Jonathan Gwynne v The Commissioners For HMRC [2026] UKFTT 1030 (TC)

[2026] UKFTT 01030 (TC)Case No TC 09951
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
Hearing Heard on: 26 June 2026Date Judgment date: 08 July 2026
In public by remote video hearing
Appeal reference: TC/2022/12426
PROCEDURE – application for reinstatement – application rejected
Before
TRIBUNAL JUDGE NIGEL POPPLEWELL
Between
JONATHAN GWYNNEAppellantTHE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMSRespondentHarry Best of counsel instructed by Millar McCall Wylie for AppellantAmanda Baldwin litigator of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office for RespondentsDECISION

INTRODUCTION

[1]The underlying issue in this appeal concerns a personal liability notice issued to the appellant in respect of VAT penalties imposed upon Endeavour Strategic Developments LLP for submitting inaccurate VAT returns.[2]The appellant appealed against the personal liability notice in May 2022.[3]Following a case management hearing on 7 March 2025, I issued case management directions which were released to the parties on 13 March 2025 (“the Directions”).[4]In a letter dated 30 December 2025 from the tribunal to the appellant’s agent, (Miller McCall Wylie, a firm of lawyers based in Belfast (“the agent”)) the tribunal confirmed that the appeal was automatically struck out on 25 November 2025 for breach of the Directions (and subsequent directions issued by the tribunal).[5]On 26 January 2026 the appellant applied to reinstate the appeal. This decision deals with that application.[6]For the reasons given later in this decision I have rejected the application and decided not to reinstate the appeal. THE LAW The legislation

THE LAW

[7]The relevant rules of procedure are set out in the Tribunal Procedure (First tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (the “Rules”, each a “Rule”). Rule 2 provides: “2. Overriding objective and parties’ obligation to co-operate with the Tribunal.(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly.(2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes— (a) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties; (b) avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings; (c) ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings; (d) using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively; and (e) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues.(3) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it— (a) exercises any power under these Rules; or (b) interprets any rule or practice direction.(4) Parties must— (a) help the Tribunal to further the overriding objective; and (b) co-operate with the Tribunal generally”. (a) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties; (b) avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings; (c) ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings; (d) using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively; and (e) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues. (a) exercises any power under these Rules; or (b) interprets any rule or practice direction. (a) help the Tribunal to further the overriding objective; and (b) co-operate with the Tribunal generally”.[8]Rule 8 provides (relevantly): “8. Striking out a party's case (1) The proceedings, or the appropriate part of them, will automatically be struck out if the appellant has failed to comply with a direction that stated that failure by a party to comply with the direction would lead to the striking out of the proceedings or that part of them… (5) If the proceedings, or part of them, have been struck out under paragraphs (1) or (3)(a), the appellant may apply for the proceedings, or part of them, to be reinstated.[9]Rule 5 provides (as far as is relevant):
“5. Case management powers Subject to the provisions of the 2007 Act and any other enactment, the Tribunal may regulate its own procedure. The Tribunal may give a direction in relation to the conduct or disposal of proceedings at any time, including a direction amending, suspending or setting aside an earlier direction”
. Subject to the provisions of the 2007 Act and any other enactment, the Tribunal may regulate its own procedure. The Tribunal may give a direction in relation to the conduct or disposal of proceedings at any time, including a direction amending, suspending or setting aside an earlier direction”.

Case law

[10]In Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC) (‘Martland’), the Upper Tribunal provided guidance on the correct approach to applications for permission to appeal out of time. However, it is clear from the judgment of the Supreme Court in BPP Holdings Ltd v HMRC [2017] UKSC 55 and the decision of the Upper Tribunal in HMRC v BMW Shipping AgentsLtd [2021] UKUT 91 (TCC) (“BMW Shipping Agents”) that the same approach should be applied to applications for proceedings to be reinstated where they have been struck out for failure to comply with a direction.[11]The Upper Tribunal’s guidance in Martland is summarised at [44] of the decision: “When the FTT is considering applications for permission to appeal out of time, therefore, it must be remembered that the starting point is that permission should not be granted unless the FTT is satisfied on balance that it should be. In considering that question, we consider the FTT can usefully follow the three-stage process set out in [Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906, [2014] 1 WLR 3926]:(1) Establish the length of the delay. If it was very short (which would, in the absence of unusual circumstances, equate to the breach being “neither serious nor significant”), then the FTT ‘is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages’ – though this should not be taken to mean that applications can be granted for very short delays without even moving on to a consideration of those stages.(2) The reason (or reasons) why the default occurred should be established.(3) The FTT can then move onto its evaluation of ‘all the circumstances of the case’. This will involve a balancing exercise which will essentially assess the 8 merits of the reason(s) given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission”.[12]In applying Martland in Dominic Chappell v the Pensions Regulator [2019] UKUT 209 (TCC) (‘Chappell’), the Upper Tribunal held that the FTT should not take the merits of an appellant’s case into account when considering an application for reinstatement following striking out for failure to comply with an unless order, unless a party has an unanswerable case (see [86] and [93]). The Upper Tribunal also held at [95] that, in assessing the seriousness of the breach of an unless order, the FTT should consider the underlying breach and the failure to carry out the obligation which was imposed by the original direction or rule and extended by the unless order when assessing the seriousness and significance of that breach.[13]In BMW Shipping Agents, the UT began its consideration of the application for reinstatement by assessing the seriousness and significance of the appellant company’s breach of the FTT’s case management directions. That breach consisted of failing to serve a list of documents by the required deadline and then failing to comply with the terms of the “unless” order giving a final chance for compliance. The breach of case management directions continued from 1 September 2017, when the list of documents was due, to 22 November 2017, when the appeal was struck out, a period of more than three months (see [45] of BMW Shipping Agents). The UT considered the breach to be serious and significant (see [45]). The UT then considered the reasons why the breach of directions took place. The final stage is to conduct a balancing exercise giving particular weight to the importance of litigation being conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost and of directions and time limits being respected.[14]In HMRC v Katib [2019] UKUT 189 (“Katib”) the Upper Tribunal had to consider the extent to which reliance on an agent was a justifiable reason for failing to make a timely appeal. On the facts of that case, the Upper Tribunal concluded that failings by the appellant’s agent could not be relied upon by the appellant at any stage in the Martland analysis. The Upper Tribunal said this:
“53. The first stage of the Martland examination can be addressed briefly. Mr Katib’s delay in appealing against the PLNs was, at the very least, 13½ months. That was “serious and significant”
. The real question is how the second and third stages of the evaluation should be performed, having regard to the particular importance of statutory time limits being respected. 54. It is precisely because of the importance of complying with statutory time limits that, when considering applications for permission to make a late appeal, failures by a litigant’s adviser should generally be treated as failures by the litigant. In Hytec Information Systems v Coventry City Council [1997] 1 WLR 666, when considering the analogous question of whether a litigant’s case should be struck out for breach of an “unless” order that was said to be the fault of counsel rather than the litigant itself, Ward LJ said, at 1675: Ordinarily this court should not distinguish between the litigant himself and his advisers. There are good reasons why the court should not: firstly, if anyone is to suffer for the failure of the solicitor it is better that it be the client than another party to the litigation; secondly, the disgruntled client may in appropriate cases have his remedies in damages or in respect of the wasted costs; thirdly, it seems to me that it would become a charter for the incompetent (as Mr MacGregor eloquently put it) were this court to allow almost impossible investigations in apportioning blame between solicitor and counsel on the one hand, or between themselves and their client on the other. The basis of the rule is that orders of the court must be observed and the court is entitled to expect that its officers and counsel who appear before it are more observant of that duty even than the litigant himself. [emphasis added] 55. We do not accept Mr Magee’s general argument that this approach simply involves attributing the actions of legal representatives to their clients and has no bearing on the question whether incorrect advice provided to a client can be a good reason for the client’s default. Given the importance of adhering to statutory time limits, we see no reason why a litigant who says that a representative failed to file an appeal on time should necessarily be in a different position from a litigant who says that a representative failed to advise adequately of the time limits within which an appeal should be brought”. Ordinarily this court should not distinguish between the litigant himself and his advisers. There are good reasons why the court should not: firstly, if anyone is to suffer for the failure of the solicitor it is better that it be the client than another party to the litigation; secondly, the disgruntled client may in appropriate cases have his remedies in damages or in respect of the wasted costs; thirdly, it seems to me that it would become a charter for the incompetent (as Mr MacGregor eloquently put it) were this court to allow almost impossible investigations in apportioning blame between solicitor and counsel on the one hand, or between themselves and their client on the other. The basis of the rule is that orders of the court must be observed and the court is entitled to expect that its officers and counsel who appear before it are more observant of that duty even than the litigant himself. [emphasis added][15]In Katib the UT also said at [17] “We have, however, concluded that the FTT did make an error of law in failing to acknowledge or give proper force to the position that, as a matter of principle, the need for statutory time limits to be respected was a matter of particular importance to the exercise of its discretion. We accept Mr Magee’s point that the FTT referred to both BPP Holdings and McCarthy & Stone in the Decision. Paragraph 27 (1) of the decision (cited above) shows that the FTT seemed to have the point in mind. However, instead of acknowledging the position, the tribunal went on to distinguish the BPP Holdings case on its facts. Differences in fact do not negate the principle, and it is not possible to detect that the tribunal thereafter gave proper weight to it in parts of the decision which followed”.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND CHRONOLOGY

[16]The Directions were issued following a case management hearing which took place on 7 March 2025 before me. That hearing had been set down, and the date notified to the parties, on 11 December 2024. An application to postpone the hearing was made on 27 February 2025 on medical grounds. In support of that application, the agent provided letters from the NHS setting out the appellant’s medical condition (“the medical evidence”).[17]Directions 1 and 2 of the Directions dealt with correspondence involving the Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”). Under Direction 1, the appellant was directed to write to HMRC to ascertain whether they intended to refer the outcome of the appeal to the CPS. Under Direction 2, HMRC were directed to respond on or before 11 April 2025.[18]Directions 3 and 4 of the Directions dealt with the appellant’s documentary and witness evidence. Direction 3 obliged the appellant to deliver a list of documents on which he intended to rely at the hearing of the appeal, and to provide copies of those documents, to HMRC, within 60 days of 11 April 2025.[19]Direction 4 obliged the appellant to provide witness statements of any witnesses on whose evidence he intended to rely at the hearing of the appeal to HMRC on or before the same date.[20]Direction 6 comprised an unless order. It stated that if the appellant failed to comply in full with any or all of Directions 1, 3 and 4, then the proceedings will be struck out.[21]The letter which accompanied the issue of the Directions to the parties stated, inter alia (concerning the letter to the CPS and response from HMRC): “… The purpose of the letter is to enable those advising the appellant to decide what level of documentary disclosure, and witness evidence, should be provided in this appeal. It is not intended to delay the further conduct of this appeal. Once, therefore, HMRC have responded to the appellant’s request, the 60 day time limit for provision of documentary evidence and witness evidence, by the appellant, kicks in”.[22]The appellant complied with Direction 1. HMRC responded by way of a letter dated 11 April 2025. It is the appellant’s case in this application that the response was inadequate and did not enable him to identify the evidence that he needed to provide in the appeal. More of this later.[23]The appellant did not provide a list of documents, the documents themselves, or any witness statements to HMRC within 60 days of 11 April 2025.[24]However, on 11 June 2025, the appellant applied for an extension of time for filing his witness statements. This was contained in an email to the tribunal of that date in which the appellant explained that it had “simply been impossible to comply” with the Directions; he was suffering from extreme stress and anxiety, something which was being exacerbated by HMRC’s failure to confirm whether they would bring criminal proceedings against him; he was awaiting appointments for further medical tests, and that he was unable to contact a solicitor and requested extra time.[25]The agent also sent an email to the tribunal on 11 June 2025 confirming the accuracy of the information in the appellant’s email. It confirmed that due to the appellant’s medical situation the agent had not been able to take instructions to draft the witness statements, and asked for an extension of time to enable the appellant’s medical condition to improve.[26]On 18 June 2025, HMRC wrote to the tribunal confirming that it had received neither the documents nor the witness statements required by the relevant Directions and sought confirmation that the appeal had been struck out on 10 June 2025. They followed this up with a further letter on 26 June 2025.[27]Following confirmation that the CPS letter had been submitted by the appellant before 28 March 2025, and confirmation from HMRC that they had responded on 11 April 2025, on 3 September 2025 the tribunal wrote to the parties, explaining that the appellant was only in breach of the Directions if he had failed to submit documents and witness statements on which he intended to rely. Failure therefore to comply with the Directions simply implied that he had no documents or witness evidence on which he did so intend to rely at the hearing. That letter went on to say that:
“Clearly this may cause him evidential difficulties, and equally clearly, should he now submit (or attempt to submit) a list of documents and/or witness statements in compliance with Directions 3 and 4, then these proceedings will be struck out since he will not have complied with the time limits set out in those Directions. But the automatic strikeout provisions cannot be applied since, as matters currently stand, the appellant has not failed to comply with Directions 3 or 4”
. The letter went on to amend the date for compliance with the Direction requiring the provision of listing information (to a date falling within 30 days from the date of the letter).[28]On 9 October 2025, the appellant applied for a stay of 14 days to apply for an amendment to the Directions.[29]Under threat of an unless order, the appellant submitted an application to amend on 23 October 2025. On 5 November 2025, HMRC objected to that application, and on 11 November 2025, the tribunal wrote to the parties confirming that Judge Dean had refused the application and went on to say: “Judge Dean has granted 14 days from the date of this correspondence for the Appellant to comply with all outstanding Directions or confirm that it has done so. Failure to comply will lead to the appeal being struck out”.[30]On 25 November 2025, the agent sent “an index and bundles of discovery that the Appellant will seek to rely upon at the hearing”.[31]On 10 December 2025, HMRC wrote to the tribunal noting that the appellant had failed to provide his listing information and had filed an index of documents on which he sought to rely at the hearing, and consequently his appeal should be struck out.[32]On 12 December 2025, the appellant provided his listing information. He did not, as required by the relevant Direction, complete and return the video hearing attendance form which had been sent to the agent by the tribunal.[33]In an email dated 30 December 2025, the tribunal indicated that Judge Brown had considered the matter. In that email, a detailed chronology was set out. On the basis of that chronology, Judge Brown confirmed that the appeal had been automatically struck out on 25 November 2025 for two reasons. Firstly, in breach of the Directions, and as explained in the tribunal’s letter of 3 September 2025, the appellant had now attempted to serve a list of documents and witness statements on HMRC. Secondly, he had failed to serve his listing information by 25 November 2025 and thus the appeal was automatically struck out pursuant to Judge Dean’s directions of 11 November 2025.[34]On 26 January 2026, the appellant applied to reinstate his appeal. DISCUSSION Submissions

DISCUSSION

[35]In summary Mr Best submitted as follows: (1). HMRC’s letter of 11 April 2025 did not enable the agent to advise the appellant what level of evidence should be provided in the appeal which was the purpose of that letter as evidenced in the tribunal’s letter of 13 March 2025 which accompanied the Directions. (2). Accordingly, it was not possible for the appellant to comply with the Directions within the 60 day period. The agent did not understand what evidence should be adduced in this appeal. (3). During this period, the appellant was ill and unable to give instructions to the agent. This is demonstrated by the medical evidence. It is also demonstrated by the appellant’s email to the tribunal of 11 June 2025. He was sure that the agent had tried to contact the appellant during this period but had no documentary evidence to support this. (4). There was considerable ambiguity in the directions issued by Judge Dean on 11 November 2025. The agent thought that this meant that the appellant was obliged to provide the documentary and witness statement evidence required by Directions 3 and 4, notwithstanding that they were still not certain what evidence should be adduced. At that stage it was possible to obtain instructions from the appellant, which the agent did, and undertook considerable work, in a short period of time, to provide the relevant evidence. (5). Admittedly the listing information was not provided by the relevant date, but it was provided on 12 December 2025, which was only a fortnight later. (6). There has, therefore, be no prejudice to HMRC whereas there would be considerable prejudice to the appellant were this appeal not to be reinstated. He would lose the opportunity of disputing the substantial financial amount at stake, which will inevitably lead to his personal bankruptcy. (7). If there have been failings, they have been failings by the agent and not the appellant who has done nothing wrong.[36]In summary Ms Baldwin submitted as follows: (1). Compliance with Directions 3 and 4 are not conditional on the terms of HMRC’s response to the appellant’s CPS letter. Once HMRC had responded, and there was no required form of that response, then the 60 day period “kicked in” as set out in the tribunal’s letter of 13 March 2025. As that letter stated, compliance with Directions 1 and 2 was not intended to delay the conduct of the appeal. (2). The appellant has been represented, throughout, by a firm of lawyers. If there was any ambiguity or allegation of failure by HMRC to comply with Direction 2 then this should have been clarified by those lawyers. (3). There was no ambiguity about the terms of Judge Dean’s directions of 11 November 2015. (4). Nor was there any ambiguity about the implications, set out in the tribunal’s letter of 3 September 2025, that should be appellant seeks to introduce documentary or witness evidence into the appeal, then the proceedings would be struck out. (5). By sending the list of documents and failing to submit the listing information on or before the due date, the appellant is in breach of the unless orders set out in the Directions and in the subsequent directions of 11 November 2015. (6). These are serious and significant breaches. No good reasons have been given for them. The medical evidence does not demonstrate why the appellant was unable to provide instructions during the 60 day period. It was provided in respect of the previous application for postponement. The appellant was clearly engaged in the process as he sent an email to the tribunal on 11 June 2025 seeking an extension to the 60 day period. There has been no explanation given as to why, if he could do this, he could not have instructed his agent to provide the relevant evidence before the expiry of that period. No reasons at all have been given for the failure to provide the listing information on or before the due date. (7). Should the appeal be reinstated, HMRC will be prejudiced. Resources will need to be redeployed which would prejudice compliant taxpayers. Allowing the application is contrary to the principle of the efficient administration of justice. Litigation should be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost. The appellant has not complied with the overriding objective in that he has failed to comply with directions and not cooperated with the tribunal. (8). If I am minded to reinstate, then I should direct that the appellant should not be entitled to adduce any documentary or witness evidence at the hearing.

My view

[37]It is for the appellant to demonstrate that I should exercise my judicial discretion as to whether the appeal should be reinstated.[38]As mentioned above, the legal principles are straightforward. I need to consider the seriousness and significance of the breaches, and the reasons for them. I then conduct a balancing exercise weighing up the reasons against the prejudice which might be caused to either party by reinstatement or non-reinstatement. At that stage I need to attach considerable importance to the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost and to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders. Failure to do so is an error of law. I can also consider previous non-compliance and do not have to focus merely on the period resulting in the non-compliance resulting in the strike out. Because of the importance attached to compliance with time limits, failures by an adviser are generally treated as failures by an appellant.

Serious and significant

[39]A failure to comply with an unless order, (or two in the circumstances of this application) is serious and significant. The orders expressly warned the appellant of the consequences of failure to comply. And in the context of the submission of documentary and witness evidence, it was made clear in the tribunal’s letter of 3 September 2025 that should the appellant seek to introduce that evidence into the appeal, the appeal would automatically be struck out as he would then be in breach of the Directions.[40]I also take into account at this stage that Endeavour Strategic Developments LLP, of which the appellant was a member, and which had brought an appeal against a decision made by HMRC, had previously failed to comply with unless orders resulting in the LLP’s appeal being struck out, and an application for reinstatement being made in February 2019.[41]Furthermore, as regards the unless order issued by Judge Dean on 11 November 2025, the appellant has not still strictly complied, as the information required to be included in the video hearing attendance form has still not been completed and submitted to the tribunal.

Reasons

[42]The reasons given for non-compliance are, essentially that: the appellant, or the agent, did not consider that HMRC had properly responded to the appellant’s CPS letter, by way of their letter of 11 April 2025; they did not understand the terms of that response; the purpose of the response was to enable the agent to advise the appellant what evidence he should adduce in his appeal, and the agent was unable to do so on the basis of the information set out in HMRC’s letter; the agent was unable to obtain, and the appellant was unable to give, instructions regarding the documentary and witness evidence during the 60 day period provided by the Directions due to the appellant’s medical condition; the breach of the unless order in the Directions arose because of a misunderstanding of the unless order issued by the tribunal on 11 November 2025.

The balancing exercise

[43]I now need to consider these reasons in the context of all the circumstances of the case, weighing up their merits and the prejudice which would be caused to either party in granting or refusing the application, and giving particular weight to the principle that litigation should be conducted efficiently and that directions and time limits should be respected.[44]An important factor in this balancing exercise is the fact that the appellant has been professionally represented, by a firm of lawyers, throughout. It is disappointing, evidentially, that there is no primary evidence from a representative of the agent explaining the reasons for non-compliance set out above. The best we have are submissions from Mr Best, supported by the emails from the appellant and the agent dated 11 June 2025.[45]From these emails I am prepared to accept that the agent was finding it difficult to obtain instructions from the appellant during the 60 day period required by Directions 3 and 4. And that this was because of the appellant’s medical condition (albeit that I appreciate that the medical evidence does not make clear why it was not possible for such instructions to be obtained in that period and that the appellant was seemingly competent to explain his position in coherent terms in his email of 11 June 2025).[46]But I do not accept that any ambiguity or misunderstanding, generated by HMRC’s letter of 11 April 2025, carries much, if any weight, in this evaluation.[47]Firstly, from an evidential perspective, the only primary contemporary evidence I have that there was some issue regarding the response, which was considered at the time, is in the appellant’s email of 11 June 2025. And in that he simply says that his stress and anxiety had been worsened by the fact that HMRC had effectively refused to confirm that they would not bring criminal proceedings against him.[48]I was not taken to anything else in relation to HMRC’s response which demonstrated that, at the time, a lack of clarity about HMRC’s intentions was a reason why the 60 day period was not complied with.[49]Furthermore, if the agent was concerned that HMRC had not provided an adequate response in their letter of 11 April 2025, the agent should have clarified the position well before the expiry of that 60 day period. Their failure to do so is one of the primary reasons why the time limit was missed. To my mind this is far more significant than the appellant’s medical condition, and whether or not the agent could obtain instructions within that period. The agent had represented the appellant prior to and during March 2025 when the case management hearing took place and the Directions were issued. If they were concerned that HMRC’s response of 11 April 2025 was insufficient to enable them to advise their client as to the evidence that he should bring in this appeal, they should have clarified the position forthwith. They should not have waited until the 60 day limit was up and then applied for an extension largely on the basis of the appellant’s ill health and their inability to obtain instructions.[50]It would have been a simple matter to have diarised a 14 day (or whatever) period following the response of 11 April 2025 to consider that response, and in light of that make an application for clarification or extension. It seems they did not do this. The application for an extension on medical grounds was made at the last possible moment.[51]It is notable that the agents email refers only to the appellant’s health condition and makes no mention of the agent’s inability to advise the appellant on the evidence he should adduce in the hearing because of failings in HMRC’s response of 11 April 2025. I would have expected that to have been an important ground for the application for an extension of time if indeed it was thought, at the time, to be a reason why the 60 day period could not be complied with.[52]It was also clear from the tribunal’s letter of 13 March 2025 that the 60 day time period “kicked in” assumes HMRC had responded. This, too, should have put the agent on notice of the importance of this 60 day time limit.[53]Mr Best argues that the appellant himself has done nothing wrong, and any failings are those of the agent. That might be the case, but, as set out in the extract from Katib above, failings by a litigant’s advisers are generally treated as failures by the litigant. This is because of the importance of complying with statutory time limits and directions made by the tribunal.[54]So, the failings by the agent identified above are attributed to the appellant.[55]Nor do I attach much weight to the submission that there was ambiguity about the directions issued by Judge Dean on 11 November 2025, with the consequence that the appellant thought that he had to comply with Directions 3 and 4, as these were “outstanding directions”.[56]Firstly, I have no primary evidence by way, for example, of a witness statement and oral testimony, from a representative of the agent that this was indeed their view at the time. I simply have Mr Best’s submission.[57]Secondly, if there was any ambiguity at the time, then clarification could have been sought by the agent.[58]Thirdly, I cannot see that there was an ambiguity in the first place. The terms of Directions 3 and 4 are self-explanatory. If the appellant wanted to adduce documentary and witness evidence then he had a certain period within which to provide it. That period had expired. He had been told that should he therefore seek to introduce that evidence into the appeal, it would be automatically struck out.[59]He was on notice that should he seek to introduce it, his appeal would automatically be struck out by dint of the application of the unless order in Direction 6. I do not consider that this is ambiguous. It was only an outstanding Direction if the appellant wished to introduce documentary and witness evidence into the proceedings. And he had been told what the consequences of attempting to do that were.[60]Finally, one of the outstanding Directions was that relating to the provision of listing information. And the appellant did not comply with that Direction within the 14 day period specified in Judge Dean’s unless order.[61]No explanation has been given for this failure. Mr Best has simply submitted that it is a minor matter and was put right relatively quickly. And as a consequence, HMRC has not been prejudiced.[62]But, with the greatest of respect, this does not take into account the particular importance that I should pay to the principle that directions should be respected. It simply adopts a broad brush approach, effectively saying “no harm done”.[63]I am conscious that, to paraphrase Katib,it is an error of law to fail to acknowledge or give proper force to the position that, as a matter of principle, the need for directions to be respected is a matter of particular importance to the exercise of my discretion.[64]As far as merits are concerned, in accordance with the principle in Chappell, I should not take into account the merits of the appellant’s case unless it is unanswerable. I was not provided with any cogent evidence or submissions that this was the case.[65]As far as prejudice is concerned, I appreciate that rejecting this application will mean that the appellant cannot challenge the personal liability notice. A consequence of this is that he will be liable to a significant financial penalty. But, as set out in Katib, this is a common feature of situations in which the appellant finds himself, and is simply a consequence of the failure to comply with directions. Accordingly, I do not give it sufficient weight to overcome the difficulties posed by the seriousness and significance of the breaches of the unless orders, and the lack of good reasons for those breaches.[66]I have therefore concluded that at this final evaluation stage, and as set out above, the reasons given for the failures to comply with the unless order set out by Judge Dean, in the directions of 11 November 2025, and the reasons given for the introduction of the documentary and witness evidence on 25 November 2025 in breach of the terms of Directions 3 and 4 which brought with it the application of the automatic strikeout provisions in Direction 6, are not sufficient to outweigh the seriousness and significance of those failings. Particular importance must be paid, as a matter of law, to the principle that directions of the tribunal should be complied with. The appellant has failed to do this.[67]In accordance with the overriding objective, I think it is fair and just to dismiss the application.

DECISION

[68]I dismiss the application.

RIGHT TO APPLY FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL

[69]This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. Release date: 08 July 2026