“5.— Case management powers (1) Subject to the provisions of the 2007 Act and any other enactment, the Tribunal may regulate its own procedure. (2) The Tribunal may give a direction in relation to the conduct or disposal of proceedings at any time, including a direction amending, suspending or setting aside an earlier direction.”
“There is no guidance in the rules as to how such a decision is to be reached other than the application of the overriding objective.” 41. Having then set out the overriding objective in rule 2, Proudman J continued at [23]: 5 “Although, as I have said, there is no guidance in the rules, the FTT applied the additional principles set out (in the context of delay in lodging an appeal) in Former North Wiltshire DC v HMRC[2010] UKFTT 449 (TC) . Those were the criteria formerly set out inCPR 3.9 (1) for relief from sanctions: see the decision of the Court of Appeal in Sayers v Clarke Walker[2002] EWCA Civ 645 at [21]. In North Wiltshire (see [56]-[57]) the FTT concluded that it was not obliged to consider these criteria but it accepted that it might well in practice do so. The same reasoning applies to the present case. The criteria were, · The reasons for the delay, that is to say, whether there is a good reason for it. · Whether HMRC would be prejudiced by reinstatement. · Loss to the appellant if reinstatement were refused. · The issue of legal certainty and whether extending time would be prejudicial to the interests of good administration. · Consideration of the merits of the proposed appeal so far as they can conveniently and proportionately be ascertained.” 45. I gratefully adopt the approach described by Proudman J in Pierhead Purchasing . In deciding whether to grant the application to set aside the Strike Out and reinstate, I bear in mind that I must give effect to the overriding objective of the FTT Rules to deal with cases fairly and justly. North Wiltshire concerned an application for an extension of time in which to appeal and so the relevant criteria were necessarily rather different. In this case, I consider that the relevant factors that I should take into account when considering whether to set aside the Strike Out are: (1) whether the appeal is arguable and has a reasonable prospect of success; (2) the reasons for the Strike Out; (3) whether there has been any material change since the Strike Out; (4) whether HMRC would be prejudiced if the Strike Out were set aside; (5) what prejudice would Jumbogate suffer if the Strike Out were not set aside; and (6) the conduct of the parties.”
“A judge should address an application for relief from sanctions in three stages. The first stage is to identify and assess the seriousness and significance of the “failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order” which engages rule 3.9(1). If the breach is neither serious nor significant, the court is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages. The second stage is to consider why the default occurred. The third stage is to evaluate “all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable [the court] to deal justly with the application including [factors (a) and (b)]”.” 41. In respect of the “third stage” identified above, the Court said (at [32]) that the two factors identified at (a) and (b) in Rule 3.9(1) “are of particular importance and should be given particular weight at the third stage when all the circumstances of the case are considered.” 42. The Supreme Court in BPP implicitly endorsed the approach set out in Denton. That case was concerned with an application for the lifting of a bar on HMRC’s further involvement in the proceedings for failure to comply with an “unless” order of the FTT. 43. In its previous form, the “checklist” of items inCPR rule 3.9 can be seen to bear a number of similarities to the questions identified in Aberdeen and Data Select; to that extent, it is easy to regard them as little more than an aide memoire to help the judge to consider “all relevant factors” (and indeed, the list was preceded by the general injunction to “consider all the circumstances”). The question that naturally arises is whether the changes toCPR rule 3.9 and the evolving approach to applications for relief from sanctions under that rule also apply to applications for permissions to appeal to the FTT outside the relevant statutory time limit. We consider that they do. Whether considering an application which is made directly under rule 3.9 (or under the FTT Rules, which the Supreme Court in BPP clearly considered analogous) or an application to notify an appeal to the FTT outside the statutory time limit, it is clear that the judge will be exercising a judicial discretion. The consequences of the judge’s decision in agreeing (or refusing) to admit a late appeal are often no different in practical terms from the consequences of allowing (or refusing) to grant relief from sanctions – especially where the sanction in question is the striking out of an appeal (or, as in BPP, the barring of a party from further participation in it). The clear message emerging from the cases – particularised in Denton and similar cases and implicitly endorsed in BPP – is that in exercising judicial discretions generally, particular importance is to be given to the need for “litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost”, and “to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders”