“(1) The Tribunal may only make an order in respect of costs…— (a) under section 29(4) of the 2007 Act (wasted costs) and costs incurred in applying for such costs; (b) if the Tribunal considers that a party or their representative has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings; [or] (c) if— (i) the proceedings have been allocated as a Complex case under rule 23 (allocation of cases to categories); and (ii) the taxpayer…has not sent or delivered a written request to the Tribunal, within 28 days of receiving notice that the case had been allocated as a Complex case, that the proceedings be excluded from potential liability for costs…under this sub-paragraph;… (2) The Tribunal may make an order under paragraph (1) on an application or of its own initiative. (3) A person making an application for an order under paragraph (1) must— (a) send or deliver a written application to the Tribunal and to the person against whom it is proposed that the order be made; and (b) send or deliver with the application a schedule of the costs…claimed in sufficient detail to allow the Tribunal to undertake a summary assessment of such costs…if it decides to do so. (4) An application for an order under paragraph (1) may be made at any time during the proceedings, but may not be made later than 28 days after the date on which the Tribunal sends— (a) a decision notice recording the decision which finally disposes of all issues in the proceedings; or (b) notice under rule 17(2) of its receipt of a withdrawal which ends the proceedings. (6) The amount of costs…to be paid under an order under paragraph (1) may be ascertained by— (a) summary assessment by the Tribunal; (b) agreement of a specified sum by the paying person and the person entitled to receive the costs…(the “receiving person”); or (c) assessment of the whole or a specified part of the costs…, including the costs…of the assessment, incurred by the receiving person, if not agreed. (7) Following an order for assessment under paragraph (6)(c) the paying person or the receiving person may apply— (a) in England and Wales, to a county court, the High Court or the Costs Office of the Supreme Court (as specified in the order) for a detailed assessment of the costs on the standard basis or, if specified in the order, on the indemnity basis; and theCivil Procedure Rules 1998 shall apply, with necessary modifications, to that application and assessment as if the proceedings in the tribunal had been proceedings in a court to which theCivil Procedure Rules 1998 apply;…” (a) under section 29(4) of the 2007 Act (wasted costs) and costs incurred in applying for such costs; (b) if the Tribunal considers that a party or their representative has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings; [or] (c) if— (i) the proceedings have been allocated as a Complex case under rule 23 (allocation of cases to categories); and (ii) the taxpayer…has not sent or delivered a written request to the Tribunal, within 28 days of receiving notice that the case had been allocated as a Complex case, that the proceedings be excluded from potential liability for costs…under this sub-paragraph;… (a) send or deliver a written application to the Tribunal and to the person against whom it is proposed that the order be made; and (b) send or deliver with the application a schedule of the costs…claimed in sufficient detail to allow the Tribunal to undertake a summary assessment of such costs…if it decides to do so. (a) a decision notice recording the decision which finally disposes of all issues in the proceedings; or (b) notice under rule 17(2) of its receipt of a withdrawal which ends the proceedings. (a) summary assessment by the Tribunal; (b) agreement of a specified sum by the paying person and the person entitled to receive the costs…(the “receiving person”); or (c) assessment of the whole or a specified part of the costs…, including the costs…of the assessment, incurred by the receiving person, if not agreed. (a) in England and Wales, to a county court, the High Court or the Costs Office of the Supreme Court (as specified in the order) for a detailed assessment of the costs on the standard basis or, if specified in the order, on the indemnity basis; and theCivil Procedure Rules 1998 shall apply, with necessary modifications, to that application and assessment as if the proceedings in the tribunal had been proceedings in a court to which theCivil Procedure Rules 1998 apply;…”
“So hmrc should pay costs here and we will apply to the FTT for costs as hmrc has lnown for sometime this was wring to go after!!. Copied to the FTT as the appeal on costs remains open.”
“copied to the Respondent, who prior to this Application, has refused to engage in any discussion re reimbursing wasted costs [sic].”
“Your application must be accompanied by a schedule of the costs you are claiming. Please either: • resubmit your application together with a schedule (and…an explanation of why the schedule was provided late); or • submit a reasoned application for the Tribunal to dispense with the requirement to provide a schedule pending the determination of the application. Bear in mind when deciding which course of action to purse, that, even if the application for costs is successful, the Tribunal will only decide the amount of the costs award if a schedule of costs claimed is provided… If the Tribunal does not hear from you within 14 days from the date of this letter, it will presume that you are not pursuing the application for costs.”
“We believed the reference to the claim for costs notified to the Tribunal on28 September 2022 was sufficient to notify the Tribunal of the claim. We then asked HMRC that day to engage with us that day to resolve [sic] and HMRC ignored us for two months and replied that they did not think they were required to reply!!. It was therefore solely HMRC’s fault that the detailed claim was not submitted as we were waiting on HMRC as to whether they would pay the costs without the Tribunal’s involvement We now know that this was HMRC misleading us by not replying for two months.”
“(1) On an application for relief from any sanction imposed for a failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order, the court will consider all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal justly with the application, including the need – (a) for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost; and (b) to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders.”
“The clear message emerging from the cases – particularised in Denton and similar cases and implicitly endorsed in BPP – is that in exercising judicial discretions generally, particular importance is to be given to the need for ‘litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost’, and ‘to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders’. We see no reason why the principles embodied in this message should not apply to applications to admit late appeals just as much as to applications for relief from sanctions, though of course this does not detract from the general injunction which continues to appear inCPR rule 3.9 to ‘consider all the circumstances of the case’.”
“the FTT can have regard to any obvious strength or weakness of the applicant’s case; this goes to the question of prejudice – there is obviously much greater prejudice for an applicant to lose the opportunity of putting forward a really strong case than a very weak one. It is important however that this should not descend into a detailed analysis of the underlying merits of the appeal…It is clear that if an applicant’s appeal is hopeless in any event, then it would not be in the interests of justice for permission to be granted so that the FTT’s time is then wasted on an appeal which is doomed to fail. However, that is rarely the case. More often, the appeal will have some merit. Where that is the case, it is important that the FTT at least considers in outline the arguments which the applicant wishes to put forward and the respondents’ reply to them. This is not so that it can carry out a detailed evaluation of the case, but so that it can form a general impression of its strength or weakness to weigh in the balance. To that limited extent, an applicant should be afforded the opportunity to persuade the FTT that the merits of the appeal are on the face of it overwhelmingly in his/her favour and the respondents the corresponding opportunity to point out the weakness of the applicant’s case...”
“in most cases, when the FTT is considering an application for permission to make a late appeal, failings by a litigant’s advisers should be regarded as failings of the litigant.”
“It is precisely because of the importance of complying with statutory time limits that, when considering applications for permission to make a late appeal, failures by a litigant’s adviser should generally be treated as failures by the litigant.”
“Ordinarily this court should not distinguish between the litigant himself and his advisers. There are good reasons why the court should not: firstly, if anyone is to suffer for the failure of the solicitor it is better that it be the client than another party to the litigation; secondly, the disgruntled client may in appropriate cases have his remedies in damages or in respect of the wasted costs; thirdly, it seems to me that it would become a charter for the incompetent...”
“…to start with the general rule that the failure of Mr Bridger [Mr Katib’s adviser] to advise Mr Katib of the deadlines for making appeals, or to submit timely appeals on Mr Katib’s behalf, is unlikely to amount to a ‘good reason’ for missing those deadlines when considering the second stage of the evaluation required by Martland.”
“It is clear from the [FTT] decision that Mr Bridger did not provide competent advice to Mr Katib, misled him as to what steps were being taken, and needed to be taken, to appeal against the PLNs [personal liability notices] and failed to appeal against the PLNs on Mr Katib’s behalf. But…the core of Mr Katib’s complaint is that Mr Bridger was incompetent, did not give proper advice, failed to appeal on time and told Mr Katib that matters were in hand when they were not. In other words, he did not do his job. That core complaint is, unfortunately, not as uncommon as it should be. It may be that the nature of the incompetence is rather more striking, if not spectacular, than one normally sees, but that makes no difference in these circumstances. It cannot be the case that a greater degree of adviser incompetence improves one’s chances of an appeal, either by enabling the client to distance himself from the activity or otherwise.”
“…when considering the third stage of the evaluation required by Martland, we should recognise that exceptions to the general rule are possible and that, if Mr Katib was misled by his advisers, that is a relevant consideration.”
“…that does not weigh greatly in the balance since most people who instruct a representative to deal with litigation do so because of their own lack of expertise in this arena.”
“It is the nature of the work done and the scope of the ultimate appeal that determine whether those costs are incidental to the appeal, not the subjective intention of the party when incurring the costs. For example, materials gathered or produced for the purpose of the internal review may then be recycled in the appeal before the FTT. Those costs are clearly of and incidental to the appeal even though they were largely incurred at the earlier stage.”