“the starting point is that the judge need not deal with every point, but the basis of his decision must be clear ” (at [56]). The reasons challenge in this case 23. The starting point has to be the dispute that the tribunal had the responsibility for deciding. The parents’ case, challenging the SEN statement for L, was as set out at [7] above. Its essence was captured by the tribunal in its statement of reasons (at [4] and [7]). The tribunal then went on to consider the evidence about L (especially at [8]-[13]). I simply note that this include a mixture of evidence and implied findings of fact, which merely reinforces the point made about the formatting of tribunal decisions at [10] above. The parties’ respective submissions before the tribunal were set out neatly in the statement of reasons (at [18] and [19]), and there was no suggestion that that summary was other than an accurate account of the competing cases. 24. The tribunal’s central conclusions and reasoning (at [B] and [C]) were as follows: “B. It is not possible for us to decide on placement until we are satisfied as to L’s primary special educational needs. In this case there was a straight dispute between the parties as to whether MSI constituted that primary need or whether in fact he is a PMLD child whose difficulties included hearing and visual impairment. That was certainly the view of Dr M and we are bound to give considerable weight to that view, because he was the only person with appropriate professional training who has given a view… C. We have to make our decision on the balance of probabilities and we have therefore come to the conclusion that L is a PMLD child with (it was agreed) significant hearing and visual impairment but his multi-sensory impairment is not his primary need. In coming to this conclusion we have also taken into account that there is no evidence that L has a higher cognitive assessment which might be expected of a child whose primary need is MSI.” 25. Both counsel took me to Dr M’s written evidence on file. It is certainly the case, as Mr Lawson argues, that the e-mail from Dr M itself is brief and on the face of it not necessarily the best or indeed most compelling evidential basis. However, as Mr Cornwell rightly pointed out, the e-mail has to be taken together with, and seen in the context of, the consultant’s previous and more detailed letter, also on file. It must also be seen in the context of the substantial body of other evidence on file which did not identify L’s needs as being primarily MSI, although both visual and hearing impairments were plainly part of the constellation of conditions involved. Indeed, as Mr Cornwell pointed out, the suggestion of MSI did not appear in the papers until relatively late in the day. 26. In those circumstances, and bearing in mind the nature of the dispute as put to the tribunal, my view is that the tribunal’s reasons as summarised at [24] above meet the Meek test. The tribunal was faced with two competing scenarios, one emphasizing PMLD, the other stressing MSI, and it explained shortly and succinctly with two reasons why it preferred the local authority’s position. It is also axiomatic that the weight to be attached to any particular piece of evidence before the tribunal “is essentially a matter for the Tribunal, unless the approach can be shown to be so illogical as to be irrational or perverse” (see Dobbs J. in W.S. (by his litigation friend Mr S) v Governors of Whitefield Schools and Centre[2008] EWHC 1196 (Admin) at [27]). 27. Other tribunals might have spent rather longer explaining their analysis of the relevant evidence. That does not mean that this tribunal erred in law. It gave adequate reasons on the central issue to be decided. As Arden LJ observed, “r easons must be satisfactory but they need not be exhaustive”; or as Mrs Commissioner Parker put it, the test remains adequacy, not perfection. 28. However, Mr Lawson’s reasons challenge goes beyond the central PMLD/MSI dispute. In particular, he attacks the tribunal’s statement of reasons (at [J]; see [9] above) as regard its treatment of the outstanding Part 2 and Part 3 issues. This is, he argues, an assertion rather than a reason. It puts the local authority at “the Goldilocks point” – “everything is just right” – and the parents in the converse position, where nothing they propose on Parts 2 and 3 is “just right”, but with no adequate explanation. 29. In fairness only one point was taken on Part 2 of the Working Document, namely the apparent ambiguity left in the final paragraph under the heading “medical issues”