“ the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer)— (a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer's undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and (b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.” 27. It is also relevant to mention a feature of the provisions within part XI of the 1996 Act for redundancy payments. I will summarize the position briefly without describing fully the quite complicated provisions of the legislation. The right to a redundancy payment is predicated upon a dismissal. If an employee’s contract of employment is renewed or the employee is re-engaged, there will generally not be a dismissal (see section 138(1)). But if the provisions of the new or renewed contract are materially different to the old, the law provides for a trial period of four weeks or longer for the purposes of training. If during that four-week period, the employee terminates that contract for any reason, there will be a dismissal (see section 138(2)-(4)). In this way the employee’s right to claim a redundancy payment is preserved, although he may lose the right to a redundancy payment if the employment is suitable and he unreasonably terminates the contract during the trial period (see section 141). 28. It is convenient to begin with paragraph 10 of the Employment Tribunal’s reasons. There is no doubt that the Employment Tribunal found that there was a specific decision, in agreement with the trade unions, that the band within which new posts would be considered for redeployment would be extended from one grade down to two grades down. I have found the Employment Tribunal’s findings later, in paragraph 10 of its Reasons, very difficult to follow. I will quote again the specific sentence: “Our understanding is that redeployment did not attract a trial period and in this re-organisation only (as opposed to the normal practice) a move to a grade two levels down was to be dealt with as a deployment.” 29. At first sight, this sentence appears to distinguish between a redeployment and a deployment. If this is its meaning, the first half of the sentence is plainly wrong. Redeployment did attract a trial period, as we have seen. Might have the Employment Tribunal have meant to refer to redeployment on both occasions in this sentence or to “deployment” on both occasions? If the Employment Tribunal meant to say “redeployment” on both occasions, it was again plainly wrong in saying that redeployment did not attract a trial period. If the Employment Tribunal meant to refer to deployment in both halves of the sentence (ie to say that the Claimant was being deployed, not redeployed) I find it difficult to understand its reasoning. On any normal and natural reading of the concept, the Claimant was being redeployed. Indeed the Employment Tribunal had already said, in the preceding sentence, that “redeployment” was extended to two grades below. The reason accepted by the Employment Tribunal was not the reason given by Miss McKenzie, and it is not easy to see the basis for the Employment Tribunal’s conclusion. Moreover, on this reading, the second half of the sentence would still be wrong insofar as it appears to say, in the passage in brackets, that the normal practice was to deal with a grade two levels down as a redeployment: as we have seen, this was not the normal practice. 30. The Employment Tribunal’s reasoning is to my mind plainly unsatisfactory. It is impossible for an appellate court or for the parties to see how it reached its conclusion on a point which was argued before it and on which the parties were entitled to proper reasons. I keep carefully in mind that this was only point among a number which the Employment Tribunal had had to decide. On this point, however, I am clear that its reasons do not meet the requisite standard. 31. The question, however, then arises: should I go the further step and hold the Employment Tribunal’s conclusion or apparent conclusion in paragraph 10 was perverse? I must say that the argument in favour of the trial period being applicable appears to me to have been a strong one. I have already noted that, in the witness statement of the relevant witness, the stated reason for refusing the trial period was that the Claimant was being moved to a post in the same service. This reason is insupportable, and Mr Kemp did not seek to support it before me. 32. Mr Kemp suggests that the agreement with the unions and the decision of the Respondent was that the offer of the post to the four Library Managers fell altogether outside the policy and the Procedure because it was an offer of a post two grades below. I must say this seems to me to make very little sense. The policy and the procedure did not simply apply to the trial period. They applied to the whole process of jobsearching, ringfencing, interviewing and so forth. I find it very difficult to suppose either that management proposed, or that the unions agreed, that the detailed and carefully drafted Redeployment Policy and Procedure would be entirely ignored, effectively thrown out of the window, if the post was two grades below. If the policy and procedure applied, the Claimant was entitled to the trial period. 33. My supposition seems to me consistent with the second sentence of the Employment Tribunal’s Reasons in paragraph 10. It found that “redeployment” was to be extended to two grades below. To my mind, the natural meaning of this sentence is that, by agreement with the trade unions, redeployment under the policy was extended to two grades below. Once granted that this was a matter of formal discussion between management and unions, that is exactly what I would expect to have happened. 34. It is at this point also relevant to consider the statutory background. The redeployment policy and procedure were not restricted to cases of redundancy. They applied also to other cases such as incapability in role. But they were expressly designed to apply in redundancy cases. The four-week trial period in the redeployment procedure appears plainly intended to meet the statutory provision for a trial period. But the statutory provision is in no way dependent on whether the redeployment is one or two grades below. It appears to make no sense to exclude from the Redeployment Policy and Procedure a case of redeployment to which the 1996 Act would apply merely because it is two grades below. I find it very difficult to suppose that this is what management decided or what the unions agreed. 35. Mr Kemp suggests that there was a piece of evidence in cross-examination upon which he fastened to make his submission to the Employment Tribunal. The Respondent did not use the procedure provided for in paragraph 5 of the Employment Appeal Tribunal’s case management order, so the evidence is not properly before me. But I must say that, when he read it to me, it seemed to me a very slender basis for his submission. 36. I am, however, conscious at this point of the very limited circumstances in which the Employment Appeal Tribunal should make a finding of perversity. I am conscious that the Employment Tribunal may have had material which I have not seen. While I consider that the Claimant’s case is a strong one on this point, I am not prepared to go so far as to say that the Employment Tribunal’s conclusion was perverse in the strict sense in which those words are used (see Yeboah v Crofton which I have already quoted). I will therefore approach the appeal on the basis that insufficiency of reasoning is established, but not perversity. 37. To my mind, the insufficiency of reasoning in paragraph 10 has an impact on the Employment Tribunal’s reasoning in paragraph 34.1. The Employment Tribunal’s conclusion in paragraph 34.1 was reached “in the circumstances set out above”