“I have made numerous attempts to obtain the information to progress both the appeals and [the] enquiries for 2017 to 2019, but so far have not received a response. I have again contacted the client stating the importance of providing the information required to progress both issues – i will contact you tomorrow if that is okay to let you know if I have received a response.”
“As I have not received a reply in respect of your reasonable excuse as to why you submitted late appeals against your 2015 and 2016 tax assessments issued on2 March 2020 and how this continued until you submitted your appeals on5 October 2020 then I can only assume you cannot. Consequently, you can either • withdraw your appeals or • proceed to Tribunal to have your late appeals accepted. I would add, that you have made no attempt to provide any further information and/or documents to support your contentions that the amounts assessed in the 2015 and 2016 assessments issued on2 March 2020 were excessive.”
“The Client is appealing against all tax and penalty assessment issued against Ian Milhill. We understand that there was the additional income tax liability for 2014/15 -£326,955.61 and 2016/17 for 104,209.40 and 2017/18 -£82,162.47 on the basis that it is unreasonable and excessive. The tax assessments were issued on21/06/2021 for£128,136.73 . There were also schedule 24 Penalties for£237,710.88 dated18/06/2021 and£76,506.67 dated17/09/2021 and consequential tax penalties i.e. late filing penalties and tax geared tax penalties, which we would like to be done under the cover of one appeal as all the issues are connected.”
“3. Can you tell me how this impacted on his personal and business interests. 4. Can you tell me if he was prevented from carrying on with his day-to-day personal life and how. 5. Can you tell me if he continued running his businesses? If not, what happened during the period involved. 6. Please fully explain why the above prevented him from: a. Submitting his SA Tax Returns on time b. Completing accurate SA Tax Returns c. Submitting timeous appeals against his 2015 and 2016 Assessments.” a. Submitting his SA Tax Returns on time b. Completing accurate SA Tax Returns c. Submitting timeous appeals against his 2015 and 2016 Assessments.”
“Where an Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post (whether the expression "serve" or the expression "give" or "send" or any other expression is used) then, unless the contrary intention appears, the service is deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting a letter containing the document and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.”
“if the addressee of the letter proves on the balance of probability that the letterwas not served upon him then that matter has been proved and the section should be applied accordingly. Of course it is not enough simply to assert that someone did not receive the letter; the court will consider all the evidence and make its findings by reference to the facts which are established including issues as to the credibility of witnesses. That is the ordinary way in which a court goes about making findings of fact.”
“We accept that the FTT made an error of law in failing to make any findings of fact as regards Websons’ contention that it had not been notified of the Review Decision. As our discussion of the relevant law illustrates, the FTT should not have proceeded on the assumption that the appeal was out of time without having established whether or not that was the case. The FTT gave no consideration to the relevant statutory provisions which establish when time starts to run for the notifying of an appeal in respect of a review decision and therefore clearly did not have those provisions in mind when making the Decision.”
“(i) The starting point, as with any statutory provision, is a consideration of the terms, context and purpose of the relevant provision: HMRC v Raftopoulou[2018] EWCA Civ 818 per David Richards LJ at [33]. (ii) Some provisions are likely to have different interpretations to others; thereis no one standard interpretation that will fit all notification provisions. (iii) There may be situations where a provision requires a particular or specialformality for the giving of notice: per Lady Smith in R (Spring Salmon andSeafood Ltd) v IRC[2004] STC 444 at [32] and per David Richards LJ inRaftopoulou at [36]. (iv) There is also a category of cases where the purpose of service of a noticecan be recognised as being simply to see to it that the recipient is informed. (v) As long as the statutory purpose has been achieved, a failure to follow theliteral wording of the provision does not invalidate a notice: Hastie & Jenkerson v McMahon[1990] 1 WLR 1575 and Ralux N.v./S.a. v SpencerMason (The Times18 May 1989 ). (vi) When considering whether the statutory purpose has been achieved it isnecessary to look at the question from the perspective of the taxpayer, HMRC’s intentions in giving the notice are not relevant: see R (SwordServices Ltd) v HMRC[2016] EWHC 1473 and Flaxmode Ltd v HMRC [2008] STC (SCD) 666. (vii)The reality of a situation should be taken into account and, in cases wherenotification requires no particular formality, evidence of actual notice having been received or of a taxpayer being made clearly aware of the subject matterof the notification directly or indirectly, may be sufficient for notice of it tohave been given, even if the notice has not been given directly to the taxpayer(Sword Services).”
“Taking this approach, and considering Sched 55 para 18, its purpose is to ensure that once HMRC makes a penalty assessment, the taxpayer is made aware of two facts: first, that they have been so assessed and second, the period to which that assessment relates. This then enables the taxpayer to consider their position and determine how to react, including whether to appeal. There is nothing in the wording of Sched 55 para 18 or its context to indicate that any special formality is required in order for a penalty notice to be valid, provided that the notification conveys the required information.”
“A notification given to an agent is effective as such if the agent receives it within the scope of the agent’s actual or apparent authority, whether or not it is subsequently transmitted to the principal, unless the person seeking to charge the principal with notice knew that the agent intended to conceal the notification from the principal.”
“It is an absolute rule that service on an agent with actual or apparent authority to receive notices is service on the principal, whether or not the agent informs the principal of the notice.”
“Where the TMA required notice to be given to a person, there is no reason at all to suppose Parliament intended to oust the normal rules of agency. So where, for instance, as in Spring Salmon and Seafood the agent was expressly authorised to receive a notice on behalf of the taxpayer, that notice was given to the taxpayer when it was given to the agent.”
“…‘acceptance period’ means the period of 30 days beginning with the date of the document by which HMRC notify the appellant of the offer to review the matter in question.”
“(1) On an application for relief from any sanction imposed for a failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order, the court will consider all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal justly with the application, including the need – (a) for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost; and (b) to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders.”
“The clear message emerging from the cases – particularised in Denton and similar cases and implicitly endorsed in BPP – is that in exercising judicial discretions generally, particular importance is to be given to the need for ‘litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost’, and ‘to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders’. We see no reason why the principles embodied in this message should not apply to applications to admit late appeals just as much as to applications for relief from sanctions, though of course this does not detract from the general injunction which continues to appear inCPR rule 3.9 to ‘consider all the circumstances of the case’.”
“the FTT can have regard to any obvious strength or weakness of the applicant’s case; this goes to the question of prejudice – there is obviously much greater prejudice for an applicant to lose the opportunity of putting forward a really strong case than a very weak one. It is important however that this should not descend into a detailed analysis of the underlying merits of the appeal…It is clear that if an applicant’s appeal is hopeless in any event, then it would not be in the interests of justice for permission to be granted so that the FTT’s time is then wasted on an appeal which is doomed to fail. However, that is rarely the case. More often, the appeal will have some merit. Where that is the case, it is important that the FTT at least considers in outline the arguments which the applicant wishes to put forward and the respondents’ reply to them. This is not so that it can carry out a detailed evaluation of the case, but so that it can form a general impression of its strength or weakness to weigh in the balance. To that limited extent, an applicant should be afforded the opportunity to persuade the FTT that the merits of the appeal are on the face of it overwhelmingly in his/her favour and the respondents the corresponding opportunity to point out the weakness of the applicant’s case. In considering this point, the FTT should be very wary of taking into account evidence which is in dispute and should not do so unless there are exceptional circumstances.”
“Of course, the applicant may in some cases be able to satisfy the court that the delay, although substantial, has not had any practical effect on the course of the proceedings, but the longer the delay, the less likely it is that he will be able to do so…One reason for limiting the time for filing a notice of appeal is to promote finality in litigation. Parties need to know where they stand. Delay of the kind that occurred in this case undermines that objective.”
“Ordinarily this court should not distinguish between the litigant himself and his advisers. There are good reasons why the court should not: firstly, if anyone is to suffer for the failure of the solicitor it is better that it be the client than another party to the litigation; secondly, the disgruntled client may in appropriate cases have his remedies in damages or in respect of the wasted costs; thirdly, it seems to me that it would become a charter for the incompetent…were this court to allow almost impossible investigations in apportioning blame between solicitor and counsel on the one hand, or between themselves and their client on the other. The basis of the rule is that orders of the court must be observed and the court is entitled to expect that its officers and counsel who appear before it are more observant of that duty even than the litigant himself..”
“We accept HMRC’s general point that, in most cases, when the FTT is considering an application for permission to make a late appeal, failings by a litigant’s advisers should be regarded as failings of the litigant.”
“It is precisely because of the importance of complying with statutory time limits that, when considering applications for permission to make a late appeal, failures by a litigant’s adviser should generally be treated as failures by the litigant.”
“…to start with the general rule that the failure of Mr Bridger [Mr Katib’s adviser] to advise Mr Katib of the deadlines for making appeals, or to submit timely appeals on Mr Katib’s behalf, is unlikely to amount to a ‘good reason’ for missing those deadlines when considering the second stage of the evaluation required by Martland.”
“…the core of Mr Katib’s complaint is that Mr Bridger was incompetent, did not give proper advice, failed to appeal on time and told Mr Katib that matters were in hand when they were not. In other words, he did not do his job. That core complaint is, unfortunately, not as uncommon as it should be. It may be that the nature of the incompetence is rather more striking, if not spectacular, than one normally sees, but that makes no difference in these circumstances. It cannot be the case that a greater degree of adviser incompetence improves one’s chances of an appeal, either by enabling the client to distance himself from the activity or otherwise.”
“…when considering the third stage of the evaluation required by Martland, we should recognise that exceptions to the general rule are possible and that, if Mr Katib was misled by his advisers, that is a relevant consideration.”