“What is missing trader fraud? Missing trader fraud involves a ‘missing’ or ‘defaulting’ trader who deliberately fails to pay its VAT liability for taxable supplies made in the UK. Those supplies may pass through a number of intermediary traders before they are either sold to an end user in the UK or to a customer outside the UK. These supply chains are known as ‘tax loss chains’. In some cases the organisers of the fraud will use non-tax loss chains alongside tax loss chains in order to disguise the VAT losses as part of an overall scheme to defraud HMRC. How can missing trader fraud affect your business? If you knew or should have known that your transaction was connected with fraud then HMRC may refuse your VAT claim in respect of that transaction. In determining whether you knew or should have known HMRC will consider all of the circumstances relating to the transaction, including whether you took reasonable steps to verify the integrity of your supply chain. How can a business avoid becoming caught up in missing trader fraud? It is in your interest to check carefully who you are dealing with. It is good commercial practice for businesses to carry out checks to establish the credibility and legitimacy of their customers, suppliers and supplies. These checks may need to be more extensive in business sectors that are commercially risky or vulnerable to fraud and other criminality. HMRC does not expect you to go beyond what is reasonable. However HMRC would expect you to make a judgement on the integrity of your supply chain and the suppliers, customers and goods or services within it. What kind of checks can I undertake to help ensure the integrity of my supply chain? The following are examples of indicators that could alert you to the risk of a connection with missing trader fraud: 1. Legitimacy of customers or suppliers. For example: • What is your customer’s/supplier’s history in the trade? • Have you been contacted within a short space of time by a prospective buyer and seller offering to buy/sell goods of the same specifications and quantity? • Has your supplier referred you to a customer who is willing to buy goods of the same quantity and specifications being offered by the supplier? • Does your supplier offer deals that carry no commercial risk for you –e.g. no requirement to pay for the goods or services until payment is received from the customer? • Are you being offered deals that involve consistent or pre-determined profit margins, irrespective of the date, quantities or specifications of the goods or services being traded? Have normal commercial practices been adopted in negotiating prices? • Are you being asked to make payments to third parties other than your supplier or payments to an offshore bank account? • Are the goods adequately insured? • Are high value deals being offered with no formal contractual arrangements? • Are high value deals being offered by a newly established supplier with minimal trading history, low credit rating etc? • Is a small, newly-established business offering to supply you with goods cheaper than a long-established supplier? • Has HMRC specifically notified you that previous deals involving your supplier were connected to fraudulent VAT losses? 2. Viability of the goods as described by your supplier. For example: • Can you be sure the goods exist in the quantity and specification being offered? • Are they in good condition and not damaged? • Why are large quantities of goods with non-UK specifications being offered for supply to you in the UK? • What recourse is there if the goods are not as described? Examples of specific checks carried out by existing businesses The following examples may help you decide which checks to carry out. This list is not exhaustive and it is for you to decide what checks you need to carry out before dealing with a supplier or customer: • obtain copies of Certificates of Incorporation and VAT registration certificates • verify VAT registration details with HMRC • obtain signed letters of introduction on headed paper • obtain some form of written and signed trade references • obtain credit checks or other background checks from an independent third party • insist on personal contact with a senior officer of the prospective supplier, making an initial visit to their premises if possible • obtain the prospective supplier’s bank details to check whether (a) payments would be made to a third party and (b) in the case of an import, the supplier and their bank share the same country of residence • check details provided against other sources e.g. website, letterheads, BT landline records. Paperwork in addition to invoices may be received in relation to the supplies you purchase and sell. This documentation should be kept to support your view of a transaction’s legitimacy. The following are examples of additional paperwork that some businesses retain: • purchase orders • pro-forma invoices • delivery notes • CMRs (Convention Merchandises Routiers) or airway bills • allocation notification • inspection reports. What will HMRC look out for when considering the extent of my checks? In each case HMRC will seek to identify what actions or precautions you took in response to any indicators of risk. This will focus on the due diligence checks you undertook and the actions taken by you in response to the results of those checks. In each case HMRC will consider: • the due diligence checks that were performed, including any checks designed to address the specific risks of a particular transaction • the extent to which your checks were appropriate, adequate and timely in relation to addressing the risks identified • the results of those checks and what action was taken, if any, in response. Can HMRC tell me exactly what checks I should undertake? No. The examples contained in this leaflet are only guidelines for the kind of checks you could make to help you avoid participating in a fraudulent supply chain. The checks you will need to make, and the extent of them, will vary depending on the individual circumstances of your trade and it is for you to consider what questions you need to ask to protect yourself in the particular circumstances of your individual transactions.”
“We are coming across more and more hurdles with our supply chain and KYC's. We are more than satisfied with what we have seen and details you have sent but it always helps if we can gather more information to protect us all from any further issues down the line. Are we able to confirm the following: 1. Proof of supply chain of products, this can be confirmed via weighbridge information, confirming you have been in receipt of goods before sending. 2. Alternatively we may require proof of purchase from you. 3. Lastly can we get copies of you latest VAT returns and confirmation of payments 4. Full names of all staff employed and purchasing metals on your behalf. As you know this industry has a very bad reputation and new companies who seem to be succeeding are looked at more than most. I would appreciate you sending confirmation of the above at your earliest convenience, to avoid any delays in purchasing and supplying materials.”
“A person who has no intention of undertaking an economic activity but pretends to do so in order to make off with the tax [they have] received on making a supply, either by disappearing or hijacking a taxable person's VAT identity, does not meet the objective criteria which form the basis of those concepts which limit the scope of VAT and the right to deduct (see Halifax para 59 and Kittel para 53). A taxable person who knows or should have known that the transaction which [they are] undertaking is connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT is to be regarded as a participant and, equally, fails to meet the objective criteria which determine the scope of the right to deduct.”
“If a taxpayer has the means at [their] disposal of knowing that by [their] purchase [they are] participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT [they] lose [their] right to deduct, not as a penalty for negligence, but because the objective criteria for the scope of that right are not met…. A trader who fails to deploy means of knowledge available to [them] does not satisfy the objective criteria which must be met before [their] right to deduct arises.”
“… A trader who knows or could have known no more than that there was a risk of fraud will find it difficult to gauge the extent of the risk; nor will [they] be able to foresee whether the circumstances are such that it will be asserted against [them] that the risk of fraud was so great that [they] should not have entered into the transaction. In short, [they] will not be in a position to know before [they] enter into the transaction that, if [they] do so, [they] will not be entitled to deduct input VAT. The principle of legal certainty will be infringed. It must be remembered that the approach of the court in Kittel was to enlarge the category of participants. A trader who should have known that [they were] running the risk that by [their] purchase [they] might be taking part in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT, cannot be regarded as a participant in that fraud. The highest it could be put is that [they were] running the risk that [they] might be a participant. That is not the approach of the court in Kittel, nor is it the language it used. In those circumstances, I am of the view that it must be established that the trader knew or should have known that by [their] purchase [they were] taking part in such a transaction …”
“The test in Kittel is simple and should not be over-refined, it embraces not only those who know of the connection but those who “should have known”
“A trader who decides to participate in a transaction connected to fraudulent evasion, despite knowledge of that connection, is making an informed choice; [they] know where [they] stand and know before [they] enter into the transaction that if found out, [they] will not be entitled to deduct input tax. The extension of that principle to a taxable person who has the means of knowledge but chooses not to deploy it, similarly, does not infringe that principle. If [they have] the means of knowledge available and choose not to deploy it, [they] know that, if found out, [they] will not be entitled to deduct. If [they] choose to ignore obvious inferences from the facts and circumstances in which [they have] been trading, [they] will not be entitled to deduct.”
“That is not the only question. The ultimate question is not whether the trader exercised due diligence but rather whether [they] should have known that the only reasonable explanation for the circumstances in which [their] transaction took place was that it was connected to fraudulent evasion of VAT.”
“But that is far from saying that the surrounding circumstances cannot establish sufficient knowledge to treat the trader as a participant. As I indicated in relation to the BSG appeal, tribunals should not unduly focus on the question whether a trader has acted with due diligence. Even if a trader has asked appropriate questions, [they are] not entitled to ignore the circumstances in which [their] transactions take place if the only reasonable explanation for them is that [their] transactions have been or will be connected to fraud. The danger in focussing on the question of due diligence is that it may deflect a tribunal from asking the essential question posed in Kittel, namely, whether the trader should have known that by [their] purchase [they were] taking part in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT. The circumstances may well establish that [they were].”
“I can do no better than repeat the words of Christopher Clarke J in Red12 v HMRC[2009] EWHC 2563 (Ch) ,[2010] STC 589 , ‘109. Examining individual transactions on their merits does not, however, require them to be regarded in isolation without regard to their attendant circumstances and context. Nor does it require the tribunal to ignore compelling similarities between one transaction and another or preclude the drawing of inferences, where appropriate, from a pattern of transactions of which the individual transaction in question forms part, as to its true nature e.g. that it is part of a fraudulent scheme. The character of an individual transaction may be discerned from material other than the bare facts of the transaction itself, including circumstantial and 'similar fact' evidence. That is not to alter its character by reference to earlier or later transactions but to discern it. ‘109. Examining individual transactions on their merits does not, however, require them to be regarded in isolation without regard to their attendant circumstances and context. Nor does it require the tribunal to ignore compelling similarities between one transaction and another or preclude the drawing of inferences, where appropriate, from a pattern of transactions of which the individual transaction in question forms part, as to its true nature e.g. that it is part of a fraudulent scheme. The character of an individual transaction may be discerned from material other than the bare facts of the transaction itself, including circumstantial and 'similar fact' evidence. That is not to alter its character by reference to earlier or later transactions but to discern it. 110. To look only at the purchase in respect of which input tax was sought to be deducted would be wholly artificial. A sale of 1,000 mobile telephones may be entirely regular, or entirely regular so far as the taxpayer is (or ought to be) aware. If so, the fact that there is fraud somewhere else in the chain cannot disentitle the taxpayer to a return of input tax. The same transaction may be viewed differently if it is the fourth in line of a chain of transactions all of which have identical percentage mark ups, made by a trader who has practically no capital as part of a huge and unexplained turnover with no left over stock, and mirrored by over 40 other similar chains in all of which the taxpayer has participated and in each of which there has been a defaulting trader. A tribunal could legitimately think it unlikely that the fact that all 46 of the transactions in issue can be traced to tax losses to HMRC is a result of innocent coincidence. Similarly, three suspicious involvements may pale into insignificance if the trader has been obviously honest in thousands. 111. Further in determining what it was that the taxpayer knew or ought to have known the tribunal is entitled to look at the totality of the deals effected by the taxpayer (and their characteristics), and at what the taxpayer did or omitted to do, and what it could have done, together with the surrounding circumstances in respect of all of them.”
“Such circumstantial evidence, of a type which compels me to reach a more definite conclusion than that which was reached by the tribunal in Mobilx, will often indicate that a trader has chosen to ignore the obvious explanation as to why [they were] was presented with the opportunity to reap a large and predictable reward over a short space of time. In Mobilx, Floyd J concluded that it was not open to the tribunal to rely upon such large rewards because the issue had not been properly put to the witnesses. It is to be hoped that no such failure on the part of HMRC will occur in the future. In so saying, I am doing no more than echoing the warning given in HMRC's Public Notice 726 in relation to the introduction of joint and several liability. In that Notice traders were warned that the imposition of joint and several liability was aimed at businesses who "know who is carrying out the frauds, or choose to turn a blind eye" (3.3). They were warned to take heed of any indications that VAT may go unpaid (4.9). A trader who chooses to ignore circumstances which can only reasonably be explained by virtue of the connection between [their] transactions and fraudulent evasion of VAT, participates in that fraud and, by [their] own choice, deprives [themselves] of the right to deduct input tax.”
“In considering circumstantial evidence, the Tribunal should take care not to restrict itself to considering each piece of evidence alone and in isolation from the others. This is because circumstantial evidence is not a chain, where a break in one link breaks the chain, but is a cord: one strand of the cord might be insufficient to sustain the weight, but three strands together might be sufficient: see R v Exall (1866) 4 F&F 922, per Pollock CB, cited with approval by the Upper Tribunal CCA Distribution at [91]. Accordingly, the whole can end up stronger than the individual parts: see the decision of Judge Christopher McNall in Wholesale Distribution Ltd v HMRC[2024] UKFTT 00514 (TC) at [49]. Further, it is necessary to consider individual transactions in their context, including drawing inferences from a pattern of transactions, and to look at the totality of the deals effected by the taxpayer (and their characteristics), and at what the taxpayer did or omitted to do, and what it could have done, together with the surrounding circumstances in respect of all of them: see Red 12 at [109] to [111]. In effect, as a facet of the guidance given in Red 12, it is necessary to guard against over-compartmentalisation of relevant factors, and to stand back and consider the totality of the evidence: Davis & Dann and CCA Distribution.”
“This means that the only factor indicative of knowledge or tending to show that the Appellant ought to have known that the transactions were connected with fraud is the lack of proper due diligence highlighted above. However, as this tribunal held in PTGI International Carrier Service Limited v HMRC[2022] UKFTT 20 (TC) at [61] : The proper question for us to ask ourselves is not "Did the Appellant carry out proper due diligence?"; but "Did the Appellant have the means at its disposal of knowing that by its purchases it is participating in transactions connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT?" Proper due diligence might be part of the means available to the Appellant. It is not the only means and that is why Moses LJ in Moblix encouraged the courts not to unduly focus on the question of whether the Appellant has acted with due diligence. The point about due diligence and the context referred to in Moblix is that "tick box" due diligence is not enough. So, it will not be open to a trader to carry out superficial due diligence and expect that to, necessarily, be sufficient. The corollary of that is that inadequate due diligence, on its own, will not be enough to establish that the trader ought to have known but had, in effect, turned a blind eye to the connection with fraud. It may be a starting point (and often a good one), but it will rarely be all that is required. As that is all HMRC has been able to establish in this case, we have come to the inevitable conclusion that the Respondents have failed to establish the burden upon them to show that the Appellant's transactions with WM were connected with VAT fraud or that the Appellant ought to have known that they were so connected.”
"60. It is true that, when there are indications pointing to an infringement or fraud, a reasonable trader could, depending on the circumstances of the case, be obliged to make enquiries about another trader from whom he intends to purchase goods or services in order to ascertain the latter's trustworthiness. 61. However, the tax authority cannot, as a general rule, require the taxable person wishing to exercise the right to deduct VAT, first, to ensure that the issuer of the invoice relating to the goods and services in respect of which the exercise of that right to deduct is sought has the capacity of a taxable person, that he was in possession of the goods at issue and was in a position to supply them and that he has satisfied his obligations as regards declaration and payment of VAT, in order to be satisfied that there are no irregularities or fraud at the level of the traders operating at an earlier stage of the transaction or, second, to be in possession of documents in that regard. 62. It is, in principle, for the tax authorities to carry out the necessary inspections of taxable persons in order to detect VAT irregularities and fraud as well as to impose penalties on the taxable person who has committed those irregularities or fraud. (emphasis added) 63. According to the case law of the court, member states are required to check taxable persons' returns, accounts and other relevant documents (see EC Commission v Italy (Case C-132/06 )[2008] ECR I-5457 , para 37, and Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w Biaymstoku v Profaktor Kulesza, Frankowski, Jówiak, Orowski (Case C-188/09 )[2010] ECR I-7639 , para 21). 64. To that end, Directive 2006/112 imposes, in particular in art 242, an obligation on every taxable person to keep accounts in sufficient detail for VAT to be applied and its application checked by the tax authorities. In order to facilitate the performance of that task, arts 245 and 249 of that directive provide for the right of the competent authorities to access the invoices which the taxable person is obliged to store under art 244 of that directive. 65. It follows that, by imposing on taxable persons, in view of the risk that the right to deduct may be refused, the measures listed in para 61 of the present judgment, the tax authority would, contrary to those provisions, be transferring its own investigative tasks to taxable persons."
“112. ‘Blind-eye’ knowledge approximates to knowledge. Nelson at the battle of Copenhagen made a deliberate decision to place the telescope to his blind eye in order to avoid seeing what he knew he would see if he placed it to his good eye. It is, I think, common ground – and if it is not, it should be – that an imputation of blind-eye knowledge requires an amalgam of suspicion that certain facts may exist and a decision to refrain from taking any step to confirm their existence. Lord Blackburn in Jones v Gordon(1877) 2 App Cas 616 , 629 distinguished a person who was ‘honestly blundering and careless’ from a person who ‘refrained from asking questions, not because [they were] an honest blunderer or a stupid [person], but because [they] thought in [their] own secret mind – I suspect there is something wrong, and if I ask questions and make farther inquiry, it will no longer be my suspecting it, but my knowing it…”
“tribunals should not unduly focus on the question whether a trader has acted with due diligence. Even if a trader has asked appropriate questions, [they are] not entitled to ignore the circumstances in which [their] transactions take place if the only reasonable explanation for them is that [the] transactions have been or will be connected to fraud. The danger in focussing on the question of due diligence is that it may deflect a tribunal from asking the essential question posed in Kittel, namely, whether the trader should have known that by [their] purchase [they were] was taking part in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT.”