“The error in VAT is£35,100 . It occurred due to incorrect mark up on zero rated sales plus the sales were overstated as it included sales for services ie. paypoint and lottery which shouldn’t have been there.”
“I am appealing because there were errors made in my case which I noticed after checking the paperwork myself. My accountant provided me with misinformation regarding the appeal, I noticed errors on behalf of HMRC as they have not given me the repayments which were due and therefore I feel that a complete review is required of the charges and VAT refunds and penalties as I believe errors were made by both HMRC and my accountants. I have never been given the choice to appeal. I made an appeal but do not [know] what happened as I have not be gave any information by my accountants who have been sacked by me of ill advise and poor service. Also there are many mistakes the VAT officer have made because I have had no refund from them. I must be given a chance to prove that errors was made by my accountant and the VAT officer, this is only fair to myself, thanks.”
“I have been badly advised by my accountants and there have not kept myself in the picture. I feel that there are mistake made by my accountant and also VAT officer who have dealt with my VAT issues. I know that I can provide the relevant information which will prove that I should have bee given a refund of VAT, instead made to pay VAT which was never due.”
“I am enclosing the letter which HMRC sent regarding my appeal and the failure of my accountants to provide a response to the correspondence.”
“(1) Subject to any provision in an enactment relating to withdrawal or settlement of particular proceedings, a party may give notice to the Tribunal of the withdrawal of the case made by it in the Tribunal proceedings, or any part of that case— (a) by sending or delivering to the Tribunal a written notice of withdrawal; or (b) orally at a hearing. (2) The Tribunal must notify each party in writing of its receipt of a withdrawal under this rule. (3) A party who has withdrawn their case may apply to the Tribunal for the case to be reinstated. (4) An application under paragraph (3) must be made in writing and be received by the Tribunal within 28 days after— (a) the date that the Tribunal received the notice under paragraph (1)(a); or (b) the date of the hearing at which the case was withdrawn orally under paragraph (1)(b).” (a) by sending or delivering to the Tribunal a written notice of withdrawal; or (b) orally at a hearing.
“That statutory provision…contained a strict requirement that HMRC actually gave notice of its objection directly to an appellant and this requirement was not satisfied by using an unauthorised proxy (i.e. the FTT or the FTT's administration), even where the notice was then passed on to, and received by, the appellant in time.”
“The real question is whether HMRC gave notice to the Appellants. In our view, HMRC did indeed give notice to the Appellants. The Appellants clearly received, within the 30 day period, a written notice from which they were able to understand that HMRC were objecting to the withdrawal of the appeals. When the statute requires that HMRC must “give the appellant notice in writing” (paragraph 37(4)(b)), construed purposively, the word “give” looks at the position of an appellant (the intended recipient of the notice) and asks: has the intended recipient actually received the written notice?”
“(1) On an application for relief from any sanction imposed for a failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order, the court will consider all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal justly with the application, including the need – (a) for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost; and (b) to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders.”
“The clear message emerging from the cases – particularised in Denton and similar cases and implicitly endorsed in BPP – is that in exercising judicial discretions generally, particular importance is to be given to the need for ‘litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost’, and ‘to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders’. We see no reason why the principles embodied in this message should not apply to applications to admit late appeals just as much as to applications for relief from sanctions, though of course this does not detract from the general injunction which continues to appear inCPR rule 3.9 to ‘consider all the circumstances of the case’.”
“the FTT can have regard to any obvious strength or weakness of the applicant’s case; this goes to the question of prejudice – there is obviously much greater prejudice for an applicant to lose the opportunity of putting forward a really strong case than a very weak one. It is important however that this should not descend into a detailed analysis of the underlying merits of the appeal…It is clear that if an applicant’s appeal is hopeless in any event, then it would not be in the interests of justice for permission to be granted so that the FTT’s time is then wasted on an appeal which is doomed to fail. However, that is rarely the case. More often, the appeal will have some merit. Where that is the case, it is important that the FTT at least considers in outline the arguments which the applicant wishes to put forward and the respondents’ reply to them. This is not so that it can carry out a detailed evaluation of the case, but so that it can form a general impression of its strength or weakness to weigh in the balance. To that limited extent, an applicant should be afforded the opportunity to persuade the FTT that the merits of the appeal are on the face of it overwhelmingly in his/her favour and the respondents the corresponding opportunity to point out the weakness of the applicant’s case. In considering this point, the FTT should be very wary of taking into account evidence which is in dispute and should not do so unless there are exceptional circumstances.”
“In the context of an appeal right which must be exercised within 30 days from the date of the document notifying the decision, a delay of more than three months cannot be described as anything but serious and significant.”
“We accept HMRC’s general point that, in most cases, when the FTT is considering an application for permission to make a late appeal, failings by a litigant’s advisers should be regarded as failings of the litigant.”
“It is precisely because of the importance of complying with statutory time limits that, when considering applications for permission to make a late appeal, failures by a litigant’s adviser should generally be treated as failures by the litigant.”
“Ordinarily this court should not distinguish between the litigant himself and his advisers. There are good reasons why the court should not: firstly, if anyone is to suffer for the failure of the solicitor it is better that it be the client than another party to the litigation; secondly, the disgruntled client may in appropriate cases have his remedies in damages or in respect of the wasted costs; thirdly, it seems to me that it would become a charter for the incompetent...”
“…to start with the general rule that the failure of Mr Bridger [Mr Katib’s adviser] to advise Mr Katib of the deadlines for making appeals, or to submit timely appeals on Mr Katib’s behalf, is unlikely to amount to a ‘good reason’ for missing those deadlines when considering the second stage of the evaluation required by Martland.”
“It is clear from the [FTT] decision that Mr Bridger did not provide competent advice to Mr Katib, misled him as to what steps were being taken, and needed to be taken, to appeal against the PLNs [personal liability notices] and failed to appeal against the PLNs on Mr Katib’s behalf. But…the core of Mr Katib’s complaint is that Mr Bridger was incompetent, did not give proper advice, failed to appeal on time and told Mr Katib that matters were in hand when they were not. In other words, he did not do his job. That core complaint is, unfortunately, not as uncommon as it should be. It may be that the nature of the incompetence is rather more striking, if not spectacular, than one normally sees, but that makes no difference in these circumstances. It cannot be the case that a greater degree of adviser incompetence improves one’s chances of an appeal, either by enabling the client to distance himself from the activity or otherwise.”
“…when considering the third stage of the evaluation required by Martland, we should recognise that exceptions to the general rule are possible and that, if Mr Katib was misled by his advisers, that is a relevant consideration.”
“…that does not weigh greatly in the balance since most people who instruct a representative to deal with litigation do so because of their own lack of expertise in this arena. We do not consider that, given the particular importance of respecting statutory time limits, Mr Katib’s complaints against Mr Bridger or his own lack of experience in tax matters are sufficient to displace the general rule that Mr Katib should bear the consequences of Mr Bridger’s failings...”