"(c) That every person at any stage of an investigation should be able to communicate and to consult privately with a solicitor. This is so even if he is in custody provided that in such a case no unreasonable delay or hindrance is caused to the processes of investigation or the administration of justice by his doing so: . . ."
" Civil actions Some of the witnesses to us have been critical of civil action as a remedy. They point to the difficulty of proving breaches of the rules and to the cost of such actions, and some doubt whether they have any impact on the individual police officer, since any award of costs is borne by police funds. Nonetheless they provide a means by which those who suffer substantial inconvenience, distress or other disadvantage as a result of unjustified police activity may gain some form of redress. It is the only means of redress for those who are not prosecuted and consequently have no opportunity to raise the matter during a trial. As we have already noted, we see this applying particularly in the case of unlawful arrest or unjustifiably prolonged detention. The arrangements we propose for recording decisions during the course of custody may assist in proving cases of unlawful action in these and other respects, for example in relation to improper refusal of access to legal advice, and the civil courts may therefore prove to have a useful role to play in the application of the statutory rules."
"The cases where a private right of action for breach of statutory duty have been held to arise are all cases in which the statutory duty has been very limited and specific as opposed to general administrative functions imposed on public bodies and involving the exercise of administrative discretions."
"In seeking to understand the intention of Parliament and the Secretary of State, regard must be paid to the object and scope of the provisions, the class (if any) intended to be protected by them, and the means of redress open to a member of such a class if the statutory duty is not performed."
"It was no doubt assumed, as it was plainly intended, that the Crown Prosecution Service would perform its duty. If for any reason it did not, a defendant injured by its failure was doubtless expected to apply for a release on bail at once, such application being assured of success."
"It is a question of available remedies. The plaintiff was undoubtedly entitled to remedies in the criminal proceedings (bail) and in judicial review proceedings. The issue is whether she is entitled to an additional remedy against the CPS by way of a civil law claim for damages …. There are strong indicators against the implied creation of a statutory tort of strict liability in a case such as this: the availability to the plaintiff of other remedies both in the criminal proceedings (bail) and in public law proceedings (habeas corpus and mandamus) …."
"your Lordships may think this an appropriate occasion on which to emphasise that whatever may have been the position before the rule was altered in 1977 in all proceedings for judicial review that have been started since that date the grant of leave to cross-examine deponents upon applications for judicial review is governed by the same principles as it is in actions begun by originating summons; it should be allowed whenever the justice of the particular case so requires"
"Some of the witnesses to us have been critical of civil action as a remedy. They point to the difficulty of proving breaches of the rules and to the cost of such actions, and some doubt whether they have any impact on the individual police officer, since any award of costs is borne by police funds. Nonetheless they provide a means by which those who suffer substantial inconvenience, distress or other disadvantage as a result of unjustified police activity may gain some form of redress. It is the only means of redress for those who are not prosecuted and consequently have no opportunity to raise the matter during a trial. As we have already noted, we see this applying particularly in the case of unlawful arrest or unjustifiably prolonged detention. The arrangements we propose for recording decisions during the course of custody may assist in proving cases of unlawful action in these and other respects, for example in relation to improper refusal of access to legal advice, and the civil courts may therefore prove to have a useful role to play in the application of the statutory rules."
"In the unwritten legal order of the British state, at a time when the common law continues to accord a legislative supremacy to Parliament, the notion of a constitutional right can in my judgment inhere only in this proposition, that the right in question cannot be abrogated by the state save by specific provision in an Act of Parliament, or by regulations whose vires in main legislation specifically confers the power to abrogate."
"It will be recalled that in King v The Queen , at p 319, Lord Hodson observed that it matters not whether the right infringed is enshrined in a constitution or is simply a common law right (or presumably an ordinary statutory right). Their Lordships are satisfied that in King v The Queen , which was decided in 1968, the Board took too narrow a view on this point. It is a matter of fundamental importance that a right has been considered important enough by the people of Trinidad and Tobago, through their representatives, to be enshrined in their Constitution. The stamp of constitutionality on a citizen's rights is not meaningless: it is clear testimony that an added value is attached to the protection of the right."
"It is important to distinguish such actions to recover damages, based on a private law cause of action, from actions in public law to enforce the due performance of statutory duties, now brought by way of judicial review. The breach of a public law right by itself gives rise to no claim for damages."
"The principles applicable in determining whether such statutory cause of action exists are now well established, although the application of those principles in any particular case remains difficult. The basic proposition is that in the ordinary case a breach of statutory duty does not, by itself, give rise to any private law cause of action. However a private law cause of action will arise if it can be shown, as a matter of construction of the statute, that the statutory duty was imposed for the protection of a limited class of the public and that Parliament intended to confer on members of that class a private right of action for breach of the duty. There is no general rule by reference to which it can be decided whether a statute does create such a right of action but there are a number of indicators. If the statute provides no other remedy for its breach and the Parliamentary intention to protect a limited class is shown, that indicates that there may be a private right of action since otherwise there is no method of securing the protection the statute was intended to confer."
"where upon the true construction of the Act it is apparent that the obligation or prohibition was imposed for the benefit or protection of a particular class of individuals, as in the case of the Factories Acts and similar legislation."
"But in order to fall within the principle which Lord Diplock had in contemplation it must, in my opinion, appear upon the true construction of the legislation in question that the intention was to confer on members of the protected class a cause of action sounding in damages occasioned by the breach. In the well known passage in the speech of Lord Simonds in Cutler v. Wandsworth Stadium Ltd. [1949] A.C. 398, 407-409, in which he discusses the problem of determining whether a statutory obligation imposed on A should be construed as giving a right of action to B, the whole discussion proceeds upon the premise that B will be damnified by A's breach of the obligation. I know of no authority where a statute has been held, in the application of Lord Diplock's principle, to give a cause of action for breach of statutory duty when the nature of the statutory obligation or prohibition was not such that a breach of it would be likely to cause to a member of the class for whose benefit or protection it was imposed either personal injury, injury to property or economic loss. But publication of unauthorised information about proceedings on a patient's application for discharge to a mental health review tribunal, though it may in one sense be adverse to the patient's interest, is incapable of causing him loss or injury of a kind for which the law awards damages. Hence Lord Diplock's principle seems to me to be incapable of application……."
"is not a liability in tort at all; it is a liability in the public law of the state."
"(1) It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right."
"It is rare to find a reasoned decision articulating principles on which a remedy is afforded." (see Dinah Shelton "