“56. In the same way, a taxable person who knew or should have known that, by his purchase, he was taking part in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT must, for the purposes of the Sixth Directive, be regarded as a participant in that fraud, irrespective of whether or not he profited by the resale of the goods. 57. That is because in such a situation the taxable person aids the perpetrators of the fraud and becomes their accomplice. 58. In addition, such an interpretation, by making it more difficult to carry out fraudulent transactions, is apt to prevent them. 59. Therefore, it is for the referring court to refuse entitlement to the right to deduct where it is ascertained, having regard to objective factors, that the taxable person knew or should have known that, by his purchase, he was participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT, and to do so even where the transaction in question meets the objective criteria which form the basis of the concepts of ‘supply of goods effected by a taxable person acting as such’ and ‘economic activity’. … 61. By contrast, where it is ascertained, having regard to objective factors, that the supply is to a taxable person who knew or should have known that, by his purchase, he was participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT.”
“43. A person who has no intention of undertaking an economic activity, but pretends to do so in order to make off with the tax he has received on making a supply, either by disappearing or hijacking a taxable person’s VAT identity, does not meet the objective criteria which form the basis of those concepts which limit the scope of VAT and the right to deduct (see Halifax at [59] and Kittel at [53]). A taxable person who knows or should have known that the transaction which he is undertaking is connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT is to be regarded as a participant and, equally, fails to meet the objective criteria which determine the scope of the right to deduct. … 52. If a taxpayer has the means at his disposal of knowing that by his purchase he is participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT he loses his right to deduct, not as a penalty for negligence, but because the objective criteria for the scope of that right are not met. It profits nothing to contend that, in domestic law, complicity in fraud denotes a more culpable state of mind than carelessness, in the light of the principle in Kittel. A trader who fails to deploy means of knowledge available to him does not satisfy the objective criteria which must be met before his right to deduct arises.”
“59. The test in Kittel is simple and should not be over-refined. It embraces not only those who know of the connection but those who ‘should have known’. Thus it includes those who should have known from the circumstances which surround their transactions that they were connected to fraudulent evasion. If a trader should have known that the only reasonable explanation for the transaction in which he was involved was that it was connected with fraud and if it turns out that the transaction was connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT then he should have known of that fact. He may properly be regarded as a participant for the reasons explained in Kittel.”
“109. Examining individual transactions on their merits does not, however, require them to be regarded in isolation without regard to their attendant circumstances and context. Nor does it require the tribunal to ignore compelling similarities between one transaction and another or preclude the drawing of inferences, where appropriate, from a pattern of transactions of which the individual transaction in question forms part, as to its true nature e.g. that it is part of a fraudulent scheme. The character of an individual transaction may be discerned from material other than the bare facts of the transaction itself, including circumstantial and ‘similar fact’ evidence. That is not to alter its character by reference to earlier or later transactions but to discern it. 110. To look only at the purchase in respect of which input tax was sought to be deducted would be wholly artificial. A sale of 1,000 mobile telephones may be entirely regular, or entirely regular so far as the taxpayer is (or ought to be) aware. If so, the fact that there is fraud somewhere else in the chain cannot disentitle the taxpayer to a return of input tax. The same transaction may be viewed differently if it is the fourth in line of a chain of transactions all of which have identical percentage mark ups, made by a trader who has practically no capital as part of a huge and unexplained turnover with no left over stock, and mirrored by over 40 other similar chains in all of which the taxpayer has participated and in each of which there has been a defaulting trader. A tribunal could legitimately think it unlikely that the fact that all 46 of the transactions in issue can be traced to tax losses to HMRC is a result of innocent coincidence. Similarly, three suspicious involvements may pale into insignificance if the trader has been obviously honest in thousands. 111. Further in determining what it was that the taxpayer knew or ought to have known the tribunal is entitled to look at the totality of the deals effected by the taxpayer (and their characteristics), and at what the taxpayer did or omitted to do, and what it could have done, together with the surrounding circumstances in respect of all of them.”
“29. It is, to us, inconceivable that Moses LJ’s example of an application of part of that test, the ‘no other reasonable explanation’, would lead to the test becoming more complicated and more difficult to apply in practice. That, in our view, would be the consequence of applying the interpretation urged upon us by Mr Brown [Counsel for taxpayer]. In effect, HMRC would be required to devote time and resources to considering what possible reasonable explanations, other than a connection with fraud, might be put forward by an appellant and then adduce evidence and argument to counter them even where the appellant has not sought to rely on such explanations. That would be an unreasonable and unjustified evidential burden on HMRC. Accordingly, we do not consider that HMRC are required to eliminate all possible reasonable explanations other than fraud before the FTT is entitled to conclude that the appellant should have known that the transactions were connected to fraud. 30. Of course, we accept (as, we understand, does HMRC) that where the appellant asserts that there is an explanation (or several explanations) for the circumstances of a transaction other than a connection with fraud then it may be necessary for HMRC to show that the only reasonable explanation was fraud. As is clear from Davis & Dann, the FTT’s task in such a case is to have regard to all the circumstances, both individually and cumulatively, and then decide whether HMRC have proved that the appellant should have known of the connection with fraud. In assessing the overall picture, the FTT may consider whether the only reasonable conclusion was that the purchases were connected with fraud. Whether the circumstances of the transactions can reasonably be regarded as having an explanation other than a connection with fraud or the existence of such a connection is the only reasonable explanation is a question of fact and evaluation that must be decided on the evidence in the particular case. It does not make the elimination of all possible explanations the test which remains, simply, did the person claiming the right to deduct input tax know that, by his purchase, he was participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT or should he have known of such a connection.”
“51. … the holding of Moses LJ does not mean that the trader has to have the means of knowing how the fraud that actually took place occurred. He has simply to know, or have the means of knowing, that fraud has occurred, or will occur, at some point in some transaction to which his transaction is connected. The participant does not need to know how the fraud was carried out in order to have this knowledge. This is apparent from paras [56] and [61] of Kittel cited above. Paragraph [61] of Kittel formulates the requirement of knowledge as knowledge on the part of the trader that ‘by his purchase he was participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT’. It follows that the trader does not need to know the specific details of the fraud.”
“112. ‘Blind-eye’ knowledge approximates to knowledge. Nelson at the battle of Copenhagen made a deliberate decision to place the telescope to his blind eye in order to avoid seeing what he knew he would see if he placed it to his good eye. It is, I think, common ground – and if it is not, it should be – that an imputation of blind-eye knowledge requires an amalgam of suspicion that certain facts may exist and a decision to refrain from taking any step to confirm their existence. Lord Blackburn in Jones v Gordon(1877) 2 App Cas 616 , 629 distinguished a person who was ‘honestly blundering and careless’ from a person who ‘refrained from asking questions, not because he was an honest blunderer or a stupid man, but because he thought in his own secret mind – I suspect there is something wrong, and if I ask questions and make farther inquiry, it will no longer be my suspecting it, but my knowing it, and then I shall not be able to recover’. Lord Blackburn added ‘I think that is dishonesty’.”
“81. It is plain that if HMRC wishes to assert that a trader’s state of knowledge was such that his purchase is outwith the scope of the right to deduct it must prove that assertion… 82. But that is far from saying that the surrounding circumstances cannot establish sufficient knowledge to treat the trader as a participant. … Tribunals should not unduly focus on the question whether a trader has acted with due diligence. Even if a trader has asked appropriate questions, he is not entitled to ignore the circumstances in which his transactions take place if the only reasonable explanation for them is that his transactions have been or will be connected to fraud. The danger in focusing on the question of due diligence is that it may deflect a Tribunal from asking the essential question posed in Kittel, namely, whether the trader should have known that by his purchase he was taking part in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT. The circumstances may well establish that he was.”
“60. It is true that, when there are indications pointing to an infringement or fraud, a reasonable trader could, depending on the circumstances of the case, be obliged to make enquiries about another trader from whom he intends to purchase goods or services in order to ascertain the latter's trustworthiness. 61. However, the tax authority cannot, as a general rule, require the taxable person wishing to exercise the right to deduct VAT, first, to ensure that the issuer of the invoice relating to the goods and services in respect of which the exercise of that right to deduct is sought has the capacity of a taxable person, that he was in possession of the goods at issue and was in a position to supply them and that he has satisfied his obligations as regards declaration and payment of VAT, in order to be satisfied that there are no irregularities or fraud at the level of the traders operating at an earlier stage of the transaction or, second, to be in possession of documents in that regard. 62. It is, in principle, for the tax authorities to carry out the necessary inspections of taxable persons in order to detect VAT irregularities and fraud as well as to impose penalties on the taxable person who has committed those irregularities or fraud. 63. According to the case law of the court, member states are required to check taxable persons' returns, accounts and other relevant documents (see EC Commission v Italy (Case C-132/06 )[2008] ECR I-5457 , para 37, and Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w Biaymstoku v Profaktor Kulesza, Frankowski, Jówiak, Orowski (Case C-188/09 )[2010] ECR I-7639 , para 21). 64. To that end, Directive 2006/112 imposes, in particular in art 242, an obligation on every taxable person to keep accounts in sufficient detail for VAT to be applied and its application checked by the tax authorities. In order to facilitate the performance of that task, arts 245 and 249 of that directive provide for the right of the competent authorities to access the invoices which the taxable person is obliged to store under art 244 of that directive. 65. It follows that, by imposing on taxable persons, in view of the risk that the right to deduct may be refused, the measures listed in para 61 of the present judgment, the tax authority would, contrary to those provisions, be transferring its own investigative tasks to taxable persons.”
“[13] I think the time has come to say, once and for all, that there is only one civil standard of proof, and that is proof that the fact in issue more probably occurred than not. … [70] …[the civil standard of proof] is the simple balance of probabilities, neither more nor less. Neither the seriousness of the allegation nor the seriousness of the consequences should make any difference to the standard of proof to be applied in determining the facts. The inherent probabilities are simply something to be taken into account, where relevant, in deciding where the truth lies.”