“I am still of the opinion that your clients [sic] comments do indicate that not all VAT was absorbed otherwise prices would have exactly matched those of Temp Dent and other competitors and turnover would not have been affected. However I do not doubt that prices were set with the company’s competitors in mind. The difference is therefore perhaps insignificant in the context of the overall amount of VAT incorrectly charged.”
“It seems that there is doubt whether your client would benefit by being wholly or partly unjustly enriched if the repayment of the claim of 30 th March 2009 was made in full. In view of this doubt, and in the light of my comments above, perhaps you could demonstrate how your client suffered a loss as result of passing the VAT on for the period of this claim. I would be happy to meet to discuss this further.”
“On the basis of the preceding points I suggest, on a ‘without prejudice’ basis, that we come to a compromise solution. Without sufficient information and given the date of the period of the claim it is difficult to suggest quite what this would amount to. I would, however, propose that 50% of the claim is due.”
“In order for our client to make a decision in respect of the offer in your letter of 26 March can you please provide me with the total payment (VAT plus interest) that would be made to [Southern Cross], as if the claim was paid on the date of your response.”
“However, in order to attempt to bring this to a conclusion speedily our client is willing to negotiate.”
“Given that the evidence obtained by The Commissioners in the course of this exercise indicated that competitors were applying VAT to their margin (commissions), we propose that in order to reach settlement we treat the claim as if all competition was applying VAT to the margin throughout the period of the claim. If we treat the industry margin as being that obtained by [Southern Cross] for the period of the original claim … which was 26%, our client would be willing to restrict its original claim by this amount. In conclusion, [Southern Cross] would accept a proposal from HMRC to repay 74% of the VAT plus interest but does not accept that payment of the claim in full would result in [Southern Cross] being unjustly enriched.”
“I can confirm that the Commissioners will accept that 74% of the claim of£861,212 will be repaid. The VAT repayment will amount to£637,296.60 and together with the appropriate interest … I will arrange for authorisation of this sum next week.”
“The situation must be viewed objectively, from the point of view of whether the inspector’s agreement to the relevant computation, having regard to the surrounding circumstances including all the material known to be in his possession, was such as to lead a reasonable man to the conclusion that he had decided to admit the claim which had been made.”
“… the notion of parties having ‘come to’ an agreement plainly implies not merely that they are of the same mind in relation to a particular matter, but also that their minds have met so as to form a mutual consensus, and that that meeting of minds, that mutual consensus, has resulted from a process in which each party has to some extent participated. On that footing it is, in my judgment, both legitimate and helpful (as both sides have accepted) to approach the question whether the Revenue and the taxpayer have made a s 54 agreement in the instant case by applying common law principles of offer and acceptance.”
“[HMRC] will accept that 74% of the claim of£861,212 will be repaid … together with the appropriate interest …”
“If there is a power to enforce there must also necessarily be a power for good consideration to accept some lesser sum. The Revenue of course have no power to refrain from collecting tax which is due, but these agreements are all made in a situation where the actual tax recoverable has not been quantified.”
“The authorities clearly show that the respondents have a managerial discretion, and that there are circumstances in which they have power to enter into an agreement with the taxpayer for the payment of a sum of money in respect of the taxpayer's tax liability, even where it may be said that they have foregone the collection of some part of the total amount of tax which was due. They can properly take into account the extent of the information which is likely to be obtainable, and the difficulty involved in identifying the extent of the exact sum which is due.”
“A back tax agreement relates to a situation in which the taxpayer has already incurred the tax liability, but its amount has not been determined. Fundamental to the legality of such an agreement is that the respondents have the power to require the taxpayer to pay what is due. As an alternative means to the same end they are regarded as having the power, in the exercise of their managerial discretion, to enter into a contract with the taxpayer for a payment in satisfaction of that liability. In that context they have power to arrange a compromise with the taxpayer, taking into account such factors as may be relevant.”
“The primary duty of the Revenue is to collect taxes which are properly payable in accordance with current legislation but it is also responsible for managing the tax system: sees 1 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 . Inherent in the duty of management is a wide discretion. Although the discretion is bounded by the primary duty (see R (on the application of Wilkinson) v IRC[2005] UKHL 30 at [21],[2006] STC 270 at [21],[2005] 1 WLR 1718 per Lord Hoffmann), it is lawful for the Revenue to make concessions in relation to individual cases or types of case which will, or may, result in the non-collection of tax lawfully due provided that they are made with a view to obtaining overall for the national exchequer the highest net practicable return: see IRC v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd[1981] STC 260 at 268,[1982] AC 617 at 636 per Lord Diplock. In particular the Revenue is entitled to apply a cost-benefit analysis to its duty of management and in particular, against the return thereby likely to be foregone, to weigh the costs which it would be likely to save as a result of a concession which cuts away an area of complexity or likely dispute.”
“Section 80(4A) operates whenever there has been a voluntary payment in response to a claim under 80(2), but sub–s (4A) does not operate where a payment has been made in settlement of a dispute which has given rise to an appeal settled within the meaning of s 85. The distinction finds support at para 106 in BSOC (see[2000] STC 892 at 921 –922 ). It is true that there was no intervention of a judicial determination as in BSOC , but s 85 has the same effect as the intervention of a judicial determination.”
“Whatever my doubts about that submission I have no need to reach any conclusion. Very different considerations apply if DFS cannot rely on s 85 and in particular it falls for consideration elsewhere as to whether s 85 ousts or merely augments the common law rule.”
“The purpose of a compromise is to put an end to the disputation in which the parties had hitherto been engaged. Such cause or causes of action as each had, or may have had, prior to the conclusion of the agreement are discharged and if the compromise is embodied in a consent judgment those causes of action become merged in the judgment. New causes of action arise from the existence of the compromises …”
“104. The question remains whether it has done so. I cannot agree that the revisiting of a payment by the commissioners is the same thing as the administrative overthrowing of a prior judicial determination. Against the background of the announcement of18 July 1996 , it is one thing for the commissioners to say to a taxpayer: 'I agree that as the law now stands I must repay you six years' overpayment, but when the law has been changed so as to introduce the new cap retrospectively, I will exercise my rights to recoup the difference.' But it seems to me that it is quite another thing for the commissioners to litigate with the taxpayer as to the extent of their liability, to find that judgment goes against them or to concede that it must, and then seek to say by administrative fiat that their 'repayment liability' was something else than it has been judicially determined to be. If Parliament wishes to legislate that prior judicial determinations can be overthrown in this way, especially in a statutory context which is all about the making of claims, then in my judgment it must say so expressly, as it could easily have done. 105. Suppose that, contrary to the facts of this case, there had been a real possibility of a defence of unjust enrichment being run. Could it be said that the statute contemplates that a tribunal decision might be given against the commissioners prior to4 December 1996 for a repayment liability of £x, and that the commissioners could thereafter seek to say that under the terms of amended s 80(3A)–(3C) they were now in a position to prove that their repayment liability was some different and lesser sum? I think not. 106. Not only is the whole context of ss 80 and 47 that of claims made rather than judicial determinations delivered, but the retrospective aspects of s 80(4A) and (4B) are written in terms of the commissioners' repayment liability at the time of the commissioners' payment . That makes sense where the commissioners are merely paying a claim without the intervention of a judicial determination. Where, therefore, the commissioners have paid a claim after18 July 1996 , they are given the power to recoup that part of the payment which exceeds their liability under the three-year cap. Where, however, the amount of the repayment liability has been determined judicially, it does not follow that the commissioners should be able to recoup administratively what they have been adjudged liable to pay, nor is there any logic in focusing on the time of payment as distinct from the time of the judicial decision.”