“(i) The court must consider whether the claimant has a ‘realistic’ as opposed to ‘fanciful’ prospect of success: Swain v Hillman[2001] 1 All ER 91 . (ii) A ‘realistic’ claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel[2003] EWCA Civ 472 at [8]. (iii) In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a ‘mini-trial’: Swain v Hillman. (iv) This does not mean that the court must take at face value and without substance everything that a claimant says in his statements before the court. In some cases, it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents: ED & F Liquid Products v Patel at [10]. (v) However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No 5)[2001] EWCA Civ 550 . (vi) Although a case may turn out at trial not to be really complicated, it does not follow that it should be decided without the fuller investigation into the facts at trial than is possible or permissible on summary judgment. Thus the court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case: Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd[2007] FSR 63 . (vii) On the other hand, it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple: if the respondent’s case is bad in law, he will in truth have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim or successfully defending the claim against him, as the case may be. Similarly, if the applicant’s case is bad in law, the sooner that is determined, the better. If it is possible to show by evidence that although material in the form of documents or oral evidence that would put the documents in another light is not currently before the court, such material is likely to exist and can be expected to be available at trial, it would be wrong to give a summary judgment because there would be a real, as opposed to fanciful, prospect of success. However, it is not enough to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may turn up which would have a bearing on the question of construction: ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v TTE Training Ltd[2007] EWCA Civ 725 .”
“It may be that the Judge concluded, from his decision that the question of knowledge or means of knowledge in an MTIC case requires a careful consideration of all the evidence and relevant circumstances of that case, that it necessarily followed that Issue (4) was unsuitable for summary determination in the present case. If however this was the Judge’s reasoning, and we accept that we are speculating, we do not think that can be supported. As Mr Carey pointed out, if this was the correct approach, it would never be possible to exercise the power of summary determination in Rule 8(3)(c) in an MTIC case. We agree with Mr Carey that this cannot be correct. It may be, where Issue (4) is concerned, that the evidential inquiry which is required is not one which lends itself easily to summary determination; see Davis & Dann above. This must however be a case sensitive question, depending upon the facts of the particular case in which summary determination is sought”
“You should satisfy yourself that you have the requisite evidence to support zero rating for supplies made to overseas customers and taken all reasonable measures to ensure your company’s transactions do not lead to your involvement in transactions connected with the fraudulent evasion of VAT”
“A SCAC request for information has been received from the Portuguese authorities. Please arrange an announced visit to obtain the information requested below. The Portuguese authorities have advised the following: We have an ongoing investigation of a VAT fraud scheme that caused high amounts of losses to PT. The manager/associate of ALFABETO DO TEMPO UNIPESSOAL LDA was born in The Netherlands on13/01/1976 and his declared address is in The Netherlands. The PT trader only sent VAT declarations related to the 1Q, 2Q and 3Q of 2017 with ICA declared only in the VAT declaration of 1Q 2017 in the amount of€315.017 . No VAT declarations for 2018 and 2019. It was impossible to contact the company or a representative, the alleged head office was closed and with no signs of activity, and therefore we do not have access to any documents. VIES shows that R S GLOBAL LTD declared supplies to the PT trader”
“Thus whilst no direct link was specifically confirmed by the Polish authorities between the supplies made to Nectel by the Appellant and Nectel’s issue of “empty”
“Equally, if Tasca wished to adduce further evidence at the trial of the Second Appeal it was incumbent upon Tasca to explain what that evidence would be, and how it would affect the position, in terms of the evidence and the arguments in the Second Appeal. In fact, Tasca did make such an application, in the course of the FTT Hearing, which was refused by the Judge; see [FTT85-89].”
“The appellant would not have been expected to account for VAT on the sales of the phones because the sale was (if cross-border) ordinarily zero rated and (if within the UK) ordinarily caught by the UK’s reverse charge regime. Moreover, ordinarily a taxpayer acquiring cross-border taxable goods for resale would not expect to pay VAT on the purchase. Such a trader would be obliged to charge itself acquisition VAT on the acquisition of the phones but would off-set in its VAT books the same amount as input tax incurred on the taxable (albeit zero rated) sale. And this was how the appellant calculated its liability to VAT as nil.”
“It is erroneous in law to assert that the reverse charge applies if goods are not zero-rated”
“A person is a taxable person for the purposes of this Act while he is, or is required to be, registered under this Act”