“Given the generalised attitude of resentment towards perceived Colonel Gaddafi supporters and fighters, and the force with which the Gaddafi regime sought to subdue the opposition, it is likely that applicants in this category will be able to show a need for international protection. Perceived supporters of Gaddafi are at risk of extra-judicial execution, arbitrary detention, torture, ill-treatment and death in detention […]. Communities perceived to be loyal to Gaddafi have also experienced forced displacements, indiscriminate shelling, looting and burning of homes.”
“There is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant would be at risk of persecution because of his political opinion imputed because the people who are in charge of the country will treat him as pro-Gaddafi and might imprison and probably execute him. This is because when he live in Khoms, everybody worked in the army, it was one of Gaddafi’s strongholds and people who lived there were all pro-Gaddafi. If returned to Libya, the border police at the airport would be able to tell where he was from because of his accent. The situation is not yet such in Libya that he could look to the authorities for protection.”
“133 Former high-ranking officials within the intelligence services have been the subject of politically motivated murders […] Dr George emphasised that attitudes towards former members of Colonel Qadhafi’s security agencies do not vary from one part of Libya to another. The OGN does not suggest that internal relocation to avoid risk is a possibility for a person in this category. 134 We do not interpret the evidence as limiting the potential for risk only to those who were formerly members of the intelligence services. Others with a close association at a senior level with the former regime we consider equally to be at risk. It is not possible, nor indeed would it be appropriate, to suggest a list describing the type of work or association with the former regime that would potentially be in this risk category. The example most often given in the background and expert evidence is of high-ranking officials within the intelligence services, but other former high-ranking officials are also reasonably likely to be at risk. 135 Self-evidently, the closer an individual was to the centre of power within the Qadhafi regime, the more likely it is that that person would be at risk. Similarly, the further away from the centre of power the converse is true. During and in the immediate post-revolutionary period, those associated or suspected of being associated with the Qadhafi regime as fighters were subject to arbitrary arrest and ill-treatment. According to Dr George, there has been a shift in the pattern of detentions from 2011 onwards in that when there were a lot of ex-Qadhafi fighters at large, there were more people to arrest. Once all the obvious suspects were arrested the rate of arrests tapered off, with most individuals from the Qadhafi era having fled the country or having been detained, resulting in fewer arrests on grounds of sympathy for Qadhafi. Having said that, he also stated that there was still a fervour to hunt down Qadhafi loyalists. 136 We refer to this evidence from Dr George in this context because it indicates that in the revolutionary and the immediate post-revolutionary fever, the degree of association with the former regime which would attract adverse attention is likely to have been less than would now be the case, subject to our assessment in relation to specific groups. 137 We do not consider that the evidence leads to the conclusion that anyone who was associated with the former regime would be at risk of persecutory ill-treatment, serious harm or Article 3 ill-treatment on return. As Dr Porter states in his report dated14 October 2013 , seventy per cent of the Libyan labour force in the time of Qadhafi worked in the public sector so that the “gross majority” of Libyans were in some way associated with the regime, and that such association was especially high in Tripoli. He went on to state that it is not unusual for individuals to have worked for, or to have had family members who have had some relationship with, the previous government. Professor Joffé’s oral evidence was that the effect of the Political Isolation Law would be that up to half the population would be excluded from holding office in the new regime. 138 All this serves to emphasise that an individual, fact-sensitive, assessment will be required in every case. That assessment will have to take into account the nature and extent of an individual’s actual or suspected past association with the Qadhafi regime and taking into account that having worked for or been associated with the former regime is by no means exceptional in Libya. We consider it unlikely that simply having worked for or been associated with the regime in any capacity whatsoever will be sufficient to create a real risk of harm on return.”
“141 We have already referred to evidence that the majority of the population have had some association with the former regime and that it is not unusual for individuals to have worked for or to have had family members who have had some relationship with the previous government. The risk to a family member will again require a fact-specific assessment. … 145 It appears to us that there is limited support for a proposition that family members of those associated with the former regime, or those suspected of being such, are now, as a matter of course, at risk on return. The background evidence to that effect is limited and the expert evidence not entirely consistent. We had one example only cited to us. If there was such a risk to family members, we consider that there would be more evidence of it in the extensive background materials to which we were referred. 146 We do not rule out the possibility that an individual will be able to demonstrate such a risk but that would have to be demonstrated by a highly specific individual assessment of that person’s circumstances. Mere assertion of risk by association as a family member would not be sufficient without fact-specific evidence of the risk to that particular family member. The clear evidence is that risk arises because of actual or perceived support for the previous regime. A family member may be able to establish risk on this basis, but the mere fact of being a family member would not in our judgement be sufficient.”
“215 Drawing on all the expert and background evidence, and taking into account the submissions of the parties, we come to the following conclusions: … (3) Having regard to the generally hostile attitude of society to the former regime, the following are, in general, at real risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment on return to Libya: - (a) former high ranking officials within the intelligence services of that regime; (b) others with an association at senior level with that regime. (4) As a general matter, the closer an individual was to the centre of power within the former regime, the more likely that the individual will be able to establish a risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment on return. (5) The majority of the population of Libya either worked for, had some association with, or has a member of the family who worked for or had an association with the Qadhafi regime. Such employment or association alone is not sufficient to establish a risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment on return. (6) In general, family members of those described in (3) and (4) above are not at risk of persecution or a breach of their protected rights on return. It is possible, however, that an individual will be able to establish such a risk but this will need to be demonstrated by specific evidence relating to the individual’s circumstances. Mere assertion of risk by association as a family member would not be sufficient without fact-specific evidence of the risk to that particular family member.”
“142 The system enables the parties and the judiciary to know where to look for what the Tribunal sees as the relevant guidance, the parties to know what they have to deal with, and, if they wish to take issue with it, what it is that has to be the target of their evidence or argument. It enables parties to rely on the material which others have had accepted without reproducing or repeating it every time, or if it has been rejected, to know that there is no point in repeating it. Consistency and the justice which that brings can be provided for, even though differing and perhaps reasonable views can be taken of a wide variety of material. It also has the advantage of enabling the understanding of country conditions to be refined as successive decisions may lead to the identification of consequential issues to be grappled with which had hitherto been unrecognised […] There is recognised scope for improvement and parties can focus their evidence and arguments upon the aspect with which they take issue.”
“serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict”
“Because of the principle that like cases should be treated in like manner, any failure to follow a clear, apparently applicable country guidance case or to show why it does not apply to the case in question is likely to be regarded as grounds for appeal on a point of law.”
“139 [Country Guidance decisions] were to be applied by the Tribunal itself and by Adjudicators unless there was good reason, explicitly stated, for not doing so. Failure to adopt that approach was an error of law in that a material consideration had been ignored or legally inadequate reasons for the decision had been given. The inconsistency itself with authoritative cases would be regarded by higher authority than the Tribunal as an error of law. 140 These decisions are now denoted as 'CG'. They are not starred decisions. Those latter are decisions which are binding on points of law. The requirement to apply CG cases is rather different: they should be applied except where they do not apply to the particular facts which an Adjudicator or the Tribunal faces and can properly be held inapplicable for legally adequate reasons; there may be evidence that circumstances have changed in a material way which requires a different decision, again on the basis that proper reasons for that view are given; there may be significant new evidence which shows that the views originally expressed require consideration for revision or refinement, even without any material change in circumstances. It may be that the passage of time itself or substantial new evidence itself warrants a re-examination of the position, even though the outcome may be unchanged.”
“It will have been noticed that Ouseley J said that any failure to apply a CG decision unless there was good reason, explicitly stated, for not doing so would constitute an error of law in that a material consideration had been ignored or legally inadequate reasons for the decision had been given. This suggestion has now been repeated and adopted in para 18.4 of the AIT Practice Direction. We have no hesitation in endorsing that approach. It would represent a failure to take a material matter into account, which is the third of the generic errors of law we have identified in para 9 above.”
“Country guidance decisions, whilst determining the rights of the parties to the actual decision, are no more than a compilation and statement of evidence relevant to the position of asylum seekers from the country in question. They therefore provide a convenient guide to the likely treatment of asylum seekers in that jurisdiction but they are no more than a judicial assessment of the probative value of the evidence on which they are based and are not intended to exclude other relevant evidence which the parties in particular cases are able to adduce. For present purposes, it is important to emphasise that they are no more than factual summaries updated from time-to-time to record material changes in the position on the ground. A change in country guidance is in no sense a change in the law: see NM and others (lone women – Ashraf) Somalia CG[2005] UKIAT 00076 at [140]. It is therefore difficult to see how the decision of the Upper Tribunal in this case which was based on a consideration of the then most recent country guidance contained in TK, coupled with the case-specific evidence produced by SA himself, can be said to contain an error of law by reason of it not having considered the then unpublished material now set out in the decision of GJ. A fact-finding tribunal may, of course, commit an error of law if it bases a particular finding on no evidence or makes an assessment of the issue it has to decide which is contrary to the only possible conclusion which could reasonably be reached on the admissible evidence: see Edwards v Bairstow[1955] 3 All ER 48 . But the decision of the Upper Tribunal in this case was clearly open to it on the factual material that it had to consider and it is difficult to see how the Upper Tribunal can be said to have fallen into error by failing to consider material that was not before it and which may in part relate to a state of affairs that post-dates its decision. This is not a case where there has been a material but subsequent change in the law with the result that the decision of the lower tribunal can now be seen to have proceeded on the basis of a misdirection. I would therefore dismiss the appeal on the basis that there has been no error of law.”
“24 Miss Chan [counsel for the Secretary of State] also says -- and here now she speaks purely hypothetically -- that, if there is in the course of delay in the Tribunal's preparing or promulgating a decision a substantial change for the better in the relevant circumstances which obtain in the foreign country, it is highly undesirable that no cognisance can be taken of it. She relies on the decision of this court in Ravichandran v Secretary of State for the Home Department (1996) Imm AR 97 in which it was held that judicial determinations made within the immigration appellate structure were to be regarded as an extension of the decision-making process and so in principle should be based upon circumstances as they are at the time of those determinations rather than at any earlier stage. Of course she does not submit that this court is part of that structure; but she reaches for the principle behind that decision. 25 There has to come a time, however, at which the opportunity for judicial survey of up-to-date evidence stops. Under our system, and save in exceptional circumstances, it stops upon promulgation of the Tribunal's determination; and so it has stopped by the time when the case reaches this court.”
“The country guidance case of IK, replicating the risk factors in A, though apparently the Appellant's solicitor was unaware of it and the Home Office Presenting Officer failed to remind the IAT of it, was in my judgment clearly relevant to that question. It constituted country guidance which might assist the Appellant, to use the IAT's words at para 6, “in establishing his fear as being well-founded”