Valiant Pub Company Limited v Newcastle City Council [2026] UKFTT 683 (GRC)

[2026] UKFTT 00683 (GRC)Case Reference: FT/CR/2025/0011
First-tier Tribunal
(General Regulatory Chamber)
Hearing Heard on: 6 May 2026Date 16 July 2026
Community Right to Bid
Heard by Cloud Video Platform
Before
JUDGE HARRIS
Between
VALIANT PUB COMPANY LIMITEDAppellantNEWCASTLE CITY COUNCILRespondentGerry Carroll for AppellantAnthony Gill for RespondentDecision: The appeal is DismissedREASONS

Background to the Appeal

[1]This appeal concerns the decision of Newcastle City Council (“the Council”) to include the Keelman Pub, Restaurant, Hotel and Brewery (the “Keelman”) on its list of Assets of Community Value (“ACV”) under the Localism Act 2011 (“the Act”). The Council’s decision was made on 18 September 2025 and confirmed on review on 4 November 2025. The appeal is brought pursuant to Regulation 11 of The Assets of Community Value (England) Regulations 2012 (“the Regulations”).[2]The Appellant is the freehold owner of the nominated land which comprises the Keelman. The Appellant purchased the Keelman in November 2024, since which time it has carried out substantial refurbishments and improvements. The Keelman is on a site of approximately 4 acres and includes multiple bars, a full-service restaurant, 14 guest bedrooms and an on-site brewery.[3]The Keelman was nominated as an ACV under the Act by Tyneside and Northumberland Campaign for Real Ale (“CAMRA”) on 15 July 2025.[4]The Council carried out an evaluation of the nomination and as a result the Keelman was listed as an ACV on 18 September 2025. The Appellant was notified of this outcome on the same date.[5]The listing was only of one building on the Keelman site, which is listed as a public bar and brewery. The uses for which the Keelman has been listed are non-ancillary.[6]On 19 September 2025, the Appellant submitted an “appeal request” for a review of the listing decision setting out seven grounds of review. Following a review, the Council confirmed the decision to list the Keelman as an ACV on 4 November 2025 The Appeal[7]The Appellant filed the appeal by way of form GRC1 dated 28 November 2025 and the appeal was accepted by the Tribunal on 10 December 2025.[8]The Appellant raised the following grounds of appeal:a. Ground 1: The Council has misapplied the “community value” test in section 88(1) of the Act; ordinary social and recreational services do not alone justify listing as an ACV. The Keelman is “a thriving, privately owned, well-invested business already delivering substantial social and economic benefit without any need for statutory intervention.”b. Ground 2: The Council dismissed as irrelevant the fact that any future sale of the Keelman would be a going concern disposal, which is an exempt transaction rather than a “relevant disposal” under the Regulations.c. Ground 3: The nomination was made by a local CAMRA branch, which cannot trigger a moratorium under Regulation 12. The Council’s assertion that another eligible group might appear later is speculative.d. Ground 4: The Keelman’s value and complexity mean that there is no realistic prospect of community ownership.e. Ground 5: The Keelman is already a Grade II listed building, so the ACV designation adds nothing and duplicates protections that already exist.f. Ground 6: There is no community benefit, risk or practical effect to designating the Keelman as an ACV.g. Ground 7: The ACV listing represents a misallocation of public resources and is “pure bureaucracy for bureaucracy’s sake. It burdens a thriving local employer, wastes taxpayer money and undermines confidence in public decision-making”. The Council’s Response to the Appeal[9]The Council filed a Response dated 6 January 2026, in which it opposed the appeal. It submits that since the uses for which the Keelman was listed are currently ongoing the relevant provision is section 88(1) of the Act and that designation does satisfy these requirements.[10]In summary, the Council responded to the grounds of appeal raised by the Appellant as follows:a. Ground 1: The nomination refers to the Keelman’s use by the local community, walkers and cyclists, and users of the local riverside park, particularly the use of its small meeting area by local groups. It refers to the brewery as “part of local culture” and refers to the value to the community of the Keelman as a heritage asset. It relies on the witness statement of Adam Taeger, which lists activities furthering the social wellbeing of the local community. The Respondent resists this ground because it is apparent the actual current uses of the Keelman which are not ancillary are furthering the social wellbeing of the local community. It is not the case in law that a “thriving” community asset should not be listed.b. Ground 2: There can be no certainty that any future sale of the Keelman would be as a going concern. The Tribunal must apply the tests set out in section 88 of the Act and is not required or allowed to consider whether the listing would in future be ineffective due to a hypothetical exempt disposal.c. Ground 3: The operation of the moratorium provisions under the Regulations are not relevant to the consideration of whether to list an asset under section 88 of the Act. The requirements of a nominating party are set out in section 89 and Regulations 4 and 5.d. Ground 4: The Appellant’s own submissions and intentions for the Keelman mean it is realistic to conclude that the existing uses furthering social wellbeing will continue.e. Ground 5: The Listed Building regime is a separate regulatory regime to the ACV list under the Act. The listing of the Keelman as an ACV does not in any way duplicate listed building control. The existence of one regulatory regime does not eliminate the need for others.f. Ground 6: The Appellant’s own submissions evidence that the continued ability of the Keelman to further social wellbeing is realistic. The Tribunal must apply the test set out in section 88(1).g. Ground 7: The Appellant wrongly implies that the Council has discretion in the application of the ACV regime; it is obliged to consider the application and apply the statutory test to determine whether to list as an ACV. The Appellant’s complaint under this ground is a policy complaint against the ACV regime as a whole, rather than a substantive challenge to the listing of the Keelman. Legal Framework[11]The Act requires local authorities to maintain a list of assets (meaning buildings or other land) which are of community value (section 87(1)). Assets remain on the list for a period of 5 years, unless the time period is either removed earlier pursuant to section 87(5) or is amended by the relevant local authority, pursuant to section 87(4).[12]The non-ancillary uses for which the Keelman has been listed, as a public house and brewery used by the local community for various social activities, are ongoing and therefore section 88(1) of the Act is the relevant section.[13]Section 88 of the Act provides:
“(1) For the purposes of this Chapter but subject to regulations under subsection (3), a building or other land in a local authority's area is land of community value if in the opinion of the authority— (a) an actual current use of the building or other land that is not an ancillary use furthers the social wellbeing or social interests of the local community, and (b) it is realistic to think that there can continue to be non-ancillary use of the building or other land which will further (whether or not in the same way) the social wellbeing or social interests of the local community.”
[14]Section 89 goes on to provide that (so far as relevant in this case) land may only be listed by a local authority in response to a community nomination. Procedural requirements for nomination and listing are contained in the 2012 Regulations.[15]The Upper Tribunal (“UT”) reviewed the case law on the meaning of “realistic in the case of Dragonfly Architectural Services Ltd v Brighton & Hove City Council [2025] UKUT 051 (AAC). At paragraph 19(4) the UT confirmed that the test of “not fanciful” is not an erroneous interpretation of “realistic”.[16]In this Tribunal’s decision in Dragonfly Architectural Service v Brighton & Hove City Council (CR/2022/0007) Judge Neville considered the sources of evidence that can inform an authority’s decision to list. He held that an authority can determine listing on such circumstances as it considers relevant whether or not in the nomination. The issues[17]The key issue identified which the Tribunal must decide is whether or not the statutory test under section 88(1) is satisfied. Specifically, it must decide:a. Whether there is a current non-ancillary use of the Keelman that furthers the social wellbeing or social interests of the local community;b. Whether it is realistic to think that there can continue to be non-ancillary use of the Keelman which will further (whether or not in the same way) the social wellbeing or social interests of the local community. Procedural matters relating to the hearing[18]The hearing was conducted by Cloud Video Platform (CVP) and the Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to proceed with the hearing in this way.[19]The Tribunal considered a bundle of 125 pages. Both parties submitted skeleton arguments, and the Council’s argument was submitted together with copies of supporting authorities.[20]The Appellant also submitted a witness statement from Mr Carroll dated 29 April 2026. Although this was filed significantly out of time, the Tribunal took the view that it contained matters relevant to the Tribunal’s decision and it was therefore in the interests of justice to admit it. Evidence[21]We heard oral evidence from Mr Carroll on behalf of the Appellant. In summary, he made the following points:a. He explained that the Appellant is a multi-site retail business based in Birmingham which purchased the Keelman in November 2024 and has since invested significant amounts in the site. The Appellant currently operates 96 pubs across the country. Mr Carroll personally works in Birmingham and has visited the Keelman between 10 and 20 times since it was acquired by the Appellant.b. He stated that there were eight other pubs within a 5-minute drive of the Keelman, none of which have been listed as an ACV.c. He asserted that there is no evidence that the community depends on the Keelman.d. He agreed that the premises are used by walkers, cyclists, park users and attendees of social events as set out in paragraph 10 of his skeleton.e. He accepted that the Appellant had not provided any evidence of how the various uses of the Keelman site interact, its value or its takings.f. He accepted that at present there is no certainty as to what any future disposal of the Keelman would entail, but said it was a popular business which would more likely than not be sold as a pub.[22]We also heard oral evidence from Mr Adam Taeger, Communities Officer, on behalf of the Council. In summary, he made the following points:a. He said there are a number of Communities Officers working for the Council and he is normally the one who is involved in ACV listings. He said that he has been involved in considering around 6 other ACV nominations, of which 2 were public houses. He said that the Council will only consider listing premises as an ACV if they are nominated.b. He said that he has visited the Keelman around 5 or 6 times over the past couple of years, both for the formal site visit in September 2025 and as a customer when using the nearby leisure centre, walking paths and cycle trails.c. He said that the test in section 88(1) is whether there are uses which further social wellbeing and interests of the local community. “Community” in this context does not only mean people living in the vicinity of the Keelman, but also other communities such as a community football team or other community that makes use of the facilities, such as the walking community. He said that a number of different communities were relevant in the case of the Keelman and that the legislation permits people other than those living on the doorstep to nominate an ACV.d. He expressed the view that popularity is not relevant to the first part of the test under section 88(1) in considering whether or not there are uses that further social interests and/or wellbeing. However, it is relevant to the second part of the test concerned with whether continued use is realistic; the viability of the pub suggests that it is realistic to consider it can continue to be used in the future, whether or not under current management.e. When asked by Mr Carroll whether every pub nominated would be listed as an ACV, Mr Taeger answered that it would not necessarily be, as social interests and wellbeing can take a variety of premises. The type of premises would meet the test, but the Council would look at each nomination individually.f. He said that the issue about whether or not a community would be able to acquire an ACV comes up only when and if it is subject to a relevant disposal. Here the Appellant has stated its intention to continue to run the Keelman, so at the point of listing as an ACV the appropriate test is section 88(1) and questions of disposal are dealt with at a later stage. Further submissions by the parties[23]The points raised by the Appellant in its skeleton argument referred to numbered grounds which raised new points and did not correspond to the grounds set out in the Grounds of Appeal. To avoid confusion with the original grounds, I refer to these new grounds with the prefixa. A. The points it made were as follows: a. Ground A1 The Appellant argues that use of the premises by walkers, cyclists, park users, social event attendees and others are “ordinary characteristics of a successful hospitality venue” and do not demonstrate that the premises function as community infrastructure within the meaning of section 88(1). If this was the case, the majority of public houses would qualify as ACVs automatically.b. Ground A2 The Appellant argues that the Keelman is not a neighbourhood public house but a “regional destination hospitality venue serving overnight guests and visitors from a wide catchment area”.c. Ground A3 The Appellant argues that commercial success demonstrates viability rather than community asset status.d. Ground A4 the Appellant says that factors such as tourism use, accessibility to walkers and cyclists and occasional CAMRA meetings do not demonstrate that the premises function as community infrastructure; these are “ordinary characteristics of commercial hospitality premises”.e. Ground A5 The Appellant says that the Respondent did not identify a qualifying community-value use capable of continuing and instead relied on the continued operation of the premises as a “successful hospitality business”.f. Ground A6: The Appellant says that the nomination evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that the Keelman functions as community infrastructure and instead demonstrates that the premises are “a successful destination hospitality venue.”g. Ground A7: The Appellant says that the scale and complexity of the Keelman property are relevant context, including the fact that it has an open market value exceeding £3.5 million. It also argues that “the operational complexity of a combined public house, hotel and brewery distinguishes the premises from assets typically capable of community acquisition or operation”.h. The Appellant argues that any future disposal would likely occur as part of a wider corporate transaction or as a going concern, which is commonly exempt under the legistlation. It says that this “demonstrates that the statutory scheme would not realistically deliver community acquisition in this case.”i. Finally, the Appellant argues that the ACV regime is intended to identify land whose use genuinely furthers the social wellbeing /interest of the local community and is not “intended to designate large mixed-use destination hospitality venues solely because they are popular.”[24]At the hearing Mr Carroll made the following additional points:a. He argued that in his experience there are very few premises like the Keelman which are listed as ACVs, as this is more often applied to pubs which are at risk or “the last pub in the village”. He said that the Keelman was the wrong type of premises to nominate.b. He said that the Council has equated the popularity of the pub with community value in applying the test under section 88(1) and that as a result the test had not been correctly applied.c. He said that what he understood by “community infrastructure” is that the premises support the community in unusual ways. He expressed the view that the Keelman is just a commercial hospitality business but not necessarily anything special to the community.d. He said that he did not understand how the brewery at the Keelman site can be listed as an ACV.e. He argued that the Council has not identified a qualifying function and has not demonstrated anything other than normal pub use.[25]The Council responded to the Appellant’s skeleton argument, noting that it raised a number of new points which had not previously been argued. In summary, it raised the following points:a. In relation to ground A1, the Appellant has not provided any precedent, any material to demonstrate the intention of parliament or explain what it means by “community infrastructure” which is not a term used in the statute. Pubs are not automatically ACVs; each case must be determined on its facts. In Admiral Taverns Ltd v CWAC and FPC [2018] UKUT 15 (AAC) at para.24 the Upper Tribunal approved the following analysis by the FTT demonstrating sufficient use “‘It is clear from the information before me that the premises have been used by local people as part of their social lives, meeting others in a convivial atmosphere for food and drink and furthermore holding some social events, notably quiz nights” CR/2016/0022 at second para.8. The Council submits that the case law supports the “ordinary characteristics” of a public house as being matters which can substantiate ACV listing.b. In relation to Ground A2, the Council notes that the wider Keelman site is not within the ACV listing, which is limited to the pub and brewery building only. It says the Appellant’s skeleton does not explain the relevance of the distinction it draws between a regional venue and a neighbourhood pub, which is not a distinction which appears in the statute. There is no basis for the Appellant’s submission that the ACV regime is applicable to neighbourhood venues and not ‘regional destinations, as it will usually be a question of fact as to what the ‘local community’ comprises in any particular case. See Pullan v Leeds CR/2015/0011 at para.10. The case law of the Tribunal has established that assets can be listed as ACVs with wider catchments for the communities whose social wellbeing they further. See 4C Hotels (2) Ltd v City of London CR/2017/0011 paras.20-23. The evidence of the Council (in significant part relying upon the Appellant’s own publicity) demonstrates the Keelman to provide social events to its patrons and be run in a convivial manner such as to merit listing as noted in Admiral Taverns.c. In relation to Ground A3, the Council sys it did not predicate its decision to list upon the commercial success of the Keelman. The Council relied upon the Appellant’s own submissions regarding the Keelman’s continued viability when considering whether the continued community use of the public house was realistic.d. In relation to Ground A4, the Council says that section 88(1) does not require use to fall within the categories identified by the Appellant and describes the Appellant’s description of the ACV regime as “entirely invented”. The Council argues that occasional meetings and general patronage are ‘ordinary characteristics’ of commercial hospitality premises and among the characteristics of a public house repeatedly held sufficient to justify ACV listing.e. In relation to Ground A5, the Council says this ground stems from the Appellant’s erroneous refusal to accept that the current operation of the Keelman facilitates uses furthering social wellbeing within s.88. The Council relied upon evidence of the Keelman’s current use by the public, and specific sports and leisure users. It is entirely reasonable and realistic to conclude that the Appellant’s own stated intention to continue to operate the Keelman would also allow those uses furthering social wellbeing to continue.f. In relation to Ground A6, the Council submits that the evidence of the use of the Keelman relied upon was, and is, sufficient to substantiate its listing.g. In relation to Ground A7, the Council submits that whether an ACV is of significant value does not inform whether it ‘genuinely functions’ as an ACV. A number of sports stadia have been listed as ACVs (including the Kassam Stadium – see para.18(b) above). They are assets of substantial value. Their value has no relationship to their functioning to further social wellbeing.h. In relation to exempt disposal, the Council notes the Appellant now concedes that any potential future exemption is not determinative of listing. The Council must apply s.88 and had no basis to determine the nomination otherwise in light of a potential future exempt disposal.[26]The Council concluded that it was correct to find the use of the Keelman (as described in the witness statement of Mr Taeger) furthers the social wellbeing and social interest of the local community. It was also correct in light of the Appellant’s own stated intentions to continue to operate the Keelman it was realistic to think that the uses of the Keelman furthering social wellbeing and social interests could continue into the future.[27]Mr Gill, for the Council, made the following additional submissions in the hearing:a. Public houses tend to have those characteristics which can be relied upon to meet the test in section 88(1)(a) – see Admiral Taverns and Dragonfly. The threshold is low; it requires that consideration be given and it has been in the context of the listing process. The category of activities which can further social wellbeing and/or interest is wide.b. The test in 88(1)(a) is met because the Appellant accepts that the matters relied on by the Council do occur at the Keelman and contribute to social wellbeing; they are in line with the case law as to what amounts to relevant use.c. The ability of a community to acquire an ACV can be relevant to the realism of future use, but is not applicable in this case because there is evidence of the Appellant’s settled intention to operate the Keelman as a pub. This intention is sufficient to meet the test in section 88(1)(b).d. “Community “is a wide concept which can be fluid; there is potentially a large spread of communities which could be proximate to the Keelman for a reason. Discussion and conclusions[28]The approach of the Tribunal to appeals under section 88 of the 2011 Act is to consider the decision afresh. The question for the Tribunal to consider is whether the Council should have decided the matter differently. Appropriate weight is to be attached to the views of the Council as the body with institutional competence and relevant expertise in making such decisions.[29]The first point I need to consider, in section 88(1)(a) is whether, as a matter of fact, there is an actual current use of the building or other land that is not an ancillary use which furthers the social wellbeing or social interests of the local community.[30]I find as a matter of fact that the nomination made reference to use of the Keelman by members of the local community, as well as walkers, cyclists and people who use the local riverside park area. The nomination form stated “The outside area is enjoyed by families and the food offering is very popular with older members of the community. The pub is welcoming to all groups and used by a large section of the community and includes disabled facilities and step free access. “. The checklist completed by Mr Taeger which appears at pages B8 and C10 of the bundle also notes that the Keelman has a good reputation for the quality of its beer, some of which is brewed in the microbrewery on site. Mr Taeger concluded in his checklist that this use furthers the social wellbeing and interests of the local community.[31]I note that, as pointed out by Mr Taeger in his evidence, the legislation permits persons other than those living in the vicinity to nominate as an ACV. I find that the wording in section 88(1) referring to a “local community” does not only include those living in the vicinity of the premises, but can also extend to those groups who have a sufficiently proximate connection to the premises in question. This could, for example, include the football team sponsored by the Keelman, or groups of walkers who use the Keelman for refreshment when walking Hadrian’s Wall.[32]I reject the Appellant’s argument that these uses do not demonstrate that the premises function as “community infrastructure” and therefore cannot meet the test in section 88. The concept of “qualifying community infrastructure” raised by the Appellant is not defined in law in the context of ACV listing and forms no part of the test in section 88. I also reject the Appellant’s argument that the Keelman is an untypical ACV and this means it is not appropriate to list it. This is because the arguments raised by Mr Carroll around the need to save a community asset, such as the last pub in the village, are instances where community use may not be ongoing the relevant test is section 88(2). Here, where the use is ongoing, a different test applies.[33]I find that the evidence on which the Council relies at appendices 3-10 of the Witness Statement of Adam Taeger, drawn in part from the Keelman’s own social media postings, supports the Council’s position that the Keelman is a place which is used by the local community as base for social actual activity and interests.[34]I note that the threshold in section 88(1) is that the test must be met “in the opinion of the authority". The opinion of the Council, which is the relevant authority here for the purposes of the statute, is that it does meet the required threshold of there being actual current use of the building or other land that is not an ancillary use furthers the social wellbeing or social interests of the local community. Giving appropriate weight to the Council’s opinion as the relevant authority, I find that the fact these activities occur at the Keelman, which is well used by a number of sectors of the local community, is sufficient to meet the test in section 88(1)(a).[35]For the same reasons, I did not accept the Appellant’s arguments that the test in 88(1)(a) is not met because the Council did not identify a qualifying use or the argument that all public houses would qualify as ACV.[36]The second part of the test I must apply, in section 88(1)(b) is whether it is realistic to think that there can continue to be non-ancillary use of the building or other land which will further (whether or not in the same way) the social wellbeing or social interests of the local community. Again, it is the Council’s opinion, not that of the owner of any potential ACV, which must be taken into account when determining whether or not the test is met in section 88(1).[37]Paragraph 32 of the witness statement of Mr Carroll state that there are no plans to close or sell the premises or change its use. He reiterated this point during the hearing. I therefore find as a matter of fact that in light of the Appellant’s own stated intentions to continue to operate the Keelman it was realistic to think that the uses of the Keelman furthering social wellbeing and social interests could continue into the future. I therefore consider that the test in 88(1)(b) is met.[38]Because I consider that the test in section 88(1) is met, it follows that I find that the decision of the Council to list the Keelman as an ACV was correct and I confirm that decision.