“Dividends 102. Subject to the provisions of the Act, the company may by ordinary resolution declare dividends in accordance with the respective rights of the members, but no dividend shall exceed the amount recommended by the directors. 103. Subject to the provisions of the Act, the directors may pay interim dividends if it appears to them that they are justified by the profits of the company available for distribution... 104. Except as otherwise provided by the rights attached to shares, all dividends shall be declared and paid according to the amounts paid up on the shares on which the dividend is paid...”
“there is no doubt that any dividend should be an interim dividend, as you have already indicated”
‘resolved that an interim dividend of£40m be declared on the A and B shares in issue’
“Our conclusion£20m UK dividend declared on your 2016-2017 tax return, as paid by Regis Group (holdings) ltd, is taxable in the 2015-2016 tax year Reason for our conclusion You were entitled to the interim dividend of£20m at the earlier date of 05/04/16”
“The article as to the payment of an interim dividend is in different terms. It provides (art.91): “The directors may from time to time pay to the members on account of the next forthcoming dividend such interim dividends as, in their judgment, the position of the company justifies.”
“Although it is perfectly true that only reg 103 [of table A] expressly refers to interim dividends, and that such dividends are not referred to in terms in regs 102 and 104, I am not persuaded that it follows from that that the latter Articles have no relevance whatever in respect of interim dividends. There is nothing in regs 102 and 104 which expressly restricts them to final dividends and, as I have noted earlier, the whole section in the Articles from reg 102 to reg 108 is simply headed by the generic word “Dividends”
“Although the principle has been characterised in somewhat different ways in different cases, I do not consider that that is because its nature or extent is in doubt or the subject of debate. The difference in language is attributable to the fact that the principle will have been expressed by reference to the particular facts of the case. The essence of the Duomatic principle, as I see it, is that, where the articles of a company require a course to be approved by a group of shareholders at a general meeting, that requirement can be avoided if all members of the group, being aware of the relevant facts, either give their approval to that course, or so conduct themselves as to make it inequitable for them to deny that they have given their approval. Whether the approval is given in advance or after the event, whether it is characterised as agreement, ratification, waiver, or estoppel, and whether members of the group give their consent in different ways or at different times, does not matter.”
“31 The Duomatic principle is, in short, the principle that anything the members of a company can do by formal resolution in a general meeting, they can also do informally if all of them assent to it. See generally Palmer’s Company Law, looseleaf ed, vol 2, paras 7.434—7.449; and Peter Watts, “Informal Unanimous Assent of Beneficial Shareholders” (2006) 122 LQR 15. The principle derives its name from In re Duomatic Ltd[1969] 2 Ch 365 , in which it was encapsulated by Buckley J, at p 373, as follows: “where it can be shown that all shareholders who have a right to attend and vote at a general meeting of the company assent to some matter which a general meeting of the company could carry into effect, that assent is as binding as a resolution in general meeting would be.” 32 The origins of the principle pre-date In re Duomatic Ltd itself. So, for example, Lord Davey in Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd[1897] AC 22 , 57 stated that “A company is bound in a matter intra vires by the unanimous agreement of its members”.” “where it can be shown that all shareholders who have a right to attend and vote at a general meeting of the company assent to some matter which a general meeting of the company could carry into effect, that assent is as binding as a resolution in general meeting would be.”
“72. Agreements can be inferred from conduct (Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club Ltd v Blackpool Borough Council[1990] 1 WLR 1195 ; Modahl v British Athletic Federation[2002] 1 WLR 1192 ), and there is no reason in principle why that cannot apply to an agreement to amend the constitution of a company (as in Re Home Treat Ltd[1991] BCC 165 ). Moreover the conduct from which agreement may be inferred may include acquiescence in circumstances where the members knew that their assent was being sought or where there was some reason why conscience demanded that they object sooner rather than later (Sharma v Sharma[2014] BCC 73 ). However conduct may be ambiguous. A court should not infer an agreement from conduct where such an agreement is only one of several equal possibilities. Where conduct alone is relied upon, that conduct must lead to the conclusion that on the balance of probabilities the members intended to amend the articles and, further, intended to make the particular amendment contended for.”
“83…The far more natural conclusion is that when Grace became a director in 2004 jointly with her daughter; and when she resigned as a director in 2005 to be replaced by her other daughter; and when she resigned again in 2011 to be replaced by her son, she knew about the arrangements and participated in them and assented to them; and that she did so with knowledge of the membership requirement. I have no reason to conclude that all that was done without her knowledge or that she did not assent to the identity of her replacement or that she did not know that her assent was required.”
“66…. The evidence indicates that too little regard was paid to the terms of Tulsesense’s articles, not that they were varied…There is, more specifically, no evidence in the present case that anyone intended to dispense with the provision in article 95 of Table A to the effect that an appointment under that article should continue, in the first instance, only until the next annual general meeting. In short, this is a case where the articles were not always followed, not one where they were modified or disapplied”
“…where all shareholders who have a right to attend and vote at a general meeting of the company assent to some matter which a general meeting could carry into effect that assent is as binding as a resolution in general meeting would be”
“In my judgment, there must be material from which an observer could discern or (as in the case of acquiescence) infer assent. The law applies an objective test in other contexts: for example, when determining whether a contract has been formed. An objective approach must, I think, also have a role with the Duomatic principle.”
“That makes it unnecessary to deal with consideration. It is also, I think, undesirable to do so. The issue is a difficult one. The only consideration which MWB can be said to have been given for accepting a less advantageous schedule of payments was (i) the prospect that the payments were more likely to be made if they were loaded onto the back end of the contract term, and (ii) the fact that MWB would be less likely to have the premises left vacant on its hands while it sought a new licensee. These were both expectations of practical value, but neither was a contractual entitlement. In Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd[1991] 1 QB 1 the Court of Appeal held that an expectation of commercial advantage was good consideration. The problem about this was that practical expectation of benefit was the very thing which the House of Lords held not to be adequate consideration in Foakes v Beer(1884) 9 App Cas 605 : see, in particular, p 622, per Lord Blackburn. There are arguable points of distinction, although the arguments are somewhat forced. A differently constituted Court of Appeal made these points in In re Selectmove Ltd[1995] 1 WLR 474 , and declined to follow Williams v Roffey. The reality is that any decision on this point is likely to involve a re-examination of the decision in Foakes v Beer. It is probably ripe for re-examination. But if it is to be overruled or its effect substantially modified, it should be before an enlarged panel of the court and in a case where the decision would be more than obiter dictum.”
“(1) If the court is satisfied that a petition under this Part is well founded, it may make such order as it thinks fit for giving relief in respect of the matters complained of. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the court's order may– (a) regulate the conduct of the company's affairs in the future; (b) require the company– (i) to refrain from doing or continuing an act complained of, or (ii) to do an act that the petitioner has complained it has omitted to do; (c) authorise civil proceedings to be brought in the name and on behalf of the company by such person or persons and on such terms as the court may direct; (d) require the company not to make any, or any specified, alterations in its articles without the leave of the court; (e) provide for the purchase of the shares of any members of the company by other members or by the company itself and, in the case of a purchase by the company itself, the reduction of the company's capital accordingly.” (a) regulate the conduct of the company's affairs in the future; (b) require the company– (i) to refrain from doing or continuing an act complained of, or (ii) to do an act that the petitioner has complained it has omitted to do; (c) authorise civil proceedings to be brought in the name and on behalf of the company by such person or persons and on such terms as the court may direct; (d) require the company not to make any, or any specified, alterations in its articles without the leave of the court; (e) provide for the purchase of the shares of any members of the company by other members or by the company itself and, in the case of a purchase by the company itself, the reduction of the company's capital accordingly.”
“19. The relevant law is not in dispute and I have adopted the general propositions set out in Mr Davies QC’s skeleton argument (at [20]–[25] below). 20.If the court is satisfied, on an application by a member of a company under s.994 of the 2006 Act, that the affairs of the company have been conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the member, or members generally, the court may, under s.996 of the 2006 Act, make such order as it thinks fit for the purposes of giving relief in respect of the matters complained of. It is established that in order for this jurisdiction to be engaged, the conduct complained of must be shown to have been both unfair and prejudicial to the petitioner: Re Saul D Harrison & Sons Plc [1994] B.C.C. 475. 21. Regarding the concept of unfairness for the purpose of the jurisdiction under s.994 of the 2006 Act, the touchstone for liability is a breach of the agreement between the members regarding the conduct of the affairs of the company: O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1092; [1999] B.C.C. 600. 22. The agreement between the members for this purpose is most obviously to be found in the company's articles of association, but its terms may also be derived from other sources, such as separate shareholders' agreements and company resolutions setting out the rights attached to shares. It is also well established that not every breach of the constitution or shareholders agreement will constitute unfairness. Trivial or technical breaches will not.”
“[…] it is my view that, in considering whether the conduct of the controllers amounts to conduct unfairly prejudicial to the interests of a member, it is also relevant to take into account any agreement, understanding or clearly established pattern of acquiescence on the part of that member which may have led the controllers to act or continue to act in a particular way, even if their action may have involved a departure from a strict adherence to the terms of the articles. In such a case, in the light of their common understanding as to what conduct will be regarded as acceptable between themselves despite the terms of the articles of association, it would not be correct to characterise the action of the controllers as unfair within the context of the whole relationship between them and the member. In my view, this is a corollary of the approach to the test of unfairness adopted in the authorities to which I have referred above, whereby the agreement between the members as set out in the articles of association may be subject to equitable considerations and obligations arising out of the particular circumstances of their relationship overall. There is no good reason why such equitable considerations should not qualify, as well as add to, the expectations about how the controllers of the company ought to behave to be derived from a simple reading of the articles of association.”
“48. I therefore agree with Mr Davies QC that, if no policy on dividends was adopted by the board of directors, there is no basis for treating the A shares and the B shares differently in respect of dividends. Prior to the special resolution, the B shares and the A shares were all ordinary shares, and the operation of the dividend regime introduced by the special resolution depended entirely upon the existence of a board policy on dividends. Therefore, and as a matter of construction, if there is no board policy in relation to dividends the B shares have throughout ranked pari passu with the A shares in respect of dividends. This reflects the default position as a matter of law. Thus, absent any applicable distinguishing provision in the Articles of association, the shares of a company rank equally: Birch v Cropper (1889) 14 App. Cas. 525 at 543 per Lord Macnaghten.”