"Dear Kim Re: Capsticks' course fees I have - received a reminder for the Capsticks' course fees, despite my phone call to Catherine after receiving the first invoice, to request that they send it to your home. In order not - to delay payment to Capsticks I have signed off an invoice today. I have copied this to Gill Watt, Financial Accountant, so that the Trust will invoice you for the course fees. I do not know what the timing of that will be. Yours sincerely Maggie Southcote-Want Director of Nursing"
"As you are aware, the scope of the investigation has taken into account the following:- 1) The advertising arrangements for the post 2) The shortlisting-process used and the consideration given to the content of the applications for employment received, taking into account the applicant's qualifications and experience 3) The interview 4) The references 5) The salary offered at appointment 6) In addition, the reports have raised issue in relation to invoicing for courses, travel and equipment."
"the process you used to appoint Mr Murphy to the post of Trust Risk Manager was not fair and that you abused your position as Director of Nursing to deliberately appoint Mr Murphy to a substantive position within the Trust"
"(1) deliberately supported and funded Mr Murphy to undertake the "
"Having regard to our findings of fact we consider that the investigations carried out by this Respondent with the resources available to it and the potential consequences for the Claimant were outside the rage [sic] of reasonableness in this case. We find that Ms Rodney did not have information from which she could reasonably conclude that the Claimant had committed an act of gross misconduct."
"causes us to doubt whether there was any real intention by the Respondent to conduct a full re-hearing having regard to the length of the disciplinary hearing, the grounds upon which the Claimant appealed, and that an additional witness was to be heard."
"that he did not have any reason, and thus we take it that the appeal panel did not have any reason, to disbelieve that the Claimant had spoken to a Ms Macarthy at "
"94. …that he had no reason to disbelieve the Claimant had telephoned Capsticks regarding the invoice being the responsibility of Mr Murphy, to have greatly prejudiced the Claimant."
"We considered whether if the Respondent had carried out another procedure within the range of reasonableness the outcome would have been different. Because of the fundamental flaws in the Respondent's procedure we cannot, on the balance of probabilities, conclude that the Respondent would have dismissed the Claimant in any event. We find the Respondent's dismissal of the Claimant to be unfair."
"Subject to sub-section (1), failure by an employer to follow a procedure in relation to the dismissal of an employee shall not be regarded for the purposes of s.98(4)(a) as by itself making the employer's action unreasonable if he shows that he would have decided to dismiss the employee if he had followed the procedure."
"56. In our view it simply means any procedure which the tribunal considers in fairness the employer ought to have complied with. If the employer has failed to comply with a procedure which ought to have been carried out, that will not render the dismissal unfair if the employer shows that the employee would have been dismissed anyway even had that fair procedure been adopted."
"Summary. 54. The following principles emerge from these cases: (1) In assessing compensation the task of the Tribunal is to assess the loss flowing from the dismissal, using its common sense, experience and sense of justice. In the normal case that requires it to assess for how long the employee would have been employed but for the dismissal. (2) If the employer seeks to contend that the employee would or might have ceased to be employed in any event had fair procedures been followed, or alternatively would not have continued in employment indefinitely, it is for him to adduce any relevant evidence on which he wishes to rely. However, the Tribunal must have regard to all the evidence when making that assessment, including any evidence from the employee himself. (He might, for example, have given evidence that he had intended to retire in the near future). (3) However, there will be circumstances where the nature of the evidence which the employer wishes to adduce, or on which he seeks to rely, is so unreliable that the tribunal may take the view that the whole exercise of seeking to reconstruct what might have been is so riddled with uncertainty that no sensible prediction based on that evidence can properly be made. (4) Whether that is the position is a matter of impression and judgment for the Tribunal. But in reaching that decision the Tribunal must direct itself properly. It must recognise that it should have regard to any material and reliable evidence which might assist it in fixing just compensation, even if there are limits to the extent to which it can confidently predict what might have been; and it must appreciate that a degree of uncertainty is an inevitable feature of the exercise. The mere fact that an element of speculation is involved is not a reason for refusing to have regard to the evidence. (5) An appellate court must be wary about interfering with the Tribunal's assessment that the exercise is too speculative. However, it must interfere if the Tribunal has not directed itself properly and has taken too narrow a view of its role. (6) The s.98A(2) and Polkey exercises run in parallel and will often involve consideration of the same evidence, but they must not be conflated. It follows that even if a Tribunal considers that some of the evidence or potential evidence to be too speculative to form any sensible view as to whether dismissal would have occurred on the balance of probabilities, it must nevertheless take into account any evidence on which it considers it can properly rely and from which it could in principle conclude that the employment may have come to an end when it did, or alternatively would not have continued indefinitely. (7) Having considered the evidence, the Tribunal may determine (a) That if fair procedures had been complied with, the employer has satisfied it - the onus being firmly on the employer - that on the balance of probabilities the dismissal would have occurred when it did in any event. The dismissal is then fair by virtue of s.98A(2). (b) That there was a chance of dismissal but less than 50%, in which case compensation should be reduced accordingly. (c) That employment would have continued but only for a limited fixed period. The evidence demonstrating that may be wholly unrelated to the circumstances relating to the dismissal itself, as in the O'Donoghue case. (d) Employment would have continued indefinitely. However, this last finding should be reached only where the evidence that it might have been terminated earlier is so scant that it can effectively be ignored."