“7. Notice of liability to income tax and capital gains tax (1) Every person who- (a) is chargeable to income tax or capital gains tax for any year of assessment, and (b) has not received a notice under section 8 of this Act requiring a return for that year of his total income and chargeable gains, shall, subject to subsection (3) below, within six months from the end of that year, give notice to an officer of the Board that he is so chargeable. (3) A person shall not be required to give notice under subsection (1) above in respect of a year of assessment if for that year- (a) the person’s total income consists of income from sources falling within subsections (4) to (7) below, (b) the person has no chargeable gains, and (c) the person is not liable to a high income child benefit charge.”
“When considering a “reasonable excuse” defence, therefore, in our view the FTT can usefully approach matters in the following way: First, establish what facts the taxpayer asserts give rise to a reasonable excuse (this may include the belief, acts or omissions of the taxpayer or any other person, the taxpayer's own experience or relevant attributes, the situation of the taxpayer at any relevant time and any other relevant external facts). Second, decide which of those facts are proven. Third, decide whether, viewed objectively, those proven facts do indeed amount to an objectively reasonable excuse for the default and the time when that objectively reasonable excuse ceased. In doing so, it should take into account the experience and other relevant attributes of the taxpayer and the situation in which the taxpayer found himself at the relevant time or times. It might assist the FTT, in this context, to ask itself the question “was what the taxpayer did (or omitted to do or believed) objectively reasonable for this taxpayer in those circumstances?”
“...HMRC are under no obligation to notify individual taxpayers.”
“Parliament cannot have intended ignorance of the law to be a reasonable excuse because Parliament must have enacted the law with the intention that it would be obeyed. In all these circumstances, ignorance of the law simply cannot amount to a reasonable excuse.”
“..lt is idle for any taxpayer to say to the Revenue, ‘Hidden somewhere in your vaults are the right answers: go thou and dig them out of the vaults’. That is not a duty on the Revenue.”
“...for anything to be a reasonable excuse for a failure, it must cause the failure. Yet HMRC's failure to tell the appellants about the change in the law did not cause their ignorance: it merely failed to change it. Mr and Mrs Hesketh were ignorant of the new filing requirement: HMRC did not write to tell them about it so they remained ignorant of it long after the due dates had passed. The failure to write to them did not cause their ignorance and so it could not in law be an excuse for it.”
“I agree with HMRC’s submissions that it is not obliged to notify all customers of changes in the law.”
“I therefore find that the discovery assessment was valid and that the appeal must be dismissed.”
“The first proposition is simply not arguable for the following reasons: (1) HMRC do not have a statutory duty to notify all taxpayers potentially affected by HICBC. By statutory duty, we mean a duty that is provided by Parliament and laid down by statute. For example, HMRC have a statutory duty to issue a notice of assessment for any tax liability to be enforceable. (2) What initiatives or measures HMRC had taken to raise awareness of HICBC were matters of internal policy decisions, over which this Tribunal has no jurisdiction. (3) The cohort of taxpayers likely to be affected by HICBC is not readily identifiable from the information held by HMRC, especially when the recipient of the child benefit and the taxpayer liable to HICBC are not the same person, as is the case here. (4) The ‘Child Benefit’ is not a means-tested benefit, and as such, the Child Benefit Agency does not hold data to enable any identification of the recipients that may be affected by HICBC. (5) The proposition that the Child Benefit Agency makes para 21 provisions relevant is completely misguided. Paragraph 21 of Sch 41 addresses situations wherein the taxpayer has relied on an agent, such as an accountant, to notify HMRC of a liability to tax. Mr Johnstone did not have an agent acting for him, and para 21 is not relevant. (6) It also seems that Mr Johnstone has confused the term ‘agency’ under para 21 with the Child Benefit Agency. Under para 21, the reliance on an agent to notify a liability to HMRC gives rise to a defence for the taxpayer because there is a contractual relationship between the taxpayer and the agent for such a responsibility to be discharged. The CBA has no 5 contractual relationship with Mr Johnstone to undertake to notify HMRC of his liability to HICBC. (7) Mr Johnstone has also suggested that the process whereby taxpayers get sent the awareness letter by HMRC was unfair, as it clearly had left some affected taxpayers out. Such a challenge can only be done by way of 10 judicial review at the High Court, as this tribunal has no general supervisory jurisdiction by way of judicial review. (See the Upper Tribunal decision in HMRC v Noor[2013] UKUT 71 at [25].)”
“... set aside a penalty which has not in fact been incurred, or to correct a penalty which has been incurred but has been imposed in an incorrect amount, but it goes no further. ... it is plain that the First-tier Tribunal has no statutory power to discharge, or adjust a penalty because of a perception that it is unfair.”