“A the [claimant] was born on 21 03 1970 B she is a single claimant for IS purposes with two minor children, H… and V… C she is a single claimant for HB purposes D she claimed… IS on 01 10 2008 and… HB on 05 09 2013 E she gave her address as … ("number 6") F number 6 was a property owned by [LBTH] G the [claimant] was the secure tenant of number 6 H her occupation of number 6 began many years ago I she was said to be in possession of capital assets in excess of the permitted maximum J the capital was in the form of a property at …("number 57") K the [claimant] bought number 57 in December 2005 L number 57 was purchased with funding from a mortgage and also from Mr N… G… (“Mr G”) M a restriction was placed on number 57 by… Mr G in April 2006 N the [claimant] vacated number 6 temporarily in 2009 due to infestation O that vacation was known to the [the Secretary of State and LBTH] P she had an intention to return to live at number 6 Q she had no intention to surrender the tenancy at number 6 R the [claimant] returned to occupy number six in August 2013”
“This was the legal outcome of the dealings between them, whether or not they gave purposeful consideration to it. That being the situation, any beneficial interest in number 57 was held by the appellant for Mr G and she held nothing for herself (save perhaps for the£250 she originally put up. Even if that were grossed up on an actuarial basis, it would not reach the capital limit for benefit purposes).”
"A decision that rested the entire beneficial ownership in Mr G would take no account of the intentions of the claimant and Mr G. in purchasing No. 57. This was to provide them with a joint income in the form of rental payments from tenants. It would take no account of the financial contribution of the claimant in terms of substantial mortgage repayments, [g]round rent, council tax and other expenses. Lord Collins in Jones v Kernott final paragraph (66) perhaps sets the standard for any decision attributing the proceeds of any sale: “Nor will it matter in practice that at the first stage, of ascertaining the common intention as to the beneficial ownership, the searches not at least in theory, for what is fair. It would be difficult (and, perhaps, absurd) to imagine a scenario involving circumstances from which, in the absence of express agreement, the court will infer a shared or common intention which is unfair. The courts are courts of law, but they are also courts of justice."
“iv) Where the intention as to the division of the property cannot be inferred, each is entitled to that share which the court considers fair. In considering the question of what is fair the court should have regard to the whole course of dealing between the parties".”
“… the tribunal stated that it had no need to consider [any] capital disregard as the [claimant] had no capital to assess. I note that she received a sum of£9,342.36 as compensation for an infestation in 2013 …. That capital warranted further investigation since it is arguable that there is no reason to disregard the sum which should have been treated as providing tariff income of£1 per week for each complete£250 in excess of£6,000 …. The tribunal arguably erred in law by not investigating this matter.”
“The appellant’s apparent acceptance that “no legally enforceable trust has been set up” would, if taken at face value, provide a sufficient reason on its own for dismissing his appeal. Ownership is a legal matter. A “trust” that is not legally-enforceable is not a trust at all. It is not in dispute that the appellant was both the legal and beneficial owner of the money before he set up the alleged trust. If he did not succeed in setting up a trust (i.e., a trust that the law would recognise and enforce) then, as a matter of law, he is still the legal and beneficial owner of that money. If the appellant’s statement that the setting up of a private trust is not “illegal or … inapplicable” was intended to mean that making the sort of arrangement he claims he has made is not contrary to the criminal law, then that is true. However, the absence of criminality is not sufficient on its own to make the family arrangement he entered into effective to transfer the beneficial ownership of the money from him to his daughters. At the risk of labouring the point, the appellant’s evidence is that he intended to make a gift to his daughters. If he was succeeded in setting up a trust then he also succeeded in making that gift. If he did not, then no gift was made and he retains ownership of the money in the Account. The issue is therefore, again, whether the appellant’s evidence has proved the existence of a trust.”
“19 I would add one thing by way of conclusion. The appellant has stated that [the local authority] have accused him and his daughters of lying and have cast aspersions on his integrity. Whilst I cannot speak for [the local authority], I wish to Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v LB Tower Hamlets & CT (IS & HB)[2018] UKUT 25 (AAC) 10 CIS/1291/2016 & CH/1294/2016 make it clear that I make no such accusation and cast no such aspersions. I am satisfied that the appellant and his family entered into a private arrangement in 1987, that they believed (albeit incorrectly) that the legal word “trust” was apt to describe that arrangement and that in 2005 they also believed, as a result of the arrangement, that the appellant’s four daughters were, at least morally although possibly not legally, the owners of the money in the [a]ccount in equal shares. 20 The law that governs entitlement to benefit is only concerned with legal ownership. As I have explained, that means that a private arrangement such as that made by the appellant will only have the effect of divesting him of beneficial ownership if it creates a Trust that the law recognises and will enforce. Although a Settlor’s intentions are an important factor to be taken into account when considering whether a trust has come into existence, the law requires—and requires for good reasons—that any person asserting the existence of a trust should be able to prove that those intentions were expressed with a sufficient level of certainty before it recognises that a trust has been created. In this case, the appellant either did not express his intentions in a sufficiently certain manner or has not retained the evidence that would enable him to prove that he did so. The effect, as the tribunal correctly concluded, is that, again as a matter of law, the money in the disputed account continues to belong to the appellant. His belief to the contrary, though no doubt honestly held, is mistaken.”
“A resulting trust arises by operation of law, though in response to a legal presumption about the intentions of the person who transfers the property which becomes subject to the trust. If A transfers property to B when it is unclear whether A intends B to have the beneficial interest in it, then B may hold the property on resulting trust for A. The trust arises by operation of law to give effect to a presumption that A did not intend B to take the property beneficially.”
“69. In law, “context is everything” and the domestic context is very different from the commercial world. Each case will turn on its own facts. Many more factors than financial contributions may be relevant to divining the parties’ true intentions. These include: any advice or discussions at the time of the transfer which cast light upon their intentions then; the reasons why the home was acquired in their joint names; the reasons why (if it be the case) the survivor was authorised to give a receipt for the capital moneys; the purpose for which the home was acquired; the nature of the parties’ relationship; whether they had children for whom they both had responsibility to provide a home; how the purchase was financed, both initially and subsequently; how the parties arranged their finances, whether separately or together or a bit of both; how they discharged the outgoings on the property and their other household expenses. When a couple are joint owners of the home and jointly liable for the mortgage, the inferences to be drawn from who pays for what may be very different from the inferences to be drawn when only one is owner of the home. The arithmetical calculation of how much was paid by each is also likely to be less important. It will be easier to draw the inference that they intended that each should contribute as much to the household as they reasonably could and that they would share the eventual benefit or burden equally. The parties’ individual characters and personalities may also be a factor in deciding where their true intentions lay. In the cohabitation context, mercenary considerations may be more to the fore than they would be in marriage, but it should not be assumed that they always take pride of place over natural love and affection. At the end of the day, having taken all this into account, cases in which the joint legal owners are to be taken to have intended that their beneficial interests should be different from their legal interests will be very unusual.”
“The doctrine of a resulting trust (as understood by some scholars) may still have a useful function in cases where two people have lived and worked together in what has amounted to both an emotional and a commercial partnership.” and in Jones v Kernott, the Supreme Court stated (at paragraph 31): “… we accept that the search is primarily to ascertain the parties’ actual shared intentions, whether expressed or to be inferred from their conduct. However, there are at least two exceptions. The first, which is not this case, is where the classic resulting trust presumption applies. Indeed, this would be rare in a domestic context, but might perhaps arise where domestic partners were also business partners: see Stack v Dowden, para 32 …”
“RESTRICTION: No disposition by a sole proprietor of the registered estate (except a trust corporation) under which capital money arises is to be registered unless authorised by an order of the court.”
“State brief details of the applicant’s interest in the making of the entry of the restriction…”
“The Applicant has an interest in the property which is the subject of this application, as a beneficiary under a Trust of Land, on the basis that he made direct substantial financial contributions to the property in question, including providing the registered proprietor with the deposit to enable the property in question to be purchased.”
“We have been advised by our Rents section that you have received compensation for an infectation [sic] at your current [address]. Please advise what you intend doing with the remaining£9,342.36 ?”
“I am told there have been some deductions and the amount is approximately£8,000 . The money will be used to pay off some of my debts and to pay the costs incurred as a result of appealing this case. I am assuming that you do not need any documentation provided in the light of the information detailed above. Please could you confirm that this is the case.”