“I am somewhat disappointed as to the approach to such matters by the government of Peru. I would point out that I am not expecting within 2024 or 2025 to be returning to the UK for a period of 10 working days and therefore, in reference to the request for dates in the period 1/4/24 to 30/11/24, I would respond by advising that there are no dates within that period.”
“In light of your statement that you will not be returning to the UK for a period of 10 working days within 2024 or 2025 and given that it is not possible for you to give evidence by video from Peru, the only alternative way in which the appeal can proceed to a resolution within a reasonable period of time is on the papers submitted by the parties. There are certain disadvantages to this way of proceeding, namely that you will not have any opportunity to cross-examine any HMRC witness (and HMRC will not be able to cross-examine you). It is also sometimes more difficult to make submissions in writing and the Tribunal Judge will not have any chance to ask you questions to clarify any points. As the burden of proof is on you, the inability to give evidence and ask questions of HMRC about their evidence may place you at a disadvantage. However, the Tribunal will try to ensure that, as far as practicable, you are able to participate fully in the proceedings and your case is given proper consideration.”
“It is directed that unless Mr Strauss confirms within 14 days that: 1. he will attend the Tribunal in London for a 10 day hearing on dates that he may specify between3 June 2024 and19 December 2025 ; or 2. he consents without any reservation to the appeal being dealt with on the papers; or 3. provides an alternative practical way to bring the proceedings to a conclusion then these proceedings WILL be STRUCK OUT without further reference to the parties.” then these proceedings WILL be STRUCK OUT without further reference to the parties.”
“I, the appellant confirm receipt of the Tribunal’s letter of 2/4/24. Firstly, apologies to Tribunal, I was hoping to send this email 2 weeks ago, but unfortunately, I was struck down with flu again and have only just got back to my feet. In reference to that letter, I would advise as follows; In putting forward my last proposal, all I was trying to do was to cause a quicker resolution to this issue, in accordance with one of the major tenets of Tribunal, that of dealing with matters in a quicker timeframe. I now appreciate that Judge Sinfield has not viewed it as such and acknowledge his viewpoint, his right to come to such a viewpoint, no matter how much I disagree the main contention of it. However, Judge Sinfield should appreciate that the contention behind my proposals was never to delay any matters, as he seems to assume. In reference to Judge Sinfield’s determinations, I would also point out as follows; Long Covid I would firstly comment that it is clear, from my recurring symptoms, that I am suffering from a form of Long Covid (Post-COVID syndrome). I am in the process of getting hold of medical confirmation of this and will provide it to Tribunal accordingly, when received. Therefore, I would add that clearly, Judge Sinfield’s determinations are written in ignorance of this fact. The current medical advice regarding sufferers of Long Covid is that they should not travel for more than 4 hours, at a time and then they need a number of days to recover. Even travelling for that time fatigues the sufferer and can cause them to become somewhat incapacitated. There is also the issue of potentially infecting others. [Mr Strauss provided a link to a website providing advice for travellers with Covid] What this means is that I am precluded from travelling from Piura to the UK, in one airline trip as such a trip is in excess of 12 hours and therefore not medically advisable for me. It would be completely counter productive for a date to be set for a hearing, for me to fly to the UK, be extremely ill for potentially months and for that date to become irrelevant because of this and I would point out that is certainly against the tenets of Tribunal, as well as being an unfair burden upon me. On that basis, I am clearly being put in a massively unfair position by Judge Sinfield’s determination and I appreciate that Judge Sinfield may have been unaware of my situation, in making his determination but, in light of the facts, that determination is unfair. On that basis I hereby make an application to have his determination set aside on the basis that it is unfair upon me. Application 1 That Judge Sinfield’s determinations in his letter of 2/4/24 be set aside. I am happy to have application 1 decided on the papers. I would further point out that this was, in essence, the reason why I was unwilling to travel to the UK within 2024 and 2025, as requested, it would take so long as to become oppressive upon me and would cause me substantial financial loss, potentially making me very ill and that would certainly be putting me in an unfair position. However, I also appreciate the need to get this matter resolved. I have therefore looked into other forms of resolution, as detailed within point 3 of Judge Sinfield’s determination. [Mr Strauss then set out ways in which the FTT might deal with his appeal, all of which, he stated, leave the FTT “no option other than to grant the appeals”.] In addition to this and on the failure of the above applications (which I do not expect to occur, but to show my commitment to resolving this matter), I have also discussed the issue with my employers. I have already had a substantial amount of time off this year with illness, so my employers will not allow me any further time this year (2024). However, they recognize, as do I that this matter needs resolution. I am in the process of agreeing with them a period, within 2025, that for a period of 2 weeks, that I will take 3 weeks unpaid holiday. My intention is to travel from Piura to either; Quito Panama City Mexico City USA and to stay, for 2 weeks in a hotel within that country, if required (which I would comment I am not expecting to require once my application is heard) so as to allow this procedure to conclude via Zoom. The issue with Piura is that in order to fly anywhere at a relatively low cost and low time one has to travel to Lima or Quito, both of which are 400+ miles away, notwithstanding Lima is travelling South and away from the North, (so the flight times to go anywhere else get longer) and although both flights (to Quito and/or Lima) would be under 4 hours, I would have to then catch a connector to anywhere else and would need time in between to recuperate. To be utterly frank, one of the reason why I said I would not be travelling to the UK in 2024 and 2025 is the burden of travelling and had this (Tribunal) issue not existed, I would have expected to finalise the works in Piura, which are due to finish June 2026, before travelling anywhere else, as the burden of that travel is onerous upon me, in terms of the affect upon my health. It was my intention, at the conclusion of that contract, to travel to Thailand, mainly by cruise boat I would add, which would be a holiday trip, to take up another project and to allow 3 months for that travel. However, I too want this matter resolved earlier rather than later, it is like the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over me and it is taking a substantial health toll upon me. To this end and in order to resolve matters and as Peru will not allow evidence, can Tribunal please confirm with the following authorities, that they will allow evidence to be given from that country; Ecuador Panama Mexico USA Once I have this information , I can then progress along a route to get this matter resolved, but I would stress that it would be of assistance to me, if this matter is not resolved by the above applications, (or before June 2026), that any dates are fixed for after June 2026, in order to accommodate the fact that I will have a burden of travel upon me, as detailed above. I would further point out that I also need confirmation of where this zoom meeting is to be conducted from, (for my part) so that I can agree dates with (1) my employer and (2) my witnesses and will proceed to obtain their confirmation of attendance once Tribunal has confirmed this as the way forward and the relevant country that will allow it. My view is that this email complies with Judge Sinfield’s directions entirely, can Tribunal please confirm that this complies with Judge Sinfield’s determinations as stated within Tribunal’s letter of 2/4/24.”
“The Tribunal’s letter of 2 April stated that, unless you confirmed one of three specified ways to bring the appeal to a conclusion within 14 days, the proceedings would be struck out without further reference to the parties. The first of the three ways was that you would attend a hearing in London on dates of your choosing between3 June 2024 and19 December 2025 . In your email, you have provided no such confirmation but have indicated that you are unable to travel to the United Kingdom because you have Long Covid and are precluded from travelling for more than four hours at a time. This is the first time that you have suggested that you might be suffering from Long Covid and you have not provided any medical evidence to support that or to show that you are not well enough to fly to the United Kingdom. The information on the website for which you provided a link is that “flying across continents is possible and safe if you take the necessary precautions.”
“When the FTT is considering applications for permission to appeal out of time, therefore, it must be remembered that the starting point is that permission should not be granted unless the FTT is satisfied on balance that it should be. In considering that question, we consider the FTT can usefully follow the three-stage process set out in [Denton v TH White Ltd[2014] EWCA Civ 906 ,[2014] 1 WLR 3926 ]: (1) Establish the length of the delay. If it was very short (which would, in the absence of unusual circumstances, equate to the breach being “neither serious nor significant”), then the FTT ‘is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages’ – though this should not be taken to mean that applications can be granted for very short delays without even moving on to a consideration of those stages. (2) The reason (or reasons) why the default occurred should be established. (3) The FTT can then move onto its evaluation of ‘all the circumstances of the case’. This will involve a balancing exercise which will essentially assess the merits of the reason(s) given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission.” (1) Establish the length of the delay. If it was very short (which would, in the absence of unusual circumstances, equate to the breach being “neither serious nor significant”), then the FTT ‘is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages’ – though this should not be taken to mean that applications can be granted for very short delays without even moving on to a consideration of those stages. (2) The reason (or reasons) why the default occurred should be established. (3) The FTT can then move onto its evaluation of ‘all the circumstances of the case’. This will involve a balancing exercise which will essentially assess the merits of the reason(s) given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission.”
“It appeared to the Judge that, at about 12:30, as [Mr Strauss] was concluding his Reply, he either accidentally left the conference call or that there was a problem with the line. The Judge waited five minutes for [Mr Strauss] to dial back into the hearing using his participant details. As [Mr Strauss] did not dial back within this period, the Judge ended the hearing. The Judge has considered [Mr Strauss’s] email of 13:03 seeking to have the oral hearing reconvened. However, the Judge notes that the hearing had proceeded for two hours, and that [Mr Strauss] had been making his submissions for all but five minutes of that time. [Mr Strauss] was apparently concluding his Reply when the conference call terminated. Although [Mr Strauss] states that his representations were still continuing, [Mr Strauss’s] Reply should be his response to the submissions made by the Respondents in the five minutes during which Ms Roberts spoke. In the circumstances the Judge considers it unlikely that [Mr Strauss] could have a new submission which had not already been made. Nevertheless, in case there is such a point - that is to say a fresh response to the Respondents' submissions which had not already been made - the Judge directs that [Mr Strauss] has until 5 p.m. on Tuesday1 May 2018 to put that new submission in writing and send that to the Tribunal, copied to the Respondents. Points already made during the hearing or in the written submissions made in advance of the hearing have been noted and should not be reiterated. The oral hearing will not be convened. The Judge will make her decision after receipt of [Mr Strauss’s] fresh submission, or after1 May 2018 if no fresh submission is received.”
“if nothing is heard within 14 days, it is likely that a judge will issue an order which may lead to the striking out of the proceedings.”
“… in my view, [Mr Strauss] is somewhat fortunate to have prevailed in relation to this application. The reason why I have spent no little time in setting out what my conclusions in relation to the application would have been in the absence of the events which occurred on20 February 2019 is that I want to make it clear to [Mr Strauss] that there is now no room for tolerance in relation to any further failures on his part to comply with the directions and instructions of the First-tier Tribunal.”
“… to agree and inform the Tribunal within the next 14 days of their earliest next 3 mutually convenient dates for the hearing to be re-listed. If the parties are unable to agree dates, they should send to the Tribunal (and copy to each other) within the next 14 days their updated availability, along with their detailed representations regarding the attempts made to agree dates, any alternative arrangements proposed and their position regarding the outstanding matters being determined on the papers without a hearing.”
“In reference to the respondent’s letter of 30/11/22, the appellant is somewhat confused and concerned with the respondent’s letter as it seems that they are attempting to represent something which is untrue. The appellant is quite prepared to agree a date with the respondents and the appellant does not consider any impasse exists. The appellant wrote to the respondents on 21/11/22 (ie 10 days ago) asking the respondents to provide details of all available dates from 1/5/23 to 31/12/23, so as to put the appellant in a position to advise Tribunal of the 3 appropriate dates to select. Since that date, the respondents have prevaricated and refused to properly respond. … The appellant would also point out that, in respect of this hearing, the appellant is preparing further paperwork for submission and therefore, the appellant’s full case has yet to be presented. Due to the poor manner by which HMRC themselves have provided the information that supports the assessments, in respect of these issues, the appellant is having to define what HMRC’s position actually is before then defining what is wrong with that position. The [FTT] should note that, in respect of this matter alone, this comment is not a criticism of the representations made by Mrs Roberts, acting on behalf of HMRC, who was given the information to represent and has represented it as it was given (which is her function) but rather a criticism of the original Inspectors who were acting at the time the original assessments were issued and whose original representations were poorly constituted, with the original representation being utterly confusing and lacking any kind of proper representation and subsequent representations still not being represented in a proper fashion and only being supplied 5 years after the original assessments had been issued and 3 years after the original appeals had been made. Due to this, the appellant is in constant process of understanding those representations, in order to put themselves in a position to properly appreciate what those original assessments represented and to be able to counter those original representations and show them as incorrect. The appellant would add that this has proved to be a long winded and time consuming process, which is still ongoing and so the appellant is having to formulate the respondent’s position in order to present evidence to [the FTT], which shows that position to be incorrect. The appellant therefore considers that, as it stands and until that additional paperwork is provided to [the FTT], the matter cannot currently be considered on the papers held by [the FTT]. … Therefore, the appellant would advise [the FTT] that, in its current state, the application cannot be properly considered by reference to the papers already held by [FTT] as not all the evidence has been supplied and not all the pleadings have been made. The alternate to this, in respect of the VOTM is that the application is granted on the basis that the respondent’s agree with the appellant’s position stated as of 15/9/22.”
“I will be putting this email in front of the relevant Judge and asking them to debar you on the basis that you have no proper understanding of the law and cannot properly represent to either myself, [the FTT] or anyone else.”
“The respondents, in making the comments that they are making and attempting to arrange exclusion, of the appellant from giving oral evidence, are the respondents prepared to act likewise. The appellant considers that the respondents should be required to respond in this respect, so the respondents can either reply to this representation or the appellant can make another application for a reply to be issued. Considering the timescale involved, the appellant gives the respondents 7 days to respond, in the absence of a response an application will be made accordingly, which unfortunately, may also delay matters further, but it should be noted that any such delay would be entirely due to the respondents’ inability to properly respond to a proper enquiry. If that is the case, that the respondents are willing to be debarred from giving any oral evidence, what is to be achieved by the hearing, if neither party can give oral evidence? If the respondents are unwilling to accept that they too are to be debarred from giving any oral evidence, then it would seem utterly inequitable for the respondents to be commenting, to Tribunal, that they consider that the appellant is not required to give any oral evidence, as they have no inkling as to what oral evidence the appellant intends to give and whether it is important to the case and, if the respondent intends to give oral evidence, the appellant currently has no inkling of what oral evidence the respondents intend to give and therefore, if the respondents are allowed to give oral evidence and intend to do so and the appellant is not allowed, that would seem incongruous, unfair and improper. In the appellant’s opinion, in asking the Tribunal to consider to debar the appellant from giving oral evidence at their own application hearing and where the respondents are fully capable of giving oral evidence and where the appellant would be unable to challenge that oral evidence, by giving their own oral evidence, that would seem to be an entirely inappropriate situation for Tribunal to allow to occur and would be a breach of the appellant’s rights in this respect. On that basis, any such hearing must be postponed to a later date, to allow equity and fairness to prevail. The appellant would also remind the respondents that Tribunal has the opportunity to ask for permission for oral evidence to be given and, if such permission is given, oral evidence can be presented by both parties and, in addition to this, a Judge can make a decision as to whether to allow such evidence, without permission being given.”
“On that basis, it would seem that the respondents are intending to either (1) accept that they cannot do what they are attempting to do, which is to improperly prosecute fraudulent intent via Tribunal, which cannot make such decision or that they are intending to provide their evidence, as oral evidence, in hearing, rather than in writing which, if that were to occur, would be another example of the improper approach to this matter by the respondents. … The appellant would add that the respondents’ approach is utterly improper anyway. The respondents are fully aware that the appellant is representing themselves. The appellant in such representation may, because it is required, give oral evidence in making proper representations. By debarring the appellant from giving oral evidence, that effectively means the appellant cannot effectively represent themselves either, as it may be considered that any representation, by the appellant, would constitute oral evidence. What that would mean is that the appellant would be unrepresented at Tribunal, which again is entirely unfair and improper and Tribunal cannot allow that inequitable situation to occur for applications that are clearly the appellant’s applications. On the basis of all the above, the appellant would comment that, yet again, the respondents are in abuse of procedure and this is indeed important in respect of the appellant’s applications that this hearing is being held to consider.”
“Avenue 1 That the respondents move this matter, away from [the FTT], to a proper court, for such allegations to be given proper and lawful consideration. Avenue 2 That the respondents make it clear, to [the FTT], that they no longer challenge the appellant’s evidence, in any way or form and that will continue until this Tribunal procedure is concluded. The result of such confirmation is that the evidence, given by the appellant, becomes unrefutable [sic] and, clearly that evidence shows that (1) the appellant is not responsible for the income and gains that the respondents have assessed and (2) that the appellant was clearly and undeniably abroad and outside the scope of UK tax, for the periods that the respondents have assessed for. Under those situations, the [FTT] will have no option other than to grant the appeals.”
“The Appellant is reminded that this hearing is not the hearing of the substantive appeal. This hearing is to consider the outstanding applications and any case management issues, to enable the [FTT] to give directions on appropriate matters. At the hearing the [FTT] will consider the applications as well as whether to give directions about: 1. The identification of the issues for determination in the appeal; 2. The agreement where possible by the parties of a statement of the undisputed facts. 3. Requests for the issue of witness summonses; 4. The documentary evidence to be adduced; 5. The preparation by the parties of a single agreed and paginated bundle of documents; 6. The date for lodging skeleton arguments and the lists of authorities; 7. The number of days required for the hearing; and 8. Any other issues, such as requirements for shorthand writers, exhibits, interpreters, special facilities, etc.”
“Your email was passed to Judge Sinfield who has read it and asked me to point out that: 1. The CPR do not directly apply to the First-tier Tribunal (see BPP Holdings v HMRC[2016] EWCA Civ 121 , particularly [32]-[33]) but they may be relevant by analogy. The applicable rules are theTribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 . 2. While it is correct that the [FTT] does not have jurisdiction in relation to criminal offences, it does have jurisdiction in appeals against civil evasion penalties which may involve dishonest conduct. In such cases, HMRC bears the burden of proof although the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities rather than the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. Judge Sinfield hopes that this clarifies the position. Any further points can be discussed at the case management hearing on 15 September which will deal with the points already outlined by Judge Sukul.”
“this matter is not just civil evasion penalties, it is an appeal against assessments issued under a number of Statutes, so not constituting civil action, and the appellant would respectfully point out that the majority of this appeal is not in reference to the civil evasion penalties, but refers to matters that are not civil evasion penalties.”
“The appellant is adamant that their position is correct and so the appellant puts all parties on notice as follows; If, in any way, a decision is reached, within this case management hearing, that the respondents are allowed to impugn the character of the appellant, within this Tribunal procedure, the appellant will act as follows; • Issue an immediate appeal against such a decision to the appropriate authority level. • Continue to appeal until such time as such decision is properly overturned to the highest court possible, if required. • Will deem this Tribunal Procedure as unlawful and will be required to withdraw until such appeals are fully held and concluded, thereby extending the timeline of these appeals by a substantial level (for example the case mentioned above started in 2015 and only concluded in 2022, so adding 7 more years to this matter). In the opinion of the appellant, any such required action would be entirely against the tenets of Tribunal to deal with matters in a timely fashion and so a decision to allow the appellant to be improperly impugned would seem to be against the tenets of Tribunal.” • Issue an immediate appeal against such a decision to the appropriate authority level. • Continue to appeal until such time as such decision is properly overturned to the highest court possible, if required. • Will deem this Tribunal Procedure as unlawful and will be required to withdraw until such appeals are fully held and concluded, thereby extending the timeline of these appeals by a substantial level (for example the case mentioned above started in 2015 and only concluded in 2022, so adding 7 more years to this matter). In the opinion of the appellant, any such required action would be entirely against the tenets of Tribunal to deal with matters in a timely fashion and so a decision to allow the appellant to be improperly impugned would seem to be against the tenets of Tribunal.”
“Order 1 That unless the respondents revisit all of their representations relating to this Tribunal and reissue such, after removal of all misrepresentations and apologize to Tribunal for the original incorrect submissions and do so prior to any final hearing date being determined and allowing sufficient time for the appellant to consider those representations as to whether they still contain misrepresentation, that the respondents are debarred from continuing to represent. Order 2 That unless the respondents agree to withdraw their unlawful VOTM document, within 14 days, that the respondents are debarred from continuing to represent. Order 3 That unless the respondents confirm, within 14 days, that they will not raise any issue or discuss, via Tribunal any matter relating to either (1) dishonesty, (2) fraudulent intent or (3) any other criminal act, regardless of whether those issues are raised directly or indirectly or even implied, that the respondents are debarred from continuing to represent. Order 4 That unless the respondents revisit all of their representations relating to this Tribunal and reissue such, after removal of all misrepresentations and apologize to Tribunal for the original incorrect submissions and do so prior to any final hearing date is determined and allowing sufficient time for the appellant to consider those representations as to whether they still contain misrepresentation, that the respondents case is struck out. Order 5 That unless the respondents agree to withdraw their unlawful VOTM document, within 14 days, that the respondents case is struck out. Order 6 That unless the respondents confirm, within 14 days, that they will not raise any issue or discuss, via Tribunal any matter relating to either (1) dishonesty, (2) fraudulent intent or (3) any other criminal act, regardless of whether those issues are raised directly or indirectly or even implied, that the respondents are debarred from continuing to represent.”
“I am somewhat disappointed as to the approach to such matters by the government of Peru. I would point out that I am not expecting within 2024 or 2025 to be returning to the UK for a period of 10 working days and therefore, in reference to the request for dates in the period 1/4/24 to 30/11/24, I would respond by advising that there are no dates within that period.”
“In light of your statement that you will not be returning to the UK for a period of 10 working days within 2024 or 2025 and given that it is not possible for you to give evidence by video from Peru, the only alternative way in which the appeal can proceed to a resolution within a reasonable period of time is on the papers submitted by the parties. There are certain disadvantages to this way of proceeding, namely that you will not have any opportunity to cross-examine any HMRC witness (and HMRC will not be able to cross-examine you). It is also sometimes more difficult to make submissions in writing and the Tribunal Judge will not have any chance to ask you questions to clarify any points. As the burden of proof is on you, the inability to give evidence and ask questions of HMRC about their evidence may place you at a disadvantage. However, the Tribunal will try to ensure that, as far as practicable, you are able to participate fully in the proceedings and your case is given proper consideration.”
“It is directed that unless Mr Strauss confirms within 14 days that: 1. he will attend the Tribunal in London for a 10 day hearing on dates that he may specify between3 June 2024 and19 December 2025 ; or 2. he consents without any reservation to the appeal being dealt with on the papers; or 3. provides an alternative practical way to bring the proceedings to a conclusion then these proceedings WILL be STRUCK OUT without further reference to the parties.” then these proceedings WILL be STRUCK OUT without further reference to the parties.”
“I, the appellant confirm receipt of the Tribunal’s letter of 2/4/24. Firstly, apologies to Tribunal, I was hoping to send this email 2 weeks ago, but unfortunately, I was struck down with flu again and have only just got back to my feet. In reference to that letter, I would advise as follows; In putting forward my last proposal, all I was trying to do was to cause a quicker resolution to this issue, in accordance with one of the major tenets of Tribunal, that of dealing with matters in a quicker timeframe. I now appreciate that Judge Sinfield has not viewed it as such and acknowledge his viewpoint, his right to come to such a viewpoint, no matter how much I disagree the main contention of it. However, Judge Sinfield should appreciate that the contention behind my proposals was never to delay any matters, as he seems to assume. In reference to Judge Sinfield’s determinations, I would also point out as follows; Long Covid I would firstly comment that it is clear, from my recurring symptoms, that I am suffering from a form of Long Covid (Post-COVID syndrome). I am in the process of getting hold of medical confirmation of this and will provide it to Tribunal accordingly, when received. Therefore, I would add that clearly, Judge Sinfield’s determinations are written in ignorance of this fact. The current medical advice regarding sufferers of Long Covid is that they should not travel for more than 4 hours, at a time and then they need a number of days to recover. Even travelling for that time fatigues the sufferer and can cause them to become somewhat incapacitated. There is also the issue of potentially infecting others. [Mr Strauss provided a link to a website providing advice for travellers with Covid] What this means is that I am precluded from travelling from Piura to the UK, in one airline trip as such a trip is in excess of 12 hours and therefore not medically advisable for me. It would be completely counter productive for a date to be set for a hearing, for me to fly to the UK, be extremely ill for potentially months and for that date to become irrelevant because of this and I would point out that is certainly against the tenets of Tribunal, as well as being an unfair burden upon me. On that basis, I am clearly being put in a massively unfair position by Judge Sinfield’s determination and I appreciate that Judge Sinfield may have been unaware of my situation, in making his determination but, in light of the facts, that determination is unfair. On that basis I hereby make an application to have his determination set aside on the basis that it is unfair upon me. Application 1 That Judge Sinfield’s determinations in his letter of 2/4/24 be set aside. I am happy to have application 1 decided on the papers. I would further point out that this was, in essence, the reason why I was unwilling to travel to the UK within 2024 and 2025, as requested, it would take so long as to become oppressive upon me and would cause me substantial financial loss, potentially making me very ill and that would certainly be putting me in an unfair position. However, I also appreciate the need to get this matter resolved. I have therefore looked into other forms of resolution, as detailed within point 3 of Judge Sinfield’s determination. [Mr Strauss then sets out ways in which the FTT might deal with his appeal, all of which, he stated, leave the FTT “no option other than to grant the appeals”.] In addition to this and on the failure of the above applications (which I do not expect to occur, but to show my commitment to resolving this matter), I have also discussed the issue with my employers. I have already had a substantial amount of time off this year with illness, so my employers will not allow me any further time this year (2024). However, they recognize, as do I that this matter needs resolution. I am in the process of agreeing with them a period, within 2025, that for a period of 2 weeks, that I will take 3 weeks unpaid holiday. My intention is to travel from Piura to either; Quito Panama City Mexico City USA and to stay, for 2 weeks in a hotel within that country, if required (which I would comment I am not expecting to require once my application is heard) so as to allow this procedure to conclude via Zoom. The issue with Piura is that in order to fly anywhere at a relatively low cost and low time one has to travel to Lima or Quito, both of which are 400+ miles away, notwithstanding Lima is travelling South and away from the North, (so the flight times to go anywhere else get longer) and although both flights (to Quito and/or Lima) would be under 4 hours, I would have to then catch a connector to anywhere else and would need time in between to recuperate. To be utterly frank, one of the reason why I said I would not be travelling to the UK in 2024 and 2025 is the burden of travelling and had this (Tribunal) issue not existed, I would have expected to finalise the works in Piura, which are due to finish June 2026, before travelling anywhere else, as the burden of that travel is onerous upon me, in terms of the affect upon my health. It was my intention, at the conclusion of that contract, to travel to Thailand, mainly by cruise boat I would add, which would be a holiday trip, to take up another project and to allow 3 months for that travel. However, I too want this matter resolved earlier rather than later, it is like the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over me and it is taking a substantial health toll upon me. To this end and in order to resolve matters and as Peru will not allow evidence, can Tribunal please confirm with the following authorities, that they will allow evidence to be given from that country; Ecuador Panama Mexico USA Once I have this information , I can then progress along a route to get this matter resolved, but I would stress that it would be of assistance to me, if this matter is not resolved by the above applications, (or before June 2026), that any dates are fixed for after June 2026, in order to accommodate the fact that I will have a burden of travel upon me, as detailed above. I would further point out that I also need confirmation of where this zoom meeting is to be conducted from, (for my part) so that I can agree dates with (1) my employer and (2) my witnesses and will proceed to obtain their confirmation of attendance once Tribunal has confirmed this as the way forward an d the relevant country that will allow it. My view is that this email complies with Judge Sinfield’s directions entirely, can Tribunal please confirm that this complies with Judge Sinfield’s determinations as stated within Tribunal’s letter of 2/4/24.”
“The Tribunal’s letter of 2 April stated that, unless you confirmed one of three specified ways to bring the appeal to a conclusion within 14 days, the proceedings would be struck out without further reference to the parties. The first of the three ways was that you would attend a hearing in London on dates of your choosing between3 June 2024 and19 December 2025 . In your email, you have provided no such confirmation but have indicated that you are unable to travel to the United Kingdom because you have Long Covid and are precluded from travelling for more than four hours at a time. This is the first time that you have suggested that you might be suffering from Long Covid and you have not provided any medical evidence to support that or to show that you are not well enough to fly to the United Kingdom. The information on the website for which you provided a link is that “flying across continents is possible and safe if you take the necessary precautions.”
“A closer country would allow for a quicker travel and an earlier hearing, but as the most distant country has now been confirmed as the only country allowable, I need more time and that means I need to negotiate with my employers the timescale, which I have now done and confirmed.” 33. From this statement, it would seem clear that, on 15 April, the Appellant was not prepared to provide dates, as he could only provide dates after receiving information from the Tribunal and the subsequent discussions with his employers. Ground d – the Appellant has now complied with The Directions 34. In The Application Email, the Appellant has stated that, having now provided a proposed way to proceed along with a potential hearing date, he has now complied with The Directions. However, he did not make an application for an extension to comply with the directions, nor does he provide an explanation for the delay in complying. 35. In addition, for the reasons given below when addressing the Appellant’s proposed hearing dates, the Respondents submit that the Appellant has still not provided a practical way to bring proceedings to a conclusion, and has therefore not complied with The Directions. 36. He states that his delay in providing his available dates for a hearing was due to needing to wait for the Tribunal’s answer to his question. 37. From the Appellant’s statement in The Application Email he contends that as the USA was the furthest potential destination it would result in the longest travelling time and the latest hearing window. Therefore, had he so wished, the Appellant could have spoken to his employers prior to sending The Response Email and provided dates for attendance from the USA in The Response Email. While he may have been able to later provide additional, earlier, dates depending on the Tribunal’s answer, there should not have been a barrier to providing the ‘furthest and latest’ dates. In addition, the third condition of The Directions did not specify that dates needed to be provided, just a practical way to bring proceedings to a conclusion. 38. This also does not address the fact that, in addition to not providing potential hearing dates, the Appellant failed to provide a practical way to bring the proceedings to a conclusion in The Response Email. 39. The Respondents do not accept that the Appellant has now complied with the Directions and, even if he had, this does not excuse his initial failure to do so. Ground e – the Appellant has not caused a delay to proceedings 40. The Appellant has contended that, following The Application Email, he has now complied with the directions, and that if the hearing is to be listed in December 2025, there will have been no material delay to proceedings caused by his initial failure to comply. 41. As detailed below, the Respondents do not believe that providing a single window of availability, at the end of a listing period, for a hearing in over 17 months’ time, and without confirming that all witnesses for the Appellant are able to attend, is a practical way to bring the proceedings to a conclusion, or at least not one within a reasonable time frame. 42. That aside, the fact that the Appellant contends that he has now complied with the directions – which the Respondents do not accept - would not excuse his initial failure to comply. The Respondents submit that compliance with Tribunal directions is an important part of the Tribunal process, and the Appellant has offered no reason for his failure to comply. Applying the three stage process 43. Rule 8(1) ofThe Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (‘The Rules’) states that proceedings will be struck out if the appellant fails to comply with a direction that stated that failure to comply would lead to the striking out of the proceedings. The severity of this sanction reflects the severity of the failure. 44. For the reasons set out above, the Respondents submit that the Appellant failed to comply with The Directions, and that this failure to comply is both serious and significant. 45. The Respondents do not agree that the Appellant has rectified this failure, and submit that his failure to comply is ongoing. 46. The Respondents submit that the Appellant has failed to give a reason for this serious and significant failure to comply. 47. For the reasons set out above, the Respondents submit that the Appellant’s lack of representation was not a reason for his failure to comply, and that he could not have believed that he had complied with The Directions when he submitted The Response Email. 48. The Respondents note that this appeal has been struck out previously as a result of the Appellant’s failure to comply with Tribunal directions. 49. In his decision dated21 February 2020 (“The Decision”) Judge Beare found (paragraph 18) the Appellant’s “…defaults to be both serious and significant, both in terms of number and in terms of the period over which they occurred” and noted that, in addition to the failures which were being considered in The Decision “the Applicant has repeatedly failed to comply with various procedural aspects of the appeal.” 50. The Respondents submit that the Appellant’s failure to comply with The Directions is the latest in a series of failures to comply. 51. The Respondents submit that these repeated failures to comply, demonstrated throughout the litigation process, are both important and relevant when considering the circumstances of the case. 52. The Appellant’s failure to comply is serious and significant, no reason for his failure has been provided, and the circumstances of this case show that this is part of an ongoing pattern of behaviour. 53. When considering reinstatement, the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and the need to enforce compliance with The Rules and directions issued by the Tribunal are both important considerations. 54. The Decision ultimately granted reinstatement of the appeal due to specific circumstances surrounding the Appellant’s submission of his witness statement. Judge Beare stated that, in the absence of those specific circumstances, he would have decided to “dismiss the application for reinstatement.”