AH v The Information Commissioner [2026] UKFTT 1003 (GRC)

[2026] UKFTT 01003 (GRC)Case Reference: FT/EA/2025/0479
First-tier Tribunal
(General Regulatory Chamber)
Date 08 July 2026
Information Rights
Decided without a hearing
Before
JUDGE ARNELLJUDGE HEALDMEMBER EDWARDS
Between
AHAppellantTHE INFORMATION COMMISSIONERRespondentDirection made under Rule 14 of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009I.It is ordered the Bundle provided to the Tribunal in this appeal is to be Closed and will be held by the Tribunal pursuant to Rule 14(1) on the basis that it will not be disclosed to any third party.II.On 16 March 2026, Judge Armstrong-Holmes made an order pursuant to Rule 14(1) granting the Appellant anonymity and prohibiting the publication or disclosure of any matter likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Upon reviewing the documentation within the Bundle, which it was necessary for Parties to disclose to the Tribunal to enable consideration of the present appeal, we are satisfied that the Bundle contains multiple documents which, if disclosed would allow members of the public to identify the Appellant and/or their child. Whilst the documents within the Bundle are arguably protected from disclosure or publication by Judge Armstrong-Holmes’ previous order we make this direction for completeness and as part of our ongoing duty to ensure fairness.Decision: The appeal is Dismissed.REASONS
[1]This is an appeal against the Decision Notice of the Information Commissioner ( “the Commissioner”) dated 01 December 2025, reference IC-385581-K7G9 (“the Decision Notice”). The Decision Notice concluded that the Appellant’s request for information to Norfolk County Council (“the Authority”), dated 20 March 2025 (“the Request”) was vexatious and the Authority were entitled to rely on section 17(6) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA).[2]Within their appeal form GRC1, the Appellant requested this appeal be decided without a hearing. The Commissioner confirmed within their Response that they agreed with the Appellant’s preferred mode of hearing. The Tribunal has the benefit of both Parties’ submissions and evidence. Having reviewed the same we do not consider that further information is required from either party in order to make an informed decision. We are therefore satisfied that we can properly determine the issues without a hearing in accordance with Rule 31(2)(b).[3]The Commissioner in consultation with the Appellant prepared the Bundle spanning 612 numbered pages. Whilst it is our intention to refer only to the relevant facts and evidence necessary to explain our Decision, the Parties can nevertheless be assured that we have considered and had due regard to all of the evidence in the Bundle. A. Background[4]The following is a summary of the background to this appeal.

The Request

[5]The Request of 20 March 2025 was made in the following terms, seeking information about a child safeguarding concern arising from an incident in 2019: Further to my enquiries on the matter of Joanne Franklin, when employed as DSL by the City of Norwich School, an Ormiston Academy, being involved in the making of false statements to the NCC CS during a child abuse investigation and subsequently being involved in the alteration of the resulting reports in a failed attempt to hide the evidence from me, new evidence has been acquired so I would like to make the following Freedom of Information Request: On the 4th May 2021, as below, you advised that you had redirected my concerns to the Education Quality Assurance Intervention Regulatory Service. Please can the CS LADO provide me with copies of all correspondence between themselves and the EQAIRS. I would like to ask this information to include the contact details used for the EQAIRS.[6]The Appellant initially sent the Request to the Authority’s Local Authority Designated Officer’s (“LADO”) email address. A reply was sent to the Appellant on the same day advising them that any requests for information from the Authority should be sent to the Authority’s information governance team, which the Appellant subsequently did later that day. The Authority did not provide the Appellant with a response to their Request within the timeframe specified in section 10 of FOIA.[7]On the 09 May 2025 the Appellant complained to the Commissioner about the way the Authority has handled their request. Within their complaint the Appellant stated they had not had a response from the Authority; “neither the information requested or [a] proper refusal notice”.

The Decision Notice

[8]Following receipt of the Appellant’s complaint, on 03 June 2025 the Commissioner wrote to the Authority asking them to provide a response to the Request within 10 working days. The Authority confirmed to the Commissioner on 16 June 2025 that it considered the request to be vexatious and as such was relying on section 17(6) of FOIA to refuse to respond to the Request. The Authority provided the Commissioner with a copy of its internal review response dated 20 November 2024 to one of the Appellant’s previous requests (“the Previous Internal Review Response”) which set out the reasons for applying section 14(1) of FOIA to that request.[9]On 01 December 2025, the Commissioner issued the Decision Notice. The reasons for the Commissioner’s findings within the Decision Notice can be summarised as follows:a. Prior to the Request the Appellant has submitted 19 freedom of information requests (FOIR) to the Authority since 2019 all relating to the same safeguarding incident. The Commissioner considers that dealing with the Appellant’s requests, complaints and correspondence has placed a significant burden on the Authority’s resources;b. The Commissioner accepts the Appellant’s earlier requests may have had a serious purpose and value but as the Authority has already disclosed information in response to these they consider the Request to have limited value. Further the Commissioner does not consider a response to the request from the Authority would be likely to resolve the Appellant’s concerns and may result in further correspondence;c. The Commissioner is satisfied that the Request was vexatious under section 14(1) of FOIA;d. The Authority refused two earlier requests from the Appellant under section 14(1) of FOIA four months prior to the Request and advised it would not respond to further requests about the safeguarding incident; ande. The Request concerns the safeguarding incident and the Commissioner considers it would be unreasonable for the Council to issue another refusal notice and this would create unnecessary work and add to the burden placed on the Authority by the Appellant’s requests. The Authority was therefore entitled to rely on section 17(6) as a basis for not issuing a refusal notice. B. Pleadings[10]The Appellant’s Notice of Appeal was accompanied by lengthy grounds of appeal which generally seek to submit that the Request was not vexatious. In summary the Appellant’s position is as follows:a. There is a legitimate public interest behind their FOIRs as they are part of an investigation into failings in child safeguarding. Previous FOIRs have revealed evidence of wrongdoing and thus there is serious value and purpose in the Appellant’s investigations. Whilst the safeguarding incident took place in 2018 the Appellant does not accept it has subsequently been dealt with. The Appellant is seeking closure for the child involved and confirms their dissatisfaction will remain until they achieve this. Further the investigation has uncovered evidence of wider safeguarding concerns. The Appellant hopes the evidence gathered during their investigation will be of use to “more qualified parties who are currently in the process of taking legal action against the [Authority] on other historic child safeguarding failures”;b. The requests have not caused any harassment or distress to the Authority’s staff as the requests are only seeking the truth. None of the correspondence to the Authority has been directly addressed to any individual account unless as a response to an email from that individual. They understood that there was no obligation to submit FOIRs to a particular address and therefore as the Request related to concerns about LADO it was logical to submit the FOIR directly to LADO in the first instance;c. The ICO nor the Authority have provided any real evidence to support their position that the Request and previous requests were vexatious. No evidence has been provided to support the Authority’s submissions about the number of previous requests made;d. It is reasonable that the Appellant’s correspondence will at times be lengthy as the subject matter is complicated and they have experienced obstructive behaviour during their investigation. Further it is the nature of an investigation that a response to a FOIR may lead to further concerns triggering a further FOIR; ande. They have previously followed the correct procedure for submitting complaints to the Authority about the way the safeguarding incident was handled, but these have been rejected.[11]The Commissioners Response resists the appeal and maintains the reasons provided in the Decision Notice. In summary the Commissioner’s position is as follows:a. The Commissioner was satisfied the Request was vexatious pursuant to section 14(1) FOIA and the Authority was entitled to rely on section 17(6) FOIA as a basis for not issuing a refusal notice;b. The Decision Notice was made based upon the submissions of the Authority and the Appellant. The Commissioner took into account the Appellant’s concerns regarding the safeguarding incident, acknowledging the serious purpose and value of the Appellant’s earlier request. However in taking a holistic approach the Commissioner was correct to deem the Request vexatious when considering the burden of dealing with prior requests due to follow up correspondence, the tone of correspondence and the fact that the Appellant’s concerns do not appear to have been substantiated by the Authority; andc. The Authority was correct to rely upon section 17(6) FOIA as it had previously issued the Appellant with two refusal notices in respect of requests relating to the same topic citing section 14 FOIA and it would be unreasonable for the Authority to issue another particularly in line with the purpose of section 14.[12]On 17 February 2026 the Appellant filed a Reply to the Commissioner’s Response. The Appellant’s Reply was lengthy totalling 40 pages with 40 accompanying documents attached. The Appellant’s Reply principally reiterates and expands upon their grounds of appeal. In particular the Appellant provides extensive submissions explaining their position as to the public interest in disclosure of the information sought in the Request and their previous FOIRs. We do not intend to rehearse these in full in this decision as it is not necessary to explain our decision, but the Parties can be assured these submissions and the accompanying documents have been considered in full and given due consideration. C. The legal framework[13]The following are the relevant provisions of FOIA.[14]Section 1(1) provides a general right of access to information held by public authorities: Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled—(a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and(b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him.[15]However, an individual does not have an unconditional right to access information held by a public authority or to be told if such information exists. FOIA contains exemptions and qualifications on the entitlement under section 1(1) and section 1(2) provides: Subsection (1) has effect subject to the following provisions of this section and to the provisions of sections 2, 9, 12 and 14.[16]Section 14 (1) provides: Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious.[17]There is no statutory guidance on the meaning of “vexatious” within FOIA. Guidance comes from the Upper Tribunal’s Decision in Information Commissioner vs Devon County Council & Dransfield [2012] UKUT 440 (AAC) (“Dransfield UT”)which was upheld and clarified by the Court of Appeal in Dransfield v Information Commissioner and another & Craven v Information Commissioner and another [2015] EWCA Civ 454 (CA) (“Dransfield CA”).[18]In Dransfield UT, Judge Wikeley held that the purpose of section 14 FOIA "must be to protect the resources (in the broadest sense of the word) of the public authority from being squandered on disproportionate use of FOIA.”. This formulation was qualified in Dransfield CA where it was confirmed that it was an aim that could only be realised if “the high standard set by vexatiousness is met”. As noted by Arden LJ at paragraph 68 of her judgement in Dransfield (CA) there is a high hurdle to show a request is vexatious:
“Parliament has chosen a strong word which therefore means that the hurdle of satisfying it is a high one, and that is consistent with the constitutional nature of the right. The decision maker should consider all the relevant circumstances in order to reach a balanced conclusion as to whether a request is vexatious.”
[19]In Dransfield (UT) Judge Wikeley sets out detailed guidance which was not challenged in the Court of Appeal. Judge Wikeley confirms “[t]he question ultimately is this -is the request vexatious in the sense of being a manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA?”[20]Judge Wikeley set out four broad issues to assist in assessing whether a request is vexatious:a. The burden imposed on the public authority by the request;b. The motive of the requestor;c. The value or serious purpose; andd. Any harassment of, or distress caused to the public authority’s staff.[21]These factors are not to be treated as exhaustive or a checklist but as part of an overall assessment taking a holistic approach.[22]Section 17 contains provisions relating to refusal of requests. Section 17(5) provides: A public authority which, in relation to any request for information, is relying on a claim that section 12 or 14 applies must, within the time for complying with section 1(1), give the applicant a notice stating that fact.[23]However, this is caveated by section 17(6) which provides: Subsection (5) does not apply where—(a) the public authority is relying on a claim that section 14 applies,(b) the authority has given the applicant a notice, in relation to a previous request for information, stating that it is relying on such a claim, and(c) it would in all the circumstances be unreasonable to expect the authority to serve a further notice under subsection (5) in relation to the current request. D. The Tribunal’s role[24]The powers of the Tribunal in determining this appeal are set out at section 58 of FOIA.(1) If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal considers— (a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or (b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal.(2) On such an appeal, the Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based.[25]The Tribunal is required to consider whether the Decision Notice is made in accordance with the law or, where the Commissioner’s decision involved an exercise of discretion, whether that discretion should have been exercised differently. The Tribunal may consider evidence that was not before the Commissioner and may make different findings of fact from the Commissioner. The Tribunal conducts a full merits review of the Decision Notice but within the limited statutory question of whether it was compliant with Part I FOIA.[26]The Tribunal’s jurisdiction does not extend to conducting a procedural review of the Commissioner’s conduct during the investigation prior to the issuing of the Decision Notice. Similarly, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction does not extend to considering subsequent FOIR made to the Commissioner following the issuing of the Decision Notice as referred to within the Appellant’s submissions. Additionally, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction does not extend to considering any allegations of wrongdoing or impropriety by the Authority, other organisations or individuals outside the scope of FOIA Part I.[27]The burden of satisfying the Tribunal that the Decision Notice was wrong in law or involved an inappropriate exercise of discretion rests with the Appellant. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.[28]However as noted by the Upper Tribunal in Forstater v Information Commissioner and others [2023] UKUT 303 (AAC) at Paragraph 40(3):
“...the concept of the burden of proof is of secondary importance in tribunal proceedings which involve a full merits review, since to apply strict burdens of proof may prevent the tribunal from properly discharging its responsibility to decide the facts for itself and/or exercise any discretion afresh…”
E. Discussions and conclusions[29]The fundamental issue for us to determine in this appeal is whether the Commissioner was correct to conclude within the Decision Notice that the Authority was entitled to rely on section 17(6) FOIA to refuse to provide a refusal notice to the Request.[30]There are three elements to section 17(6) FOIA which must be satisfied before an Authority is entitled to rely upon it. We must consider each of these in reaching our determination and do so in the separately headed paragraphs which follow.

Section 17(6)(a) – Reliance

(a) – Reliance

[31]Section 17(6)(a) provides that in order to engage section 17(6) the Authority must be relying on a claim that section 14 FOIA applies to the Request. The two requests made prior to the Request, by the Appellant to the Authority were refused under section 14 FOIA. The Authority confirmed in their correspondence to the Commissioner dated 16 June 2025 that the Request was reviewed on receipt and it was determined that it fell into the same category of requests as the two requests previously refused under section 14 FOIA. The Appellant has not disputed this.[32]We therefore find the Authority was relying on a claim that section 14 FOIA applied to the Request.

Section 17(6)(b) – Previous Notice

(b) – Previous Notice

[33]Section 17(6)(b) requires that the Authority has given a notice to the Appellant in relation to a previous FOIR that it was relying on section 14 FOIA.[34]The Appellant made a previous FOIR to the Authority on 12 July 2024. The Authority refused that FOIR on 01 August 2024 confirming that the request was being treated as vexatious under section 14 FOIA and providing reasoning for the same. The Appellant requested an internal review of that refusal and on 20 November 2024 the Authority issued the Previous Internal Review Response. The Previous Internal Review Response upheld the initial refusal and provided a very detailed explanation as to why the Authority were treating the FOIR as vexatious. The conclusion to the Previous Internal Review Response confirmed “Any further requests for information under the FOI Act on the matter of this incident, the investigations and anything linked to it will be logged but not responded to.”[35]The Appellant made a further FOIR on 20 November 2024 which crossed over with the issuing of the Previous Internal Review Outcome. On 26 November 2024 the Authority issued a refusal to the Appellant confirming it was treating the FOIR of 20 November 2024 as vexatious under section 14 FOIA and referring the Appellant to the reasons given in the Previous Internal Review Response. This refusal also confirmed “Any further requests for information regarding this subject will be placed on file and no further refusal notice issued. This is in line with advice published on the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) website.”[36]Neither the Previous Internal Review Response nor the 26 November 2024 refusal were challenged by the Appellant.[37]We therefore find that:a. The Previous Internal Review Response clearly stated it considered the previous request to be vexatious under section 14 FOIA and gave a considerably detailed explanation for its reliance on the same;b. The notice given in the concluding paragraphs of the Previous Internal Review Outcome is sufficiently clear as to the parameters under which further requests for information from the Appellant would be considered vexatious; andc. The Authority provided a further clear refusal notice that it considered one of the Appellant’s previous requests vexatious under section 14 FOIA on 26 November 2024. It was reasonable for the Authority on that occasion to refer the Appellant to the reasoning given in the Previous Internal Review Response in light of the relevant dates. The refusal notice of 26 November 2024 is sufficiently clear as to the parameters under which further requests for information from the Appellant would be considered vexatious and confirms no further refusal notice will be issued in relation to FOIRs falling within those parameters.[38]Accordingly, we find that the requirements of section 17(6)(b) are met by the Previous Internal Review Response and the refusal notice of 26 November 2024.

Section 17(6)(c) - Unreasonableness

(c) - Unreasonableness

[39]Finally, we must consider whether it would be unreasonable in all the circumstances to require the Authority to provide a further refusal notice to the Request.[40]We note that there is no explicit requirement in section 17(6) FOIA to find that the Request is vexatious. However, the Commissioner found in the Decision Notice that the Request was vexatious and relied on that finding as a factor when concluding that it would be unreasonable in all the circumstances for the Authority to issue a further refusal notice. It follows that we must have some consideration as to whether the Request was vexatious as part of our overall consideration of “unreasonableness.”[41]Having considered the overall circumstances of the case and the suggested list of factors set out in Dransfield UT, we find there was sufficient evidence for the Commissioner to make a finding of vexatiousness. The Commissioner had before them, as do we, the detailed reasons provided by the Authority in the Previous Internal Review Request. The Commissioner concluded in the Decision Notice that the Request was vexatious for two main reasons.[42]Firstly, the burden placed on the Authority in responding to the Appellant’s FOIRs due to the volume of requests and complaints and the length and complexity of some of those requests. The Commissioner goes on to conclude that despite the number of FOIRs and complaints previously submitted by the Appellant, the Appellant remains dissatisfied with how the safeguarding incident (which is the overarching subject of all of the Appellant’s FOIRs) was dealt with and therefore considered if the Authority was to respond to the Request it would be unlikely to conclude the matter and may lead to further correspondence. We find that the number of previous requests relating to the same subject matter would have placed a significant burden on the Authority. We also find that it was reasonable for the Commissioner to conclude that had the Authority responded to the Request this would likely have led to further correspondence or FOIRs, indeed the Appellant states within their grounds of appeal that their dissatisfaction with the Authority will remain until they get closure for the child involved in the safeguarding incident.[43]Secondly, whilst acknowledging that the Appellant’s earlier FOIRs may have had serious purpose and value, the Commissioner concluded that as the Authority had already disclosed information relating to the safeguarding incident the Request has limited value. We recognise the strength of the Appellant’s feelings on the subject matter and note that any information concerning the safeguarding of children is likely to be of public interest. However, when considering the objective public interest in the information sought, as information relating to the incident has already been disclosed, the public value in the Request is limited.[44]Additionally, we have considered the motive of the Appellant. Although FOIA is motive-blind, motive is one of the suggested factors for consideration listed in Dransfield UT as part of an objective holistic consideration of the “wider context of the course of dealings between the individual and the relevant public authority”. Dransfield UT also confirms that a requester may pursue FOIA rights in a manner that become inappropriate even without proper intent. Whilst we accept that the Appellant’s requests are motivated by a personal connection to the subject matter and by a strongly held conviction, on which we make no findings, that the safeguarding incident in 2018 was not dealt with appropriately, we find that there are other more appropriate avenues available to Appellant to express his concerns and make allegations of wrongdoing. Indeed, the Appellant has confirmed that he has previously submitted complaints following the proper procedure. As such, although we do not find that the Appellant’s FOIRs were improperly motivated, the purpose of seeking to perpetuate a complaint against the Authority supports a finding of vexatiousness.[45]We now proceed to consider whether, in all the circumstances, it would have been unreasonable to expect the Authority to provide a refusal notice to the Request.[46]We note that section 14 FOIA allows public authorities to treat requests as vexatious however it is not the intention of the legislation to allow a public authority to treat a requestor as vexatious. It therefore follows there is an implied limit on the operation of a previous notice in accordance with section 17(6)(b), such that there must be a connection between a previous request(s) and the current request in questions.[47]We find there are some factors which weigh against a finding of unreasonableness. Namely the seriousness of the subject matter and the Appellant’s apparent passionate and personal connection to the subject matter. However as above at paragraph 44 we have found that objectively there is limited public value in the information sought.[48]We find the following factors support a finding of unreasonableness:a. The purpose of section 17(6) is to protect public authorities from the additional unnecessary burden of responding to requests where there has already been a finding of vexatiousness. As above we find there was sufficient evidence before the Commissioner to conclude that the Request was vexatious and thus to require the Authority to issue a refusal notice would be unreasonable;b. There is only a short timescale of four months between the Request and the previous refusals, and we do not consider that to be a reasonable interval between requests such as to alleviate the burden on the Authority;c. The Request relates to the same safeguarding incident which was the subject matter of the Appellant’s previous FOIRs. We therefore find there is a sufficient nexus between the Request and those previously refused under section 14 FOIA;d. The Authority provided extremely detailed reasons for their refusal within the Previous Internal Review Response as to why they considered that request vexatious. Therefore, we are satisfied the Authority has considered the applicability of section 14 of FOIA in relation to the Appellant’s FOIRs on this subject matter at length; ande. There are other avenues of challenge outside of FOIA open to the Appellant to raise concerns about the safeguarding incident. Therefore by declining to issue a refusal notice the Authority are not closing down the Appellant’s ability to raise concerns in the appropriate forum.[49]We are satisfied that these factors outweigh the limited factors against a finding of unreasonableness and conclude that it would be unreasonable in all of the circumstances to require the Authority to provide a further refusal notice to the Request.[50]Therefore, we find for all the reasons given above that the Commissioner’s Decision did not involve an error of law or an inappropriate exercise of discretion. Accordingly the Decision is upheld and the appeal is dismissed.[51]We conclude by noting our decision in this appeal does not mean the Authority can apply a blanket automatic refusal to reply to all FOIRs made by the Appellant. The Authority remains obligated to consider each individual request to determine whether section 14 FOIA applies and, if so, if it is unreasonable in all the circumstances to expect them to provide a further refusal notice on that occasion. Signed Judge Arnell Date: 01 July 2026