RICHARD ALDERSONAppellantTHE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMSRespondentMr Alderson represented himself for AppellantStuart Redpath, litigator of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office for RespondentsDECISION
Introduction
[1]This is the Appellant’s application for reinstatement of his appeal, after it was automatically struck out on 20 October 2025 for failure to comply with an unless order.
Legal principles
[2]Legal principles Rule 8(1) of the FTTTC Rules provides for the automatic striking out of proceedings following failure to comply with an unless order and for an application for reinstatement: Rule 8 (1) The proceedings, or the appropriate part of them, will automatically be struck out if the appellant has failed to comply with a direction that stated that failure by a party to comply with the direction would lead to the striking out of the proceedings or that part of them. … (5) If the proceedings, or part of them, have been struck out under paragraphs (1) or (3)(a), the appellant may apply for the proceedings, or part of them, to be reinstated. (6) An application under paragraph (5) must be made in writing and received by the Tribunal within 28 days after the date that the Tribunal sent notification of the striking out to the appellant.[3]In Chappell v The Pensions Regulator [2019] UKUT 0209 (TCC), the Upper Tribunal considered the principles applicable to an application for reinstatement under Rule 8(5) of The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, following an automatic strike out for failure to comply with an unless order under Rule 8(1) of those rules. Those provisions are materially identical for relevant purposes to those in Rule 8 of the FTTTC Rules with which we are here concerned. In Carbon Six Engineering Limited v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 00177 (TC) at [104], Judge Amanda Brown KC held that the FTT is bound to follow the approach set out in Chappell when considering whether to set aside a barring order under rule 8. It applies equally to an application for reinstatement of proceedings which have been struck out, as here.[4]In Carbon Six, the relevant legal principles identified in Chappell were summarised at [81] as follows:(1) The Tribunal must have regard to the overriding objective and must consider flexibility, participation, and avoidance of delay, and the duty of parties to cooperate.(2) Although the CPR does not apply directly, the Tribunal must adopt the same approach to sanctions as articulated by the Supreme Court in BPP SC. BPP Holdings Limited v HMRC[2017] UKSC 55(3) BPP SC confirms that the three-stage Denton Denton v White Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 3926 approach applies in the Tribunal context, including reinstatement applications following unless orders.(4) Martland Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC) provides a structured adaptation of the Denton test for tribunals, including assessment of delay, reasons, and prejudice, with limited consideration of the strength of the underlying case.(5) Consideration of underlying merits is generally irrelevant in case‑management decisions following default, save where the applicant’s case is so strong as to be analogous to a summary judgment scenario: Global Torch Ltd v Apex Global Management Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 4495 (Global Torch).(6) Breaches of unless orders require assessment of the underlying breach as well as the final breach, because the unless order represents a ‘second chance’: British Gas Trading Ltd v Oak Cash & Carry Ltd [2016] 1 WLR 4530.(7) Where multiple failures led to the unless order, the entire sequence constitutes the underlying breach: Khandanpour v Chambers [2019] EWCA Civ 570.(8) Applying these principles, the Tribunal must evaluate seriousness, reasons, prejudice, and the overarching need for procedural discipline, considering merits only to the limited Global Torch extent.[5]Therefore the three stages of the Martland approach, adapted to the context of a reinstatement application, are as follows:(1) Consider the seriousness and significance of the breach of the unless order, together with the underlying breach or breaches which led to the issue of the unless order;(2) Establish the reason (or reasons) why the breaches occurred;(3) Evaluate 'all the circumstances of the case'. This will involve a balancing exercise which will weigh the seriousness and reasons from the first two stages with any other relevant factors, in particular the importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost and for tribunal directions to be respected, as well as any prejudice which would be caused to the parties by granting or refusing reinstatement. Merits of the underlying appeal are generally irrelevant unless the Appellant’s case is so strong as to be analogous to a summary judgment scenario.[6]We make a further three observations in terms of legal approach.[7]First, there is no statutory test of “reasonable excuse” for a reinstatement application to succeed, unlike (for example) under Schedule 24 to the Finance Act 2021 in respect of late submission penalties. The second stage of Martland does require considering the reasons why the delay (in the context of a late appeal) or the default (in the context of reinstatement) occurred, but it does not of itself require the appellant to establish a reasonable excuse. Rather, the tribunal considers the merits of the reasons for delay / breach and weighs them as part of the overall balancing exercise at the third stage, see Martland [44(3)]. In Chappell at [122], the Upper Tribunal indicated that the lack of a good reason for the failure to comply was a very strong factor against reinstatement.[8]Second, any exercise of the Tribunal’s powers to allow or refuse a reinstatement application under rule 8 must be consistent with the over-riding objective under rule 2 to deal with cases fairly and justly. In that regard, while recognising that here we are dealing with a failure to comply with an unless order and an automatic strike out under rule 8(1), we bear in mind that striking out a party from pursuing an appeal is a draconian step (see for example Atec Associates Limited v HMRC [2016] UKFTT 713 (TC) at [106], albeit in the different context of a strike out application for failure to co-operate with the Tribunal under rule 8(3)(b)).[9]Third, the fact that an appellant would lose the ability to appeal the decision in question if reinstatement was not allowed is common to any reinstatement application, and this factor is not, of itself, sufficient. In Katib v HMRC [2019] UKUT 189 (TCC) at [60], as regards the consequences of Mr Katib not being able to appeal, which the FTT had concluded would mean he would lose his home, the UT observed that: We have considered this factor anxiously for ourselves. However, again, when properly analysed, we do not think that this factor is as weighty as the FTT said it was. The core point is that (on the evidence available to the FTT) Mr Katib would suffer hardship if he (in effect) lost the appeal for procedural reasons. However, that again is a common feature which could be propounded by large numbers of appellants, and in the circumstances we do not give it sufficient weight to overcome the difficulties posed by the fact that the delays were very significant, and there was no good reason for them.
Factual background
[10]We find as facts the following background from the documentation before us. We will address in subsequent sections the Appellant’s oral evidence, and (separately) our further findings of fact as to the reasons for the breaches.[11]On 11 May 2023, two notices of assessment were issued to the Appellant under paragraph 9 of Schedule 16 to the Finance Act 2020 in the total amount of £80,564.44, on the basis that HMRC considered that he had received that amount in Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (‘CJRS’) payments to which he was not entitled. Following request for review, HMRC issued a review conclusion letter dated 11 January 2024, upholding the decision to issue the assessments but varying them in amount, such that the total due was £76,538.17.[12]On 5 February 2024, the Appellant submitted his notice of appeal. In that, he gave his email address and stated that email was his contact preference. He stated he did not have a representative.[13]On 11 April 2024, HMRC applied for further and better particulars of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal.[14]On 28 October 2024, the Appellant responded to an email from Tribunal dated 11 October 2024 with more detail, and although HMRC subsequently reapplied for further and better particulars, on 1 March 2025 the Tribunal determined that the notice of appeal combined with the 28 October 2024 email provided sufficient information to enable HMRC to prepare their statement of case.[15]Following an application for an extension of time, HMRC provided their statement of case on 14 April 2025. That contends that the Appellant had a total sum of £80,564.44 paid into his business account, that he held the license for the relevant business (the ‘Wheatsheaf Inn’), and that although the Appellant provided bank statements showing that corresponding payments were made to employees, they do not evidence that the employees were entitled to those payments, nor did they support any calculations made by the Appellant in reaching the CJRS claim amounts. HMRC used its own calculations for the employees using PAYE data, and contend that these identified inconsistencies.[16]On 16 April 2025, the Appellant responded by email. He referred to his relying on his accountant to set up the PAYE and process payroll for the Wheatsheaf Inn, made various points about the factual circumstances in which the CJRS claims were made and asked for the underlying situation to be looked into. He ended stating: This has now put some serious pressure on the situation & i am finding myself under serious strain on life & with this hanging over my head is seriously pressure which I can’t handle & frustration due to myself doing the best i could at the time. I am hopeful that it can be looked upon with all of the details above & whats guidance was given at the time & all monies had been paid & no financial gain was taken at the time with again no wrong doing.[17]On 2 June 2025, the Tribunal issued case management directions (the June Directions) by email to the parties, directions 1 to 3 of which provided for lists of documents, witness statements and listing information respectively (Directions 1 to 3) as follows: LIST OF DOCUMENTS 1. Not later than 18 July 2025 each party shall:(1) send or deliver to the other party and the Tribunal a list of documents in its possession or control which that party intends to rely upon or produce in connection with the appeal ("documents list"); and(2) send or deliver to the other party copies of any documents on that documents list which have not already been provided to the other party and confirm to the Tribunal that they have done so. WITNESS STATEMENTS 2. Not later than 15 August 2025 each party shall send or deliver to the other party statements from all witnesses on whose evidence they intend to rely at the hearing setting out what that evidence will be and shall notify the Tribunal that they have done so. LISTING INFORMATION 3. Not later than 29 August 2025 both parties shall send or deliver to the Tribunal and each other a statement detailing: (1) Whether counsel is appointed; (2) The number and role of participants for that party;(3) Confirmation that all participants for that party will attend the hearing centre for the face to face hearing of the appeal;(4) Where a participant is a witness, whether the witness will attend the entire hearing or only attend to give his or her evidence.(5) How long the hearing is expected to last (together with a draft trial timetable if the hearing is expected to last four days or more);(6) Whether reading time should be allocated to the panel in addition to the time estimated for the hearing in (5) above and, if so, how long;(7) two or three agreed periods of time for the hearing which are within or shortly after a hearing window starting 27 October 2025 and ending 20 February 2026 and each of which is at least as long as the longest time estimate for the hearing provided under (5) above OR if the parties are unable to agree such periods, then each party must provide their dates to avoid for a hearing in the same hearing window. 4. Shortly after 29 August 2025 the Tribunal may fix the date of the hearing despite any non-compliance with 3(7) above. A request for postponement on the grounds that the date of the hearing is inconvenient is unlikely to succeed if the applicant did not comply with the above or if, having provided dates for the hearing, the applicant then failed to keep the dates clear of other commitments.[18]On 18 July 2025, HMRC provided a list of documents. The Appellant did not.[19]On 30 July 2025, the Tribunal sent a letter to the Appellant by email, attaching a copy of the June Directions. These required him to provide the list of documents or tell the Tribunal if there are no documents on which he relies within 14 days (the 30 July Letter): The Tribunal refers to the Directions sent on 2 June 2025, a copy of which is enclosed. The Tribunal does not appear to have received your List of Documents in compliance with Direction 1, which was due on 18 July 2025. It is important that each party to an appeal discloses in advance to the other party the documents on which they rely, so that both parties can properly prepare for the hearing. If, therefore, you do not comply within 14 days with the direction to provide your list of documents, a Judge may issue a direction which may lead to the striking out of the appeal on the basis that your failure to disclose the documents on which you rely is unfair to the other party. You should now immediately provide your list of documents (with an application for the list to be admitted out of time) or tell the Tribunal if there are no documents on which you rely.[20]The Appellant did not respond within 14 days.[21]On 15 August 2025, the Appellant responded by email, attaching a copy of the June Directions. This email was lengthy, giving more detail about the Appellant’s underlying claim. This included the fact that due to the Appellant serving a custodial sentence, the brewery of the restaurant immediately surrendered his lease such that all paperwork was cleared out, leaving him unable to obtain records of employees to contact them for statements: This resulted in myself not been able to obtain any records of employees details so I could contact them for Statements to support this tribunal, this is obviously not a fair position for myself due to the circumstances.[22]He then went on to state that he was not able to provide further documentation: We understand that HMRC are trying to punish us with this & not taking accountability for the errors made during this time. Doing a lot of research there seems to be a lot of these error claims against employers like ourselves trying to do our best at that time & wish for you to take into account that we are not able to provide other documentation for further evidence due to the brewery clearing out the premises when we wasn’t able to be there ourselves to clear our papers & contact details of our employers at that time.[23]Earlier on 15 August 2025, which was the date for witness statements in the June Directions, HMRC had applied to the Tribunal for an extension of time of two weeks for the service of witness statements. HMRC told us that they never received a formal determination of this application by the Tribunal.[24]On 27 August 2025, HMRC (Mr Redpath) served by email their witness statement of Officer Reid, and an amended list of documents, copying in the Appellant. In this email, HMRC expressly noted that they had yet to receive a list of documents or witness statement from the Appellant.[25]On 29 August 2025, which was the date for listing information in the June Directions, HMRC applied for an extension of time of 7 days. HMRC told us that they never received a formal determination of this application by the Tribunal.[26]On 2 September 2025, HMRC provided their listing information by email. The Appellant responded directly to HMRC, requesting some telephone call recordings.[27]On 11 September 2025, the Appellant emailed HMRC (Mr Redpath) asking whether ADR could be explored: After a recent telephone call with my Solictiors thwy have pointed out which I didn’t realise, a possibility of ADR, is this something we can explore prior to pushing forward with tribunal?[28]On 12 September 2025, HMRC (Mr Redpath) replied with details of how to make an ADR application, but reminding the Appellant that the Tribunal directions still apply and that he was required to complete his witness statement by 27 August 2025 and issue it to the Tribunal: I would remind you that the foregoing Tribunal Directions still apply, and that you were required to complete your witness statement by 27 August 2025. Please complete this and issue it to the Tribunal and myself.[29]On 26 September 2025, the Tribunal issued an unless order requiring by 10 October 2025 (14 days later) written confirmation from the Appellant that he intends to proceed with the appeal and compliance with Directions 1 to 3, failing which his appeal would be automatically struck out (the Unless Order): The Appellant having failed to comply with the Directions issued on 2 June 2025 and having failed to reply to the letters from the Tribunal dated 30 July 2025 within the times stipulated therein or at all the Tribunal DIRECTS that UNLESS the Appellant no later than 5pm on 10 October 2025 confirms in writing to the Tribunal that he intends to proceed with the appeal AND by the same date and time complies with Directions 1-3 of the Directions then these proceedings WILL be STRUCK OUT without further reference to the parties. Any party may apply for these Directions to be amended, suspended or set aside or for further Directions.[30]On 13 October 2025, HMRC (Mr Redpath) wrote to the Tribunal copying in the Appellant, stating that HMRC had not received anything from the Appellant further to the Unless Order and asking for the Tribunal to confirm whether it had or whether the appeal had been struck out.[31]On 20 October 2025 at 03.35 in the morning, the Appellant responded to HMRC’s email of 13 October 2025, stating “Thank you for your email, I will be filing an application at the earliest for an ADR & is it possible for the tribunal to be placed on hold pending the outcome of this application?”[32]Later that day, on 20 October 2025, the Tribunal wrote to the Appellant stating that because he did not appear to have complied with the Unless Order, his appeal was automatically struck out as of 10 October 2025 and informing him of his right to apply for reinstatement within 28 days.[33]On 23 October 2025, the Appellant applied for the reinstatement of his appeal by email, as follows: Thank you for your email & I want to offer my apologies for not complying with the details. I would like to reinstate my application please under the grounds of not receiving the emails due to the emails going into my Junk folder which resulted in myself not seeing them in time of the time frames. Should you have been sending this via a letter to my address I have not received anything via the mail either. I am now ensuring that I will be checking all inboxes daily to ensure I don’t miss any of the email going forward. I have also submitted an ADR application to which the application number is: 720H-CU7M-EXRB Should you need anything else then please let me know. Again sorry for the confusion on my end.[34]On 18 November 2025, the Tribunal wrote to HMRC asking for representations on the reinstatement application.[35]On 1 December 2025, HMRC (Mr Redpath) provided by way of an email HMRC’s submissions objecting to the reinstatement of the appeal.[36]On 12 March 2026, the Tribunal issued directions for the hearing of the reinstatement application, which included a requirement by 9 April 2026 that each party deliver the witness statement of any person on whose evidence that party intends to rely.[37]In June 2026, the Tribunal wrote to the Appellant reiterating that if he wishes to tell the Tribunal any facts, for example, his reasons for not complying with the Tribunal’s directions and the Unless Order, he should file a written statement summarising what his spoken evidence will be.[38]On 10 July 2026, the Appellant submitted a two-page witness statement dated 9 July 2026, the contents of which went to the underlying substance of his appeal and not to the reasons for failing to comply with Tribunal directions.[39]On 20 July 2026, the Tribunal wrote to the Appellant, explaining that the witness statement of 9 July 2026 did not go to the question of why he failed to comply with the Tribunal directions, which is the issue to which any witness statement for the hearing of the reinstatement application must be directed: The Appellant should note that the hearing listed on 4 August 2026 will consider only whether the appeal should be reinstated. Mr Alderson must explain at the listed hearing why he did not engage with the Tribunal’s directions issued in June 2025 and continued not to do so despite the issue of the unless order issued on 26 September 2025. That is the issue to which any present witness statement must be directed. Service of such a statement would be outside the time limit provided for its service. If such a statement is now served, it should be accompanied by a further explanation as to why it is late and the hearing judge will consider whether to admit it at the start of the hearing on 4 August 2026.
The Appellant’s evidence
[40]Notwithstanding the fact that the Appellant had not put in a witness statement ahead of the hearing explaining his reasons for failing to comply with the Unless Order and prior directions, we considered that it would be in the interests of justice to allow him to explain to us at the hearing why he failed to comply with the Unless Order and prior directions, by way of oral evidence which he gave under oath, with HMRC having an opportunity to question him. HMRC did not object to our proceeding in this way.[41]We record the evidence that the Appellant gave to us orally, including in response to our questions, as follows below:(1) As regards the June Directions, the Appellant was not 100% sure whether he had seen it at the time it was sent to him (2 June 2025), but accepted that he had seen them by 30 July 2025, when they were attached to the Tribunal’s email of that date to which he had responded on 15 August 2025. He said that he was “not a legal person” and was trying to seek legal advice at the time about what he needed to do. He approached a couple of legal representatives, but the money that they wanted for looking at the matter was too much. He was trying to find someone to give him advice with minimal cost.(2) He accepted that he failed to respond to the 30 July Letter within 14 days. He stated that he had gone to prison and since coming out of prison in November 2021 he had suffered depression, due to which he was started on medication in 2022. He remains on medication, although it has changed. He said he has a therapist and was trying to keep life on track, but he pushes a lot of things to the side. He said he found the proceedings stressful, was scared of opening emails and having more hassle and more stress, and that he did not check emails daily at the time, but maybe weekly or fortnightly. He said that he did not know it was possible to ask for an extension of time, and said that he had not read and/or noticed direction 13 in the June Directions which stated that any party may apply for the directions to be amended, suspended or set aside.(3) As regards his email to the Tribunal of 15 August 2025, he explained that he was trying to give an outline about the appeal. He stated that he did not have any documents in addition to those which HMRC listed in their list of documents, which include bank statements that he had provided, because the premises had been cleared after he went to prison and the lease was ended.(4) As regards his not providing a witness statement by 15 August 2025, 27 August 2025 (when HMRC provided theirs) or thereafter, he said that he did not realise that by witnesses Direction 2 included the Appellant himself. He thought that the references to witnesses on whose evidence the Appellant intended to rely at the hearing of his appeal was to other people, and that there is no one else.(5) He did not give a clear answer about why listing information was not provided on 29 August 2025, 2 September 2025 (when HMRC provided theirs) or thereafter. He said that he was seeking help from a few solicitors, there was one in Birmingham who said their fees would be in the region of £20,000, which was “astronomical". He had asked if there was any advice they could give him and was told the best advice would be to go through ADR route before proceeding to the tribunal. He thought he was probably concentrating more on the ADR situation in September, although he acknowledged that HMRC had reminded him on 27 August and 12 September of the need to comply with Tribunal directions.(6) As regards the Unless Order, when the Tribunal asked when he saw this, his initial response was that he did not remember seeing it at the time. He later stated that it had gone to his junk email folder. He said that some of the emails, three or four, had gone to junk email, not all of them, although other than the Unless Order he could not specify which had not. He had no explanation for why some went to junk email and some did not, and he acknowledged that he had received several earlier emails from the Tribunal. He said that he had experience in the past of emails going to junk, including emails from banks, and that he knew to review his junk email folder. He said that he would review his junk email folder as and when he checked his email, but that he would not always review his emails. He repeated that he was on medication and said he struggled with administrative tasks, and that his mum keeps an eye over him, and his rent commitments and mobile bills. He stated that he tends to push things to the side, and referred to the old saying of burying your head in the sand.[42]Mr Redpath for HMRC did not seek to cross-examine the Appellant as regards this evidence.
Submissions
[43]Submissions The Appellant made brief oral submissions in addition to his evidence in explanation above. He acknowledged at the outset that he could have been a lot better with deadlines and should have dealt with things quicker. In effect, he says he should have done better reading the June Directions and July letter now, but he lacks knowledge “on the legal side”. He said that he is trying to deal with things as well as he can going forward.[44]For HMRC, Mr Redpath advanced submissions on each of the stages of Martland:(1) In respect of the breaches, these are substantial and significant, considering not just the failure to comply with the unless order but the entire procedural history. There was no compliance with Directions 1 to 3, in particular the email of 15 August 2025 did not clearly state that there were no documents on which the Appellant sought to rely.(2) As regards the reasons for the failures, while HMRC acknowledges that the Appellant is a litigant in person, he commenced the Tribunal proceedings and he is responsible for complying with the Tribunal directions and progressing the appeal. There is no evidence of the Unless Order going to the junk mail folder beyond the Appellant’s testimony, and there are instances of the Appellant replying to Tribunal emails, but even if it had gone to junk mail, that does not constitute a good excuse, because he should have reviewed the junk mail folder. The Appellant was aware of the directions to provide witness evidence, and despite that, did not provide one, and HMRC do not accept the Appellant’s stated misunderstanding, that this was directed to evidence of people other than himself, to constitute a reasonable excuse. Further, while HMRC sympathise with stress and depression following the Appellant’s exit from prison, these factors do not explain the failures, as the Appellant was capable of responding to the Tribunal and did so on occasions.(3) On all the circumstances, HMRC submit this is not a case where the underlying merits of the appeal were so strong as to materially alter the outcome of the application. This is not a case of a single isolated breach, but where there was a prolonged pattern of non-compliance, without sufficiently good explanation. There is a public interest in ensuring tribunal directions are complied with, and there are no sufficient countervailing factors to outweigh the breaches, so the application for reinstatement should be refused. While HMRC’s written objection made a further submission that allowing reinstatement would prejudice HMRC “by placing them at a disadvantage going forward”, but that submission was not developed before us, in particular no evidential prejudice was specifically articulated.
Discussion
[45]We approach this application in light of the legal principles discussed above, and accordingly address each of the stages in Martland, as adapted to a reinstatement context, in turn.[46]i. The nature and significance of the breaches We turn first to the June Directions, and Directions 1 to 3.[47]As regards Direction 1 and the requirement to provide a List of Documents:(1) Direction 1 of the June Directions required the Appellant to provide a List of Documents by 18 July 2025. The Appellant failed to comply by that date.(2) The 30 July Letter, read as a whole, required the Appellant either to provide a list of documents with an application for the list to be admitted out of time, or “to tell the Tribunal if there are no documents on which you rely” within 14 days, i.e. by 13 August 2025. The Appellant failed to respond within 14 days. However we consider that the Appellant’s email of 15 August 2025 did respond to the 30 July Letter and did in substance make the point that he had no further documents in the passage cited at paragraph 22 above, even if this was not clearly stated as it should have been. It follows that we do not consider that there was a significant substantive ongoing breach of Direction 1 after this date.[48]As to Direction 2 and the requirement to provide a witness statement from all witnesses on whose evidence the Appellant intends to rely:(1) While Direction 2 required the provision of witness statements by 15 August 2025, HMRC on that date applied for a two week extension of time for the service of witness statements. Although the Appellant did not himself apply for an extension of time, we do not consider that there was a clear breach of this order as at 15 August 2025, because the direction was subject to an extension of time application on the part of HMRC.(2) As of 29 August 2025 to the date when the appeal was struck out, the Appellant was in breach of this direction, even if he misunderstood it. He did not provide a witness statement from himself, and he does intend to rely on his own evidence at the hearing of the appeal.[49]As to Direction 3 and the requirement to provide listing information, while Direction 3 required the provision of listing information by 29 August 2025, HMRC applied for a 7 day extension, for which reason we consider that he was only in breach of this order as of 5 September 2025. We bear in mind however that the June Directions stated that the Tribunal may fix the date of the hearing despite any non-compliance with listing information, and we do not consider the breach of the listing information direction to be as serious as the ongoing failure as regards provision of a witness statement.[50]Next, in respect of the 30 July Letter, as set out above we consider that although there was a failure to comply within 14 days as required, there was on our analysis substantive compliance on 15 August 2025, inasmuch as reading that email as a whole and bearing in mind that the Appellant is a litigant in person, we consider he was in the detail of that email stating that he had no further documentation.[51]Finally, as regards the Unless Order, there was no compliance with this. We note that the Unless Order had in substance four elements, in that the Appellant was required, within 14 days (i.e. by 10 October 2025) required to do all of four things, namely to confirm in writing that he intends to proceed with the appeal, and to comply with each of Directions 1, 2 and 3. There was no compliance with this Unless Order, because irrespective of the position as regards Direction 1 already noted, there was no compliance with the other three elements.[52]Both individually and cumulatively, the breaches above, and in particular the three ways in which the Unless Order was breached, were serious and significant. We observe however that as at the date of the Unless Order, the period of non-compliance was in effect 28 days, in respect of Direction 2, and 21 days in respect of Direction 3.[53]ii. The reasons for the breaches The immediate reason advanced by the Appellant in his 23 October 2025 application for the failure to comply with the Unless Order is that he did not see it because it went to his junk mail folder. He repeated this to us in his evidence, although his initial response to our question as to when he saw the Unless Order was somewhat equivocal, being that he did not remember seeing it at the time. We note that the Appellant accepted that some previous emails from the Tribunal had not gone into his junk folder, and further that he was unable to give any specifics as to which other emails he says did go to junk mail (the 23 October 2025 application refers to not receiving “the emails”). There is no documentary evidence (such as a screenshot) of the relevant email being in the junk mail folder. We do not discount the possibility that one email from a sender might go to junk mail when other emails had not, but as a whole we are not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Unless Order went to the junk mail folder. Further, we would in any case not be satisfied that this was the reason why there was no compliance with the Unless Order, because the Appellant’s evidence was that he would review his junk mail folder when he checked his email, and we consider it likely that he would have checked his email at least once in the period from 26 September 2025 to 10 October 2025, by when compliance was due.[54]Rather, we consider that on the balance of probabilities, the Appellant failed to comply with the Unless Order due to a combination of the following factors:(1) We think it likely that the Appellant did not immediately see the Unless Order on 26 September 2025 because he did not check his emails daily, such that the time for complying was reduced by the time he saw it.(2) The Unless Order involved four elements for compliance.(3) The Appellant had difficulty managing the litigation and understanding what was required to comply. This is evidenced by his seeking the help of solicitors, only to find that he could not afford it. The nature of his response of 15 August 2025, which did not clearly and straightforwardly simply state that there were no documents on which he relied, also reflects difficulty in engaging with the Tribunal’s directions. Likewise, we note that his difficulty in understanding tribunal correspondence is reflected in the fact that in the run up to this hearing, the Appellant provided a witness statement of 9 July 2026 that did not go to what was explained to him as the purpose of this hearing.(4) As regards Direction 2 for witness evidence, we accept the Appellant’s evidence that in his mind, he considered that Direction 2 was asking for a statement of witnesses being people other than himself, and there were (and are) no such other people that he was wanting to give evidence (a point he obliquely made in the 15 August 2025 email cited above).(5) The Appellant did not think he could ask for more time for compliance, even though the Unless Order expressly stated, as the June Directions did, that any party could apply for it to be amended, suspended or set aside.(6) The Appellant hoping that the dispute might proceed to ADR, which was an option he tried to explore with HMRC on 11 September 2025, even though HMRC clearly stated by reply on 12 September 2025 that he needed to comply with the Tribunal’s directions.(7) He found the litigation stressful, against the background of suffering depression for which he took medication.[55]In short, we consider that it is likely that the Appellant did see the Unless Order at some point prior to 10 October 2025, but rather than engage with it, ‘buried his head in the sand’ to use the phrase he referred to in evidence.[56]In our judgment, these are not good reasons for the breaches in question. Even when taking into account the difficult circumstances in which the Appellant found himself, we consider that the Appellant should and could have engaged with the Tribunal. At the very least he should have confirmed by that date his intention to proceed with the appeal and asking for clarification of, or a short further extension for compliance with, Directions 2 and 3. We consider that he could have done this, and we note that he was able to respond quickly on 23 October 2025 following the Tribunal’s notice on 20 October 2025 of the striking out of his appeal.[57]iii. All the circumstances of the case We consider the following are particularly significant factors that weigh against granting the application for reinstatement:(1) A particularly important consideration is the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost and for tribunal directions to be respected.(2) The three constituent breaches of the Unless Order, and the two underlying breaches in respect of witness statements and listing information, are collectively significant and serious. This is self-evidently the case in respect of the Unless Order, which clearly on its face warned the Appellant that failure to comply would result in his appeal being struck out.(3) Of the constituent breaches of the Unless Order, the requirement to provide written confirmation of the intention to proceed with the appeal was straightforward, and one that the Appellant did not suggest to us that he misunderstood.(4) We do not consider that there are good reasons for these three breaches. We have not been persuaded that the reason for the failure was that the Unless Order was in the Appellant’s junk mail and was not seen until after the date for compliance.(5) There would be a degree of prejudice to HMRC if reinstatement were allowed, including the time and effort that HMRC have had to spend on the reinstatement application which, had the Appellant been compliant, would have been unnecessary, and because of the time and effort that HMRC will have to spend on the ongoing appeal. We do not however consider that there is significant evidential prejudice to HMRC were the appeal to be reinstated.[58]Conversely, we consider the following in particular are aspects of the case that weigh in favour of granting reinstatement:(1) Contrary to the premise of the Unless Order, the Appellant had provided a response to the 30 July Letter (albeit late) on 15 August 2025 and had in substance stated that he had no further documents.(2) The fact that of themselves, we do not consider that the Appellant’s failures in respect of Directions 2 and 3 would have justified a Tribunal striking out the appeal as of 20 October 2025, bearing in mind that it is a draconian remedy of the last resort.(3) The fact that, of itself, non-compliance with the direction for listing information does not seriously prejudice the management of the appeal, as the June Directions specifically envisaged proceeding to list the appeal notwithstanding any such non-compliance.(4) The fact that there are some mitigating circumstances on the particular facts of this case such that the Appellant was struggling to understand and deal with Tribunal directions and correspondence as well as others might have.(5) The fact that if reinstatement is not permitted, the Appellant will lose the ability to challenge very significant assessments made against him in the cumulative sum of £76,538.17. This is a strong factor in favour of reinstating his appeal.(6) The fact that at the time of the Unless Order, the period of non-compliance was 4 weeks (given HMRC’s application to extend date for witness evidence to 29 August 2025), and at the time of automatic strike out on 10 October 2025, the total period of non-compliance was therefore 6 weeks, which is a relatively short time frame.[59]We do not consider that the merits of the Appellant’s underlying appeal are a relevant factor either way. There is no suggestion that they are so strong as to be akin to a summary judgment scenario.[60]There are in our decision weighty factors on both sides. However, standing back and looking at all the circumstances as a whole, in light of the over-riding objective under rule 2 to deal with cases fairly and justly, we conclude that the balance weighs in favour of allowing the appeal to be reinstated.
Conclusion
[61]Conclusion We therefore allow the application for reinstatement.
Consequential directions
[62]Consequential directions We attach consequential directions for the onward management of this appeal. The Appellant should read these directions very carefully and must comply with them.
Right to apply for permission to appeal
[63]Right to apply for permission to appeal This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. Release date: 13 August 2026