“A secured by design assessment has been carried out by Sussex Police (ref: NW/M/19/006B SBD) for St Peter’s Health Centre, 30-36 Oxford Street, Brighton BN1 4LA I would like a copy and also provide email address to contact.”
“29. First there is a need to identify the applicable interest(s) within the relevant exemption. There are only two under s31(1)(a), namely the prevention or detection of crime. 30. Second, the nature of the ‘prejudice’ being claimed must be considered. An evidential burden rests with the decision maker to be able to show that some causal relationship exists between the potential disclosure and the prejudice and that the prejudice is, as Lord Falconer of Thoronton has stated, “real, actual or of substance” (Hansard HL, Vol. 162, April 20, 2000, col. 827). If the public authority is unable to discharge this burden satisfactorily, reliance on ‘prejudice’ should be rejected. There is therefore effectively as de minimis threshold which must be met… 31. When considering the existence of ‘prejudice’, the public authority needs to consider the issue from the perspective that the disclosure is being effectively made to the general public as a whole, rather than simply the individual applicant, since any disclosure may not be made subject to any conditions governing subsequent use. 32. However, while the intended use or motive of the applicant is not relevant to a decision whether to grant or refuse access, this Tribunal accepts that where a public authority is aware of the intended use, it may be a factor for consideration when assessing the nature of the prejudice… 34. A third step for the decision-maker concerns the likelihood of occurrence of prejudice. A differently constituted division of this Tribunal in John Connor Press Associates Limited v Information Commissioner (EA/2005/0005) interpreted the phrase “likely to prejudice” as meaning that the chance of prejudice being suffered should be more than a hypothetical or remote possibility; there must have been a real and significant risk. That Tribunal drew support from the decision of Mr Justice Mundy in R (on the application of Lord) v Secretary of State for the Home Office[2003] EWHC 2073 (Admin) , where a comparable approach was taken to the construction of similar words inData Protection Act 1998 . Mr Justice Munby stated that ‘likely’: “connotes a degree of probability where there is a very significant and weighty chance of prejudice to the identified public interests. The degree of risk must be such that there may ‘may very well’ be prejudice to those interests, even if the risk falls short of being more probable than not.” 35. On the basis of these decisions there are two possible limbs on which a prejudice-based exemption might be engaged. Firstly, the occurrence of prejudice to the specified interest is more probable than not, and secondly there is a real and significant risk of prejudice, even if it cannot be said that the occurrence of prejudice is more probable than not.” “connotes a degree of probability where there is a very significant and weighty chance of prejudice to the identified public interests. The degree of risk must be such that there may ‘may very well’ be prejudice to those interests, even if the risk falls short of being more probable than not.”