““statutory responsibility for the provision and content of training for the judiciary rests with the Lord Chief Justice as Head of the Judiciary in England and Wales, and the Senior President of Tribunals, in line with theConstitutional Reform Act 2005 …. [and]…the Judiciary are not a public authority for the purposes of FOIA…”
“the Judicial Studies Board is listed under Schedule 1 [of FOIA] The Judicial College was formerly the Judicial Studies Board and there has been no indication that it has been removed from the scope of the Freedom of Information Act.”
“(1) Is the Judicial College a public authority for the purposes of FOIA? (2) If yes, does the Judicial College hold any part of the requested information? (3) Irrespective of the answer to (1) above, does the Ministry of Justice hold any part of the requested information? (4) If the answer to either (2) or (3) above is in the affirmative, should the Tribunal issue a Substituted Decision Notice directing production of that part of the requested information that is found to be held?”
“If the Tribunal does not accept that the interpretation urged by the appellant is a straightforward literal construction of the words of the schedule, it is in any event a properly purposive construction. The will of parliament should be given effect, not thwarted: and since the JSB was included on the schedule when the Act came into force in 2005, and parliament has not since then evinced any intention to remove it or to take a different view of the proper status of the JC, giving effect to the will of parliament involves interpreting the words “Judicial Studies Board” to mean the JSB’s successor body, the JC. If necessary, it is submitted that the conditions are met for a “rectifying construction” to substitute the words “Judicial College” for “Judicial Studies Board”: see Inco Europe Ltd. and Others v First Choice Distribution (a firm) and Others[2000] 1 WLR 586 .” 34. Once again, we reject the appellant’s submission. It is beyond legal argument that there is a presumption that the text of a statute is the primary indication of Parliament’s intention and that the enactment is to be given its literal meaning. If, on an informed interpretation, there is no real doubt that a particular meaning of an enactment is to be applied, that is to be taken as its legal meaning. If there is a real doubt, it is to be resolved by applying interpretive criteria. Where the meaning of statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not for the courts or tribunals to interfere, nor invent ambiguities. 35. In our view the words “Judicial Studies Board” could not be clearer. They refer to the body known by that name and described above, which was set up in 1979, was in existence at the time of the passing of FOIA and which ceased to exist on31 March 2011 . What the appellant urges the Tribunal to do is to read words into FOIA that are not there. This is not beyond the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, but this jurisdiction is confined to plain cases of drafting mistakes: see Inco Europe Ltd. and Others at [592E]. The absence of an Order made pursuant to section 4 of FOIA to either remove the Judicial Studies Board from Schedule 1 to the Act or to add the Judicial College thereto, is not akin to a drafting mistake in the words of a statute. If the tribunal were to conclude otherwise, we would in effect be, in our view impermissibly, taking on a function reserved by statute to either the “Secretary of State or the Minister for the Cabinet Office”
“General right of access to information held by public authorities. 1(1) A person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled— (a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and (b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him.”
“Amendment of Schedule 1. 4.(1)The Secretary of State or the Minister for the Cabinet Office may by order amend Schedule 1 by adding to that Schedule a reference to any body or the holder of any office which (in either case) is not for the time being listed in that Schedule but as respects which both the first and the second conditions below are satisfied. (2) The first condition is that the body or office— (a) is established by virtue of Her Majesty’s prerogative or by an enactment or by subordinate legislation, or (b) is established in any other way by a Minister of the Crown in his capacity as Minister, by a government department….. (3) The second condition is— (a) in the case of a body, that the body is wholly or partly constituted by appointment made by the Crown, by a Minister of the Crown, by a government department…., or (b) in the case of an office, that appointments to the office are made by the Crown, by a Minister of the Crown, by a government department….. (4) If either the first or the second condition above ceases to be satisfied as respects any body or office which is listed in Part VI or VII of Schedule 1, that body or the holder of that office shall cease to be a public authority by virtue of the entry in question. (5) The Secretary of State or the Minister for the Cabinet Office may by order amend Schedule 1 by removing from Part VI or VII of that Schedule an entry relating to any body or office— (a) which has ceased to exist, or (b) as respects which either the first or the second condition above has ceased to be satisfied. (6) An order under subsection (1) may relate to a specified person or office or to persons or offices falling within a specified description….”
“Further power to designate public authorities. 5.(1) The Secretary of State or the Minister for the Cabinet Office may by order designate as a public authority for the purposes of this Act any person who is neither listed in Schedule 1 nor capable of being added to that Schedule by an order under section 4(1), but who— (a) appears to the Secretary of State or the Minister for the Cabinet Office to exercise functions of a public nature, or (b) is providing under a contract made with a public authority any service whose provision is a function of that authority. (2) An order under this section may designate a specified person or office or persons or offices falling within a specified description. (3) Before making an order under this section, the Secretary of State or the Minister for the Cabinet Office shall consult every person to whom the order relates, or persons appearing to him to represent such persons.”
“it is conceivable that in the absence of any explanation as to the nature of the transition from the JSB to the JC that “the only available inference … was that the body responsible for the training of judges had changed its name” (as it is put in ground 4). Indeed, whether or not these grounds of appeal have real merit there is in any event a public interest in ensuring that the status of the JC as a public authority subject to FOIA (or not, as the case may be) is clarified at this level.”
“…In common with all the other public bodies and offices listed in Part VI of the Schedule the name [the BBC] tells one all one needs to know. That, indeed, is the purpose of the listing. Its purpose is to enable people who wish to exercise the general right of access to exercise it without having to go to the courts to find out whether the body or office-holder to whom the request is directed is a public authority within the meaning of section 1(1). As the commentators on theFreedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 in Current Law Statutes explain in their general note on section 3 and Schedule 1, clarity of coverage in advance was understood by the legislature to be vital. It was appreciated that to replace the list in Schedule 1 with an omnibus provision that the Act applied to bodies that provided a public service could lead to endless litigation. This was contrary to the principle that the primary role in enforcing the Act should rest with the Commissioner and not the courts: section 47(1). The system of listing is elaborate and, as section 7 recognises, will require constant monitoring to ensure that it is kept up to date. Its value, however, is that it reduces to the minimum the scope for dispute about whether a particular body or office-holder is, or is not, a public authority.”