“(1) A creditor’s petition must be in respect of one or more debts owed by the debtor, and the petitioning creditoror each of the petitioning creditors must be a person towhom the debt or (as the case may be) at least one ofthe debts is owed. (2) Subject to the next three sections, a creditor’s petition may be presented to the court in respect of a debt ordebts only if, at the time the petition is presented— (a) the amount of the debt, or the aggregate amount of the debts, is equal to or exceeds the bankruptcy level, (b) the debt, or each of the debts, is for a liquidated sum payable to the petitioning creditor, or one or more of the petitioning creditors, either immediately or at some certain, future time, and is unsecured, (c) the debt, or each of the debts, is a debt which the debtor appears either to be unable to pay or to have no reasonable prospect of being able to pay, and (d) there is no outstanding application to set aside a statutory demand served (under section 268 below) in respect of the debt or any of the debts.” (a) the amount of the debt, or the aggregate amount of the debts, is equal to or exceeds the bankruptcy level, (b) the debt, or each of the debts, is for a liquidated sum payable to the petitioning creditor, or one or more of the petitioning creditors, either immediately or at some certain, future time, and is unsecured, (c) the debt, or each of the debts, is a debt which the debtor appears either to be unable to pay or to have no reasonable prospect of being able to pay, and (d) there is no outstanding application to set aside a statutory demand served (under section 268 below) in respect of the debt or any of the debts.”
“any of the following— (a) any debt or liability to which he is subject at the commencement of the bankruptcy, (b) any debt or liability to which he may become subject after the commencement of the bankruptcy (including after his discharge from bankruptcy) by reason of any obligation incurred before the commencement of the bankruptcy ….” (a) any debt or liability to which he is subject at the commencement of the bankruptcy, (b) any debt or liability to which he may become subject after the commencement of the bankruptcy (including after his discharge from bankruptcy) by reason of any obligation incurred before the commencement of the bankruptcy ….”
“For the purposes of references in this Group of Parts [which comprises sections 251A to 385] to a debt or liability, it is immaterial whether the debt or liability is present or future, whether it is certain or contingent or whether its amount is fixed or liquidated, or is capable of being ascertained by fixed rules or as a matter of opinion; and references in this Group of Parts to owing a debt are to be read accordingly.”
“Rule 45—A judgment of a court of a foreign country (hereinafter referred to as a foreign judgment) has no direct operation in England but may (1) be enforceable by claim or counterclaim at common law or under statute, or (2) be recognised as a defence to a claim or as conclusive of an issue in a claim … Rule 46—(1) …a foreign judgment in personam given by the court of a foreign country with jurisdiction to give that judgment…and which is not impeachable…, may be enforced by a claim or counterclaim for the amount due under it if the judgment is (a) for a debt, or definite sum of money (not being a sum payable in respect of taxes or other charges of a like nature or in respect of a fine or other penalty); and (b) final and conclusive, but not otherwise. … Rule 51—a foreign judgment which is a final and conclusive on the merits and not impeachable…is conclusive as to any matter thereby adjudicated upon, and cannot be impeached for any error either (1) of fact; or (2) of law.” (1) be enforceable by claim or counterclaim at common law or under statute, or (2) be recognised as a defence to a claim or as conclusive of an issue in a claim (a) for a debt, or definite sum of money (not being a sum payable in respect of taxes or other charges of a like nature or in respect of a fine or other penalty); and (b) final and conclusive, (1) of fact; or (2) of law.”
“The principle on which this action is founded is, that, where a court of competent jurisdiction has adjudicated a certain sum to be due from one person to another, a legal obligation arises to pay that sum, on which an action of debt to enforce the judgment may be maintained. It is in this way that the judgments of foreign and colonial courts are supported and enforced, and the same rule applies to inferior courts in this country, and applies equally whether they be courts of record or not.”
“It is not an admitted principle of the law of nations that a state is bound to enforce within its territories the judgment of a foreign tribunal. Several of the continental nations (including France) do not enforce the judgments of other countries, unless where there are reciprocal treaties to that effect. But in England and in those states which are governed by the common law, such judgments are enforced, not by virtue of any treaty, nor by virtue of any statute, but upon a principle very well stated by Parke, B., in Williams v. Jones [citing the passage set out at para 42 above].”
“It is unnecessary to repeat again what we have already said in Godard v. Gray. We think that, for the reasons there given, the true principle on which the judgments of foreign tribunals are enforced in England is that stated by Parke, B., in Russell v. Smyth, and again repeated by him in Williams v. Jones, that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction over the defendant imposes a duty or obligation on the defendant to pay the sum for which judgment is given, which the courts in this country are bound to enforce…”
“A foreign judgment given by a court of competent jurisdiction over the defendant is treated by the common law as imposing a legal obligation on the judgment debtor which will be enforced in an action on the judgment by an English court in which the defendant will not be permitted to reopen issues of either fact or law which have been decided against him by the foreign court.”
“The theoretical basis for the enforcement of foreign judgments at common law is that they are enforced on the basis of a principle that where a court of competent jurisdiction has adjudicated a certain sum to be due from one person to another, a legal obligation arises to pay that sum, on which an action of debt to enforce the judgment may be maintained: Williams v Jones (1845) 13 M & W 628, 633, per Parke B; Godard v Gray (1870) LR 6 QB 139, 147, per Blackburn J; Adams v Cape Industries plc[1990] Ch 433 , 513 and Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco[1992] 2 AC 443 , 484, per Lord Bridge of Harwich. As Blackburn J said in Godard v Gray, this was based on the mode of pleading an action on a foreign judgment in debt, and not merely as evidence of the obligation to pay the underlying liability: LR 6 QB 139, 150.”
“But this is a purely theoretical and historical basis for the enforcement of foreign judgments at common law.”
“A foreign judgment has no direct operation in England. It cannot be immediately enforced by execution.”
“A foreign judgment has no direct operation in England” and the comment explained this by reference to execution: “A foreign judgment does not operate directly in England. The judgment of, e.g., a French Court, cannot be enforced here by execution”
“An invalid foreign judgment has…no effect”
“The first rule of foreign judgments is that judgments of foreign courts have, as such, no legal effect in England, for foreign judges have no authority in England. Except where Parliament has provided otherwise, foreign judgments cannot be enforced in England by execution, and no person is in contempt of court, or otherwise in peril in England, if she fails to do what she has been ordered to do by a foreign judge. As judicial adjudication is an exercise of state sovereignty, this is obvious: state sovereignty ends at the border of the state, and while international comity may certainly require that respect be given to exercises of that power within the sovereign’s own territory, that is where the conventional obligations of comity end.”
“The foreign judgment, if it satisfies the requirements of the common law, is understood to create an obligation, a tie of law, by which the parties are bound and to which each may hold the other. The ‘doctrine of obligation’, which provides the basis and the intellectual justification for the common law recognition of judgments, was articulated 150 years ago in two classic judgments of the Court of Queen’s Bench, and was never doubted by Dicey.”
“English courts have no jurisdiction to entertain an action: (1) For the enforcement, either directly or indirectly, of a penal, revenue or other public law of a foreign state”
“The significance of this for present purposes lies in the fact that there can, I think, be no doubt but that the ‘revenue rule’ precludes presentation of a bankruptcy petition in respect of a foreign tax liability. Nor did I understand Mr Phillips to dispute that. The ‘revenue rule’ must therefore serve to prevent a foreign tax from being regarded as a ‘debt’ in respect of which a petition could be presented notwithstanding the fact that nothing to that effect is expressed in section 267(2)(b) of the 1986 Act. More specifically, the fact that imposition of a tax involves an exercise of sovereign power must result in a foreign tax not being regarded as a ‘debt’ on which a bankruptcy petition can be presented. That tends to support the contention that an unrecognised foreign judgment, which has no ‘direct operation’ because it arises from an exercise of sovereign power, is likewise not to be seen as giving rise to a ‘debt’ capable of founding bankruptcy proceedings.”
“There is a well-established and almost universal principle that the courts of one country will not enforce the penal and revenue laws of another country. Although the theoretical basis for the Rule is a matter of some controversy, the best explanation, it is submitted, is that suggested by Lord Keith of Avonholm in Government of India v Taylor, that enforcement of such claims is an extension of the sovereign power which imposed the taxes, and ‘an assertion of sovereign authority by one State within the territory of another, as distinct from a patrimonial claim by a foreign sovereign, is (treaty or convention apart) contrary to all concepts of independent sovereignties.’”
“In the present case, the appellants are undoubtedly able to point to prior exercises of sovereign power by Denmark in creating its laws relating to the taxation of dividends and in operating the tax system. This, however, merely provides the context for the present claims. The substance of the claims, as we have seen, does not involve any act of a sovereign character, any exercise or enforcement of a sovereign right, or any vindication of sovereign power. On the contrary, the respondent is simply bringing restitutionary claims to recover monies of which it has been defrauded, a course open to any private citizen who had been similarly defrauded. Furthermore, as the Court of Appeal pointed out, the attempt to challenge that conclusion by seeking to characterise the payment of the refunds as sovereign acts does not assist the appellants. First, even if, notwithstanding the fact they were induced by fraud, the making of the payments was correctly characterised as a sovereign act, there is no reason why an attempt to recover the payments should be considered a vindication of sovereign power. Secondly, the respondent is not seeking to vindicate the payment but to invalidate them on grounds of fraud.”
“A judgment creditor seeking to enforce a foreign judgment in England at common law cannot do so by direct execution of the judgment. It must bring an action on the foreign judgment.”
“The judgment creditor may serve a statutory demand in terms of the foreign judgment, just as with any other unpaid debt”
“No proceedings for the recovery of a sum payable under a foreign judgment, being a judgment to which this Part of this Act applies, other than proceedings by way of registration of the judgment, shall be entertained by any court in the United Kingdom.”
“Access of foreign creditors to a proceeding under British insolvency law”: “1. Subject to paragraph 2 of this article, foreign creditors have the same rights regarding the commencement of, and participation in, a proceeding under British insolvency law as creditors in Great Britain. 2. Paragraph 1 of this article does not affect the ranking of claims in a proceeding under British insolvency law, except that the claim of a foreign creditor shall not be given a lower priority than that of general unsecured claims solely because the holder of such a claim is a foreign creditor. 3. A claim may not be challenged solely on the grounds that it is a claim by a foreign tax or social security authority but such a claim may be challenged— (a) on the ground that it is in whole or in part a penalty, or (b) on any other ground that a claim might be rejected in a proceeding under British insolvency law.” (a) on the ground that it is in whole or in part a penalty, or (b) on any other ground that a claim might be rejected in a proceeding under British insolvency law.”