“21. This being the case and there having been no determinations upon any of protests which have taken place close to the Short Strand area, the PSNI have had to police the situation in line with their powers outside of the statutory scheme contained in the [Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 ]. 22. PSNI also have regard to our general functions as contained inSection 32 of the Police (NI) Act 2000 (‘the P(NI)A’) wherein the general duties of the police are set out ie to protect life and property, to preserve order, to prevent the commission of offences and, where an offence has been committed, to take measures to bring the offender to justice. Human Rights considerations are included in decisions made in respect of public order issues such as have arisen during the flag protests. This includes but is not necessarily limited to article 2 Rights (Life) wherein public order disturbances can put this right at risk along with the article 8 Rights (Private Life) of persons in the community and the article 11 Rights (Assembly) of the protesters. The interaction between these competing rights and the status of article 8 and 11 rights as being qualified are all taken into account when operational decisions are being made.”
“On the 14th of February, as part of the ongoing strategy review, several changes were adopted, one was in respect of the protests processing into the city centre and the other regarded the charging policy … The considerations resulting in the decision to stop the unnotified parade included the fact that protests were continuing although with lower numbers, the views of the CNR [Catholic/Nationalist/Republican] community that the protests should be stopped, the wider attitude in the PUL [Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist] community that the protests had run their course and the likely reaction from Loyalists would not be extreme as had been the case in or around the 6th of December. In addition, the wish to have a break in time between the protests and the main marching season, the lack of any proper structure in the protests groups whereby an agreed cessation could be settled, the resource considerations in terms of our ability to manage and contain any problems associated with stopping the protests and the impact upon the residents of the Short Strand of the ongoing protests.”
“Between the 6th of December and the 8th of December, the decision not to permit flag protestors to move into the city centre was changed. The rationale for this change was that risks associated with doing so were too great. The intelligence at the time informed us that had we stopped the protests from going into the city centre that the risk to life posed by the resultant disorder and violence posed too great an article 2 risk.”
“As regards the responsibility of PSNI to ensure that parades and protests which have previously resulted in disorder do not occur again, it is important to remember that PSNI do not authorise parades or protests. I am sure you will agree with me that it would be inappropriate in a democratic society for the police to determine when people can protest. However, it is important that the police take all feasible steps to maintain order and PSNI are committed to continuing to do so.”
“Professional policing decisions dealing with public order issues are extremely complicated and require the balancing of a wide range of competing interests. As recognised by the European Court of Human Rights in its decision on the admissibility in PF and EF v United Kingdom (23 November 2010 ) to require ‘the police in Northern Ireland to forcibly end every violent protest would likely place a disproportionate burden on them, especially where such an approach could result in the escalation of violence across the province. In a highly charged community dispute, most courses of action will have inherent dangers and difficulties and it must be permissible for the police to take all of those dangers and difficulties into consideration before choosing the most appropriate response’.”
“The interview on which the article was based explored a number of aspects of the unnotified parades. ACC Kerr sought to promote the primacy of the Parades Commission in the regulation of all parades. He indicated that police did not want to find themselves in the situation they were in prior to the 1998 Act. It was against that background that he noted that police did not have power to stop an illegal parade under the 1998 Act. He was correct about that. Such power lay only with the Secretary of State. He noted that the offence under the Act was taking part in an unnotified parade. That again was correct. He went on to indicate that police were faced with having to make decisions about the appropriate response to such parades on the basis of a risk or threat to life. We do not consider that any criticism can be made of that.”
“[Mr Kerr] hoped to persuade [the commission] that there was some mechanism by which they could become involved in the determination of the action to be taken in respect of such parades. That certainly was the intention of the North Committee. It is, however, agreed that there is no mechanism by which the Parades Commission can take decisions for unnotified parades. The management of such parades is the responsibility of the police on the basis of their general public order powers and their obligation to prevent crime including crimes under the 1998 Act.”
“(1) If a senior police officer, having regard to the time or place at which and the circumstances in which any public procession is being held or is intended to be held and to its route or proposed route, reasonably believes that - (a) it may result in serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of the community; or (b) the purpose of the persons organising it is the intimidation of others with a view to compelling them not to do an act they have a right to do, or to do an act they have a right not to do, he may give directions imposing on the persons organising or taking part in the procession such conditions as appear to him necessary to prevent such disorder, damage, disruption or intimidation, including conditions as to the route of the procession or prohibiting it from entering any place specified in the directions.”
“(7) A person who organises or takes part in a public procession - (a) in respect of which the requirements of this section as to notice have not been satisfied; or (b) which is held on a date, at a time or along a route which differs from the date, time or route specified in relation to it in the notice given under this section, shall be guilty of an offence.”
“The North Report recognised that under its proposals there would still remain that cohort of parades that were last minute or unforeseen. It considered that in those circumstances the parades should be controlled by police using their public order powers. The problem for police, which the circumstances in this case demonstrate, is that the partial implementation of the North Report has left a larger cohort of parades outside the Parades Commission’s jurisdiction. In particular, the PSNI have to deal with unnotified parades using their available public order powers including the right of arrest in respect of the organisation or participation in such parades and the prevention of such unlawful parades in accordance with the duty under section 32 of the 2000 Act to prevent crime.”
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.”
“34. The Court observes that paragraph 2 of article 11 entitles States to impose ‘lawful restrictions’ on the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly. The Court notes that restrictions on freedom of peaceful assembly in public places may serve the protection of the rights of others with a view to preventing disorder and maintaining the orderly circulation of traffic. 35. The Court reiterates that a prior notification requirement would not normally encroach upon the essence of that right. It is not contrary to the spirit of article 11 if, for reasons of public order and national security, a priori, a High Contracting Party requires that the holding of meetings be subject to authorisation (see Nurettin Aldemir v Turkey, nos 32124/02, 32126/02, 32129/02, 32132/02, 32133/02, 32137/02 and 32138/02 (joined), para 42,18 December 2007 ). 36. However, in special circumstances when an immediate response might be justified, for example in relation to a political event, in the form of a spontaneous demonstration, to disperse the ensuing demonstration solely because of the absence of the requisite prior notice, without any illegal conduct by the participants, may amount to a disproportionate restriction on freedom of peaceful assembly (see Bukta, cited above, paras 35 and 36). It is important for the public authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful gatherings if the freedom of assembly guaranteed byarticle 11 of the Convention is not to be deprived of all substance (see Nurettin Aldemir, cited above, para 46). 37. Nevertheless, in the Court’s view, the principle established in the case of Bukta cannot be extended to the point that the absence of prior notification can never be a legitimate basis for crowd dispersal. Prior notification serves not only the aim of reconciling, on the one hand, the right to assembly and, on the other hand, the rights and lawful interests (including the right of movement) of others, but also the prevention of disorder or crime. In order to balance these conflicting interests, the institution of preliminary administrative procedures is common practice in member states when a public demonstration is to be organised. In the Court’s view, such requirements do not, as such, run counter to the principles embodied inarticle 11 of the Convention , as long as they do not represent a hidden obstacle to the freedom of peaceful assembly protected by the Convention (see Balcik v Turkey, no 25/02, para 49,29 November 2007 ). 38. The Court therefore considers that the right to hold spontaneous demonstrations may override the obligation to give prior notification to public assemblies only in special circumstances, namely if an immediate response to a current event is warranted in the form of a demonstration. In particular, such derogation from the general rule may be justified if a delay would have rendered that response obsolete.”
“… operational discretion is important to the police. … It has been recognised by the European court: see [(2012)] Austin v United Kingdom 55 EHRR 359, para 56. And I have kept it well in mind in writing this judgment. But operational discretion is not sacrosanct. It cannot be invoked by the police in order to give them immunity from liability for everything that they do.”
“… [these cases] all concerned the compatibility of decisions of an administrative character with the Convention rights of those affected by them. Nevertheless, the essential point established by them is that the Smith test [see R v Ministry of Defence, Ex p Smith[1996] QB 517 , 554] is insufficiently intense and that the actions of the police in the present case have to pass the test of proportionality, which must be decided by the court.”
“It can, of course, only be on the rarest occasions, and in circumstances where the appellate court is convinced by the plainest of considerations, that it would be justified in finding that the trial judge had formed a wrong opinion.”
“3. The reasons justifying that approach are not limited to the fact, emphasised in Clarke’s case and Thomas v Thomas, that the trial judge is in a privileged position to assess the credibility of witnesses’ evidence. Other relevant considerations were explained by the United States Supreme Court in Anderson v City of Bessemer (1985) 470 US 564, 574-575: ‘The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not limited to the superiority of the trial judge’s position to make determinations of credibility. The trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise. Duplication of the trial judge’s efforts in the court of appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources. In addition, the parties to a case on appeal have already been forced to concentrate their energies and resources on persuading the trial judge that their account of the facts is the correct one; requiring them to persuade three more judges at the appellate level is requiring too much. As the court has stated in a different context, the trial on the merits should be “the ‘main event’ … rather than a ‘tryout on the road.’” … For these reasons, review of factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard - with its deference to the trier of fact - is the rule, not the exception.’ Similar observations were made by Lord Wilson JSC in In re B (A Child)[2013] 1 WLR 1911 , para 53. 4. Furthermore, as was stated in observations adopted by the majority of the Canadian Supreme Court in Housen v Nikolaisen[2002] 2 SCR 235 , para 14: ‘The trial judge has sat through the entire case and his ultimate judgment reflects this total familiarity with the evidence. The insight gained by the trial judge who has lived with the case for several days, weeks or even months may be far deeper than that of the Court of Appeal whose view of the case is much more limited and narrow, often being shaped and distorted by the various orders or rulings being challenged.’”