence, one of its responsibilities is ‘securing’ the refugee camps and its residents. In reality, this means stopping anyone from leaving, even if it means using extreme violence.”

“Given the generalised attitude of resentment towards perceived Col. Gaddafi supporters and fighters, and the force with which the Gaddafi regime previously sought to subdue the opposition, it is likely that applicants in this category will be able to show a need for international protection. Perceived supporters of Gaddafi and his regime are at risk of extra-judicial execution, arbitrary detention, torture, ill-treatment and death in detention, both by authorities of the Interim Government or its armed affiliates, as well as by armed militias operating without government control.” 85. Para 3.10.19 goes on to state that consideration should be given to the individual’s circumstances, including “the nature and degree of the perceived relationship to Gaddafi’s regime”, and that: “Where it is accepted that an individual applicant was closely involved with Gaddafi and the regime, or his particular circumstances indicate a likely risk of attracting the adverse interest of militia brigades allied to the Libyan authorities, a grant of asylum will generally be appropriate, subject to any exclusion considerations under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention.” 86. The OGN concludes that it is unlikely that such a person would be able to relocate internally given that the interim government would not be able to provide effective protection, that torture is carried out by officially recognised security entities and that persons suspected of having supported Qadhafi’s forces are taken captive on the streets and at checkpoints. 87. The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada report dated 7 December 2012 in relation to the “Situation and treatment of those perceived to be loyal to Qaddafi since his fall; state protection”

“Given the generalised discrimination towards women in Libya, and the inability of the current Government to provide protection against harm, it is likely that some women and especially particular sub-categories of women (e.g. women of African ethnicity, victims of sexual violence, and women perceived to have been allied to the Gaddafi regime) will be able to demonstrate a need for international protection. All relevant factors should be taken into account, including the age, health, educational and economic status, and the individual circumstances of the applicant. Female applicants able to show they are at real risk of persecution because they are accused of sexual ‘misdemeanours‘ or offences against family honour are likely to be able to show that they fall into the category of a particular social group (PSG).”

“Given the circumstances and cultural factors set out above, female applicants who have been raped by soldiers loyal to Gaddafi or other combatants are also likely to be able to show that they are at real risk as members of a PSG. Evidence suggests that even where the rape victim‘s father or husband does not attach personal blame to her, as is the case with other categories of sexual dishonour, she is still at risk of being the subject of an ‘honour‘ killing, in order to save her and her family from dishonour.” 93. Libya Herald on 23 September 2013 reported that the government intended to clamp down on violence against women, while presenting legislation to the GNC to guarantee equality between men and women, backed up by legal sanctions. Justice Minister Salah Bashir Al-Marghani said that the issue of violence against women had to be addressed. 94. A BBC news report dated 13 December 2011 refers to women heading two ministries in the new government, health and social affairs. The report describes Libya as a deeply conservative, male-dominated society where wedding parties and public gatherings are often segregated and men traditionally take the political decisions. An assertive new generation of women’s rights is emerging, gathering every day in homes, offices and Tripoli’s smarter hotels, to discuss and set out their demands. Referring to a protest outside the prime minister’s office, it states that dozens of women covered their mouths with tape to symbolise the silence with which rape victims were greeted by the interim government. Security/policing/judiciary 95. Under the heading “Safety and Security”, The Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya dated 5 September 2013, the report refers to the bombing of the French embassy in Tripoli in April 2013, the targeting of an Italian diplomatic vehicle in June and the firing of a rocket-propelled grenade at the UAE embassy in July. In June UN staff in Sabha were temporarily relocated to Tripoli after armed clashes between rival tribes and the closure of the city airport. 96. In a Security Council Briefing dated 16 September 2013 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNSMIL, at para 16 it reports that progress in integrating revolutionary fighters into the police and army remains very limited, as is their reintegration into civilian life. However, to encourage such fighters to enlist in the army and to improve salary for current uniformed personnel, salary increases were to take effect from January 2014. The training outside Libya of 12-15,000 soldiers was also announced. The Briefing goes on to state that the Libyan police continue to integrate individuals from the armed brigades. 97. In a detailed report entitled “Searching for Justice in Post-Gaddafi Libya” described as a socio-legal exploration of people’s concerns and institutional responses at home and from abroad, it states at 2.2.3 that the development of an active civil society has been supported by government policy and NGOs have in many cases become a vehicle for policy initiatives. Para 3.3.1 notes that Law 37/2012 outlawing the “glorification” of the Qadhafi regime was struck down as being unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 98. The OGN of 9 May 2013 at 2.2.3 states that Libya continued to make efforts to form national security services. The numbers in the security services are said to be unclear although in March 2012 Libya’s Interior Minister said that the police force numbered 25,000 “and was able to provide security”

“The current limitations of Libya‘s legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm mean that in general claimants would not always be able to access effective protection.” 101. Regarding internal relocation, paras 2.3.3-2.3.9 refer to the closed military zone in the south of the country and difficulties with land border crossings, including threats from criminal activities in areas bordering Sudan, Chad, Niger and Algeria. With the exception of the official land border crossings to Tunisia and Egypt, visitors and residents are not permitted to travel in the interior or to border areas without an officially sanctioned guide or specific permission from the authorities. 102. Referring at 3.9.8 to FCO travel advice for Libya, updated in January 2013, it states that violent clashes between armed groups are possible across the country, particularly at night, and even in those places that have previously avoided conflict. These often include the use of heavy weapons. There is a high threat from terrorism. Attacks could be indiscriminate, including in places frequented by expatriates and foreign travellers and there is a threat of kidnapping (3.9.9). 103. At 3.9.13 it is stated that: “Libya has become a patchwork of factions whose continued presence - one that appears to be empowering warlords over elected officials - makes it difficult to ensure the establishment and maintenance of a single body of law that can apply equally and to all.” 104. The OGN assesses at 3.9.20 that: “There continue to be outbursts of internal armed conflict in parts of Libya, but it is not at such a level, either in Libya generally or a material part of it, that substantial grounds exist for believing that any civilian would, solely by being present there, face a real risk of serious harm. The security and humanitarian situation in Libya remains fluid, and some individuals may fall into an enhanced risk category on the basis of certain characteristics. Each case must be considered on its individual merits.” 105. A number of reports deal with what on the face of them could be described as political acts of violence. BBC news Africa on 10 October 2013, reporting on instability in the country noted that the Italian Consulate in Benghazi was attacked in January 2013, the French embassy in Tripoli in April, the EU’s convoy in August and the Russian embassy in October (2013). AI reported on 8 March 2013 on the attack on a TV station which had broadcast a debate about the proposed Political Isolation Law. During the attack Al-Assema TV, a private news channel in Tripoli, was stormed by armed men who abducted four people. 106. BBC news Africa reported on 30 April 2013 that the offices of the Libyan Justice Ministry in Tripoli were surrounded by armed men demanding the expulsion of officials who worked for the government during the Qadhafi era. The report goes on to state that armed groups have targeted state buildings in the past. 107. In a report dated 8 August 2013 Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) state that at least 51 people have been killed “in a broadening wave of apparent political assassinations” in Benghazi and Derna in eastern Libya, although it later states that the actual number is probably higher. The victims included a political activist, two judges and at least 44 serving members of the security forces, most of whom had held positions in the Qadhafi government, at least six having been high ranking officers under Qadhafi. Such political assassinations are said in the report to have peaked in the second half of 2012 and again in January and July 2014. No groups or individuals had claimed responsibility for the assassinations and the only person known to have been arrested escaped. 108. HRW information was to the effect that 12 victims were apparently killed by explosive devices targeting their cars and the rest were shot, mostly in drive-by shootings in front of their homes, workplaces or in their cars. The suspect who escaped was shown in an on-line video apparently confessing to having killed several people stating that commanders of Islamist militias operating in eastern Libya gave orders for the killing of former officers and that they had said that it was acceptable to kill army officers and people affiliated with the current government. In a second video he stated that he had confessed under torture. 109. Given the fact that most of the attacks targeted Qadhafi-era officers in the Benghazi and Derna area and the planned and efficient manner of the killings, it is suggested in the report that they are related and part of a pattern or campaign against individuals with a particular profile. 110. HRW stated that Benghazi has experienced large-scale attacks by various militias on state security forces facilities and army positions as well as armed clashes between militia factions and attacks on foreign diplomatic missions. There is reference to an attack on the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) in May 2012, with a militia accusing the ICRC of proselytising for Christianity including distributing Bibles. 111. Reuters reported on 5 October 2012 that at least 12 soldiers were killed in an attack on a checkpoint near the city of Bani Walid. In a further report dated 9 November 2013 the killing of two policemen in Benghazi by gunmen is referred to, and stating that this was a day after the army had vowed to restore order in the city. The report goes on to state that security in the city has deteriorated in the past few months “with militants and Islamists roaming unchallenged”. 112. The blockade of an oil port by Berbers in western Libya in October 2013 is reported by the Society for Threatened Peoples on 28 October 2013. It is said to have been a form of protest against the ongoing exclusion of ethnic or racial minorities. 113. In an article in Libya Herald dated 14 October 2013 there is a report on the conference on the Transitional Justice Law, held in Tripoli on 30 September 2013. The President of the GNC is said to have explained the aims of the law which include provision for compensation for victims of the Qadhafi regime and of the revolution, to provide justice and compensation for victims of injustice since the revolution and promote national reconciliation. A Fact-Finding and Reconciliation Board is to be set up. Amongst its tasks will be to look at the position of internally displaced persons, such as the Tawurga, missing persons, those imprisoned, and to investigate attacks on people by militias, individuals or state bodies. The rights of those accused of human rights crimes will be guaranteed in the proposed law, and no civilian will be tried in a military court. 114. A further Libya Herald article dated 24 October 2013 refers to a newly passed legislation against torture, kidnapping and discrimination, including with reference to holders of public office, bureaucrats and members of the security forces being subject to the law and to ensure that the prohibited offences did not take place. 115. A report from No Peace Without Justice dated 25 October 2013 describes details of a series of activities and workshops between 5-8 October 2013 “to strengthen the capacity of Libyan national institutions and civil society actors on accountability, human rights and the rule of law.”