“...the interpretive obligation decreed by s3 is of an unusual and far-reaching character. Section 3 may require a court to depart from the unambiguous meaning the legislation would otherwise bear. In the ordinary course the interpretation of legislation involves seeking the intention reasonably to be attributed to Parliament in using the language in question. Section 3 may require the court to depart from this legislative intention, that is, depart from the intention of the Parliament which enacted the legislation. The question of difficulty is how far, and in what circumstances, s3 requires a court to depart from the intention of the enacting Parliament. The answer to this question depends upon the intention reasonably to be attributed to Parliament in enacting s3. [31] On this the first point to be considered is how far, when enacting s3, Parliament intended that the actual language of a statute, as distinct from the concept expressed in that language, should be determinative. Since s3 relates to the “interpretation” of legislation, it is natural to focus attention initially on the language used in the legislative provision being considered. But once it is accepted that s3 may require legislation to bear a meaning which departs from the unambiguous meaning the legislation would otherwise bear, it becomes impossible to suppose Parliament intended that the operation of s3 should depend critically upon the particular form of words adopted by the parliamentary draftsman in the statutory provision under consideration. That would make the application of s3 something of a semantic lottery. If the draftsman chose to express the concept being enacted in one form of words, s3 would be available to achieve Convention-compliance. If he chose a different form of words, s3 would be impotent. [32] From this the conclusion which seems inescapable is that the mere fact that the language under consideration is inconsistent with a Convention-compliant meaning does not of itself make a Convention-compliant interpretation under s3 impossible. Section 3 enables language to be interpreted restrictively or expansively. But s3 goes further than this. It is also apt to require a court to read in words which change the meaning of the enacted legislation, so as to make it Convention-compliant. In other words, the intention of Parliament in enacting s3 was that, to an extent bounded only by what is “possible”, a court can modify the meaning, and hence the effect, of primary and secondary legislation. [33] Parliament, however, cannot have intended that in the discharge of this extended interpretative function the courts should adopt a meaning inconsistent with a fundamental feature of legislation. That would be to cross the constitutional boundary s3 seeks to demarcate and preserve. Parliament has retained the right to enact legislation in terms which are not Convention-compliant. The meaning imported by application of s3 must be compatible with the underlying thrust of the legislation being construed. Words implied must, in the phrase of my noble and learned friend Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, “go with the grain of the legislation”
“Implementation of Care Plan)[2002] 2 AC 291 , [2002] 2 AII ER 192, [2002] 1 FCR 577 . There the proposed “starring system” was inconsistent in an important respect with the scheme of theChildren Act 1989 , and the proposed system had far-reaching practical ramifications for local authorities. Again, in R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2003] 1 AC 837 , [2002] 4 AII ER 1089,s29 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 could not be read in a Convention-compliant way without giving the section a meaning inconsistent with an important feature expressed clearly in the legislation. In Bellinger v Bellinger[2003] 2 AC 467 , [2003] 2 AII ER 593, [2003] 2 FCR 1 , recognition of Mrs Bellinger as female for the purposes ofs11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 would have had exceedingly wide ramifications, raising issues ill-suited for determination by the courts or court procedures.”