“I write to make a request under the Freedom of Information Act (2000) concerning the mid-term review for Centres for Doctoral Training. This was summarized here: https://www.epsrc.ac.uk/newsevents/news/cdtreview/ In respect of that exercise, I ask for: https://www.epsrc.ac.uk/newsevents/news/cdtreview/ In respect of that exercise, I ask for: 1. The scores of each institution (including their meaning, e.g. if they were scored based on 1- 5, then an indication of which was lowest or highest). 2. The entire spreadsheet that contains said scores (if it exists). 3. The feedback provided to each institution or centre from this exercise.”
“1. General right of access to information held by public authorities (1) Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled- a. to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information fo the description specified in the request, and b. if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him…” a. to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information fo the description specified in the request, and b. if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him…”
“2. Effect of the exemptions in Part II (1) Where any provision of Part II states that the duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to any information, the effect of the provision is that where either- a. the provision confers absolute exemption, or b. in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exclusion of the duty to confirm or deny outweighs the public interest in disclosing whether the public authority holds the information, section 1(1)(a) does not apply. (2) In respect of any information which is exempt information by virtue of any provision of Part II, section 1(1)(b) does not apply if or to the extent that- a. the information is exempt information by virtue of a provision conferring absolute exemption, or b. in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information. (3) For the purposes of this section, the following provisions of Part II (And no others) are to be regarded as conferring absolute exemption- … (g) section 41 …” a. the provision confers absolute exemption, or b. in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exclusion of the duty to confirm or deny outweighs the public interest in disclosing whether the public authority holds the information, section 1(1)(a) does not apply. a. the information is exempt information by virtue of a provision conferring absolute exemption, or b. in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.
“any information in written, visual, aural, electronic or any other material form on— (a) the state of the elements of the environment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape and natural sites including wetlands, coastal and marine areas, biological diversity and its components, including genetically modified organisms, and the interaction among these elements; (b) factors, such as substances, energy, noise, radiation or waste, including radioactive waste, emissions, discharges and other releases into the environment, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the environment referred to in (a); (c) measures, (including administrative measures), such as policies, legislation, plans, programmes, environmental agreements, and activities affecting or likely to affect the elements and factors referred to in (a) and (b) as well as measures or activities designed to protect those elements …”
“This request is made under the Environmental Information Regulations (2004), on the basis that the CDTs in question are expressly measures (Reg 2I) aimed at advancing the associated environmental concerns found in Regs 2(a) and 2(b): indeed, the EPSRC claims they are “critical” to them. The reports concerning the performance of such measures are therefore plainly environmental information applying UTJ Wikeley’s decision in Department for Energy and Climate Change v The Information Commissioner & Anor[2015] UKUT 671 (AAC) (since approved by the Court of Appeal). Moreover, the public interest is overwhelming, as I understand at least one CDT has failed to meet the high standards of these priority areas (especially in respect of the expressed aspirations), and presumably many more have also done so. The EPSRC is therefore misleading the public about the success of these ‘measures’, as well as preventing an informed public debate about our environmental future, clean air, and the sustainability of our society’s energy systems.”
“The approach to this question is to determine what [sic] the “measure” which the information is “on” – information is “on” a measure if it is about or relates to or concerns the measure in question, it is permissible to go beyond the precise issue with which the disputed information is concerned in identifying the relevant “measure”
“to give a general and unlimited right of access to all information held by public authorities which has a connection, however minimal, with one of the environmental factors mentioned… To be covered by the right of access that it establishes, such information must fall within one of more of the … categories set out in that provision.”
“I am sure that we should apply Section 36 to this case”
“The conduct of public affairs and the impact of disclosure of the information is the kernel of this case. The Commissioner, from the submissions of the research council on this issue has properly concluded that it is reasonable to be concerned at credible negative impacts of disclosure. The exemption is engaged. However, the extent of that negative impact and the positive value of greater transparency and accountability, both of UKRI and of the CDTs needs more careful evaluation. Feedback was given to each centre on the basis of the material submitted and its assessment. It was intended to assist the centres in moving forward for the rest of the period of funding to help them address any areas where there appeared to be a shortfall from the expected performance. It was intended to be helpful; the Appellant (from a consideration of some material in the public domain) described it as anodyne. That is not a wholly unfair description. It reflects a step in a complex administrative process of the supervision of substantial levels of public expenditure in public institutions dedicated to the advancement of understanding and the development of young researchers. The people involved in the process know this and how such exercises are carried out. It is a significant aspect of transparency that such material is in the public domain as showing how the system works. It does not (despite the Appellant’s occasionally strident claims to the contrary) show failures of administration and supervision, it may provide material to support criticism of the arrangements – so much the better. Through better public understanding of the way research and training for research is organised there can be more informed discussion. While it is reasonable to apprehend some discomfort from publication, the timely publication of this material would have done minimal harm and would have contributed to accountability.”
“31. Under section 2 of FOIA, information is exempt from disclosure if an absolute or qualified exemption is conferred and, in the latter case, if the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure. Section 36 (for present purposes – see section 2(3)(e)) confers a qualified exemption and so a decision whether information is exempt under that section involves two stages: first, there is the threshold in section 36 of whether there is a reasonable opinion of the QP that any of the listed prejudice or inhibition (“prejudice”) would or would be likely to occur; second, which only arises if the threshold is passed, whether in all the circumstances of the case the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing it. 32. The QP is not called on to consider the public interest for and against disclosure. Regardless of the strength of the public interest in disclosure, the QP is concerned only with the occurrence or likely occurrence of prejudice. The threshold question under section 36(2) does not require the Commissioner or the F-tT to determine whether prejudice will or is likely to occur, that being a matter for the QP. The threshold question is concerned only with whether the opinion of the QP as to prejudice is reasonable. The public interest is only relevant at the second stage, once the threshold has been crossed, That matter is decided by the public authority (and, following a complaint, by the Commissioner and on appeal thereafter by the tribunal).”
“It is clearly important that appropriate consideration should be given to the opinion of the qualified person at some point in the process of balancing competing public interests under section 36. No doubt the weight which is given to this consideration will reflect the tribunal’s own assessment of the matters to which the opinion relates. Provided this is done, it does not seem to me to matter greatly whether it is taken into account at the outset or at a later stage.”
“In my judgment, three elements are normally required if, apart from contract, a case of breach of confidence is to succeed. First, the information itself, in the words of Lord Greene MR in Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd, must ‘have the necessary quality of confidence about it’. Secondly, that information must have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. Thirdly, there must be an unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the party communicating it.”
“The first limiting principle (which is rather an expression of the scope of the duty) is highly relevant to this appeal. It is that the principle of confidentiality only applies to information to the extent that it is confidential. In particular, once it has entered what is usually called the public domain (which means no more than that the information in question is so generally accessible that, in all the circumstances, it cannot be regarded as confidential) then, as a general rule, the principle of confidentiality can have no application to it. I shall be reverting to this limiting principle at a later stage. The second limiting principle is that the duty of confidence applies neither to useless information, nor to trivia. There is no need for me to develop this point. The third limiting principle is of far greater importance. It is that, although the basis of the law’s protection of confidence is that there is a public interest that confidences should be preserved and protected by the law, nevertheless that public interest may be outweighed by some other countervailing public interest which favours disclosure. This limitation may apply, as the learned judge pointed out, to all types of confidential information. It is this limiting principle which may require a court to carry out a balancing operation weighing the public interest in maintaining confidence against a countervailing public interest favouring disclosure.”
“[s]ometimes the whole can be greater than the sum of its parts”
“Lord Goff emphasized the possibility of a countervailing public interest which favours disclosure. Given the scale and significance of the work of research councils their effectiveness is a clear matter of public interest. There is a real public interest in both disclosing how universities are working with these arrangements for training PhD students and how UKRI/EPSRC evaluates the information.”