Grand Smile Design Limited v The Commissioners for HMRC [2026] UKFTT 1248 (TC)

[2026] UKFTT 01248 (TC)Case No TC 10000
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
Hearing Heard on: 21 and 22 May 2026Date Judgment date: 26 August 2026
Appeal reference: TC/2024/02554
Income tax –application of the loan charge on the amount of “quasi-loans” outstanding at the end of 5 April 2019 – appeal dismissed
TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARRIET MORGANTRIBUNAL MEMBER MRS JANE SHILLAKERGRAND SMILE DESIGN LIMITEDAppellantTHE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMSRespondentMr Michael Avient, of counsel for AppellantMr Colm Kelly, counsel instructed by HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office for RespondentsDECISION

Part A - Overview

[1]The appeal relates to (1)| a determination made on the basis that the appellant is liable to additional income tax in respect of arrangements which the appellant’s directors, Dr Thomas Keppel (“Dr Keppel”) and his wife, Dr Priyangika Suaris (“Dr Suaris”), entered into regarding the repayment of “quasi-loans”, and (2) two decisions that the appellant is liable to pay additional national insurance contributions (“NICs”) in respect of the arrangements.[2]The determination was made under regulation 80 of the Income Tax (Pay As You Earn) Regulations 2003 and the decisions were made under s 8 of the Social Security Contributions (Transfer of Functions, etc) Act 1999. Originally HMRC determined income tax to be due of £860,461.76 and NICs to be due of £202,262.84, in respect of Dr Keppel, and of £123,262.84, in respect of Dr Suaris. As explained below, the determination and the decisions were later varied and only the income tax and NICs position in relation to Dr Keppel is under appeal.[3]In 2014 and 2015, Dr Keppel and Dr Suaris participated in arrangements known as the Qubic Gold Bullion Scheme (“the QGB scheme”). This is a type of structure which is commonly known as a “disguised remuneration” scheme. The purpose was to enable employees and directors to receive sums as a reward for their services without suffering tax charges on them under arrangements which typically involved the sums being delivered to the employees/directors under “loans”. Dr Keppel’s and Dr Suaris’ participation in this scheme resulted in them owing sums as “loans” to an employee benefit trust, the Grand Smile Design Limited Employee Trust 2014 (“the Trust”’) of £500,000 and £250,000 respectively[4]In 2017 the Government introduced rules to tax such loans, referred to as “quasi-loans”, which were outstanding as at the end of 5 April 2019 in schedule 11 of the Finance F(No2) Act 2017 (“schedule 11”). We refer to the tax charge imposed under these rules as “the loan charge”. Unless expressly stated otherwise all references to paragraphs of legislation in this decision are to paragraphs in schedule 11.[5]In summary, the loan charge applies to any balance of a “quasi-loan” as at the end of 5 April 2019 less, as provided for in para 11(4)(b), any “payment made in money (if any) made by [the debtor under the quasi-loan] on or after 17 March 2016 by way of repayment of the initial debt amount...”.Under para 12, a “payment made in money” which otherwise falls within the terms of para 11(4)(b) is to be disregarded for the purposes of that provision if: “(a) there is any connection (direct or indirect) between the payment or transfer and a tax avoidance arrangement (other than the arrangement under which the quasi-loan was made)…”.[6]For the purpose of these proceedings, it is accepted that the “loans”, which Dr Keppel and Dr Suaris received under the QGB scheme, are “quasi-loans” for the purposes of schedule 11. On the conclusion of a review of their original determination and decisions, HMRC informed the appellant that they accepted that, for the purposes of schedule 11, in each case before the end of 5 April 2019,(1) Dr Suaris had repaid in full her “quasi-loans” to the Trust on making payments to the Trust using her own resources and(2) Dr Keppel had repaid some of his “quasi-loans” to the Trust, also by using his own resources, such that, in their view the remaining amount of his outstanding loans at the end of 5 April 2019 was £386,838.24 (“the disputed balance”) (and not £500,000 as they had originally considered).[7]As a result of their review,(1) the amount which HMRC had treated as the employment income/earnings of Dr Keppel in the determination was adjusted downwards to £386,838.24 (from £500,000),(2) the income tax which HMRC sought to impose in the determination was varied to £804,202.10 and(3) the NICs which HMRC sought to impose in the decisions was varied to £307,639.32.[8]The appellant claims that Dr Keppel repaid the disputed balance of £386,838.24 to the Trust by 5 April 2019 under arrangements he undertook known as the Qubic Loan Cleanse Scheme (“QLC scheme”). In outline, in early 2019(1) the Trust borrowed money to “purchase” 32 shares in the appellant from Dr Keppel and Dr Keppel used the “sales proceeds” of £324,480, so the appellant contends, to repay the disputed balance in that sum by 5 April 2019, and(2) before that date, Dr Keppel paid a further sum of £38,358.24 to the Trust, so the appellant contends, in respect of the lending fee which the Trust had to pay for the borrowings and that sum was applied in discharging the remaining disputed balance.[9]Hence, the appellant’s stance is that, under these arrangements, by “payment made in money” made by Dr Keppel, in large part using the proceeds from the share sale and otherwise from his own resources, which were “made by way of repayment” of his “quasi-loans”, the disputed balance was reduced to nil before 5 April 2019. In HMRC’s view,(1) on a purposive approach to the construction of the relevant provisions in schedule 11, on a realistic view of the facts, the arrangements undertaken under the QLC scheme do not fall within the terms of para 11(4)(b), and(2) if, as the appellant argues, that is not correct, the “repayments” made by Dr Keppel under the QLC scheme are prevented from being treated as reducing the amount of the disputed balance under the anti-avoidance provision in para 12.

Law

[10]Law Schedule 11 operates, in effect, as an adjunct to Part 7A the Income Tax (Earnings and PAYE) Act 2003 (“ITEPA”). Part 7A sets out provisions relating to employment income provided through third parties. Sums brought into charge to income tax under Part 7A are taxable under the main charging provisions in ITEPA. For example, s 6(1)(b) ITEPA provides that the charge to tax on employment income under Part 2 ITEPA includes a charge on “specific employment income” which includes “any amount which counts as employment income” by virtue of Part 7A of ITEPA (see s 7(6)(ba)). Such an amount also falls within the meaning of the expression “employment income” (see s 7(2)(c)).[11]Hence, sums which by virtue of schedule 11 are brought into charge to tax under Part 7A are taxable under the main charging provisions in ITEPA (and the related provisions which apply for NICs purposes).

Part 7A ITEPA

[12]Part 7A ITEPA Section 554A(1) ITEPA states that Chapter 2 applies if- “(a) a person (“A”) is an employee… of another person (“B”), (b) there is an arrangement (“the relevant arrangement”) to which A is a party… (c) it is reasonable to suppose that, in essence- (d) a relevant step is taken by a third person, and (e) it is reasonable to suppose that, in essence- (2) In this Part “relevant step” means a step within… paragraph 1… of [Schedule 11]” (Emphasis added.)(i) the relevant arrangement… is (wholly or partly) a means of providing, or is otherwise concerned (wholly or partly) with the provision of, rewards or recognition or loans in connection with A’s employment… with B, (i) the relevant step is taken (wholly or partly) in pursuance of the relevant arrangement, or(ii) there is some other connection (direct or indirect) between the relevant step and the relevant arrangement.[13]If Chapter 2 applies by reason of a relevant step:(1) “the value of the relevant step counts as employment income of A’s employment with B for the tax year in which the relevant step is taken…” (under s 554Z2), and(2) if the relevant step involves a sum of money, its value is the amount of the sum (under s 554Z3).

Schedule 11

[14]Under para 1(1) (as amended by section 15 of Finance Act 2020) a person (“P”) is treated as taking a relevant step for the purposes of Part 7A if- “(a) P has made… a quasi-loan, to a relevant person, (b) the… quasi-loan was made on or after 9 December 2010, and (c) an amount of the… quasi-loan is outstanding immediately before the end of 5 April 2019.” (Emphasis added.)[15]Where P is treated as taking a relevant step under the above provisions:(1) P is treated as taking the step immediately before the end of 5 April 2019.(2) References to “the relevant step” in sections 554A(1)(e)(i) and (ii) of ITEPA have effect as if they were references to the step of making the “quasi-loan” (see para 1(3)).(3) For the purposes of section 554Z3(1) ITEPA, the step is to be treated as involving a sum of money equal to the amount of the “quasi-loan” that is outstanding at the time P is treated as taking the step (see para 1(4)).(4) Whether an amount of a “quasi-loan” is outstanding at a particular time - (a) is to be determined in accordance with the relevant provisions in schedule 11, and (b) “does not depend upon the quasi-loan subsisting at that time” (see para1(7)).[16]As noted, it is not disputed that the requirements of paras 1(1)(a) and (b) are met on the basis that P (the Trust) has made “quasi-loans” to a relevant person (Dr Keppel) on or after 8 December 2010. The sole issue is whether any amount of the “quasi-loans” was outstanding immediately before the end of 5 April 2019 (for the purposes of para 1(1)(c)).[17]Paragraph 11(4)(b) determines when a “quasi-loan” is outstanding for the purposes of para 1 as follows:
“Meaning of “outstanding”: quasi-loans (1) An amount of a quasi-loan is outstanding for the purposes of paragraphs 1… if the initial debt amount exceeds the repayment amount. (2) In sub-paragraph (1) “initial debt amount”, in relation to a quasi-loan, means the total of- (3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)- (4) In sub-paragraph (1) “repayment amount”, in relation to a quasi-loan, means the total of… (a) an amount equal to the value of the acquired debt (see paragraph 2(2))… (a) where the acquired debt is a right to payment of an amount, the “value” of the debt is that amount… (b) payment made in money(if any) made by the relevant person on or after 17 March 2016 by way of repayment of the initial debt amount...” (Emphasis added.)
[18]For the reasons set out in Part D,(1) the appellant argues that the arrangements Dr Keppel entered into in 2019 meet the requirements of para 11(4)(b) for him to have made a repayment of the disputed balance in full before the end of 5 April 2019, and(2) HMRC dispute that.[19]Under para 12 a payment made in money which otherwise falls within para 11(4)(b) is to be disregarded for the purposes of paragraph 11(4)(b) if:
“(a) there is any connection (direct or indirect) between the payment or transfer and a tax avoidance arrangement (other than the arrangement under which the quasi-loan was made)…” (Emphasis added.)
[20]For the purposes of schedule 11 “tax avoidance arrangement” has the same meaning as it has for the purposes of ss 554Z(13) to (16) in Part 7A ITEPA. Under those provisions:(1) “Tax avoidance arrangement” means an arrangement which has a tax avoidance purpose (see sub-s (13)).(2) For this purpose, an arrangement has a tax avoidance purpose if sub-s (15) applies to a person who is a party to the arrangement (see sub-s (14)).(3) subsection (15) applies to a person “if the main, or one of the main purposes, of the person entering into the arrangement is the avoidance of tax or national insurance contributions”(4) Sub-s (16) states that “The following paragraphs apply for the purpose of determining whether any relevant step or any other step is connected with a tax avoidance arrangement – (a) the step is connected with a tax avoidance arrangement if (for example) the step is taken (wholly or partly) in pursuance of – (i) the tax avoidance arrangement, or (ii) an arrangement at one end of a series of arrangements with the tax avoidance arrangement being at the other end, and (b) it does not matter if the person taking the step is unaware of the tax avoidance arrangement.” (a) the step is connected with a tax avoidance arrangement if (for example) the step is taken (wholly or partly) in pursuance of – (i) the tax avoidance arrangement, or (ii) an arrangement at one end of a series of arrangements with the tax avoidance arrangement being at the other end, and[21]For the reasons set out in Part D,(1) HMRC argue, that even if Dr Keppel can be taken to have made a repayment of the disputed balance which meets the requirements of para 11(4)(b), that repayment is prevented from falling within that provision under para 12, and(2) the appellant argues that the test in para 12 is not met.[22]It is common ground that, if and to the extent that para 1 applies, the outstanding amount of Dr Keppel’s “quasi-loans” would count as employment income of Dr Keppel’s employment with the appellant for the purposes of Part7A (and for NICs purposes).[23]Conclusion In summary, for all the reasons set out in Part D, we have decided that, for the purposes of schedule 11, the disputed balance of £386,838.24 was outstanding at the end of 5 April 2019 and, therefore, pursuant to para 1 and Part 7A ITEPA (and related provisions which apply for NICS purposes), that sum constitutes employment income which is subject to income tax and NICs.

Part B - Evidence and Facts

[24]Part B - Evidence and Facts The appellant and the Trust The appellant is a company that was incorporated in England and Wales on 17 April 2009 and whose registered office is at an address in Surrey. The appellant’s principal business activity is that of providing dental services including routine dental care, restorative dentistry (such as fillings, crowns and implants), cosmetic treatments (such as teeth whitening and veneers) and orthodontic treatment.[25]At all material times, the appellant had two directors, Dr Keppel and Dr Suaris. Dr Keppel has also been company secretary since the appellant’s incorporation.[26]During the tax year 2018/19, the appellant had an average of eight employees (including directors).[27]At the start of 2018/19, Dr Keppel owned the 100 ordinary shares issued in the appellant.[28]The Trust was established on 16 July 2014 and its terms were set out in a Deed of Settlement of the same date. The parties to the Trust deed were:(a) the appellant, as settlor; and(b) Qubic Trustees Ltd as trustee (‘the Trustee’) being a corporate entity independent of the appellant that provided professional trustee services.[29]The Trust was discretionary in nature and the class of beneficiaries included the past, current and future employees and office holders of the appellant (thereby including Dr Keppel and Dr Suaris) and their family members as defined in the Deed of Settlement.[30]. The appellant settled an initial sum of £1,000 on the Trust at the time of its creation.[31]The establishment of the Trust and the Trust debts were created as part of the appellant’s implementation of two iterations of certain “Asset Based Planning’ arrangements.

The original planning

[32]The original planning Dr Keppel explained the original planning as follows:(1) He recalls speaking to the appellant’s accountant, Mr Ross Martin of Hive Business (“Hive”), at some point around 2014 about how he and his wife could take out funds from the appellant in a tax efficient way. Mr Martin introduced them to Qubic Tax Ltd (“Qubic”), which they understood to be a specialist tax firm. Given the proposal and transactions took place around 10 years ago, he can only recall the key elements and how he was advised this would result in them having use of the funds from the appellant. The planning involved the appellant providing gold to them which they immediately sold, using the proceeds to pay off the liability the appellant had incurred in purchasing the gold. He confirmed that he did not physically receive/see the gold. He said the purpose of the appellant in providing the gold to them was to reward them for their work and so that they could reward themselves financially. When asked what steps he took to sell the gold, he said that Hive and Qubic arranged everything for them and they just followed their advice.(2) As part of the agreement to receive the gold, he and his wife, Dr Suaris, each agreed to pay an equivalent amount to the Trust which was also set up as part of the planning. The people who could benefit from the Trust included the directors of the appellant and its employees along with their family members.(3) Given both his and his wife’s roles as directors and their central function to the ongoing success of the appellant, it was expected that they were likely to be awarded significant benefits from the Trust in the future if or when distributions were made. He said that, as the main owner of the appellant, he was the driver of the business.(4) The key to the planning, as he understood it, was that they could take out of the company an amount equivalent to that which they had paid, on behalf of the appellant, for the gold and use it without either the appellant or them having to pay tax. As explained to them, the reason for this tax treatment was that after 10 years they were obliged to pay the same amount (adjusted for indexing) to the Trust. Therefore, in their minds it was like a loan, whereby they had the use of the money for 10 years but after that it would have to be repaid. In the meantime, they could use the money as they saw fit.(5) He accepted that the point of the QGB scheme was that he would not have to pay tax on sums received. It was put to him that he did not receive a loan and in essence he was undertaking to pay money to the Trust, of which he is a beneficiary, and, in effect, he was just agreeing to pay himself money in the future. He said it was not just him who would benefit; the long-standing employees of the appellant also benefit.(6) The planning suited them because he was around 47 years old at the time, and he recalls that his plan for them to repay their “loan” would probably involve him either selling part of the appellant to a suitable new partner, or, potentially selling the whole business, and using the proceeds for this purpose. This was in line with his wider thoughts on retirement plans at the time and how he intended to exit from the appellant and its business in the future.(7) He said that, since he started the business, there has always been an exit in his head. At this time, he discussed this exit plan with Mr Martin on the phone.(8) They undertook the planning twice in successive years and the combined value of the debts that they owed to the Trust was £750,000. Of this of he owed £500,000 and his wife owed £250,000.[33]Dr Keppel and Dr Suaris and the Trustees of the Trust entered into the following transactions in 2014 and 2015:(1) On 21 July 2014, Dr Keppel and the Trustee entered into a Deed of Undertaking as a result of which he undertook to pay £250,000 to the Trustee no later than 16 July 2024.(2) On 21 July 2014, Dr Suaris and the Trustee entered into a Deed of Undertaking as a result of which she undertook to pay £100,000 to the Trustee no later than 16 July 2024.(3) On 14 September 2015, Dr Keppel and the Trustee entered into a Deed of Undertaking as a result of which he undertook to pay £250,000 to the Trustee no later than 25 August 2025.(4) On 14 September 2015, Dr Suaris and the Trustee entered into a Deed of Undertaking as a result of which she undertook to pay £150,000 to the Trustee no later than 25 August 2025. We refer to the “debts” undertaken by Dr Keppel described above as “the Keppel quasi-loans” and those undertaken by Dr Suaris described above as “the Suaris quasi-loans”, or in each case as “the debts”.[34]In respect of each Deed of Undertaking(1) the obligation was stated to be to pay the specified sum as increased by reference to RPI and by any increase such that no amount of corporation tax would be payable under s 464A(3) of the Corporation Tax Act 2010, and(2) certain circumstances were specified in which the sum would be payable earlier than the specified date.[35]As Dr Keppel explained, the Keppel quasi-loans and the Suaris quasi-loans were undertaken as part of the appellant’s implementation of the QGB scheme. We note that the QGB scheme was considered by this tribunal, and found to be ineffective, in Wired Orthodontics Ltd v HMRC [2023] UKFTT 17 (TC). The operation of the QGB scheme was summarised by the tribunal as follows at [1]: “Wired Orthodontics Limited (“the Company”) established an employee benefits trust (“the Trust”) to which it undertook to contribute £300,000 within the next 10 years. The Company then entered into agreements with a company called Asset Hound Ltd (“Asset Hound”) for the purchase of £300,000 worth of gold bullion for Ms Bessant and Mr Hutchinson (“the Directors”), who were its shareholders and directors as well as employees of it. The gold was immediately sold and the Directors satisfied the Company’s obligation to Asset Hound to pay for the gold by the use of the proceeds of its sale. In so doing a corresponding credit was created on their directors’ loan accounts which they later drew upon by payments in cash to them. At the same time as the purchase of the gold the Directors agreed to assume the obligation entered into by the Company to pay £300,000 to the Trust. We refer to the transactions taken together as “the Scheme”.[36]. In that case it was held that the intention of the QGB scheme was to allow the directors of the company to extract sums via their directors’ loan accounts tax free. The obligation of the directors to make contributions to the trust totalling £300,000 at a future date was said by the scheme designer to demonstrate that they did not receive taxable earnings. The tribunal concluded that by providing gold bullion to the directors, the company had made a payment of money’s worth, which was caught by s 62(2)(b) ITEPA. The appeal was determined on the basis that the obligations which the directors undertook to make payments to the trust were real obligations (see [155] of the decision) and the directors understood that they would be able in some way to access those funds again when “recycled” by the trust (see [136], [197], [200(3)], [208] of the decision).

Decision to “repay” the Keppel quasi-loans

[37]Decision to “repay” the Keppel quasi-loans In 2017, Dr Keppel recalls being advised by Hive that a change in the law meant that if the debts he and his wife owed to the Trust remained outstanding at 5 April 2019, a tax charge may arise on the appellant. He understood that the introduction of this legislation was controversial and would cause them real problems. He knew that the appellant would not have available money to pay in full the tax that would be due and he and his wife would not have sufficient savings to fully pay their debts to the Trust by April 2019 (given this date was years before they had originally needed to do so).[38]He hoped that perhaps the law might be changed, and for a period he “put his head in the sand”. There were no obvious options immediately available to them. The property owned by the appellant and used for the business was mortgaged and, as an owner-manager, it is very difficult for him and his wife to obtain personal loans, even with a successful business. It was only when it became clear that, if nothing was done, the appellant would have to pay tax and NICs on the value of their outstanding debts to the Trust, that they finally confronted the difficulties they were facing.[39]Therefore, in early 2019 and with the assistance of Hive, they obtained advice from Qubic as to their options, which confirmed the choices as being that(1) tax had to be paid as a result of the loan charge,(2) their debts to the Trust had to be paid, or(3) they had to settle on the planning with HMRC. Their preferred option was to proceed with the planning as originally envisaged and pay their debts to the Trust. If the loan charge was paid, they would still have to pay their “debts” of £750,000 to the Trust. Alternatively, if they sought to settle with HMRC on the planning, it would have been for no purpose, and they would still owe their debts to the Trust. He accepted that purpose of the option they chose of paying the debts earlier, was to avoid the loan charge.[40]At that time, they did not have sufficient money to pay for any of the identified options. Qubic estimated that to pay the loan charge in respect of the Keppel quasi-loans the appellant would need £441,000 and to settle with HMRC it would need £479,000. From speaking to Qubic and Hive, the option of the Trustee acquiring shares in the appellant was raised to provide him with the additional money to be able to pay off the Keppel quasi-loans and remove the risk of the loan charge applying. In his witness statement he said this about considering a sale of shares:(1) He had very real concerns about selling shares to someone else. He had previous experience of running a business with a partner that had not worked out well; he did not want to repeat that in terms of his future ownership and management of the appellant. He was conscious that selling part of the practice to a third party might take many months (if not years) to achieve with no definitive outcome known at the outset and, in any event, he did not have time to do this in terms of the imminent deadline for paying their debts. At that time, he was 51 years old and had worked hard alongside the company’s staff over the previous 10 years to establish the appellant as a leading dental practice. With that in mind, he was also reluctant to hand an element of control of the appellant to a third party that may not share the same views and culture that they all did (him, his wife and the staff) as to how the business should run moving forward. He also thought there was still growth in the business that could be achieved if they all continued to work hard as a team.(2) As explained to him, his broad understanding was that if he sold shares to the Trust, the Trustee would not look to unnecessarily interfere in the day to day running of the business and would rely on him and his wife to continue running the business successfully; the Trustee did not have any experience in running a dentistry practice. He understood that if he and Dr Suaris failed to run the business properly, the Trustee may need to step in and take action as they saw fit in their capacity as a shareholder of the company and given their wider responsibilities as trustee of the Trust. However, they had no intention other than to continue running the business successfully and he had known Qubic for approximately 5 years by this time and was comfortable with them and the Trustee being a “suitable business partner” in the circumstances. He was also told that, if shares were to be purchased by the Trust, this could be achieved before 5 April 2019.(3) For these reasons, given the problems they faced with the loan charge, the Trust owning some shares in the appellant felt like a “safe harbour” in respect of trying to ensure that staff were best looked after in circumstances where he had to sell some of his shares in the business and new ownership was going to be introduced as a result. In addition, he hoped that the related stability may encourage everyone to continue working hard and which they would all hopefully benefit from. For these reasons, selling his shares to the Trust (as opposed to other potential buyers) seemed like the best choice. Overall selling some of the shares to the Trust was his only real option to resolve the problems caused by the loan charge.(4) As a result, and having considered their options, he and his wife decided that they would stick to their original plan to pay the “debts”. He understood that, if they did so, no tax would be due in respect of the loan charge.[41]At the hearing: (1) Dr Keppel did not accept that he did not give consideration to anyone other than the Trustee acquiring the shares in the appellant. He accepted that there is no evidence on that before the tribunal and said:
“it was in my head… because I was time limited really at that stage to try and find someone who would be suitable. In my line of work bringing someone in, as a dentist, bringing someone into your practice that you can trust and know and I had that experience in the past with someone who was very damaging to my dental practice. And at that short notice to try and find someone in such an important area really wasn’t a consideration as far as I’m concerned, so I don’t have any physical evidence of them trying to find someone else. It was just merely the fact that I was time limited and I’m trying to find someone who I could trust to take over my patients to come into the practice.” (2) He then accepted that there was no real consideration given to anyone other than the Trustee acquiring shares in the appellant. He said that was because there was no time; selling a dental practice takes time. (3) It was put to him that he did not approach a commercial lender like a high street bank, for example, and ask if he could borrow secured on the “loans”
. He said as he owned the building used as the dental practice he was quite highly indebted at the time so he did not think he would have time to do anything like that. (4) It was put to him that, as the Trustee had to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries of the Trust, in so far as the Trustee would ever step in, that was never going to involve removing him or his wife from running the business. He said that was the case as long as they were running it successfully but if they were not running it successfully, he is sure that they would be removed. (5) He accepted that the Trustee’s contribution to the day-to-day running of the practice would have been zero. When it was put to him that the Trustee has nothing to contribute to the bigger strategic picture involved in running a successful dentistry practice, he said he thought you could see it “almost like a business manager. If things are going wrong, they would have to step in. If I wasn’t meeting its goals and failing, it would have to step in”. (6) He accepted that the Trustee had no experience to his knowledge of running a dentistry practice. He accepted that, in reality, nothing about the running of the business changed after he transferred the shares in the appellant to the Trust[42]We do not accept that Dr Keppel’s comments, set out at [40] and [41], establish, as seemed to be the suggestion, that there was a purpose to selling the shares to the Trust other than to give effect to a manner of “repayment” of Dr Keppel’s quasi-loans which it was thought would satisfy the requirements of para 11(4)(b). It is not credible that Dr Keppel viewed the Trustee as a “suitable business partner” or thought that the Trustee would step in to run the business given that(a) the Trustee had no experience of running a dentistry business,(b) the on-going role of Dr Keppel and Dr Suaris in the business as directors, and(c) Dr Keppel’s acceptance that, in reality, nothing changed about the running of the business after the transfer of the shares in the appellant to the Trustee. Any possibility of the Trustee taking any such action is inherently remote and highly theoretical given that Dr Keppel and his wife had been running the dentistry practice successfully for many years.[43]In his witness statement Dr Keppel set out that by early 2019:(1) He and Dr Suaris had managed to “shovel together” enough money to pay Dr Suaris’ debts to the Trust from their own savings, in an ISA, and she asked for money from her elderly parents. This only left approximately £63,000 from their remaining savings and investments for him to pay the Keppel quasi-loans. Whilst he was a director and shareholder of the appellant and also Teeth and Gas Limited (“TAGL”), he was reluctant to take out any of the money held by these companies for use in paying their debts as this was largely needed by the businesses for operational purposes and to meet running costs.(2) At this time, Qubic provided further advice to the appellant which included information on how he could sell shares to the Trust. Given the passage of time, he cannot precisely recall all of the discussions. However: (a) He broadly understood the key aspects of the proposal to be that the Trust would borrow money to purchase shares in the appellant from him, which would provide him with the money to fully pay his debts by 5 April 2019. The Trust needed to borrow money because it did not hold anywhere near enough cash at that time to pay him for his shares. (b) Qubic explained that the Trustee would be keen to keep the cash they would receive from his wife separate from his own debt payments so there could be no risk of mixing the funds, leading to any argument that one, or both, of them may not have properly paid their respective debts. (c) Qubic explained that the Trust would need to purchase sufficient shares in the appellant at a commercial value. The money paid to him by the Trust could then be used by him in return, with the balance of his available funds, to pay off his debts.(3) In order to know how many shares in the appellant that he would need to sell, he was advised that a professional valuation of the shares should be undertaken. Having discussed matters with Mr Martin, he and Dr Suaris decided that it would be sensible to obtain an independent valuation to remove any potential suggestion of bias in this regard. As a result, Mr Martin introduced them to LB Corporate Finance (“LB”) to prepare a share valuation report. He was also advised that the Trustee would have solicitors acting for them in relation to the share purchase and it would be sensible for him to also have a solicitor. Either Qubic or Hive recommended The Endeavour Partnership LLP (“Endeavour”) and he went with the recommendation.(4) It was also explained that he would need to cover the cost to the Trust of obtaining borrowings, as it did not have money to pay this cost itself (and, as noted, he was advised that the amount it would receive from Dr Suaris should not be mixed). He would therefore need to pay this cost first, so the Trust could finance its borrowing, but he was told this would go towards paying off his debts. Therefore, he did not see this as an additional cost, with it going towards the goal of paying off his overall debts.(5) He was made aware that selling any shares in the appellant would be likely to result in a gain for tax purposes on which he would need to pay Capital Gains Tax (“CGT”). Qubic also advised that the Trustee would have to pay stamp duty on the value of any shares that he sold to the Trust and would have its own legal costs in this regard and that he would need to cover these costs. Again, he was told this would go towards paying his debts. As a result, his wife’s debts to the Trust were to be paid from the cash they were able to “shovel together” whereas his debts were to be paid from the balancing cash they were able to pull together and the proceeds from the sale of some of his shares in the appellant to the Trust.(6) Having made the decision to sell some of his shares in the appellant to the Trust, in approximately the middle of March 2019, he began the process of paying his debt” to the Trust with assistance from Hive, Qubic, the Trustee, and Endeavour. He was involved throughout the process; documents were sent to him for his review and agreement. His main contact through this process was Hive (rather than Qubic) and when documents were sent to him, if he had any questions, he would have contacted Hive. He has little recollection of the actual events and therefore necessarily relies upon the content of the documents. Hive, with the assistance of Qubic helped him to manage the whole process. Where documents or letters needed to be signed by him, he would have checked he was happy with the contents before agreeing and signing them.[44]He was asked why, once his wife had repaid her debt by paying cash into the Trust, as the Trustee had cash, it did not reduce the amount it borrowed by the cash it held. He said (as he had said in his statement) that it was because his and his wife’s positions were to be kept separate. That was their understanding in 2019- they were advised to keep things separate so there would be no confusion in the future. He did not accept that the sum of £38,358.24, which he had to cover as the Trustee’s “cost of borrowing”, was in reality “a scheme fee” paid so that he could use the QLC scheme. He said that he was informed by his accountants and Qubic that this was all going towards paying off his debt to the Trust.[45]He was taken to an advice letter from Qubic dated 11 February 2019 (“the advice letter”) which was addressed to the directors of the appellant. This includes these statements “Following on from discussions to date, terms of engagement have been agreed between the Company and Qubic Tax Limited for us to provide advice on the 2019 Loan Charge Rules and associated options for dealing with any charge that may arise as a result of these rules in respect of relevant arrangements previously entered into and which are still in existence.” “This letter represents our substantive advice on the above matters and associated considerations from a taxation, commercial and practical perspective.” “Having considered the advice in this letter, should the Company decide to progress with any of the options outlined and wish to obtain related assistance from Qubic Tax in this regard, then any associated advice will be provided under separate terms of engagement to be agreed as necessary.”[46]The letter attached a memorandum setting out various circumstances with a space for a box to be ticked by the appellant if those circumstances applied:(1) The box was ticked relating to a statement that the relevant individuals (stated to be Dr Keppel and Dr Suaris) were to repay their existing debts to the Trust in order to avoid any potential loan charge and “agree for Qubic Tax to provide further advice and assistance with costs dependant (sic) on circumstances”. There was a comment that “as a guide, costs have been in the region of £30,000 - £60,000 plus VAT where repayments of up to £1m have been made to trust with utilisation of the trust thereafter in terms of trustees investing in property and shares.”(2) The box was ticked relating to the statement that: “It is likely that the following relevant individuals do not and will not have available cash for use in repaying their outstanding debts to the trust ahead of April 2019”.(3) The box was ticked in relation to the option of: “Investment by way of purchasing shares in the company from relevant individuals, including beneficiaries of the trust”.[47]The memorandum also contained the following statement:
“Should a relevant individual not have available cash to repay their debt to trust for 2019 Loan Charge purposes, a trustee financing option may be available (subject to the particular circumstances) that could enable individuals to have access to relevant cash funds for use in this regard. Fees for this financing option will be 3% (no VAT) and payable by the relevant individual.”
[48]Dr Keppel seemed to accept that there is no evidence in the bundle of any invoice issued to him, his wife or the appellant by Qubic in respect of the fee which in the confirmation in this letter the appellant/they agreed to pay, or of any payment of that fee in his personal bank statements or otherwise. It was put it to him again that £38,358.24 he paid to the Trustee was a scheme fee for the use of the SLC scheme. He said that he was informed this sum was going to pay his debt to the Trust and he was told he had to pay everything to the Trust. When it was put to him that he paid via the Trust but he had an obligation to pay to Qubic, he said that is a technicality and he does not know. He said, in effect, that he did not know why that cost was not reflected in a lower purchase price for the shares rather than him having to pay it over in cash and: “Just everything was set out for me to follow by my advisers and I just followed what they told me to do”.

Implementation of the repayment plan

[49]Implementation of the repayment plan . On 12 March 2019, Dr Keppel, by letter to the Trustee, stated he wished “…to make voluntary early payment of” specified debts to the Trust: The letter noted:
“I do not have the required amount of cash to enable me to make cash payment of the debts in question. However, I do personally own assets specifically shares in Grand Smile Design Limited which to my knowledge are worth at least the value of the debts that I owe to the Trust and that I would be willing to transfer to the Trust in settlement of my debts.” (Emphasis added.)
[50]By letter dated 15 March 2019 from the Trustee to Dr Keppel, the Trustee acknowledged his letter and stated:(1) There was an opportunity for the Trustee to be able to borrow funds.(2) Subject to the terms of the Trust, those funds could be used to purchase some shares from Dr Keppel in the appellant.(3) The proceeds from the sale of shares to the Trust could be used towards payment of his debts to the Trust.(4) If Dr Keppel wished to proceed, an attached “Due Diligence Questionnaire” should be completed and returned.[51]The “Due Diligence Questionnaire” dated 17 March 2019:(1) set out that (a) Dr Keppel’s debts of £500,000 to the Trust were to be repaid from: (i) “c. £20k of existing cash reserves”; and (ii) “c. £480k via purchase of shares”, (b) Dr Keppel owned 100 ordinary shares in the appellant, and (c) the accounting date of the appellant was 31 October, and(2) gave details of the appellant’s accountants, Hive, and of the appellant’s business and information regarding the general standing of the appellant,(3) included confirmation that a valuation of the shares in the appellant had been undertaken by LB.[52]It was put to Dr Keppel that he was asked to fill out this questionnaire after he had already, in February 2019, agreed to enter into the QLC scheme (as shown in the boxes ticked in the memorandum attached to the advice letter then received). He said that he just followed what he was told to do. It was good practice, he presumed, to fill in this questionnaire[53]Dr Keppel explained that:(1) By this time he had sought and received a share valuation report from LB dated March 2019 stating that the 100 ordinary shares in the appellant were worth £1,040,000. However, because he did not need to sell all of these 100 shares to raise sufficient funds, a “minority discount” of 22% was deemed to apply. As a result, it was determined that 1 share was worth £8,112 and the sale price of 59 shares would be £478,608.(2) By letter dated 20 March 2019, the Trustee confirmed that they could borrow sufficient money to acquire 59 shares from him. He also understood from this letter that, when he received cash from the Trust for the sale of his shares, his solicitor would then be required to use that money towards paying off his debts to the Trust. He had no issue with this because that was the whole reason why he was selling the shares in the first place. To go ahead, he was also asked to pay £21,392 to cover the Trust’s transactional costs.[54]At the hearing, Dr Keppel accepted that the valuation report was not shared with any arm’s length third parties. He said that was due to the timing issue. His recollection is that instructions regarding the preparation of the report was all done through Mr Martin and Hive, his accountants at the time. There was a lot going on then. He could not remember if he had seen the instructions to LB.[55]A document headed “Minutes of a meeting” held “on 19 March 2019” records that a Trustee board meeting was held on that date and set out the following:(1) The Trustee noted that Dr Keppel wished to make an early repayment of his debts to the Trust, largely funded from the proceeds of a sale of shares in the appellant to the Trust.(2) The shares in the appellant would constitute a suitable investment for the Trust.(3) The Trust had the express power to borrow funds and had received from Delta Multiplex Finance Limited (“Delta”) a proposed Loan Agreement and Loan Application Form relating to the potential share acquisition by the Trust.(4) An independent valuation of the shares in the appellant had been received.(5) The Trustee agreed to borrow £478,608 from Delta and purchase shares in the appellant from Dr Keppel on the following basis: Purchase of 59 Ordinary Shares £478,608.00 Lender Fee £14,358.24 Womble Bond Dickinson (UK) LLP legal fees £2,395.00 Bankruptcy search £16.95 Winding-up search on the appellant £3.90 CHAPS fee £42.00 Total £498,424.09(6) The Trust had “only a nominal amount in cash” and Dr Keppel would be required to make a cash payment to the Trust in part payment of the debt, equal to the total amount of fees set out above, to ensure the Trust had sufficient funds to pay the costs of purchasing the shares.(7) Womble Bond Dickinson (UK) LLP solicitors (“WBD”) would be instructed to act on the Trust’s behalf.[56]. A letter dated 19 March 2019 from the Trustee to Delta confirmed that:(1) The Trust wished to borrow £478,608.(2) The borrowed funds were to be used to acquire 59 ordinary shares in the appellant.(3) Delta was to act as agent for the Trust, whereby receipt by Delta of £478,608 from Dr Keppel would be accepted as payment towards Dr Keppel’s debts to the Trust and repayment of the Trust’s borrowing from Delta.(4) On receipt of the funds by Delta, it would immediately transfer an amount of £478,608 to the Trust and this amount would then immediately be returned to Delta.[57]. On 20 March 2019:(1) In a letter from Delta to the Trustee: (a) Delta agreed to lend £478,608 to the Trust, (b) it was stated the purpose of the loan was to purchase 59 ordinary shares in the appellant from Dr Keppel, (c) it was acknowledged that a condition of the purchase was that Dr Keppel would direct that the proceeds of the sale received be paid to Delta, in order to fulfil the Trust’s obligation to repay the loan taken out with Delta, (d) Delta gave agreement to act as the Trust’s agent, whereby receipt of the £478,608 by Delta would also be accepted as payment by Dr Keppel towards his debts to the Trust. In the letter Delta noted the request that Delta would transfer the funds received immediately to the Trust, which would then be immediately returned to Delta, and requested the completion of the loan agreement, which was attached.(2) A document headed “Minutes of a meeting” held “on 20 March 2019” records that a Trustee board meeting took place and that the Trustee agreed to execute the loan agreement with Delta.(3) An agreement was executed between the Trustee and Delta (“the Original Loan Agreement”) whereby it was agreed that: (a) Delta would lend £478,608 to the Trustee, (b) the loan would be unsecured, (c) a fee of £14,358.24 was payable to Delta, and (d) the loan would be interest free and repayable within 10 days.(4) A letter from the Trustee to Dr Keppel records: (a) the Trust’s proposal to purchase from him 59 ordinary shares in the appellant for £478,608, (b) the requirement for the proceeds of the sale to be used by Dr Keppel to repay his debts to the Trust, (c) the need for an undertaking from the solicitor acting on Dr Keppel’s behalf that the proceeds be directed to the Trust, (d) Delta would be acting as the Trust’s agent in respect of receipt of the proceeds from the sale, and such receipt would also repay the Trust’s borrowing from Delta, (e) a payment of £21,392.00 was required to be made by Dr Keppel to the Trust to ensure it had sufficient funds to pay the costs in respect of the transactions (as set out above) and a balancing payment was required to pay the debts in full, and (f) written confirmation was required if Dr Keppel wished to proceed.(5) By letter from Dr Keppel to the Trustee, Dr Keppel, confirmed: (i) he wished to proceed; and (ii) his instruction to Endeavour as his solicitors in respect of the transaction.[58]Under the arrangements referred to above(1) Dr Keppel paid £21,392 to the Trustee on 21 March 2019,(2) the Trustee paid £14,358.24 to Delta on 22 March 2019. By letter dated 22 March 2019, the Trustee acknowledged receipt of Dr Keppel’s payment of £21,392. Dr Keppel commented that, therefore, he believed everything had been done so that the sale of his 59 shares in the appellant could go ahead, and he would have sufficient money to fully pay his debts to the Trust before the deadline of 5 April 2019.[59]Delta’s bank statement shows £478,608 was sent to the Trustee, with reference GRA001ACC01, on 28 March 2019. The Trustee bank statement for the Trust shows on 28 March 2019(1) a deposit of £478,608 received from Delta, with reference 0329014857; and(2) £484,065.85 sent to WBD, with reference 0329014732 (being the total costs, as recorded in the board minute of 19 March 2019, of £498,424.09 less the lender’s fee of £14,358.24).[60]Dr Keppel said that following this, he specifically remembers receiving an unexpected call from Mr David Graham of Qubic on 31 March 2019. He said that he was calling on behalf of the Trustee as they had discovered for legal reasons the Trust could not purchase all of the 59 shares. As it was explained to him, the solicitors had informed Qubic that the Trust could not purchase more than 32% of his shares without approval from the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) and this could not be obtained in time. He was aware that the appellant was authorised by the FCA for introducing clients to certain third-party finance providers who could assist in paying their dental bills for related services that it provides. However, he did not know this would impact on his ability to freely sell his shares. He was shocked by this news and particularly the related timing given arrangements to pay his debts, and sourcing the required cash to do so, had been months in the planning (not least to try and avoid any last minute issues from arising). It also meant he needed to get a revised valuation, in relation to the sale of 32 and not 59 shares in the appellant. He recalls that the next few days were very stressful for him.[61]The appellant accepts, as is supported by documents obtained from Companies House, that Mr David Graham was a director of Delta, the Trustee and the other Qubic companies. It is apparent from this and from the fact that the documents show Delta and Qubic as sharing an address, that Delta was associated with the other Qubic entities involved who acted as Trustee and provided advice on the QLC scheme.[62]A revised share valuation report was prepared by LB in respect of the open market value of all of the shares issued in the appellant in which LB increased the valuation from £1,040,000 to £1,300,000. The stated purpose of the report was:
“Establishing a value range for the £100 £1 Ordinary shares in the Company…with a view to a potential future sale of some of the shares to a connected trust…”
. The report stated a “valuation of £1,300k” in respect of the 100 ordinary shares issued in the appellant and that “32% of the shares sold to the trust will repay £324k (rounded) to the trust (32% * (£1,300k * (1-22%)).”[63]Dr Keppel said that LB increased the valuation because he made them aware of an offer of £1,300,000 that he had received for the purchase of the business from Portman Dental Care in November 2018, which he had previously forgotten to reference with LB and, therefore, had not been taken into account by them in their initial valuation. The revised value per share, inclusive of a minority discount, when selling 32 shares in the appellant was therefore £10,140, giving a total sale price of £324,480.53. However, he was still left with the problem that he would owe a balancing amount of £154,128 (i.e. £500,000 (original debt amount) – £21,392 (already paid) – £324,480 (share sale proceeds) = £154,128).[64]He managed to pull together this balancing amount of £154,128 from using the majority of his and his wife’s remaining savings and investments at that time, by taking funds out of the appellant and TAGL (which he was now forced to do having previously been reluctant to do so) and by asking for more money from Dr Suaris’ elderly parents. He made an initial payment of £70,000 on 2 April 2019. The remainder of the steps to pay fully his debts to the Trust needed to take place over 3 and 4 April 2019 to make sure that he met the deadline on 5 April 2019 and he remembers being sent documents throughout this period, which he found very stressful.[65]He received a letter from the Trustee dated 3 April 2019 setting out the basis on which the Trust now agreed to purchase 32 shares from him, and that he would need to find the balance to pay his debts from other sources.[66]Having little choice, he sent a letter to the Trustee dated 3 April 2019, agreeing the revised proposal and made further payments of £74,000 and £10,000 towards his debt. On the same day, assisted by Endeavour, he completed all the legal paperwork provided to him, which he was advised was needed formally to sell 32 shares in the appellant to the Trust. He relied on Endeavour’s advice and assistance to ensure these documents accurately reflected the terms that he had agreed and to ensure that(1) he would receive the agreed purchase price of £324,480 and that(2) the proceeds would be used to pay off his remaining “debts” to the Trust.[67]On 3 April 2019:(1) A document headed “Minutes of a meeting” held “on 3 April 2019” records a Trustee board meeting where the Trustee decided to amend their decision to purchase shares in the appellant and repay the amount under the Original Loan Agreement. The amended proposal was for the purchase of 32 ordinary shares in the appellant for £324,480 and for a lending fee of £38,358.24 and the other costs as set out above:(2) By letter from the Trustee to Delta, the Trustee stated that they wished to borrow reduced funds of £324,480, on the same terms as agreed in the Original Loan Agreement, and that they had arranged for the original amount borrowed of £478,608 to be repaid to Delta.(3) Delta approved the revised borrowing request, provided a new loan agreement, and acknowledged the request to repay the amount under the Original Loan Agreement.(4) A document headed “Minutes of a meeting” held “on 3 April 2019” records that a Trustee board meeting took place at which it was agreed to execute the new loan agreement.(5) A new loan agreement was executed between the Trustee and Delta, the terms of which were materially the same as the Original Loan Agreement except the amount borrowed was £324,480 and the lending fee for the provision of the loan was stated to be £38,358.24 (“the Second Loan Agreement”).(6) The Trustee bank statement shows: (a) a deposit of £484,065.85 received from WBD with reference JCA0010MW; (b) £478,608 sent to Delta with reference JCA0010MYA; and (c) a deposit of £324,480 received from Delta with reference 0404015591.(7) Delta’s bank statement shows: (a) a deposit of £478,608 received from the Trustee with reference GRA001ACC01; and (b) £324,480 sent to the Trustee with reference GRA001ACC01.(8) By letter from the Trustee to Dr Keppel, the revised offer to purchase the shares in the appellant was set out, in similar terms to the original offer. The new proposal as set out was that Dr Keppel would repay a further £130,128, without recourse to the proceeds from the sale of the shares in the appellant and would pay to the Trust a further £24,000 to ensure it had sufficient funds to meet the proposed transactions costs.(9) Dr Keppel confirmed he accepted the terms of the new proposal and would make payment of a total of £154,128 to the Trust.(10) Dr Keppel entered into an agreement with the Trustee of the same date entitled “Share Purchase Agreement relating to the sale and purchase of Grand Smile Design Limited” (“the SPA”) which set out that: (a) the Trustee would buy 32 ordinary shares in the capital of the appellant from Dr Keppel, (b) the consideration for the sale of the shares would be £324,480, (c) completion of the transaction would take place immediately following the execution and exchange of the SPA, and (d) once the completion requirements had been complied with, the Trustee would procure payment of the agreed purchase price by CHAPS telegraphic transfer to Endeavour (being Dr Keppel’s solicitors).(11) Dr Keppel entered into a deed in favour of the Trustee entitled “Declaration of Trust” as directed by clause 4.2.1 of the SPA.(12) A stock transfer form was signed by Dr Keppel in respect of the transfer of 32 ordinary shares in the appellant from him to the Trustee.(13) A share certificate was issued to the Trustee confirming that it was the registered holder of 32 ordinary shares in the appellant.(14) Delta, by letter to Dr Keppel, stated that, in their capacity as agent of the Trustee, they had received and accepted £324,480 from Endeavour as part payment of Dr Keppel’s “debt” to the Trust.[68]The letter from the Trustee to Dr Keppel referred to at (8) above includes the following statements: “As previously mentioned, the fee due to the Lender and the costs of purchasing the above mentioned shares from you (e.g. legal fees and disbursements and Stamp Duty Tax) will be payable by Qubic Trustees Ltd and will need to be paid from the Trust fund. The Trust fund currently comprises a certain amount in cash (following the previous part payment that you made in cash towards your debts to the Trust). Should you agree to our purchase of the proposed shares from you, it will be necessary for you to make a balancing cash payment to the Trust (£24,000) such that we have sufficient funds to meet these transactional fees and costs as set out below. Further to our recent conversation, we also note your wish to make a further part payment towards your above mentioned debts to the Trust in the sum of £130,128 and have no objection to this proposed payment being made based on the information previously provided in your completed Due Diligence questionnaire. Should the source of this payment be different to that referenced please notify us in writing so that we may consider matters further (and obtain any necessary information and evidence as may be required) and do not instruct for this payment to be made. As referenced, the above mentioned payments made by you will be as part payments of your debts to the Trust and, as a result, the proposed purchase of your shares has been made with this in mind. [The costs were set out including the “lender’s fee of £38,354.24] Should you agree to our above mentioned proposal, we would be grateful if you could now make payment of £154,128 towards your existing debts to the Trust - payment should be made to the following bank details: … Purchase of Assets - Failure to Complete Please note that should our proposed purchase of your shares referenced above not be completed (for whatever reason), then you will remain as the legal owner of the shares in question. In turn, you will not be in receipt of any related sale proceeds that you will be able to use towards payment of your debts to the Trust for 2019 Loan Charge Rule purposes. Finally, it should also be understood that in such circumstances, any payment of £154,128 that may have been made towards your existing debts to the Trust will not be refunded or reclassified in any nature. Next Step Having considered our proposal to purchase the above-mentioned shares from you, we would be grateful if you could provide written confirmation of your agreement (or otherwise) In this regard and details of the solicitor you will be instructing to assist you in the transaction. Please find attached a template letter that maybe suitable for use in responding to our proposal. In terms of next steps, if you are in agreement with our proposal, we will instruct our solicitors (Womble Bond Dickinson (UK) LLP) to progress matters on our behalf as necessary. …” [The costs were set out including the “lender’s fee of £38,354.24] Purchase of Assets - Failure to Complete

Next Step

[69]Dr Keppel’s bank statement shows £154,128 was sent to the Trustee as follows:(a) on 2 April 2019, £70,000(b) on 3 April 2019, £74,000(c) on 3 April 2019, £10,000(d) on 4 April 2019, £128[70]Endeavour’s client ledger in respect of Dr Keppel shows, on 3 April 2019(1) a deposit of £324,480 received from WBD with transaction number 00478005/001, and(2) £324,480 sent to Delta with transaction number 00478020/001[71]The Trustee bank statement number 50 for the Trust shows:(1) On 3 April 2019, £329,167.85 was sent to WBD with reference JCA0010N2A comprised of the following: (a) the agreed purchase price regarding 32 ordinary shares in the appellant of £324,480 (b) WBD fees of £3,000, (c) stamp duty (rounded) of £1,625 (d) CHAPS fee of £42, (e) a bankruptcy search fee of £16.95, and (e) a winding up search fee of £3.90 giving a total of £329,167.85.(2) On 3 April 2019, £24,000 was sent to Delta with reference JCA0010N4A.(3) On 4 April 2019, £154,128 was received from Dr Keppel comprised of the following: (a) reference JCA0010LVA on the “Transaction Date” of 2 April 2019, £70,000 (b) reference JCA0010NCA on the “Transaction Date” of 3 April 2019, £74,000 (c) reference JCA0010NEA on the “Transaction Date” of 3 April 2019, £10,000 (d) reference JCA0010SBA on the “Transaction Date” of 4 April 2019, £128.(4) On 3 April 2019, £324,480 was received from Delta with reference 0404015594 (as directed by clause5.1 of the Second Loan Agreement).(5) On 3 April 2019 £324,480 was sent to Delta with reference JCA0010N0A (as directed by clause5.2 of the Second Loan Agreement).[72]Delta’s bank statement shows that on 3 April 2019:(1) A deposit of £24,000 was received from the Trustee with reference GRA001 INV00039.(2) A deposit of £324,480 was received from Endeavour.(3) £324,480 was sent to the Trustee with transaction reference GRA001ACC01 (directed by clause5.1 of the Second Loan Agreement).(4) A deposit of £324,480 was received from the Trustee with reference GRA001ACC01 (as directed by clause5.2 of the Second Loan Agreement).[73]. On 4 April 2019:(1) A document headed “Minutes of a meeting” held “on 4 April 2019” records that a Trustee board meeting took place and states that: (a) Delta had confirmed receipt of £324,480, as agent for the Trust, from Endeavour, representing part payment of the £500,000 “debt” owed by Dr Keppel to the Trust, and (b) Delta had also confirmed the payment represented full repayment of the amount borrowed by the Trust under the Second Loan Agreement. Taking into account this payment and the other payments made, full repayment of the debts owed by Dr Keppel to the Trust had been made.(2) The Trustee stated to Dr Keppel by letter: (a) his sale of the shares in the appellant had been completed, (b) the proceeds from the sale had been used in part repayment of his “debts”, and (c) his “debts” to the Trust had been repaid. An entry was made in the appellant’s register of members dated 5 April 2019 that the Trustee owned 32 ordinary shares of the appellant’s issued share capital.[74]Dr Keppel said that, from his perspective, the way in which the above arrangements set out above took was set out in the paperwork and checked by Endeavour. As far as he understood it, Endeavour did not see anything out of the ordinary by which this was to be achieved, and it was similar to what happens when you use a solicitor to sell a house i.e. your solicitor receives your sale proceeds from the buyer’s solicitor. There was never any doubt in his mind that the proceeds from the sale of the shares was his money, because they were his shares. As he wanted to use this money towards paying off the debts, he was happy to provide the requested undertaking that the money he received from his sale of shares be used for this purpose. The method by which that actually occurred he left to the lawyers to ensure that it occurred before the deadline. He received a letter from Delta, in their capacity as the Trustee’s agent, dated 3 April 2019, confirming that they had received and accepted the payment that he had made of £324,480 towards his “debts”. On 4 April 2019, he made a final payment of £128 to the Trust, and, on the same day, he also received two separate letters from the Trustee dated 4 April 2019 in which they confirmed receipt of his payments and that his debts had been fully paid.[75]Dr Keppel made the following further comments in his witness statement:(1) He was advised that payment of £38,358.24 he made to the Trust would go towards payment of his debts to the Trust and he made the payment on this basis. As a result, he believes payment of this amount should be treated as such.(2) Because of a change in the law, he was told that he had to (a) pay the loan charge, (b) settle on the planning, or (c) pay the debts he owed to the Trust. To achieve any of these, he had to use his savings and whatever other assets he had to raise the cash. For the reasons already set out, he chose to pay the debts to the Trust. In doing so, he decided to sell 32 shares in the appellant at their commercial value to the Trust. As a result, he no longer owns these shares and used the proceeds towards paying in full his debts. He was willing to sell shares to the Trust as it would allow him and his wife to continue running the business in the same manner and with the same culture as before. However, he is very aware that these are no longer his shares and, as such, he cannot act as if they are.(3) It is accepted that, sometime in the future, the Trustee will likely make distributions from the Trust. Furthermore, given both his and his wife’s role as directors and their key involvement in the business and its success, they expect to receive a significant amount in this regard (albeit not the total amount held in the Trust); especially should they in the future intend to leave the business due to retirement or in contemplation of a sale of the business. They are aware of the terms of the Trust, and it will also at that time be appropriate for them as directors of the appellant to recommend payments which should be made to long standing employees. He was told at the time that, if he paid off his “debts” in this way, the loan charge would not be due.(4) He understands that HMRC think that the payment he made of his debts from the proceeds of the sale of his shares should be ignored, because it constituted a tax avoidance arrangement. If by this HMRC mean that he sought not to pay the loan charge by paying off his “debts”, then he cannot dispute this. Notwithstanding that, in paying off his debts, CGT was paid by him on his sale of shares and the Trustee had to pay stamp duty on purchasing the shares. As a layman, he cannot see how selling his own shares and using the proceeds to pay off his “debts” can in any other way be tax avoidance.(5) He has explained why selling shares to the Trust made sense to him and he was very careful to ensure that the price paid reflected the true commercial value of the shares. Whether he sold the 32 shares to another dentist, rather than the Trust, the amount he would have received would still have been the same amount. He appreciates that he expects to benefit significantly from the Trust in the future, but he is also advised that there will be tax consequences when any payment is made to him.(6) At the end of the day, as a result of the planning, he received from the appellant the use of £500,000. He initially thought he had use of this amount for 10 years before it needed to be paid to the Trust. However, because of the loan charge, his use of this amount was brought to an abrupt halt, and he was required to pay £500,000 to the Trust early. He did so by using his existing savings and investments, taking loans and/or dividends from the appellant and TAGL, asking for money from his wife’s elderly parents and selling shares equal to the balance of his debts to the Trust. In doing so, he fully paid his “debts” to the Trust, and he believe that his intention in doing so (to avoid having to pay the loan charge) should not mean that the payment made as a result of his sale of shares should be ignored.(7) The loan charge and the decision he and his wife took to pay their debts to the Trust had a very real economic impact. The majority of their savings and investments were exhausted, they had to ask for money from Dr Suaris’ parents that they needed to pay back and he took out money from the appellant and TAGL via a combination of loans and dividends that he needed to repay and pay tax on as necessary. The source of the funds to repay his £500,000 of debts to the Trust were as follows: £53,520 of personal savings/investments that they held prior to April 2019, £30,000 from Dr Suaris’ parents, £24,000 loans/dividends from the appellant, and £68,000 of loans/dividends from TAGL and funds raised from selling his 32 shares in the appellant of £324,480. He had to pay CGT of £31,211.40 on the gain that arose on him selling these shares. He also gave up all rights associated with owning these shares including voting, dividends and entitlement upon liquidation. He has also lost the right to freely deal with the shares and can no longer use these as a future source of raising finance. Put simply, he knows that these are no longer his shares to do with as he wishes.(8) It is correct that, in the future, he anticipates receiving a significant benefit from any eventual sale of the shares by the Trust, but that does not assist his economic position now. Any such future benefit will not make obtaining a bank loan any easier at present, or, entitle him to dividends.[76]At the hearing:(1) It was put to him that the terms used in the correspondence which suggested that there was some commerciality and negotiation involved in the transactions was just an attempt to dress up a preordained series of steps as having the character of a commercial negotiation. He said: “Not that I can see. I was advised. I took into consideration, I had to pay the Trust back, I had very little time to do so. Hive and Qubic arranged everything for me and I took everything under advisement from them.”(2) He did not accept that the steps involved were simply steps in a preordained scheme. He said: “it was a method to pay back to the Trust. I had a time limit to do it. I took it under advice, as I say, to pay back the debt, pay back the loan. I had always intended to.”(3) . It was put to him that, in reality, £324,480 was not paid in cash by him in repayment of his debts, it was done by transferring his shares to the Trustees. He said that he was informed at the time they did this that the cash was paid for the shares and then paid back into the Trust, so there was a cash transaction. So, he would consider that as a cash transaction as part of his overall payments.(4) It was put to him that he used the QLC scheme to avoid the application of the loan charge without suffering the economic consequences which Parliament intended, namely, a reduction in his cash position. He said that he was given three options and he chose the option which was the only one he could afford, which was to pay back the Trust, albeit five/six years early, but that was his original intention and that is what he intended to do, and he was advised that he could do that and his intention was to pay the “loan” back. He said, in effect, that these were not tax avoidance arrangements, as far as he was concerned and did not accept that the payment by him of £324,480 and of £38,358.24 was connected with tax avoidance. He said again that this went towards paying off his “loan”; that it what he was told by his advisors.[77]It is plain on the evidence that, in implementing the QLC scheme, by the “sale” of 32 shares in the appellant and obtaining a valuation of the shares, Dr Keppel was simply following a pre-determined plan designed by Qubic to generate a temporarily available cash sum so it could be claimed the Keppel quasi-loans were settled by a payment by Dr Keppel made in money. The fact that Dr Keppel obtained a valuation of the shares in the appellant does not, as he seemed to suggest, render the “sale” of the shares as a commercial transaction; it was simply part of the plan designed to give the transactions the appearance of being a sale. We have commented further on the nature of the transactions in our conclusions in Part D.[78]Dr Keppel completed a “Disguised remuneration – loan charge information form” dated 19 September 2019 with the information required by section 35C of schedule 11 including details of the Keppel quasi-loans which he asserts have been “repaid” by him. This form was delivered to HMRC by recorded postal delivery before 1 October 2019.[79]Dr Keppel’s self-assessment tax return for the tax year ended 5 April 2019 dated 6 April 2019 stated that he had sold 32 ordinary shares in the appellant during the year and had received disposal proceeds of £324,480 giving rise to a taxable gain of £312,114 and CGT of £31,211.40.

Part C - caselaw

[80]Part C - caselaw This appeal hinges on the correct interpretation of the relevant provisions in schedule 11. It was common ground that, following the seminal decision in WTRamsay Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners[1982] AC 300 (“Ramsay”), it is well established that, in line with how other legislation is interpreted, the courts and tribunals must apply a purposive approach in interpreting tax legislation. The essence of the modern approach to statutory construction in a tax context is encapsulated in the comments of Ribeiro PJ in Collector of Stamp Revenue v Arrowtown Assets Ltd [2003] HKCFA 46 (2004) 6 ITLR 454, at [35], where he summarised the “driving principle” in the Ramsay line of cases as involving:
“a general rule of statutory construction and an unblinkered approach to the analysis of the facts. The ultimate question is whether the relevant statutory provisions, construed purposively, were intended to apply to the transaction, viewed realistically.”
[81]The parties disagreed, however, on precisely how that approach is to be applied in this case and the result that it gives.[82]In Ramsay Lord Wilberforce made the well-known comments to the effect that, when interpreting a tax statute, the court may determine a composite transaction’s tax effects by reference to its overall nature. In summary, Lord Wilberforce said that when construing a tax provision the court must determine the legal nature of the transaction for tax purposes but if that “emerges from a series or combination of transactions, intended to operate as such, it is that series or combination which may be regarded” and that, accordingly, the courts “are not bound to consider individually each separate step in a composite transaction intended to be carried through as a whole” (see pages 179 and 180). By way of shorthand, we refer to this approach, as the “composite approach. (In using this term, we do not suggest that Lord Wilberforce set out this approach as a distinct legal principle rather than as part of what may be required to construe a statute purposively.)[83]. Essentially, for many years the courts have been at pains to emphasise that the Ramsay composite approach is simply an example in a tax context of the purposive approach which must be applied to the construction of all legislation. The decision in Ramsay did not establish a new jurisprudence governed by special rules of its own. The Supreme Court explained the correct approach in their decision in 2021 in Rossendale Borough Council v Hurstwood Properties (A) Ltd [2021] UKSC 16 (“Rossendale”) at [15] to [17] on a review of the authorities including the seminal judgements of Lord Nicholls in Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson [2004] UKHL 51 (“Barclays”) and inInland Revenue Comrs v Scottish Provident Institution [2004] UKHL 52 (“Scottish Provident”):15. In the task of ascertaining whether a particular statutory provision imposes a charge, or grants an exemption from a charge, the Ramsay approach is generally described-as it is in the statements quoted above-as involving two components or stages. The first is to ascertain the class of facts (which may or may not be transactions) intended to be affected by the charge or exemption. This is a process of interpretation of the statutory provision in the light of its purpose. The second is to discover whether the relevant facts fall within that class, in the sense that they "answer to the statutory description" (Barclays Mercantile at para 32). This may be described as a process of application of the statutory provision to the facts. It is useful to distinguish these processes, although there is no rigid demarcation between them and an iterative approach may be required.16. Both interpretation and application share the need to avoid tunnel vision. The particular charging or exempting provision must be construed in the context of the whole statutory scheme within which it is contained. The identification of its purpose may require an even wider review, extending to the history of the statutory provision or scheme and its political or social objective, to the extent that this can reliably be ascertained from admissible material.17. Likewise, the facts must also be looked at in the round. In Inland Revenue Comrs v McGuckian [1997] 1 WLR 991, 999, Lord Steyn explained that it was the formalistic insistence on examining steps in a composite scheme separately that allowed tax avoidance schemes to flourish. Sometimes looking at a composite scheme as a whole allows particular steps which have no commercial purpose to be ignored. But the requirement to look at the facts in the round is not limited to such cases. Thus, in Scottish Provident where the taxing statute granted an allowance which depended upon the taxpayer having an entitlement to a specified type of property (gilts), a view of the facts in the round enabled the House of Lords to conclude that a legal entitlement to gilts generated by one element in a larger scheme failed to qualify because the entitlement was intended and expected to be cancelled out by an equal and opposite transaction.” (Emphasis added.)[84]HMRC referred to the comments of the Court of Appeal in Watts v HMRC [2025] EWCA Civ 1615, [2026] 4 WLR 12 (“Watts”) where, at [37] to [39], they referred to the review of the authorities in Rossendale. We have set this out in full as they include a useful summary of the earlier caselaw on the Ramsay approach, including passages which the appellant also referred to:
“37. The relevant authorities were reviewed by the Supreme Court in Rossendale [2022] AC 690, from which the following guidance may be drawn: i) The approach to the construction of taxing statutes stemming from Ramsay is well-settled. It is based upon the modern purposive approach to the interpretation of all legislation (para 9). (ii)… (iii) As explained in para 12: “Another aspect of the Ramsay approach is that, where a scheme aimed at avoiding tax involves a series of steps planned in advance, it is both permissible and necessary not just to consider the particular steps individually but to consider the scheme as a whole. Again, this is no more than an application of general principle. Although a statute must be applied to a state of affairs which exists, or to a transaction which occurs, at a particular point in time, the question whether the state of affairs or the transaction was part of a preconceived plan which included further steps may well be relevant to whether the state of affairs or transaction falls within the statutory description, construed in the light of its purpose. In some of the cases following Ramsay, reference was made to a series of transactions which are ‘pre-ordained’: see eg Inland Revenue Comrs v Burmah Oil Co Ltd [1982] STC 30, 33 (Lord Diplock); Furniss v Dawson [1984] AC 474, 527 (Lord Brightman). As a matter of principle, however, it is not necessary in order to justify taking account of later events to show that they were bound to happen - only that they were planned to happen at the time when the first transaction in the sequence took place and that they did in fact happen: see [Scottish Provident] at [23], where the House of Lords held that a risk that a scheme might not work as planned did not prevent it from being viewed as a whole, as it was intended to operate.” (iv) The Ramsay principle is an application of general principles of statutory interpretation (para 13). As Lord Nicholls put it in [Barclays]at para 32, the essence of the approach is: “to give the statutory provision a purposive construction in order to determine the nature of the transaction to which it was intended to apply and then to decide whether the actual transaction (which might involve considering the overall effect of a number of elements intended to operate together) answered to the statutory description.”
[85]The Court of Appeal continued to note at [37(v)]) that in Barclays, at [36], Lord Nicholls quoted with approval the similar statement of Ribeiro PJ in Arrowtown at [35] which they cited (as set out above) and, at [37(vii] and (viii)]), they set out [16] and [17] of the decision in Rossendale.[86]At [38] the Court of Appeal set out that Rossendale the Supreme Court referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in UBS AG v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2016] UKSC 13 (“UBS”) and cited [62] to [64] of that decision which the appellant in this case referred to:
“62. The significance of the Ramsay case was to do away with both those features. First, it extended to tax cases the purposive approach to statutory construction which was orthodox in other areas of the law. Secondly, and equally significantly, it established that the analysis of the facts depended on that purposive construction of the statute. Thus, in Ramsay itself, the terms ‘loss’ and ‘gain’, as used in capital gains tax legislation, were purposively construed as referring to losses and gains having a commercial reality. Since the facts concerned a composite transaction forming a commercial unity, with the consequence that the commercial significance of what had occurred could only be determined by considering the transaction as a whole, the statute was construed as referring to the effect of that composite transaction. As Lord Wilberforce said, at p 326: ‘The capital gains tax was created to operate in the real world, not that of make-belief. As I said in Aberdeen Construction Group Ltd v Inland Revenue Comrs [1978] AC 885 , it is a tax on gains (or I might have added gains less losses), it is not a tax on arithmetical differences. To say that a loss (or gain) which appears to arise at one stage in an indivisible process, and which is intended to be and is cancelled out by a later stage, so that at the end of what was bought as, and planned as, a single continuous operation, there is not such a loss (or gain) as the legislation is dealing with, is in my opinion well and indeed essentially within the judicial function.’ “63. ‘Unfortunately’, the Committee commented in Barclays Mercantile at para 34, ‘the novelty for tax lawyers of this exposure to ordinary principles of statutory construction produced a tendency to regard Ramsay as establishing a new jurisprudence governed by special rules of its own’. In the Barclays Mercantile case the Committee sought to achieve ‘some clarity about basic principles’ (para 27). It summarised the position at para 32: [They set out [32] of Barclays] As Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead said in MacNiven v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2003] 1 AC 311, 320, para 8: “The paramount question always is one of interpretation of the particular statutory provision and its application to the facts of the case”’. As the Committee commented, this is a simple question, however difficult it may be to answer on the facts of a particular case. “64. This approach has proved to be particularly important in relation to tax avoidance schemes as a result of two factors identified in Barclays Mercantile at para 34. First, ‘tax is generally imposed by reference to economic activities or transactions which exist, as Lord Wilberforce said, “in the real world”’. Secondly, tax avoidance schemes commonly include ‘elements which have been inserted without any business or commercial purpose but are intended to have the effect of removing the transaction from the scope of the charge’. In other words, as Carnwath LJ said in the Court of Appeal in Barclays Mercantile, [2002] EWCA Civ 1853; [2003] STC 66, para 66, taxing statutes generally ‘draw their life-blood from real world transactions with real world economic effects’. Where an enactment is of that character, and a transaction, or an element of a composite transaction, has no purpose other than tax avoidance, it can usually be said, as Carnwath LJ stated, that ‘to allow tax treatment to be governed by transactions which have no real world purpose of any kind is inconsistent with that fundamental characteristic’. Accordingly, as Ribeiro PJ said in Collector of Stamp Revenue v Arrowtown Assets Ltd [2003] HKCFA 46; (2003) 6 ITLR 454, para 35, where schemes involve intermediate transactions inserted for the sole purpose of tax avoidance, it is quite likely that a purposive interpretation will result in such steps being disregarded for fiscal purposes. But not always.”
[87]At [39] the Court of Appeal referred to [67] and [68] of UBS, which the appellant in this case also relied on. At [67] it was stated that references to “reality” should not, be misunderstood. The approach described by Lord Nicholls in Barclays and the earlier cases “has nothing to do with the concept of a sham, as explained in Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786” rather, as Lord Steyn observed in Inland Revenue Comrs v McGuckian [1997] 1 WLR 991 (“McGukian”) at 1001, “tax avoidance is the spur to executing genuine documents and entering into genuine arrangements.” (Emphasis added.)[88]The appellant referred also to the comments of Lord Nicholls in Barclays, at [37] and [38]. In those passages Lord Nicholls said that the need to avoid sweeping generalisations about disregarding transactions undertaken for the purpose of tax avoidance was shown by MacNiven v Westmoreland Investments Ltd[2003] 1 AC 311 (“MacNiven”) which, in his view, shows:
“the need to focus carefully upon the particular statutory provision and to identify its requirements before one can decide whether circular payments or elements inserted for the purpose of tax avoidance should be disregarded or treated as irrelevant for the purposes of the statute.”
[89]In MacNiven the House of Lords held that a debtor made a payment of interest within the meaning of the relevant statute which entitled him to a deduction or repayment of tax notwithstanding that it was funded by monies borrowed for that purpose from the creditor himself and was made solely to reduce the debtor’s liability to tax. The House of Lords said that the purpose of requiring interest to be “paid” is to produce symmetry; it gives a right to a deduction in respect of any payment which gives rise to a corresponding tax liability for the recipient (or which would do so if the recipient is a taxable entity.) As the payment was accepted to have had this effect, it answered the statutory description. The appellant acknowledged that of course MacNiven was concerned with different provisions to those under consideration in this case but submitted that, for the reasons set out below, a similar analysis applies to the concepts of “payment made in money” and “repayment” in the relevant provisions.[90]In MacNiven Lord Nicholls’ comments on the Ramsay line of cases are consistent with his comments in Barclays and the approach taken in the other caselaw referred to in the passages above. Lord Nicholls emphasised that in Ramsay “the House did not enunciate any new legal principle” but rather highlighted that, “confronted with new and sophisticated tax avoidance devices, the courts’ duty is to determine the legal nature of the transactions in question and then relate them to the fiscal legislation…” (at [1]). He noted, at [2] to [5], that Ramsay brought out the following three points, in particular> (1) When seeking to attach a tax consequence to a transaction, the court may have regard to the overall effect of a series or combination of transactions intended to operate as such and:
“..Courts are entitled to look at a pre-arranged tax avoidance scheme as a whole. It matters not whether the parties’ intention to proceed with a scheme through all its stages takes the form of a contractual obligation or is expressed only as an expectation without contractual force”. (2) That does not mean that transactions or relevant steps are to be treated as “shams” nor does it require going “behind a transaction for some supposed underlying substance”
. Rather it enables the court “to look at a document or transaction in the context to which it properly belongs”. (3) Having identified the legal nature of the transaction, the courts must then relate this to the language of the statute:
“For instance, if the scheme has the apparently magical result of creating a loss without the taxpayer suffering any financial detriment, is this artificial loss a loss within the meaning of the relevant statutory provision?”
[91]Lord Nicholls, then referred with approval, at [6], to the comments of Lord Steyn and Lord Cooke of Thorndon in McGuckian” at 1000 and 1005 respectively. He noted that they said that this approach (as Lord Nicholls had described it, including the composite approach) “is an exemplification of the established purposive approach to the interpretation of statutes” and “an application to taxing Acts of the general approach to statutory interpretation whereby, in determining the natural meaning of particular expressions in their context, weight is given to the purpose and spirit of the legislation”.[92]At [7], he cautioned that the observations on the Ramsay approach in some later decisions should be read in the context of the particular statutory provisions and sets of facts under consideration and that they:
“cannot be understood as laying down factual pre-requisites which must exist before the court may apply the purposive, Ramsay approach to the interpretation of a taxing statute. That would be to misunderstand the nature of the decision in Ramsay.”
[93]At [8] he said this is not an area for absolutes and:
“The paramount question always is one of interpretation of the particular statutory provision and its application to the facts of the case. Further, as I have sought to explain, Ramsay did not introduce a new legal principle. It would be wrong, therefore, to set bounds to the circumstances in which the Ramsay approach may be appropriate and helpful. The need to consider a document or transaction in its proper context, and the need to adopt a purposive approach when construing taxation legislation, are principles of general application. Where this leads depends upon the particular set of facts and the particular statute….”
(emphasis added)[94]The appellant also referred to Lord Hoffman’s judgement in MacNiven. Lord Hoffman was also clear that, on a Ramsay approach, the ultimate question is one of statutory interpretation. However, he sought to provide guidance on precisely when a composite approach is appropriate. In summary, he drew a distinction between cases where a statutory concept is intended to be given(a) a commercial meaning, in which case steps with no commercial purpose artificially inserted into a composite transaction for tax purposes will not affect the answer to the statutory question, and(b) a legal meaning, in which case the juristic interpretation of the provision is to be respected.[95]At [28], Lord Hoffman said that “everyone agreed that Ramsay is a principle of statutory construction”. However, in his view it involved an “innovation” in that its effect “was to give the statutory concepts of "disposal" and "loss" a commercial meaning” in recognition that “the statutory language was intended to refer to commercial concepts”, so that “the court was required to take a view of the facts which transcended the juristic individuality of the various parts of a pre-planned series of transactions”.[96]At [40], he considered what the court meant in Ramsay in referring to the “real” nature of the transaction and to what happens in “the real world”. He said that:
“The point to hold onto is that something may be real for one purpose but not for another”
. He said that accordingly: (1) The acceptance that the transactions in Ramsay were not shams was an acceptance of “the juristic categorisation of the transactions as individual and discrete” and that “each of them involved no pretence. They were intended to do precisely what they purported to do. They had a legal reality”. (2) On the other hand, the view that the transactions did not give rise to a “real” disposal giving rise to a “real” loss was a rejection of “the juristic categorisation as not being necessarily determinative” for the purposes of those statutory concepts as properly interpreted. He thought that the “contrast here is with a commercial meaning of these concepts” and that reference to the income tax legislation as operating “in the real world”, is a reference to “the commercial context which should influence the construction of the concepts used by Parliament”.[97]Lord Hoffman concluded, at [58] and [59], by again referring to the distinction between legal and commercial concepts:
“The limitations of the Ramsay principle therefore arise out of the paramount necessity of giving effect to the statutory language. One cannot elide the first and fundamental step in the process of construction, namely, to identify the concept to which the statute refers. I readily accept that many expressions used in tax legislation (and not only in tax legislation) can be construed as referring to commercial concepts and that the courts are today readier to give them such a construction than they were before the Ramsay case. But that is not always the case. Taxing statutes often refer to purely legal concepts…If a transaction falls within the legal description, it makes no difference that it has no business purpose. Having a business purpose is not part of the relevant concept… Even if a statutory expression refers to a business or economic concept, one cannot disregard a transaction which comes within the statutory language, construed in the correct commercial sense, simply on the ground that it was entered into solely for tax reasons. Business concepts have their boundaries on this topic.”
[98]In the later cases, such as Barclays the House of Lords clarified that Lord Hoffman’s words are not to be interpreted as meaning that there is an a priori assumption that statutory concepts should be classified into legal or commercial ones before a Ramsay approach can be applied. In Barclays, Lord Nicholls commented on Lord Hoffman’s approach in MacNiven as not “an unreasonable generalisation” but said:
“we do not think that it was intended to provide a substitute for a close analysis of what the statute means. It certainly does not justify the assumption that an answer can be obtained by classifying all concepts a priori as either "commercial" or "legal". That would be the very negation of purposive construction: see Ribeiro PJ in Arrowtown at paras 37 and 39….”
[99]In the passages in Arrowtown to which Lord Nicholls referred, Ribeiro PJ said that he did not think that Lord Hoffman “actually intended to lay down a mechanistic test based on a “commercial”/“legal” dichotomy for pre-determining whether a particular provision is or is not susceptible to a Ramsay approach” and that: “the “valuable insights” that Lord Hoffman was acknowledging [as regards Lord Brightman’s comment in Furniss] were all centred on the proposition that the Ramsay doctrine has at its core the purposive interpretation of statutes applied to facts viewed realistically and untrammelled by “limitations” which might be thought to arise out of Lord Brightman’s formulation. Such an approach strikes me as the antithesis of a mechanistic use of the “commercial”/“legal” dichotomy as a straitjacket limiting construction of the relevant statute…” [as Ribeiro PJ thought was reinforced by Lord Hoffman’s comments at [50]]

Caselaw on meaning of tax avoidance

[100]The parties also referred to a number of well-known authorities in which the courts have considered, in different statutory contexts, the meaning of the term “tax avoidance” or what constitutes a purpose of avoiding tax. This is relevant to what constitutes a “tax avoidance” arrangement for the purposes of para 12.[101]In IRC v Brebner [1967] 2 AC 18 at [30] (“Brebner”) the issue related to certain transactions entered into in connection with the long and short-term financing of arrangements to defeat a threatened takeover bid of a company in which the taxpayers were interested as shareholders and as directors which involved the extraction of cash from the company by way of a capital reduction rather than by declaration of a dividend. It was plain that the taxpayers had obtained a tax advantage as a result of arranging the reduction of capital which HMRC could cancel unless the person who obtained it could show that the transaction or transactions were carried out(a) either for bona fide commercial reasons or in the ordinary course of making or managing investments, and(b) that none of them had as their main object, or one of their main objects, to enable a tax advantage to be obtained. In considering the main object test Lord Upjohn said this:
“….when the question of carrying out a genuine commercial transaction, as this was, is reviewed, the fact that there are two ways of carrying it out – one by paying the maximum amount of tax, the other by paying no, or much less, tax - it would be quite wrong, as a necessary consequence, to draw the inference that, in adopting the latter course, one of the main objects is, for the purposes of this section, avoidance of tax. No commercial man in his senses is going to carry out a commercial transaction except upon the footing of paying the smallest amount of tax that he can. The question whether in fact one of the main objects was to avoid tax is one for the Special Commissioners to decide upon a consideration of all the relevant evidence before them and the proper inferences to be drawn from that evidence.”
[102]The approach in Brebner was applied in IRC v Trustees of the Sema Group Pension Scheme [2002] STC 276 at [113].[103]Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation [1987] AC 155, (“Challenge Corporation”) is a New Zealand case, where shares in a company were sold to Challenge Corporation Limited (“C”) for a price equal to $10,000 or 22.5% of the loss in the company of $5.8 million which proved to be deductible from the assessable income of C’s group of companies. The question was whether the contract for the sale was void as against the New Zealand tax authorities under a provision which stated that would be the case if and to the extent that, directly or indirectly the contract’s “purpose or effect” was to reduce liability to income tax. C argued this provision did not apply as the legislation specifically provided for losses to be transferred between group companies. Lord Templeman said this at 167 to 168:
“There are, however, discernible distinctions between a transaction which is a sham, a transaction which effects the evasion of tax, a transaction which mitigates tax and a transaction which avoids tax… The material distinction in the present case is between tax mitigation and tax avoidance. A taxpayer has always been free to mitigate his liability to tax… Income tax is mitigated by a taxpayer who reduces his income or incurs expenditure in circumstances which reduce his assessable income or entitle him to reduction in his tax liability. Section 99 does not apply to tax mitigation because the taxpayer’s tax advantage is not derived from an “arrangement” but from the reduction of income which he accepts or the expenditure which he incurs. Thus when a taxpayer executes a covenant and makes a payment under the covenant he reduces his income. If the covenant exceeds six years and satisfies certain other conditions the reduction in income reduces the assessable income of the taxpayer. The tax advantage results from the payment under the covenant. When a taxpayer makes a settlement, he deprives himself of the capital which is a source of income and thereby reduces his income. If the settlement is irrevocable and satisfies certain other conditions the reduction in income reduces the assessable income of the taxpayer. The tax advantage results from the reduction of income. Section 99 does apply to tax avoidance. Income tax is avoided and a tax advantage is derived from an arrangement when the taxpayer reduces his liability to tax without involving him in the loss or expenditure which entitles him to that reduction. The taxpayer engaged in tax avoidance does not reduce his income or suffer a loss or incur expenditure but nevertheless obtains a reduction in his liability to tax as if he had.”
[104]In Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Ltd v Stokes [1992] 1 AC 655 Lord Templeman made reference to his own comments in Challenge Corporation at 675 and commented that:
“There is nothing magical about tax mitigation whereby a taxpayer suffers a loss or incurs expenditure in fact as well as in appearance”
. Lord Goff said this in that case at page 681B:
“Like my noble and learned friend, Lord Templeman, I approach this case on the basis that there is a fundamental difference between tax mitigation and unacceptable tax avoidance. Examples of the former have been given in the speech of my noble and learned friend. These are cases in which the taxpayer takes advantage of the law to plan his affairs so as to minimise the incidence of tax. Unacceptable tax avoidance typically involves the creation of complex artificial structures by which, as though by the wave of a magic wand, the taxpayer conjures out of the air a loss, or a gain, or expenditure, or whatever it may be, which otherwise would never have existed. These structures are designed to achieve an adventitious tax benefit for the taxpayer, and in truth are no more than raids on the public funds at the expense of the general body of taxpayers, and as such are unacceptable. Again, examples have been given in the speech of my noble and learned friend. The question in the present case is into which of these two categories the transaction under consideration falls.”
[105]CIR v Willoughby (1997) 70 TC 57 (“Willoughby”) concerned the application of the “transfer of assets abroad” legislation then in place to transactions involving transfers of assets to an insurance company including whether the deferral of a liability to United Kingdom income tax can constitute the avoidance of liability to income tax for the purposes of those provisions and whether on the facts as found(a) the purpose of avoiding liability to taxation was the purpose or one of the purposes for which the transfer of assets or any operation associated therewith was effected; or(b) that transfer and any operations associated therewith were bona fide commercial transactions and not designed for the purpose of avoiding liability to taxation. We refer to this as the motive test. Lord Nolan said this as regards the motive test at page 116:
“[ Counsel for HMRC submitted that] ... tax avoidance was to be distinguished from tax mitigation. The hallmark of tax avoidance is that the taxpayer reduces his liability to tax without incurring the economic consequences that Parliament intended to be suffered by any taxpayer qualifying for such reduction in his tax liability. The hallmark of tax mitigation, on the other hand, is that the taxpayer takes advantage of a fiscally attractive option afforded to him by the tax legislation, and genuinely suffers the economic consequences that Parliament intended to be suffered by those taking advantage of the option. ... My Lords, I am content for my part to adopt these propositions as a generally helpful approach to the elusive concept of “tax avoidance”, the more so since they owe much to the speeches of Lord Templeman and Lord Goff of Chieveley in Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Ltd. v. Stokes 64 TC 617, [1992] 1 AC 655 at pages 675C-676F and 681B-E. One of the traditional functions of the tax system is to promote socially desirable objectives by providing a favourable tax regime for those who pursue them. Individuals who make provision for their retirement or for greater financial security are a familiar example of those who have received such fiscal encouragement in various forms over the years. This, no doubt, is why the holders of qualifying policies, even those issued by non-resident companies, were granted exemption from tax on the benefits received. In a broad colloquial sense tax avoidance might be said to have been one of the main purposes of those who took out such policies, because plainly freedom from tax was one of the main attractions. But it would be absurd in the context of s 741 to describe as tax avoidance the acceptance of an offer of freedom from tax which Parliament has deliberately made. Tax avoidance within the meaning of s 741 is a course of action designed to conflict with or defeat the evident intention of Parliament.” (Emphasis added.)
[106]That these comments still represent current judicial thinking is shown by UBS where, at [1] Lord Reed said this:
“In our society, a great deal of intellectual effort is devoted to tax avoidance. The most sophisticated attempts of the Houdini taxpayer to escape from the manacles of tax (to borrow a phrase from the judgment of Templeman LJ in [Ramsay] [1979] 1 WLR 974, 979) generally take the form described in [Barclays], para 34: ‘... structuring transactions in a form which will have the same or nearly the same economic effect as a taxable transaction but which it is hoped will fall outside the terms of the taxing statute. It is characteristic of these composite transactions that they will include elements which have been inserted without any business or commercial purpose but are intended to have the effect of removing the transaction from the scope of the charge.’”
[107]The parties also both referred to R v IRC ex parte Matrix Securities [1994] 1 WLR 334, 356-7, where Lord Templeman said this:
“The courts have long since insisted that fiscal consequences correspond to real consequences. Every tax avoidance scheme involves a trick and a pretence. It is the task of the revenue to unravel the trick and the duty of the court to ignore the pretence. In the present case the principal trick employed consisted of circular, self-cancelling payments of £64,125,000. The pretence was that the investors were expending £64,125,000. The trick of circular, self-cancelling payments with matching receipts and payments was rejected … The authorities disclose that unacceptable tax avoidance schemes exhibit several similar or identical characteristics. A scheme may of course include embellishments designed to avoid the mistakes of earlier schemes. It is a common characteristic of a scheme that, considered as a whole, the results claimed are too good to be true … It is a common characteristic that some steps in the scheme are preordained though not necessarily contractual….in reality recourse to the investors will never be made. Title to the money circulated will be produced by Hill Samuel only for the purpose of steps which ensure that in practice the money will come back to Hill Samuel immediately.”
[108]As regards the correct approach to determining the purpose or object of arrangements the appellant referred to Snell v HMRC [2007] STC 1279 and the recent consideration of this issue by the Court of Appeal in HMRC v Burlington Loan Management DAC [2026] EWCA Civ 461 where Snowden LJ, at [62], affirmed the principles as set out by Falk LJ in BlackRock Holdco 5 v HMRC [2024] EWCA Civ 330 at [124]:
‘(a) Save in 'obvious' cases, ascertaining the object or purpose of something involves an inquiry into the subjective intentions of the relevant actor. (b) Object or purpose must be distinguished from effect. Effects or consequences, even if inevitable, are not necessarily the same as objects or purposes. (c) Objective intentions are not limited to conscious motives. (d) Further, motives are not necessarily the same as objects or purposes. (e) 'Some' results or consequences are 'so inevitably and inextricably involved' in an activity that, unless they are merely incidental, they must be a purpose for it. (f) It is for the fact finding tribunal to determine the object or purpose sought to be achieved, and that question is not answered simply by asking the decision maker.’
[109]As regards points (c) and (e), Snowden LJ referred, at [64]. to the well-known decision in Mallalieu v Drummond [1983] 2 AC 861 and, at [65], to the comments on that in Mackinley v Arthur Young McClelland Moores [1990] 2 AC 239 where, at page 255, Lord Oliver said this:
“Your Lordships have been referred to what may be regarded as a seminal decision of this House in Mallalieu v Drummond [1983] 2 AC 861and much argument has been addressed to the question whether the purpose of the particular payment falls to be ascertained objectively or by reference only to the subjective intention of the payer. For my part, I think that the difficulties suggested here are more illusory than real. The question in each case is what was the object to be served by the disbursement or expense? As was pointed out by Lord Brightman in Mallalieu's case, this cannot be answered simply by evidence of what the payer says that he intended to achieve. Some results are so inevitably and inextricably involved in particular activities that they cannot but be said to be a purpose of the activity. Miss Mallalieu's restrained and sober garb inevitably served and cannot but have been intended to serve the purpose of preserving warmth and decency and her purpose in buying cannot but have been, in part at least, to serve that purpose whether she consciously thought about it or not.” (Emphasis added)

Part D – submissions and decision

[110]To recap, the parties are agreed that for the purposes of para 2(2), in 2019 Dr Keppel owed “quasi-loans” in the total sum of £500,000. The question is whether, as HMRC contend, the disputed balance, of £386,838.24 of the Keppel quasi-loans was “outstanding” at the end of 5 April 2019 or whether, as the appellant argues, Dr Keppel made “payment made in money…by way of repayment of” the disputed balance in full before that deadline.[111]It appears to be common ground that the provisions in schedule 11 were enacted in 2017 with the purpose (1), as the appellant put it, of taxing “quasi-loans” which were outstanding at the end of 5 April 2019, on the basis that such loans were a method of providing “disguised remuneration” by which employees and directors were remunerated for their services without suffering the usual tax charges, and (2) in effect, taxpayers who had utilised arrangements resulting in them having “quasi-loans” were given a window of opportunity to avoid a charge to tax on a sum equal to the “quasi loans” if and to the extent that, before the end of 5 April 2019, the debtor made “payment…in money…by way of repayment of” the “quasi-loans”. Given this overarching purpose, and on the plain, natural meaning of para 11(4)(b) it is reasonable to suppose that the legislature intended that only “genuine” repayments should be taken into account where the debtor has, in real terms, discharged the “quasi-loan” to the tune of the payment made and incurred an economic cost in money terms in doing so.[112]The appellant submitted that this broad purpose is reflected in the following statements of the Government made during the passage of the legislation through Parliament: (1) Mel Stride, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, stated:
“Affected scheme users can avoid the loan charge by repaying the loan and replacing it with a commercial loan”. (2) It was stated in a debate on 29 January 2019 on the loan charge that: “It allowed three years for individuals to clean up the loan – if they were loans, they could be refinanced on a proper, commercial basis…”. (3) It was made clear by Jesse Norman, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, in an answer to a Parliamentary question on 27 April 2021, that in relation to non-genuine arrangements: “…there have been numerous cases in which [HMRC] has made arrests or prosecuted people in relation to fraud, and particularly in relation to disguised remuneration loan-busting schemes.”
[113]As HMRC submitted, that this is the broad purpose is supported by the comments in two cases which considered these provisions in judicial review proceedings: (1) In R (Cartref Care Home Limited) v HMRC [2019] EWHC 3382 (Admin), [2020] STC 516 (“Cartref”), where the purpose of schedule 11 was described as follows at [225]:
“The purpose of the legislation is not one which can be sensibly impugned; it is to deprive tax avoidance schemes of oxygen, and to ensure that people and companies bear their fair burden of tax, rather than throwing unfair weight on others – in particular those who do not have the opportunity to use such schemes.” (2) In Zeeman v HMRC [2020] EWHC 794 (Admin), [2020] STC 828 (“Zeeman”), where, at [80], the Court of Appeal said this: “Mr Gilbert’s and Ms McGeehan’s evidence on behalf of HMRC as to the purpose of the legislation was clear, and as Cockerill J said in Cartref, at [225], it cannot be sensibly impugned. Parliament wished to draw a line under this type of tax avoidance. It intended to ensure that individuals (and companies) bear their fair burden of tax, rather than throwing an unfair burden on others who do not arrange their affairs in the same way.”
[114]The dispute is over precisely how the requirements of paras 11(4)(b) and 12 are to be interpreted and the interaction between them. In particular, the parties disagree over, how and at what stage of the analysis, the overriding purpose of the provisions is to be given effect.[115]The appellant’s main contentions are as follows:(1) Para 11 and para 12 are distinct and separate provisions. Para 11 is a self-contained computational/arithmetical provision for determining the amount of the quasi-loan outstanding at the specified date which, for current purposes, is only subject to para 12. Parliament decided to use precise legal concepts to define what constitutes a repayment after 16 March 2016 seemingly to ensure that, after the announcement of the loan charge, only payments which meet the specified legal descriptions constitute repayments. Both “payment” and “money” are legal concepts. As in MacNiven (albeit in a different statutory context) all that is required is for a payment in money to be made as opposed to, for example, an illegal set-off. The intention is to create legal certainty so that taxpayers can clearly demonstrate payment of the quasi-loan such as by providing a bank statement showing that funds have moved. The use of the term “money” confines cases of payment to the movement of legal currency in cash or electronically such that, for example, a barter arrangement is excluded. Overall, therefore, these requirements provide certainty in this computational provision as to the amount that the taxpayer claims to have repaid without the need to investigate the mechanics of payment or value of what is provided in payment.(2) This strict interpretation is reinforced by para 1(7) of schedule 11. That provides that, for the purposes of schedule 11, whether an amount of a loan or quasi loan is outstanding at a particular time does not depend on the loan or quasi loan subsisting at that time. So, even if in general law a quasi-loan has been repaid, it is not treated as repaid for the purposes of this schedule unless it is repaid in accordance with the precise terms of para 11. That effectively broadens the scope.(3) Para 12 provides a separate policing provision by permitting transactions which otherwise meet the statutory requirements in para11(4)(b) to be disregarded where the necessary statutory conditions in para 12 are met. This makes it clear that, as its plain terms suggest by the use of legal concepts, para (4)(b) goes no further than requiring the analysis set out above. Any restriction by reference to whether the arrangements involve tax-avoidance is then imposed by the following provisions in para 12, specifically para 12(1)(a), which sets out the parameters of what constitutes a tax avoidance arrangement.(4) Consequently, for the reasons set out below, the payment of £324,480 and of £38,358.24, viewed realistically, met the statutory description in para 11(4)(b) – subject only to whether para 12 applies (which it does not). For the reasons already given, the focus in para 11 is on a specific transaction. In this case, the focus is on the payment of money by Dr Keppel in repayment of the Keppel quasi-loans to the Trust. As a matter of agreed fact as regards payment of £324,480: (a) Dr Keppel had money in his solicitor’s client account in the amount of £324,480, (b) that money was agreed to be paid to the Trust in part repayment of the Keppel quasi-loans, and (c) the money was paid to the Trust’s agent, Delta. Consequently, the facts in the current instance answer the statutory description in para 11(4)(b) as regards the payment of £324,480. This being the case, it constitutes part of the repayment amount for the purposes of sub-para (1), to the extent it is not disregarded under para 12.(5) Para 12 does not operate to exclude the payment in money made by Dr Keppel from being regarded as a repayment of the disputed balance within the meaning of para 11(4)(b). As held in Willoughby, the meaning of tax avoidance for the purposes of para 12 is “a course of action designed to conflict with or defeat the evident intention of Parliament”. It would be absurd to describe as tax avoidance the acceptance of an offer of freedom from tax which Parliament has deliberately made – by a taxpayer taking advantage of the opportunity offered by para 11(4) to fall outside of the loan charge by repaying the “quasi-loan” by the debtor making payment in money. Having regard to the overall purpose of schedule 11 and the operation of para 11(4)(b), the purpose of para 12 is to give effect to the overarching purpose, namely, to prevent taxpayers benefiting from para 11(4)(b) when arrangements, which otherwise meet its requirements, do not have the intended economic effect of removing the benefit of the prior receipt of the tax free quasi-loan by the debtor. Hence, the test under para 12 is whether Dr Keppel “genuinely suffered the economic consequences that Parliament intended to be suffered by those taking advantage of” the opportunity to fall outside the scope of the loan charge. For the reasons set out below, Dr Keppel did genuinely suffer the intended economic consequences.(6) On the facts, the payment of £38,358.24 also was a payment of money by Dr Keppel by way of repayment of the disputed balance. HRMC argue that it was a scheme fee but in any event the use to which the Trust then put the money received from Dr Keppel is irrelevant. The evidence does not support HMRC’s contentions. It is notable that, as set out in the Trustee’s letter of 3 April 2019, if the purchase of the shares did not go ahead, the monies that Dr Keppel had paid from his other resources would not be repaid to him. This demonstrates this was a real independent payment to reduce the disputed balance. On the evidence there is no basis for a finding that Dr Keppel owed a scheme fee to Qubic. The advice letter was addressed to the directors of the appellant and in the confirmation in that letter the appellant undertook to pay Qubic’s fee. There was no evidence in his personal bank statement that the fee had been paid because it was not his liability. The appellant did not put any of the appellant’s bank statements into evidence as it was not fully aware of HMRC’s contentions in this regard until the hearing. Hence, there is no basis for a finding that the payment of £38, 358.24 made by Dr Keppel to the Trust constituted a payment for a fee that there is no evidence that he was ever liable for. There are two distinct costs: the cost to the Trust of obtaining the lending and Qubic’s fee for its advice which was due from the appellant.(7) Nor should the payment of £38,358.24 be disregarded under para 12(1)(a). For the reasons already set out, the sale of the shares to the Trust at market value did not constitute tax avoidance, nor was that a main purpose. Hence, the payment was not connected, either directly or indirectly, with a tax avoidance arrangement, other than the arrangements by which the Keppel quasi-loans were made which are excluded from being a relevant arrangement.[116]In HMRC’s view, however, the appellant’s interpretation of para 11(4)(b) is far too restricted and limited unduly in light of the overall purpose of these provisions. In their view that purpose should be fully taken into account in the interpretation and application of para 11(4)(b):(1) It is agreed that para 11 essentially establishes a formula for arriving at the amount of any “quasi-loan” outstanding at the end of 5 April 2019. However, regard must be had to the reality of the facts of the case, which the appellant’s approach wrongly ignores. The clear purpose of the provision is to remove from the scope of the charge to tax amounts of “quasi-loans” which are genuinely repaid by 5 April 2019 by debtors with a view to removing the economic advantage of having entered into a tax avoidance scheme. In other words, debtors will only fall outside of the scope of schedule 11 where they have borne, in real terms, the economic cost of repaying the “quasi loan”.(2) In reality and viewed realistically: (a) the QLC scheme merely involved the circulation of the same sum of money of £324,480 between entities associated with the scheme, namely Delta (as lender), the Trustee, WBD (as the Trustee’s solicitor) and Endeavour (as Dr Keppel’s solicitor), rather than having ever been received by or having passed through Dr Keppel’s hands. Its handling as part of the QLC scheme cannot therefore be said to amount to a payment in money by Dr Keppel on or after 17 March 2016 or to be by way of payment of the disputed balance in respect of which he had a payment obligation. (b) Further or alternatively, viewed realistically, Dr Keppel has simply done what he suggested to the Trustee in his letter of 12 March 2019 and “paid” the disputed balance in shares with a value of £324,480; the requirement of para 11(4)(b) for “payment in money” is not met. If one strips out the artificial circulation of money from and back to Delta as part of a pre-ordained series of steps, the reality is that Dr Keppel has purported to pay the debts by the transfer of shares into a Trust of which he remains a beneficiary. Viewed realistically, that is not a payment of money. That conclusion is consistent with the purpose of schedule 11 as derived from its words and, as identified in Cartref and Zeeman.(3) Viewed realistically, the sum of £38,358.24, was simply the fee due to Qubic for the use and implementation of the QLC scheme which was not made in repayment of the disputed balance. It is clear from the evidence that Qubic charged a fee for the use of the QLC scheme but it is unclear whether the fee was due from the appellant or Dr Keppel personally. It is reasonable to suppose that this sum represents the payment of that fee to Delta, an entity associated with Qubic, made through the Trustee, whether made by Dr Keppel personally or acting on behalf of the appellant. It is unrealistic that it was a lending fee charged by Delta as it would represent a charge of a huge amount of interest (at a rate of 12%) on funds made available by Delta for a few hours only. Dr Keppel was unable to identify any evidence of Qubic invoicing him or the appellant for those costs or of him or the appellant making a payment to Qubic in respect of those costs. Nor could Dr Keppel identify any evidence of the appellant resolving to pay Qubic’s costs.[117]On HMRC’s approach, therefore, para 12 simply does not come into play, However, if, contrary to their view, it is in point, HMRC’s view is that para 12 seeks to exclude arrangements which do not have the intended economic effect in that, as they put it, the asserted repayment of £324,480 of the disputed balance through the share “sale” does not leave the debtor worse off in money terms. They essentially made the same arguments as they made in relation to para 11(4)(b) that under the arrangements implemented under the QLC scheme, Dr Keppel did not suffer that intended economic effect. They emphasised, in particular, that had Dr Keppel sold his shares on the open market, he would have fully alienated them, whereas, by transferring them to the Trust, they have become (on the appellant’s case), investment assets of a Trust of which he remains a beneficiary and, on his own evidence, he stands to benefit from that Trust. The appellant’s analysis would undermine the purpose of schedule 11, as identified in Cartef and Zeeman, namely, to deprive “quasi-loan” schemes of their oxygen. Dr Keppel’s purpose in purporting to “pay” the disputed balance was only to avoid the loan charge applying, rather than for some commercial imperative. He did this by the artificial QLC avoidance scheme. In their view para 12 also applies to exclude £38, 358.24 from being taken into account in para 11(4)(b).[118]The appellant responded that:(1) The factual factors which HMRC point to in relation to para 11(4)(b) have no relevance to the analysis of whether that provision applies; they are matters for consideration only as regards para 12 (and in any event HMRC’s view of the relevant factors in the context of that test is not correct). At this stage of the analysis, the statutory requirements of para 11(4)(b), based as they are on legal concepts necessarily treat as irrelevant circular payments or elements inserted for the purposes of tax avoidance (see Barclays at [38]). HMRC wrongly seek to apply the wider focus as to the overall economic outcome of a series of commercially linked transactions, and not the more restricted focus actually required by para 11. The transactions by which Dr Keppel obtained the money although related, have no bearing on the application of para 11 (see UBS at [68]). Indeed, para 12 would be redundant if it were relevant, as HMRC argue it is, to consider such matters in the application of the computational provision in para 11.(2) In any event the fact that there are two methods of achieving the same result of repayment of the disputed balance (by transferring shares in equal value to the debts to the Trust or by selling the shares and using the proceeds to repay the debts) does not permit the transactions to be recharacterized (see MacNiven).(3) HMRC’s position as regards para 11(4)(b) is misconceived for all the following reasons: (a) The proceeds from the sale of Dr Keppel’s shares were paid into Endeavour’s client account and held for him; it was his money and it is irrelevant that the funds were not paid into his personal account. (b) The payment of the money to the Trust’s agent, Delta, as opposed to the Trust is irrelevant; the receipt by an agent being receipt by the principal. (c) The obligation to use the money to repay the quasi-loans to the Trust did not denature it as money; it remained money notwithstanding that Dr Keppel agreed it would be used for a specific purpose, as is common in many commercial arrangements such as for the provision of loan funding and investments. (d) HMRC have not pleaded that the shares in the appellant, which Dr Keppel sold to the Trust, did not have a value of £324,480, nor adduced evidence that their value was different; a buyer in the open market would have paid the same price as the Trust. (e) Whether the Trust or a buyer on the open market purchased the shares, the asset and liability positions of Dr Keppel and the Trust are the same: (a) Dr Keppel no longer owned the shares and had repaid in money £324,480 of the disputed balance and (b) in the case of the open market buyer the Trust has cash of £324,480 and, in the case of the Trust acquiring the shares, the Trust has shares of the same value. The outcome is that Dr Keppel therefore suffered the economic consequences sought, under schedule 11, in either scenario, having paid the same amount of money to the Trust; the identity of the purchaser of the shares is not relevant to the purpose of para 11. (f) HMRC have not challenged the bona fides of the Trust and therefore it is not open to them to submit that Dr Keppel will benefit from the Trust in respect of the shares transferred to it. In making that submission they are asking the tribunal to ignore the accepted responsibility of Trustees which have not been called into question.[119]HMRC added that:(1) The appellant’s microscopic focus on paragraph 11(4)(b) alone, fails to construe that sub-para in the context of the statutory scheme as a whole which, as noted, has an anti-avoidance purpose. The relevant statutory concept is not merely whether there was a payment in money by Dr Keppel, but rather what was the value of the Keppel quasi-loans outstanding on 5 April 2019, and the repayment amount is only one element of that concept. Whilst para 11 has a computational component it is not limited to that and the terms used, such as “repayment” of debt, are not purely legal in nature. It is plain that, having regard to the wider context and overall purpose of these provisions, a relevant person makes a “repayment” of a “quasi-loan” “in money” only if the person suffers the economic consequence that Parliament intended, namely, by being worse off in money terms.(2) The appellant’s reliance on MacNiven and Barclays is misplaced. In those cases, it was found that the purpose of different legislation required a focus on the specific transactions. In the context of this different statutory scheme and having regard to its purpose, that is not the case here for the reasons already given. Moreover, in Watts the Court of Appeal rejected similar arguments to those raised by the appellant, namely, that a “computational” provision should be given a restricted meaning. Counsel set out in some detail the relevant facts and analysis in Watts but we have not found it useful to consider that in detail given the different statutory context.(3) The appellant’s approach also “atomises” the composite whole of the QLC scheme and focuses on only one of its components – the payment by Endeavour of £324,480 to Delta on 3 April 2019. It is precisely “the formalistic insistence on examining steps in a composite scheme separately” which Lord Steyn deprecated in McGuckian [at 999 (with that criticism repeated in Hurstwood, at [17], and Watts, at [37(viii)]). The arrangements should be considered as a composite whole.(4) Under these arrangements Dr Keppel has not suffered the kind of detriment that Parliament was contemplating for the requirements in para 11(4)(b) to be met. Parliament contemplates that, on any purported repayment, the relevant person will suffer an outright disbenefit/alienation; a repayment in money, which results in an outright detriment and not, as here, the retention of access to a benefit in the future. HMRC accept that there is a repayment in money if (a) a debtor simply drains their bank account of cash to pay the relevant “quasi-loan”, or (b) borrows money to pay it as that leaves the debtor with a genuine debt, or (c) if there is a genuine sale of assets which generates cash which is used to pay the “quasi-loan”. Para 11(4)(b) does not contemplate a situation where a person transfers assets into a Trust from which that person expects to obtain a significant benefit in the future. That is what distinguishes Dr Keppel’s situation from the situation of Dr Suaris who transferred cash into the Trust.(5) Dr Keppel accepts that he expected to obtain a significant benefit from the Trust in the future. Hence, it is not necessary for HMRC to challenge the bona fides of the Trust. Viewing the facts realistically, Dr Keppel retained control of the appellant such that he could, if he wished, pay himself a salary or a consultancy fee or even move the trade out of the appellant. The only consequence that he might feel is that in the future when he comes to sell the appellant, 32% of the value will go into the Trust but he expects to receive a significant benefit from the Trust.(6) As regards the appellant’s criticism of HMRC’s approach to the other relevant facts, the point is that the transactions were not commercial and were undertaken solely with a view to avoiding the loan charge without the appellant bearing the intended economic consequences. In that context: (a) The tribunal should treat with caution the claim that Dr Keppel always thought he was going to repay the Keppel quasi-loans. That this was not the intention behind such arrangements is plain from the decision in Wired Orthodontics. The tribunal found that, under the original scheme, any repayment, if it was made, would have been recycled by the trust and would have created a pension pot for the directors. (b) Other notable features are the circular movement of funds and the pre-ordained nature of the transactions. Dr Keppel said that he simply did what his advisers told him to do and that Hive and Qubic arranged everything for him. Some of the correspondence plainly seeks to give the arrangements a veneer or commerciality/element of commercial negotiation which does not exist. (c) It is not credible that Dr Keppel viewed the Trustee as a business partner. The Trustee could not run a dentistry practice; it was not in any meaningful sense a business partner. (d) There is no explanation for why the Trust needed to borrow so much to make what the appellant claims is a valuable investment in shares in the appellant given the Trust had just received £250,000 from Dr Suaris in repayment of the Suaris quasi-loans. (e) HMRC do not challenge the valuation of the shares in the appellant obtained from LB. However, the fact that there was a valuation does not mean that the transactions in question were commercial or ordinary and/or normal arrangements. It is notable that it is evident from the documents in the bundle that the offer from the third party for the shares, which was taken into account in LB’s later valuation, was made on the basis of locking the directors into the business for a fixed period and that not all of the consideration would be payable immediately - there were earn out provisions. None of that features in the assumptions in either of the valuation reports. Those reports have valued the appellant on the basis that Dr Keppel could sell his shares on day one and leave the business immediately. The reports simply do not lend any support to the suggestion that these were normal or commercial transactions. The obtaining of the reports was just one more step in the scheme.(7) If para 12 is in point (which HMRC do not accept), all of the above factors are equally applicable to the analysis under that provision. Hence, if the “payment” made by Dr Keppel is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of para 11(4)(b), it would be excluded from being taken into account under that provision by para 12.[120]The appellant responded as follows:(1) These provisions, to some extent, do not operate in the “real world”. For example, the effect of para 1(7) is that a “quasi-loan” can exist for the purposes of schedule 11, even when in the “real world” it has been repaid. The concept of debt is a legal concept. The appellant’s analysis does not involve tunnel vision; the analysis assesses the purpose of para 11(4)(b) within the context of the whole statutory scheme. The appellant’s interpretation correctly reflects the overall purpose, by taking account of the economic effect of the relevant arrangements under the specific anti-avoidance provision in para 12. The inclusion of this specific provision reinforces (as is apparent also from the terms used in para 11(4)) that para 11 is confined to being a mechanical, computational provision which is designed readily and easily to determine the amount outstanding of a “quasi-loan” on the specified date. It is specifically left to para 12 to make the kind of analysis which HMRC wish to conduct in relation to para 11. Parliament was clear in its intention as to what is meant by tax avoidance in this case and that that issue is to be dealt with only under para 12.(2) The computational provision under consideration in Watts was entirely different to that in question here. It determines whether there was a loss from the disposal of gilts and many of the authorities relied on related to similar issues. As recognised in the case law, concepts such as “loss” and “gain” are commercial terms which require a “real world” assessment. By contrast, in this case, the question is whether there has been a payment of a debt, as a legal concept. In any event the relevance of the case law referred to is to demonstrate the correct approach the tribunal should take to the construction of the provisions. In this case, Parliament has split these provisions into two separate elements in the manner described, with their different focuses, and has chosen to set out a specific description of what constitutes a tax avoidance arrangement.(3) The decisions in Cartref and Zeeman are of no real assistance to HMRC. Cartref was a judicial review case in which the taxpayer sought to challenge the legitimacy of the actual legislation. The Judge therefore spoke about the purpose of the loan charge in broad terms. For the reasons already given, the appellant’s approach is on all fours with that broad approach.(4) There is no logical reason for making any distinction, as HMRC seek to do, between Dr Suaris’ repayment of the Suaris quasi-loans and the transactions whereby Dr Keppel repaid the disputed balance. In all of these scenarios, Dr Keppel and Dr Suaris may get significant returns from the Trust which may involve the sums paid into the Trust or part of the proceeds from any eventual sale of the shares by the Trust. It does not make any sense, therefore, to assert that in repaying the disputed balance, Dr Keppel has not suffered the intended economic consequences such that he cannot benefit from para 11(4)(b). In each case, Dr Keppell and Dr Suaris have “outright” deprived themselves of the relevant sums by payment into the Trust. Moreover, in more general terms, given the nature of the planning which leads to taxpayers having “quasi-loans”, it is necessarily the case that, in every case where taxpayers have chosen to repay them, payment will be made into the relevant trusts. On HMRC’s analysis, therefore, schedule 11 would be deprived of any purpose at all.(5) Moreover, there is no “commerciality” issue as HMRC contend. The only question is essentially whether the debtor legally has the monies to pay the “quasi-loan” and in repaying it in fact suffers the legal detriment of not having those monies. HMRC’s comments on the valuation by LB are nothing to the point given they accept it is a valid valuation. On Dr Keppel’s evidence there are sensible reasons for making a clear separation between the funds used for the repayment of the Keppel quasi-loans from those used by Dr Suaris in the payment of the Suaris quasi-loans.(6) In any event, Dr Keppel and the Trust undertook real transactions. It is not disputed by HMRC that the deb” was repaid and that the Trust owns the shares. This is not a case where money goes round in a circle, allegedly a loss is created but nobody suffered any economic detriment. When the transactions were complete, Dr Keppel had received funds and HMRC accept that a payment was made as a legal matter. Dr Keppel has borne the full economic consequence of repaying the Keppel quasi-loans; as a result of the repayment he is economically worse off in the amount of £324,480: (a) He disposed of the shares at market value, he no longer owns those shares, he no longer has the proceeds of sale, the proceeds were applied for the repayment of the Keppel quasi-loans, and therefore he has met the economic burden required by para 12. (b) On the facts, the economic consequences suffered by Dr Keppel are the same whether he sold the shares on the open market or to the Trust, as he no longer owns those shares. Following any such sale he would not receive the dividends, he could not use the shares sold as security for a loan, and he could not realise their value. He also no longer had the proceeds from the sale of the shares as the monies were paid to the Trust. (c) Further, the fact that Dr Keppel could have transferred the shares directly to the Trust in settlement of the disputed balance (thereby extinguishing it in law but not for the purposes of para 1) does not makes the route he chose instead, of selling the shares for cash and using the cash to repay the disputed balance, tax avoidance, nor does it mean that the purpose of the transaction is tax avoidance (see Brebner). (d) The economic consequences for Dr Keppel in respect of any future benefit received from the Trust would be the same whether they related to money that had its source from the sale of the shares to a third party or from their sale to the Trustee. Whether a payment was received in money of £100 or shares were transferred of £100 value, the economic consequences would be the same for Dr Keppel; as would the tax consequences. (e) The economic consequences for Dr Keppel are not altered by the method by which the purchase price of the shares was financed by the Trust. It is accepted, viewed in isolation, the obtaining of a loan by the Trust to acquire the shares and using that same money in repayment of the disputed balances, was in effect self-cancelling as regards that loan, but this is not relevant for the purposes of para 12. It is not the economic consequence of the transactions on the Trust, but the economic consequences on Dr Keppel which are relevant for the purposes of the provision. Even if this were not the case, the transactions as a whole resulted in the acquisition of 32 shares at market value for the Trust. (f) As noted, HMRC have not challenged the bona fides of the Trust and therefore it is not open to them to submit that Dr Keppel will benefit from the Trust in respect of the shares transferred to it. (g) Consequently, neither the choice to sell the shares to repay the disputed balance, nor that the shares were sold to the Trust, affects the genuine economic consequences for Dr Keppel; this being the appropriate test as to whether there is tax avoidance. Dr Keppel sold the shares for market value and used the proceeds to repay his quasi-loan to the Trust The transactions had the genuine economic effect that was the purpose for which schedule 11 was enacted. As a result, para 12 does not bite, and the payment by Dr Keppel to the Trust of £324,480 is not to be disregarded.(7) As regards the payment of £38,358.24, as before, there is no evidential basis for HMRC’s assertions. It is noted that it is not clear what the financing option in the memorandum to the advice letter refers to. Plainly this sum does not equate to 3% of the amount loaned by Delta.

Conclusion

[121]We assess first how para 11(4)(b) applies in these circumstances. Subject to our comments on the payment of £38,358.24, it was not disputed that each of the steps involved in the QLC scheme (the borrowing by the Trust, the purchase of the shares in the appellant by the Trustee, the payment of the purchase price by the Trustee to Dr Keppel and the use of those funds to pay the disputed balance) if viewed as individual and discrete transactions, as Lord Hoffman put it in MacNiven, “involved no pretence” in that they “had a legal reality”. There is no allegation that the transactions were a sham. Rather the question is whether, on a purposive approach to the construction of the relevant provisions:(1) as the appellant submitted, each of the steps should be analysed according to that legal reality or, as Lord Hoffman put it in MacNiven, on the basis that the juristic analysis of each step should be respected, with the result that Dr Keppel made “payment made in money….by way of repayment of” the disputed balance for the purposes of para 11(4)(b); or(2) as HMRC submitted, the transaction should be analysed adopting a composite approach, having regard to the overall effects of the steps as elements designed to operate together, with the result, in their view, that Dr Keppel did not make such a “payment” within the terms of para 11(4)(b).[122]The courts have repeatedly referred to the comments in Arrowtown byRibeiro PJ that the driving principle of the Ramsay line of cases is to apply in tax cases “a general rule of statutory construction and an unblinkered approach to the analysis of the facts”; in other words, the “ultimate question is whether the relevant statutory provisions, construed purposively, were intended to apply to the transaction, viewed realistically”. In UBS, Lord Reed emphasised, that Ramsay established not only that a purposive approach must be taken to the construction of tax statutes but also and “equally significantly” that “the analysis of the facts depended on that purposive construction”. In other words, “the facts must be analysed in the light of the statutory provision” and “if a fact is of no relevance to the application of the statute”, it can be disregarded for that purpose.[123]For many years now we have been told by the courts at the highest level repeatedly and consistently that guidance on the Ramsay approach (such as that as set out by Lord Hoffman in MacNiven) is just that, guidance as to the factual circumstances in which acomposite approach may be required and where it may generally give the effect that certain steps in a transaction may be ignored. Tax avoidance structures often contain steps inserted into a pre-ordained transaction with no commercial or business purpose other than to give or avoid a particular tax result. Whilst it may well be the case that such steps should be ignored in deciding on whether a particular statutory provision applies, that will not necessarily be so. The question is always one of what the particular statutory provision requires.[124]As Lord Nicholls put it in MacNiven, the “paramount question always is one of interpretation of the particular statutory provision and its application to the facts of the case” in the light of “the need to consider a document or transaction in its proper context, and the need to adopt a purposive approach”. As he later said in Barclays, the court or tribunal must “determine what transactions the relevant provision is intended to apply to and whether the actual transaction (which might involve considering the overall effect of a number of elements intended to operate together) answers to the statutory description” (emphasis added). Lord Nicholls emphasised the need to avoid sweeping generalisations about disregarding transactions undertaken for the purpose of tax avoidance. Rather it is essential “to focus carefully upon the particular statutory provision and to identify its requirements” before it can be decided “whether circular payments or elements inserted for the purpose of tax avoidance should be disregarded or treated as irrelevant for the purposes of the statute”.There is simply no substitute for a close analysis of what the particular provision require.[125]As set out above, the purpose of para 11 is to identify the amount of “quasi-loans” outstanding at the end of 5 April 2019 in order to neutralise or claw back the benefit of the debtor having previously received a tax-free sum under a “quasi-loan” which represents earnings from an employment. In effect, the debtor has received an economic advantage under the “quasi-loan”, in the form of a tax-free sum equal to the principal of the loan and the legislature seeks to an extent to neutralise or remove that advantage. Hence, under para 11 (1), if and to the extent that the “quasi-loan” is not “repaid” by the end of 5 April 2019, within the meaning of para 11(4)(b), a tax charge is imposed on the amount of the loan then outstanding by treating it as employment income, and (2) if and to the extent that the “quasi-loan” is repaid by the end of 5 April 2019, within the meaning and for the purposes of para11(4)(b), no such tax charge arises in respect of the funds obtained under the loan.[126]The critical question, therefore, is the nature of the “payment” by Dr Keppel of(1) £324,480 to the Trustee, which was as a legal matter received from the Trustee as the purchase price of the shares in the appellant and immediately paid back to it in part satisfaction of the disputed balance, and of(2) £38,358.24, which was ostensibly paid to put the Trustee in funds to pay a “lending fee” due to Delta. Specifically, the question is, whether, on the correct interpretation of para 11(4)(b), these “payments” each constitute a “payment made in money…made by the debtor…by way of repayment of the initial debt amount”.[127]On the plain, natural meaning of the terms used in para 11(4)(b),(a) a “payment” in kind, such as by the transfer of an asset to the lender does not qualify as a payment which may reduce the amount of a “quasi-loan”; the payment must be made “in money”; and(b) the payment made “in money” must be made in satisfaction of the initial debt amount so that the debtor’s liability to pay that amount is discharged in an amount equal to the payment made “in money”. The precise rationale for excluding a payment in kind is not clear to us; it could be in order to avoid valuation issues as the appellant suggested. However, in our view, if that were the rationale or part of it, it does not follow that this provision is to be given the formalistic analysis which the appellant argues for.[128]Having regard to the overall purpose of para 11, it is reasonable to infer that the legislature intended a “payment made in money” to fall within para 11(4)(b) only if, and to the extent that, in making it to discharge the “quasi-loan”, the debtor thereby suffers an economic disadvantage/cost, in a financial and commercial sense thereby removing to some extent the economic/financial benefit of having received a tax free sum under the “quasi-loan”. That would be the case, for example, if the debtor were to make payment using his own cash resources or cash raised from a commercial interest-bearing loan – albeit that in the scenarios in which the loan charge typically applies, as here, it is likely that the lender would hold the cash received for the benefit of the debtor (or for a class of beneficiaries including the debtor).[129]In our view, therefore, the relevant provisions, in the words of Carnwath LJ in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Barclays, at [66], “draw their life-blood from real world transactions with real world economic effects”. The intention is that there is no loan charge if and to the extent that a debtor repays a “quasi-loan” by a “payment made in money”, with “real world” economic consequences for the debtor of the required kind. To give effect to their true purpose requires these provisions to be given, as Lord Nicholls put it in Scottish Provident, a “wide practical meaning” which requires the tribunal “to have regard to the whole of a series of transactions which were intended to have a commercial unity”.[130]On a realistic view of the facts, viewing the transactions undertaken by Dr Keppel and the Trustee in April 2019, as they were plainly intended to operate, as a composite whole, Dr Keppel did not make any “payment made in money… by way of repayment of” the disputed balance within the intended meaning of these terms. We accept that, under the arrangements, the disputed balance was treated as discharged to the extent of £324,480 and, as a result, Dr Keppel suffered an economic consequence, namely, that, he had less shares in the appellant on transferring 32 shares in it into the Trust (albeit he stood to benefit under the Trust and, in practical terms, he and his wife retained control of the appellant). However, the overall effect of the pre-ordained set of events is that(a) Dr Keppel did not suffer an economic consequence in monetary terms in respect of the discharge of £324,480 of the disputed balance,(b) that portion of the disputed balance was not repaid by a cash sum of £324,480 but by the transfer of the 32 shares by the appellant to the Trustee which, viewed realistically, was made, in effect, as a gift, and(c) Dr Keppel suffered an economic disadvantage in monetary terms in paying £38,358.24 but that sum was paid via the Trustee to Delta/Qubic for the provision of the QLC scheme and not in part payment of the disputed balance.[131]We do not accept the appellant’s contentions, in effect, that(a) each limb of the arrangements is to be assessed according to its individual legal effect, and(b) the self-cancelling nature of the payments made is not relevant to the analysis on the basis that it affects the economic consequence of the transactions on the Trustee/Trust but not on Dr Keppel and it is only the consequence for him which is relevant. Given the purpose of the relevant statutory provisions and the nature of the arrangements, it is necessary to have regard to the overall effect of the QLC scheme as a composite whole and not to adopt, as is the appellant’s approach, a blinkered or tunnel vision view of the facts. (1) On all the evidence, the “sale” of the shares in the appellant in return for a “price” was an uncommercial device, which was undertaken purely for the purpose of putting monies fleetingly into the appellant’s hands, so that it could be claimed that the disputed balance was repaid by a payment made by Dr Keppel, as debtor, “in money”. It is plain that the transfer of the shares to the Trust did not, as a commercial and economic matter, take place by way of a “purchase” of the shares by the Trust for a “price” in the usual sense, from the perspective of the Trustee, with the corollary that there was not in a meaningful sense a “sale” of the shares for a “price” by Dr Keppel. (2) Contrary to the appellant’s view, the nature of the arrangements as a device of this kind is apparent from the circular nature of the arrangements for the payment of the “price” by the Trustee: on the same day, Delta (an entity associated with Qubic) “loaned” a sum equal to the “purchase price” to the Trustee, the Trustee paid that sum to Dr Keppel, Dr Keppel used it to “repay” the disputed balance and the Trustee repaid the “loan” to Delta. The Trustee did not in any economic or commercial sense incur any cost in “purchasing” the 32 shares in the appellant. The self-cancelling money movements were exactly that; their circular, short lived movement, which culminated in funds of £324,480 ending up where they started off (with Delta), cannot realistically be viewed as anything other than an engineered movement of funds which was put in place purely for the purpose of enabling the appellant to avoid the loan charge in circumstances where the legislature plainly does not intend para 11(4)(b) to apply (namely, where an asset is given to the lender in discharge of all or part of the balance outstanding of a “quasi-loan”). (3) We do not accept that £38,358.24 was, in reality, the Trustee’s lending fee. On the available evidence, it is reasonable to infer that the sum of £38,358.24 was the fee due from the appellant and/or Dr Keppel for the use of the QLC scheme to manufacture a temporarily available cash sum of £324,480. In all the circumstances, the fact it was paid via the Trustee and described as a “lending fee” due from the Trustee to Delta does not affect its character. We note, in particular, that (a) the Trustee had no particular reason to wish to acquire the shares in the appellant on obtaining “funding” from Delta; it is evident the QLC scheme was undertaken entirely to enable the appellant to avoid the loan charge. A valuation was obtained simply to give the arrangements what was considered to be a necessary commercial veneer, (b) as a matter of commonsense, the sum of £38,358.24 far exceeds what may be charged on a commercial lending as it equates to an interest rate of 12%,(c) the memorandum in the advice letter refers to a financing fee of 3% of sums loaned (giving a sum of only around £9,000),(d) Delta was associated with Qubic/the Trustee, and(e) the sum simply passed to Delta via the Trustee. (4) In economic and commercial reality, the overall result of the QLC scheme was that: (a) The Trustee received and accepted the shares in the appellant, at no material cost to it, in satisfaction and discharge of the disputed balance to the value of £324,480. We note that the Trustee’s incidental costs of structuring matters in this way were covered by Dr Keppel. (b) Dr Keppel divested himself of the 32 shares in discharge of the disputed balance to the value of £324,480 and (i) the monies of £324,480 were fleetingly (notionally) in his hands solely to put him in funds, at no economic cost to the Trustee, so that he fleeting had that sum for him immediately to hand back to the Trustee and hence to Delta, and (ii) in effect, in order to receive those funds on that basis, Dr Keppel paid to the QLC scheme providers the scheme fee of £38,358.24 (as also paid via the Trustee, so that it could be claimed that this sum was paid in discharge of the disputed balance). (c) Following the above steps, the 32 shares in the appellant were then held in the Trust for the benefit of Dr Keppel and Dr Suaris (and the other beneficiaries whom they had selected when the Trust was set up) unencumbered by any “real” cost to the Trust, in that the Trustee had not taken out any commercial loan to fund them and did not in any economic/commercial sense incur any cost in acquiring them from Dr Keppel.[132]We do not accept the appellant’s submissions that the fact that(1) para 11(4)(b) is a computational provision, and(2) para 12 contains a specific anti-avoidance provision, means that para 11(4)(b) must be given the formalistic interpretation the appellant argued for. The application of a purposive approach to the construction of legislation is not precluded by a specific anti-avoidance test with its own specific requirements. The anti-avoidance test is not entirely commensurate with the required purposive approach to the construction of the relevant provisions in para 11(4)(b), to which para 12 relates, and we can see nothing in the terms and/or purpose of the provisions to suggest that the anti-avoidance test is intended to stand in place of or, to preclude, that approach in the necessary prior analysis under para 11(4)(b).[133]In any event, if, contrary to our conclusion, para 11(4)(b) applies as the appellant argues for, para 12 applies to preclude the “repayments” of £324,480 and £38,358.24 from falling within its terms. In our view, there is a connection between those “repayments” and a tax avoidance arrangement. On the appellant’s own contentions, an arrangement involves avoidance in this context if it is undertaken with a view to defeating the intention of Parliament. For all the reasons already given, that intention was to allow taxpayers to avoid a tax charge on amounts of “quasi-loans” only if and to the extent that, in economic and commercial substance, the debtor repays them by a payment or payments made “in money” (emphasis added). On the evidence set out in Part B, assessing matters under the tests set out in the case law referred to in Part C, the main or one of the main purposes of Dr Keppel in entering into the arrangements was to avoid income tax and NICs by making “repayments” which, for all the reasons already given, viewed realistically, in economic and commercial substance amounted to(1) a payment in kind (and not in money) made by making, in effect, a gift of the shares in the appellant to the Trustee, in discharge of the disputed balance to the value of the shares transferred to the Trustee, and(2) a fee for the use of the QLC scheme, which was not made in discharge of the disputed balance.

Conclusion

[134]Conclusion For all the reasons set out above, the appeal is dismissed.[135]This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. RELEASE DATE: 26 August 2026