“The argument about tax avoidance rather than tax advantage is misconceived…There plainly were notifiable arrangements, and the contention that they did not have obtaining a tax advantage at their heart is difficult to follow: what else was the purpose of this rigmarole? The evidence deployed by HMRC proved the point beyond doubt, and the Claimant produced no evidence what so ever to suggest otherwise.”
“(a) The arrangements were ‘the current iteration’ of a contractor loan scheme previously known as K2/Lighthouse and were first implemented in tax year 14/15; (b) Under the arrangements, a director/contractor is employed by Hyrax Resourcing Limited as trustee of HRT [Hyrax Resourcing Trust]. The services of that director/contractor are then sub-contracted to an end user being the entity wishing to engage the contractor/director. HRT invoices the end user for the services of their employee. HRT pays their employee a national minimum wage (‘NMW’) and gives him/her interest-free loans. The benefit of repayment of the loan is assigned to an offshore employer-financed retirement benefits scheme. The loans are, in reality, never expected to be repaid. (c) The employee declares the NMW for PAYE and NIC. The interest free loan is declared as a beneficial loan on the employee’s tax return but is excluded from it for PAYE purposes. The tax on the beneficial loan is far lower than if the loan sum was taxed as employment income.”
“4.3.5 FAQ – Do I have to repay the loan to the trust/RBS? In practice, extremely unlikely Nearly 25,000 businessmen and contractors have used this mechanism and no-one has yet had to repay it However, there needs to be the POSSIBILITY of repayment, otherwise it would not be a loan.”
“The slide went on to explain that the trustee was bound by law to act solely in (sic) interests of the beneficiary and (implied) a request to repay would never be in (sic) interests of contractor (the beneficiary); moreover, as the funds in trust were held for benefit of beneficiary ‘you would in effect be repaying yourself’. It went on to explain that the loan would not affect the scheme user’s credit score and that a scheme user could still obtain a mortgage through the scheme’s brokers: ‘our mortgage brokers use contract value as evidence of earnings’.”
“QC’s opinion was obtained by a UK tax boutique firm and based on that they have advised on the Hyrax structure. The opinion was reviewed by Hyrax’s directors and I to ensure we were comfortable with the structure.”
“As the structure involves no more than an employer paying its employees a low salary and possibly offering discretionary loans, the QC has opined that there is no ‘tax advantage’ to be disclosed under the DOTAS provisions … Should the arrangement be disclosed unnecessarily, this would create an unacceptable PI risk for parties involved. Please note that, if the QC’s opinion regarding the disclosure of the structure was different, no new disclosure would be required; rather the existing DoTAS (sic) number would continue to apply to the structure – ie the one you have.”
“….arrangements which are substantially the same as the notifiable arrangements (whether they relate to the same or different parties).”
“In agreement with the Upper Tribunal, I consider that this condition makes it clear that the Upper Tribunal should have regard to the usual considerations which apply when the imposition of a tax penalty is in question, including such matters as the reasons for non-compliance, the extent to which the position has been remedied, the gravity and duration of the non-compliance, the presence of aggravating or mitigating factors, the availability of other methods for HMRC to recover the tax at risk (most obviously by making an assessment, if necessary on a best of judgment basis), and generally the need to achieve a fair and proportionate outcome, having regard to the interests of the public purse and the general body of taxpayers as well as the circumstances of the non-compliant taxpayer himself.”
“In deciding whether the excuse put forward, viewed objectively, is sufficient to amount to a reasonable excuse, the tribunal should bear in mind all relevant circumstances; because the issue is whether the particular taxpayer has a reasonable excuse, the experience, knowledge and other attributes of the particular taxpayer should be taken into account, as well as the situation in which that taxpayer was at the time or times….”
“5a. We do not agree the businesses are ‘the same’, even subject to the points you mention. In our view the businesses are fundamentally different. Cirus had only two clients whereas Hyrax has hundreds and has to manage day to day dealing with those clients. In addition, there is the basic difference that Cirus was offshore (and had employees working in various countries around the world) whereas Hyrax is based in the UK and only places its staff in the UK.”
“50. In that case the FTT, correctly in our view, stated that documents on their own without a supporting witness statement may be sufficient to prove relevant facts. It said this at [8]: ‘In this Tribunal witness evidence can be and normally should be adduced to prove relevant facts. Documents (if admitted or proved) are also admissible. Such documents will often contain hearsay evidence, but often from a source of unknown or unspecified provenance. Hearsay evidence is admissible, albeit that it will be a matter of judgement for the Tribunal to decide what weight and reliance can be placed upon it.’ 51. The FTT also made the following observations at [15] with which we would agree: ‘15. We also point out what should be obvious to all concerned, which is that assertions from a presenting officer or advocate that this or that “would have” or “should have” happened carries no evidential weight whatsoever. An advocate’s assertions and/or submissions are not evidence, even if purportedly based upon knowledge of how any given system should operate.’” ‘In this Tribunal witness evidence can be and normally should be adduced to prove relevant facts. Documents (if admitted or proved) are also admissible. Such documents will often contain hearsay evidence, but often from a source of unknown or unspecified provenance. Hearsay evidence is admissible, albeit that it will be a matter of judgement for the Tribunal to decide what weight and reliance can be placed upon it.’ ‘15. We also point out what should be obvious to all concerned, which is that assertions from a presenting officer or advocate that this or that “would have” or “should have” happened carries no evidential weight whatsoever. An advocate’s assertions and/or submissions are not evidence, even if purportedly based upon knowledge of how any given system should operate.’”
“Mr Venables QC took the view, and I adopt here the words attributed to him, that Hyrax ‘involved no more than an employer paying its employees a low salary and the possibility of offering discretionary loans’”
“I certainly recall that the sequence of events was as I have described. There was been focus more recently on the notifiability question, including in particular the First-tier Tribunal case in 2018, and as a result I still have a recollection of what happened in 2014.”
“We do not dispute that EDF Tax Ltd had a major role in the creation and promotion of the arrangements… Importantly, and as we indicate above, HRL was informed that Counsel’s opinion was that, even if the arrangements were disclosable under the DOTAS regime, HRL would not be considered to be the promotor of those arrangements in any event.”
“EDF was in complete control of the process and was responsible for setting up the new employer and all the relevant documentation”
“The Meeting was to discuss details of implementation of a tax planning arrangement (“the Arrangement”) which EDF intended to market to individuals”
“… the structure, whether it was notifiable to HMRC under the DOTAS regime, the role of the employer, their potential involvement as directors of the company which would potentially act as trustee of the employer, and any risks relating thereto”
“Despite not having Mr Venables’ opinion, he had, at a consultation with EDF at the end of January 2014, given an indication that he may conclude that the strategy was not notifiable …”
“It is significant to note that the issues you refer to in relation to disclosability were in fact addressed by EDF Tax Limited and Robert Venables QC before HRL was incorporated or approached to act as the employer entity”
“If the Respondents wish to persuade the court that they reasonably relied upon the advice of their in house accountant (or any other accountant or professional adviser for that matter), it is for them to adduce clear evidence of what advice they were given and when.”
“It is not the name of the QC which is important, but his or her instructions, the qualification of the provider who instructed the opinion and scope of the opinions.”
“The Respondent is, therefore, put to strict proof to establish, with evidence, that it had a reasonable excuse. In particular, the Respondent is put to strict proof to establish, with relevant witness and contemporaneous documentary evidence, any facts it asserts gave rise to a reasonable excuse.”
“(4) The Tribunal may allocate a case as a Complex case under paragraph (1) or (3) only if the Tribunal considers that the case— (a) will require lengthy or complex evidence or a lengthy hearing; (b) involves a complex or important principle or issue; or (c) (c)involves a large financial sum.”
“Litigation in this tribunal is intended to conform to a different model from litigation in the High Court and the Rules establish the framework within which litigation in this tribunal is to be carried on. Rule 27 provides for the normal disclosure in a standard or complex case and I consider it would not be appropriate for me, at this stage in this litigation, to require wider disclosure than that required by rule 27.”
“Disclosure of documents is not an end in itself but a means to an end, namely to ensure that the tribunal has before it all the information which the parties reasonably require the tribunal to consider in determining the appeal. It is only one step in the overall management of the case which should, as the appeal progresses towards a substantive hearing, identify and if possible narrow the issues between the parties. The scope of the issues in contention at the trial depends in part on the legal test to be applied by the tribunal and in part on the parties’ respective positions as to which elements of that test are in contention.”
“…in the absence of any explanation at all for the failure of the directors of the respondents to give evidence it is appropriate to draw the inference that the evidence they could have given would not have assisted their case…”
“57. Under FTR rule 27, it is open to a party to decide the documents on which it intends to rely or to produce at the hearing whether to support its own case or to disprove the case as put by the other party. If the relevant party chooses not to produce a particular document to which a witness refers that may well reduce the value of the evidence given by the witness and affect the strength of that party’s case overall. That is a matter for the Tribunal to assess and is a risk that the relevant party takes. While I accept Mr Ramsden’s point that, if it is read in this way, the effect of the rule is that the level of disclosure under rule 27 is left largely in the hands of the disclosing party, in my view, on its terms, rule 27 does not require a party to disclose any other documents.”
“98C Notification under Part 7 ofFinance Act 2004 (1) A person who fails to comply with any of the provisions of Part 7 of theFinance Act 2004 (disclosure of tax avoidance schemes) mentioned in subsection (2) below shall be liable— (a) to a penalty not exceeding— (i) in the case of a provision mentioned in paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (ca) of that subsection,£600 for each day during the initial period (but see also subsections (2A), (2B) and (2ZC) below), and (ii) in any other case,£5,000 , and … (2) Those provisions are— (a) section 308(1) and (3) (duty of promoter in relation to notifiable proposals and notifiable arrangements), … (2ZA)In this section “the initial period” means the period— (a) beginning with the relevant day, and (b) ending with the earlier of the day on which the penalty under subsection (1)(a)(i) is determined and the last day before the failure ceases; and for this purpose “the relevant day” is the day specified in relation to the failure in the following table. Failure Relevant day … Any other failure to comply with subsection (3) of section 308 The first day after the end of the period prescribed under that subsection … (2ZB) The amount of a penalty under subsection (1)(a)(i) is to be arrived at aftertaking account of all relevant considerations, including the desirability of its beingset at a level which appears appropriate for deterring the person, or otherpersons,from similar failures to comply on future occasions having regard (in particular)— (a) in the case of a penalty for a promoter's failure to comply with section 308(1) or (3) or section 310A, to the amount of any fees received, or likely to have been received, by the promoter in connection with the notifiable proposal (or arrangements implementing the notifiable proposal), or with the notifiable arrangements, and … (2ZBA) In subsection (2ZB)— (a) “promoter” has the same meaning as in Part 7 of theFinance Act 2004 , and … (2ZC) If the maximum penalty under subsection (1)(a)(i) above appears inappropriately low after taking account of those considerations, the penalty is to be of such amount not exceeding£1 million as appears appropriate having regard to those considerations. … (2B) Where a failure to comply with a provision mentioned in subsection (2) concerns a proposal or arrangements in respect of which an order has been made undersection 314A of the Finance Act 2004 (order to disclose), the amounts specified in subsection (1)(a)(i) and (b) above shall be increased to the prescribed sum in relation to days falling after the prescribed period. (2C) In subsection (2A) and (2B)— (a) “the prescribed sum” means a sum prescribed by the Treasury by regulations, and (b) “the prescribed period” means a period beginning with the date of the order under section 306A or 314A and prescribed by the Commissioners by regulations. (2D) The making of an order under section 306A or 314A of that Act does not of itself mean that, for the purposes of section 118(2) of this Act, a person either did or did not have a reasonable excuse for non-compliance before the order was made. (2E) Where an order is made under section 306A or 314A of that Act then for the purposes of section 118(2) of this Act— (a) the person identified in the order as the promoter of the proposal orarrangements cannot, in respect of any time after the end of the period mentioned in subsection (2B), rely on doubt as to notifiability as an excuse for failure to comply with section 308 of that Act, and (b) any delay in compliance with that section after the end of that period is unreasonable unless attributable to something other than doubt as to notifiability. …”