“In the [PAC Report] it says the following: ‘The Department’s Permanent Secretary confirmed that he was satisfied the selection process met the requirements of HM Treasury’s Managing public money, but he would not commit to sharing his Accounting Officer assessment with the committee. He has since written to the Committee with a summary of his assessment provided in confidence, and on which we therefore will not comment. It remains unpublished.’ I would therefore like to request the release of the two documents mentioned in the extract above, namely: 1. the Accounting Officer’s assessment 2. The Permanent Secretary’s summary of his assessment”
“This is a freedom of information request for a full copy of the accounting officer’s assessment of the Towns Fund”
“Counsel for the Appellant asked Mr Thomas to clarify which paragraphs of the Assessment were no longer being contested. Mr Thomas explained that information in only four paragraphs was still being contested by the Department, and the Department’s broad reasons for contesting that information. He stated that, in respect of that contested information, the Department was of the view that the relevant section 35(1)(a) and/or section 36(2) exemptions were engaged, and that the balance of the public interest was not in favour of disclosure. Some of the information was no longer being contested. Judge Buckley, Mr Taylor and Ms Murphy asked questions about: whether the policy was still live at the time that the Department answered the Requestors’ requests in January 2021; why the Appellant didn’t inform the Requestors that some of the information in the Assessment was already in the public domain through the NAO Report; why the Appellant had recently changed its mind in deciding that some of the information which was previously being contested was no longer being contested; whether some of the information which was still being contested was already in the public domain in effect; and whether the Commissioner had agreed that a particular sentence in the Assessment was covered by legal advice privilege and should not be disclosed. On this last point, Counsel for the Commissioner explained that the Commissioner agreed that that particular sentence was covered by the legal advice privilege exemption, and should not be disclosed.”
“General right of access to information held by public authorities. 1(1) Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled—(a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and(b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him. Effect of the exemptions in Part II. .......2(2) In respect of any information which is exempt information by virtue of any provision of Part II, section 1(1)(b) does not apply if or to the extent that—(a) the information is exempt information by virtue of a provision conferring absolute exemption, or (b) in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.”
“… when assessing competing public interests under FOIA the correct approach is to identify the actual harm or prejudice that the proposed disclosure would (or would be likely to or may) cause and the actual benefits its disclosure would (or would be likely to or may) confer or promote. This … requires an appropriately detailed identification of, proof, explanation and examination of both (a) the harm or prejudice, and (b) benefits that the proposed disclosure of the relevant material in respect of which the exemption is claimed would (or would be likely to or may) cause or promote.”
“35 Formulation of government policy, etc.
“(iv) The timing of a request is of paramount importance to the decision. We fully accept the DFES argument, supported by a wealth of evidence, that disclosure of discussions of policy options, whilst policy is in the process of formulation, is highly unlikely to be in the public interest, unless, for example, it would expose wrongdoing within government. Ministers and officials are entitled to time and space, in some instances to considerable time and space, to hammer out policy by exploring safe and radical options alike, without the threat of lurid headlines depicting that which has been merely broached as agreed policy. We note that many of the most emphatic pronouncements on the need for confidentiality to which we were referred, are predicated on the risk of premature publicity. In this case it was a highly relevant factor in June 2003 but of little, if any, weight in January 2005. (v) When the formulation or development of a particular policy is complete for the purposes of (iv) is a question of fact. However, section 35(2) and to a lesser extent 35(4), clearly assume that a policy is formulated, announced and, in many cases, superseded in due course. We think that a parliamentary statement announcing the policy, of which there are examples in this case, will normally mark the end of the process of formulation. There may be some interval before development. We do not imply by that that any public interest in maintaining the exemption disappears the moment that a minister rises to his or her feet in the House. We repeat – each case must be decided in the light of all the circumstances. As is plain however, we do not regard a “seamless web” approach to policy as a helpful guide to the question whether discussions on formulation are over.”
“25.There is a substantial body of case law which establishes that assertions of a “chilling effect” on provision of advice, exchange of views or effective conduct of public affairs are to be treated with some caution. In Department for Education and Skills v Information Commissioner and Evening Standard EA/2006/0006, the First-tier Tribunal commented at [75(vii)] as follows: “In judging the likely consequences of disclosure on officials’ future conduct, we are entitled to expect of them the courage and independence that has been the hallmark of our civil servants since the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms. These are highly-educated and politically sophisticated public servants who well understand the importance of their impartial role as counsellors to ministers of conflicting convictions. The most senior officials are frequently identified before select committees, putting forward their department’s position, whether or not it is their own.” 26.Although not binding on us, this is an observation of obvious common sense with which we agree. A three judge panel of the Upper Tribunal expressed a similar view in DEFRA v Information Commissioner and Badger Trust[2014] UKUT 526 (AC) at [75], when concluding that it was not satisfied that disclosure would inhibit important discussions at a senior level: “75. We are not persuaded that persons of the calibre required to add value to decision making of the type involved in this case by having robust discussions would be inhibited by the prospect of disclosure when the public interest balance came down in favour of it... “In judging the likely consequences of disclosure on officials’ future conduct, we are entitled to expect of them the courage and independence that has been the hallmark of our civil servants since the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms. These are highly-educated and politically sophisticated public servants who well understand the importance of their impartial role as counsellors to ministers of conflicting convictions. The most senior officials are frequently identified before select committees, putting forward their department’s position, whether or not it is their own.” “75. We are not persuaded that persons of the calibre required to add value to decision making of the type involved in this case by having robust discussions would be inhibited by the prospect of disclosure when the public interest balance came down in favour of it... 76. ...They and other organisations engage with, or must be assumed to have engaged with, public authorities in the full knowledge that Parliament has passed the FOIA and the Secretary of State has made the EIR. Participants in such boards cannot expect to be able to bend the rules.” 27. In Department of Health v Information Commissioner and Lewis[2015] UKUT 0159 (AAC) , [2017] AACR 30 Charles J discussed the correct approach where a government department asserts that disclosure of information would have a “chilling” effect or be detrimental to the “safe space” within which policy formulation takes place, as to which he said: “27. ...The lack of a right guaranteeing non-disclosure of information ...means that that information is at risk of disclosure in the overall public interest ... As soon as this qualification is factored into the candour argument (or the relevant parts of the safe space or chilling effect arguments), it is immediately apparent that it highlights a weakness in it. This is because the argument cannot be founded on an expectation that the relevant communications will not be so disclosed. It follows that ... a person taking part in the discussions will appreciate that the greater the public interest in the disclosure of confidential, candid and frank exchanges, the more likely it is that they will be disclosed... 28. ...any properly informed person will know that information held by a public authority is at risk of disclosure in the public interest. 29. ... In my view, evidence or reasoning in support of the safe space or chilling effect argument in respect of a FOIA request that does not address in a properly reasoned, balanced and objective way: i) this weakness, ... is flawed.” 28.Charles J discussed the correct approach to addressing the competing public interests in disclosure of information where section 35 of FOIA (information relating to formulation of government policy, etc) is engaged. Applying the decision in APPGER at [74] – [76] and [146] – [152], when assessing the competing public interests under FOIA the correct approach includes identifying the actual harm or prejudice which weighs against disclosure. This requires an appropriately detailed identification, proof, explanation and examination of the likely harm or prejudice. 29.Section 35 of FOIA, with which the Lewis case was concerned, does not contain the threshold provision of the qualified person’s opinion, but these observations by Charles J are concerned with the approach to deciding whether disclosure is likely to have a chilling effect and we consider that they are also relevant to the approach to an assessment by the qualified person of a likely chilling effect under section 36(2) and so to the question whether that opinion is a reasonable one. 30.Charles J said at [69] that the First-tier Tribunal’s decision should include matters such as identification of the relevant facts, and consideration of “the adequacy of the evidence base for the arguments founding expressions of opinion”
“36 Prejudice to effective conduct of public affairs (1) This section applies to— (a) information which is held by a government department … and is not exempt information by virtue of section 35, and … (2) Information to which this section applies is exempt information if, in the reasonable opinion of a qualified person, disclosure of the information under this Act… (b) would, or would be likely to, inhibit— (i) the free and frank provision of advice, or (ii) the free and frank exchange of views for the purposes of deliberation, or (c) would otherwise prejudice, or would be likely otherwise to prejudice, the effective conduct of public affairs. …”
“49. If it were the case that colleagues knew the Assessment would be published, this would have undermined the efficacy of the process of which the document is the artifact. It would have inhibited the frank exchange of views which went into the preparation of the document. Insofar as knowledge of its publication would have inhibited the candour with which officials presented the Towns Fund in the preparation of the draft AO assessment, this would have prejudiced the effective conduct of Government affairs.”
“50. If the AO had been aware that her assessment would be published, this would have increased the tension between her duty to the minister as Permanent Secretary and to Parliament as AO. This tension was highlighted by the 2016 PAC Report at paragraph 18: “Tensions can arise if an AO believes that a Minister’s favoured policy is not feasible or value for money, or if the spending involved would be unlawful or improper. The National Audit Office concluded that in such cases, AOs are often reluctant to raise concerns about the use of taxpayers’ money given there is effectively a conflict with their duty to serve Ministers.”
“It is important to retain the trust of the minister you are working with – this is the fundamental point about serving equally well governments of different political persuasions … it is important that the minister feels that they can trust their officials and that officials are not undermining them in some way…So there is a natural caution in wanting to do anything that would be seen to undermine that, which is not the same as saying that in the room or in advice officials wouldn’t say, “This is not a good idea”
“I think the distinction I would draw…when we write accounting officer assessments at least in my department we normally try to put them, or to think about them in a sort of ‘red teaming’ kind of way… in other words, can one put the point where it is attacking - not necessarily in a full throttle way but they … can be phrased in a way which is designed to make you pause and think. One could make the same points without phrasing in them in that way - not sure the phrasing is necessarily illustrative of a lack of accountability or any of these other things - but I think the way in which our current practice is these days which is to try and put the points bluntly, that approach, I think, would not be taken if the material was primarily drafted or expected to be released.”
“This is very much my layman’s perspective, and I have become more familiar with the law in recent days, but the layman’s perspective has tended to be that the Freedom of Information Act provides for a safe space that provides that advice to ministers and so on, could potentially be disclosed but there are safeguards around that, which I guess is part of the issue today. From a layman’s perspective I think when one is writing a submission to a minister or accounting officer advice, one works on the assumption that this is within the space of formulating and deciding on what the government policy would be, which is different from ‘does the government have information about x or y?’”
“Officials were aware that elements of the policy could be considered contentious and explored these concerns frankly in the AO assessment in a manner reflecting the assumption that, as advised in the AO assessment guidance at the time, the document would not be disclosed to the public. This frank discussion is evidenced in the closed witness statement. … where there is a perceived risk that the AO assessment might be published, it would have the potential to prejudice the effective conduct of public affairs by (i) exacerbating the inherent tension for the Permanent Secretary between complying with their duty to the minister and complying with their duty as AO to Parliament; (ii) reducing the likelihood of officials giving a frank assessment; and (iii) blurring the significance of a ministerial direction.”
“It’s an excellent question, so as I tried to outline earlier I think I pointed out that colleagues had tended to think of accounting officer assessments in the same vein as ministerial submissions in that they are very much bound up with the question of ‘Are we doing the right thing?’ ‘Is this the right policy?’ ‘What direction should we be going in?’ and so in my perhaps misguided layman’s approach I think that’s how it was considered up to now. So yes I am aware that those are potentially disclosable, I think again my layman’s misunderstanding is not that… There tends to be a bit more protection afforded to those than there is to say, other papers that the government might hold. Again I might be entirely wrong in which case you could correct me. I think I would also add, as I said in answer to one of Mr Jackson’s questions, I’m not aware that the accounting officer assessment has been published in full against the wishes of the accounting officer. Again that might be incorrect I’ve not done an exhaustive survey.”
“Not at all… there is a legal requirement to make available to the National Audit Office everything it wants to see, pretty much… we give access to everything they want and they are at liberty to make what use of it they want. We will have a discussion about checking the facts are correct, there is a process involving a draft coming to me and then for the accounting officer to say that we are happy that it is factually accurate. Sometimes as part of that process we might say, ‘This bit is commercially confidential’ or we don’t agree with the way it is phrased.”
“The Comptroller and Auditor General. He is an officer of Parliament and they are his reports. It may happen at Accounting Officer clearance stage that some comments come to me, and I may make comments and have a discussion with the NAO team. I hope at that stage everyone is happy, if not there is occasionally a discussion between the Accounting Officer and the Comptroller and Auditor General… The point of the process of agreement is largely to make sure that when the Public Accounts Committee meets there is agreement over facts. That’s the general point of it but part of that is also the NAO will listen if we say ‘look this is not appropriately phrased’ or something like that. We don’t say that terribly often, they have a way of writing the report. It is their say at the end of the day. If they wanted to say something we disagreed with, which they frequently do, then they are entirely at liberty to say so.”
“Yes it does actually and I think I should have said this earlier, so my approach to this has been that we want to put down some of the reasons we think it is not a good idea when writing accounting officer assessments or the things that they are going to be particularly interested in so that so that you can kind of see all these were some of the things that were weighed up. I wouldn’t say that that’s a requirement for everything but certainly usually we write them in the expectation that is very likely the national audit office will want to see them.”
“A data analysis conducted by the London School of Economics concluded: “…there is robust evidence that ministers chose towns so as to benefit the Conservatives in marginal Westminster seats.”
“The Secretary of State has picked 49 towns (48 town deals with one cluster of two towns). from the highest scoring 320 after the top 40 have been removed and 12 from the lower scoring ‘low priority’ towns. The cluster is Keighley (in the top 40) and Shipley (in the next 320). Officials had recommended that as a potential cluster and the justification is that they are nearby and that you are combining a mix of more prosperous and less prosperous towns to have a mix of need and opportunity in one deal”
“For one town selected (Kidsgrove), Secretary of State wants the letter to district and county to recommend collaboration with nearby towns in the Stoke City conurbation. This would be determining expectations for local town partnerships more tightly than we are in other places. This will present specific delivery questions (like how the local authorities work together) that are policy choices yet to come. This could be challenging but we anticipate could also be true in other places when we launch the prospectus and begin to work with places. We will set out in our Q&A that this is to be set out in more detail in the prospectus and determined through the development of deal proposals.”