AB (Protection, criminal gangs, internal relocation) Jamaica CG [2007] UKAIT 00018 (22 February 2007) [2007] UKAIT 00018

"20. Although this appellant did not make any reports to the police she believed that to do so would be of no use and could lead to her being suspected of being an informer is objectively supported by the background material. To report the domestic violence would have meant that the appellant would have had to name the perpetrator who would then inflict further violence because of her informing against him. Similarly to report the gangs would have been of little use as the background material shows that criminal gangs operate with impunity. I find that the Jamaican government are unable to offer a sufficiency of protection to women against domestic violence and against being targeted by criminal gangs."

"23. The respondent's representative has raised the issue of internal flight as an alternative to international protection. The court report refers to migratory crime and that victims of gang directed crime are unable to internally relocate within Jamaica. The report by Mr Sobers in the case of Atkinson also states that "simply put relocation will neither eliminate nor substantially reduce the risk of harm from gang reprisal"

"1. The IJ misunderstood the nature and effect of Atkinson . That decision was one about certification only as was made clear by the Tribunal in NR Jamaica [2005] UKIAT 00008 , a determination which was served by post on 12 July and received on 13 July. The IJ made no reference to that. NR if read would have given clearer guidance on that issue. 2. The IJ failed to indicate upon what objective evidence the decision was made and/failed to consider properly the objective evidence presented. Miss Ahluelia submitted that the IJ relied on the evidence of Mr Sobers which was cited by the court in Atkinson with approval [paragraphs 24-33-34-40-55 of Atkinson]. It was submitted that paras 6.200, 6.202, 6.206, 6.123 and 5.93 of the CIPU supported Mr Sobers. Miss Brown suggests that 5.59, 5.70, 5.77-80, 8.52-100, 5.105 and 6.16 of the CIPU indicated that there was a sufficiency of protection. CIPU Report April 2005 was more recent and at least ought to have been considered. Particularly in the light of NR , I find failure to consider material evidence or to make a proper assessment. 3. IJ applied Atkinson and finds Convention reason on the basis that the appellant is wanted as an informer or perceived informer [Para 22]. Such is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of the case. She is wanted by the gang not as an informer but because she may know the whereabouts of her boyfriend for whom they are looking. We find there to be no basis upon which a Convention reason under the [Refugee] Convention can be established. 4. It is submitted that the decision on Article 8 shall stand as it was not challenged by the respondent in the grounds. It was allowed because of the finding that the appellant falls under 1951 Convention. It is tainted by a fundamentally flawed finding. 5. The above amount to material errors of law requiring reconsideration."

"(1) In deciding whether a person is a refugee an act of persecution must be: (a) sufficiently serious by its nature or repetition as to constitute a severe violation of a basic human right, in particular a right from which derogation cannot be made under Article 15 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; or (b) an accumulation of various measures, including a violation of a human right which is sufficiently severe as to affect an individual in a similar manner as specified in (a)"

" 1) In deciding whether a person is a refugee or a person eligible for humanitarian protection, protection from persecution or serious harm can be provided by: (a) the State; or (b) any party or organisation, including any international organisation, controlling the State or a substantial part of the territory of the State. (2)Protection shall be regarded as generally provided when the actors mentioned in paragraph 1(a) and (b) take reasonable steps to prevent the persecution or suffering of serious harm by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm, and the person mentioned in paragraph (1) has access to such protection. …"

"Asylum claims ... 4) Sufficiency of state protection, whether from state agents or non-state actors, means a willingness and ability on the part of the receiving state to provide through its legal system a reasonable level of protection from ill-treatment of which the claimant for asylum has a well-founded fear; Osman[v United Kingdom 1999] 1 FLR 193 ] , Horvath , Dhima [ [2002] Imm AR 394 ]. 5) The effectiveness of the system provided is to be judged normally by its systemic ability to deter and/or to prevent the form of persecution of which there is a risk, not just punishment of it after the event; Horvath , Banomova [ [2001] EWCA Civ 807 ] , McPherson [ [2001] EWCA Civ 1955 ] and Kinuthia [ [2001] EWCA Civ 2100 ] . 6) Notwithstanding systemic sufficiency of state protection in the receiving state, a claimant may still have a well-founded fear of persecution if he can show that the authorities know or ought to know circumstances particular to his case giving rise to his fear, but are unlikely to provide the additional protection his particular circumstances reasonably require; Osman . Article 3 claims ... 7) The same principles apply to claims in removal cases of risk of exposure to Article 3 ill-treatment in the receiving state, and are, in general, unaffected by the approach of the Strasbourg Court in Soering [ (1989) 11 EHRR 439 ]; which, on its facts, was, not only a state-agency case at the highest institutional level, but also an unusual and exceptional case on its facts; Dhima , Krepel and Ullah . 8) The basis of an article 3 entitlement in a removal case is that the claimant, if sent to the country in question, would be at risk there of Article 3 ill-treatment. 9) In most, if not all, Article 3 cases in this context the concept of risk has the same or closely similar meaning to that in the Refugee Convention of a "well-founded fear of persecution, save that it is confined to a risk of Article 3 forms of ill-treatment and is not restricted to conduct with any particular motivation or by reference to the conduct of the claimant: Dhima , Krepel ; Chahal [(1994) 18 EHRR CD 193]. 10) The threshold of risk required to engage Article 3 depends on the circumstances of each case, including the magnitude of the risk, the nature and severity of the ill-treatment risked, and whether the risk emanates from a state agency or non-state actor; Horvath . 11) In most, but not necessarily all, cases of ill-treatment which, but for state protection, would engage Article 3, a risk of such ill-treatment will be more readily established in state agency cases than in non-state actor cases – there is a spectrum of circumstances giving rise to such risks spanning the two categories, ranging from breach of a duty by the state of a negative duty not to inflict Article 3 ill-treatment to a breach of a duty to take positive protective action against such ill-treatment by non-state actors; Svazas[ [2002] EWCA Civ 74 ] . 12) An assessment of the threshold of risk applicable in the circumstances to engage Article 3 necessarily involves an assessment of the sufficiency of state protection to meet the threat of which there is such a risk – one cannot be considered without the other whether or not the exercise is regarded as 'holistic' or to be conducted in two stages: Krepel [2002] EWCA Civ 1265 ] , Svazas . 13) Sufficiency of state protection is not necessarily a guarantee of protection from Article 3 ill-treatment any more than it is a guarantee of protection from an otherwise well-founded fear of persecution in asylum cases – nor, if and to the extent that there is any difference, is it eradication or removal of risk of exposure to Article 3 ill-treatment; Dhima , McPherson , Krepel . 14) Where the risk falls to be judged by the sufficiency of state protection, that sufficiency is judged, not according to whether it would eradicate the real risk of the relevant harm, but according to whether it is a reasonable provision in the circumstances; Osman . 15) Notwithstanding such systemic sufficiency of state protection in the receiving state, a claimant may still be able to establish an Article 3 claim if he can show that the authorities there know or ought to know particular circumstances likely to expose him to risk of Article 3 ill-treatment; Osman . 16) The approach is the same whether the receiving country is or is not a party to the ECHR, but in determining whether it would be contrary to Article 3 to remove a person to that country, our courts should decide the factual issue as to risk as if ECHR standards apply there – and the same applies to the certification process under Section 115(1) and/or (2) of the 2002 Act."

"21. In my judgment neither Article 3 nor the jurisprudence of the Court of Human Rights on the positive obligation of states to protect individuals from other individuals goes as far as Ms. Farbey contends. What matters is that protection should be practical and effective, not that it should take a particular form. Indeed, to insist on the latter might very well be to frustrate the former. What perhaps matters more is the standard of protection which the state is expected to afford. The higher the standard, the less the individual will have to establish in order to show non-compliance with it. Our attention has been drawn in this regard to the formulation in HLR v. France (1997) 26 EHRR 29"

"32. There are two points which I wish to add about what an appellant has to show in these circumstances to discharge the onus of proof to the requisite standard. First, in the light of the Domestic Violence Act 1995, it is not, in my judgment, enough for the appellant to show that the sanctions imposed for offences against the person under the criminal law of Jamaica were ineffective. In the context of domestic violence, a state can provide effective measures of a different nature… … 35. I see no reason in principle why suitably-crafted provisions of the civil law should not have the requisite degree of deterrence as much as provisions of the criminal law. It all depends on the circumstances and the nature of the provision."

"… those which attain an adequate degree of efficacy in practice as well as exist in theory. If the appellant were able to show to the requisite standard of proof that the remedies provided under the law of Jamaica against domestic violence are unlikely to be an effective deterrent, in my judgment she would have shown that her removal from the United Kingdom to Jamaica would violate her rights under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights."

"29. All these reports, therefore, are consistent with one another. These opinions are, at least in the case of Mr Sobers' and Ms Sobers' reports, supported by examples and illustrations. There is no expert evidence to the contrary."

"30. Of course, I bear in mind the fact stressed by Mr Clarke that the appellant did survive in Jamaica for nearly four years after informing on the gang member to the police and that it is now some eight years since she gave that information to the police. Nonetheless, the fresh evidence is compelling and, in my judgment, sufficiently establishes a real risk that sooner or later, wherever the appellant located herself in Jamaica, the Tivoli Gardens gang would be likely to find her and seek revenge. The evidence that as recently as April 2001 the don of that gang refused to forgive her and to allow her to return to that community is consistent with the expert evidence and is credible. Of course, she might survive somewhere on the island. It is by no means certain that she would be killed. But it does not have to be for these purposes. It is enough that there is a real risk to her life if she were to be sent back. 31. Moreover, even if the appellant did manage to find a locality where for a time she could survive, the evidence also demonstrates that she would be very vulnerable there without friends or relatives and, given the high levels of unemployment in Jamaica, probably without a job. Ms Sobers in her report points out that there is no social welfare safety net in Jamaica and that the family and local community normally provides a measure of security for such women. Separated from such family and local support, the appellant would be extremely vulnerable. 32. Having read these reports it seems to me that they show that there would be a considerable risk of a repetition of the [appellant's experiences of ill-treatment]."

"28. In R (Brown) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWHC 2045 Admin Crane J held that the Secretary of State was entitled to certify his conclusion that relocation offered sufficiency of protection outside Kingston on the facts of that case. He did, however, say that leaving aside the question of relocation he would have held that the Secretary of State was not entitled on the evidence presented to conclude that there was sufficiency of protection for human rights purposes in relation to the protection of informers and suspected informers. This case does, however, seem to me to have been very fact specific on both points. In the present case there is the unchallenged evidence of Mr Sobers. We were referred briefly to R (Gibson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWHC 1919 Admin where leave to apply for judicial review of the Secretary of State's decision to include Jamaica on the "white list" (that is those countries included in section 94(4) of the 2002 Act to which removal would not in general involve a serious risk of persecution or breach of human rights) was refused. The court in that case does not, however, appear to have been invited to consider any expert evidence. 30. The final case to which I make brief mention is R (Britton) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 227 in which the Court of Appeal remitted the case to the IAT to consider the sufficiency of protection issue. It had neither dealt with the appellant's evidence nor given reasons for its decision. Tuckey LJ said at para 20: "

"22. In the present case, therefore, the question is whether the state of Jamaica is both willing and able to provide reasonable protection to the appellant. The evidence does not raise any real doubt about willingness to provide such protection: the real focus is on its ability to do so. The difficult question is where to draw the line that defines what an appropriate standard is. It is not enough that some individuals will be failed by the state's criminal justice system, not enough that the state has not been effective in removing risk. There has in my judgment to be a systemic failure that relates at the very least to a category of persons of whom the individual under consideration is one. In this case the focus is on informers or perceived informers or those who in some way are the target of the gangs or the dons who head them. In my view it is no answer that a state is doing its incompetent best if it nevertheless falls below the appropriate standard. One has to ask whether the state is failing to perform its basic function of protecting its citizens. Does the writ of law run or not?"

"24. In the Court of Appeal there was additional evidence, including from Mr Hilaire Sobers, the same distinguished expert whose evidence is before the court in the present case. In short his evidence was that the power and influence of the dons who head the gangs extends over the whole island and the appellant would be at substantial risk of harm if returned to any part of Jamaica. Hit men could be hired for as little as £100 sterling and it would be difficult for Ms A to conceal her Tivoli Gardens origins. 25. Keene LJ, with whom Peter Gibson and May LJJ agreed, said he was persuaded that the removal directions given by the Secretary of State would involve a breach of Ms A's human rights. Articles 2 and 3, he pointed out, are absolute rights. A contracting state, such as the United Kingdom, will be in breach of the ECHR if it expels or removes a person to a state where there is a real risk to that person from people who are not public officials. Removal of Ms A would be in breach of her human rights because there was a real risk both to her life and of Article 3 treatment from the Tivoli Gardens gang and from others within Jamaica. Mr Sobers' evidence was that these criminal gangs and their operations are not confined to the so- called garrison communities. Gunmen have been "exported" to other areas to terrorise various groups of people including suspected informers. The dons have developed networks throughout the island of Jamaica."

"33. The issue is not in my view however whether the Jamaican authorities have the willingness to deal with the problem but whether they have shown the ability to do so. The decision letter it should be noted was written just four or five months after the November 2002 initiatives. The question is whether these initiatives have had the success that the Secretary of State suggests. The evidence suggests that, at least on one view, they have not. 34. We have had the advantage of two additional reports from Mr Sobers that postdate the judge's decision. Mr Sobers in his report of 20 October 2003 refers not only to clear deficiencies in the initiatives but also to the chronic institutional weaknesses of the Jamaican police force and the contrasting strengths of the typical Jamaican criminal gangs. The implicit assumption in the Home Office's analysis that the balance of power favours the Jamaican authorities, he says, is wrong. Criminal networks in Jamaica continue to act with almost complete impunity in inflicting reprisals upon persons like the appellant who have offended them. He says he strongly rejects the assertions of the Home Office that the latest initiatives have led to any or any substantial improvement in the capacity of the police or the military to protect citizens like the appellant from threats from reputed gang members. The new initiatives are largely quantitative in nature and do not address the qualitative dimensions of Jamaica's crime phenomenon particularly the symbiosis between organised crime and politics. Whilst it is true that the November 2002 crime plan theoretically aims at dismantling criminal gangs, he is not aware of any fundamental changes in (a) the capacity of the police to accomplish this or (b) the linkage between crime and politics/civil society. The problems associated with organised crime are deeply entrenched in Jamaican polity and are unlikely in his view to be resolved in the short term. 35. Mr Sobers has produced a further report dated 25 May 2004. In it he picks up on various points made in the respondent's skeleton argument. He says that the thrust of his opinion is not so much the capacity of the Jamaican authorities to eliminate or insulate the threat to the appellant, but the impotence of the Jamaican state to provide protection. He emphasises his conclusion that there does not currently exist in Jamaica any reasonable system of protection. Indeed, he says that the capacity of the state in this regard may well have diminished even further since the preparation of his principal opinion, given Jamaica's worsening rate of violent crime and recent developments with respect to the Jamaican police force. He says that the violent crime has increased rather than diminished in 2004. At a press conference on 8 April 2004 the Commissioner of Police stated that there were 277 murders in the first three months of 2004, 69 more than during the first three months of 2003. Another 110 people were killed in April. The deputy police commissioner is reported as saying that the increase in the crime rate has not been met by a commensurate increase in police resources to deal with it. Mr Sobers also refers to various news reports emphasising the continuing nexus between politics and crime."

"37. In my judgment there is force in Mr Drabble's criticism of the Secretary of States certification and of the judge's decision to uphold it. It is clear that there has been a long-standing and endemic problem in Jamaica and the state authorities ability to overcome it. There is no doubt about willingness to tackle the problem. It is another matter, however whether effective steps have been taken to achieve the bare minimum required to provide reasonable protection for informers and perceived informers who find themselves in situations such as the appellant. … 40. I am far from saying that the appellant will necessarily succeed on an appeal to an adjudicator, but it seems to me that the present evidence raises, at the very least, a serious question on whether the state of Jamaica provides a sufficiency of protection to informers or perceived informers in the category of the appellant. On one view at least Jamaica has not shown a reasonable ability to resolve the problem and provide the basic protection required."

"Simply put, relocation will neither eliminate nor substantially reduce the risk of harm to (the appellant) from gang reprisals."

"49. In his earlier report of 29 October 2003 Mr Sobers had made it clear that his reason for this conclusion was primarily the small size of Jamaica and the trans-geographic power and reach of criminal gangs in the island. The fact that Jamaica is only 4,400 sq miles makes it difficult, if not impossible, for someone to conceal their identity at least for any length of time. Strangers, says Mr Sobers, attract more attention in small communities. He also points out that successful relocation requires social and economic support which, for most Jamaicans, is limited or absent. Jamaica has no state-sponsored welfare system. It is difficult or impossible to relocate without the independent means to do so or access to private social or economic support. Jamaica remains a highly violent society driven by strong enduring impulses for retribution. Those who offer, or appear to offer, support to targets of reprisal almost invariable become targets themselves. Few, if any, are willing to put their lives on the line for a target like the appellant. The judge did not of course have the more recent reports of Mr Sobers. He did, however, have that of 6 August 2003 prepared for the case of Brown which spoke in similar terms, albeit terms that were less specific to the appellant's case, on the issue of relocation. 50. The judge also had before him a report from Amnesty International of 8 September 2001 but made no reference to the following passage at p 3: "

"Being an informer, being suspected of being an informer, or being a relative or associate of an informer would also place a person at extreme risk of violence outside their own garrison community."

"The ability of a person to successfully relocate within Jamaica could be expected to be dependent on a range of factors, including their status as an informer, origins from a PNP or JLP community, their socio-economic status, sexuality, familial connections with local community and other factors. Amnesty international is concerned that a person of the profile given in Mr Atkinson's asylum account would not be able to successfully relocate within Jamaica and would face the risk of human rights violations if enforcibly returned." 51. These passages all seem to me to be consistent with the three reports from Mr Sobers. In my judgment certification was not justified on the relocation issue. It has to be borne in mind that for the relocation issue to become a live one there is a presupposition that there is no sufficiency of protection for Article 3 purposes in the appellant's home community. I simply cannot accept that in such circumstances his arguments that internal relocation is not a viable alternative are clearly unfounded."

"The subsidiary question of internal relocation likewise raises issues that should not, on the material before us, have been rejected as clearly unfounded. Accordingly in my judgment the appeal should be allowed, the application for judicial review should succeed and the Secretary of State's certification should be quashed."

"There is clear evidence that in general the Government of Jamaica is not only willing, but also able to provide through its legal system a reasonable level of protection from ill-treatment to its citizens who fear criminal acts in Jamaica and to those who fear retribution for testifying against criminals."

".. an article dated 6 September 2006 stated that following the deaths of their leaders, both the One Order and Klansmen gangs were in a "phase of restructuring"

"On the 1 June 2006 the National Security minister, Dr Peter Philips disclosed the recent achievements made by the Internal Affairs/Anti Corruption Division of the Professional Standards Branch (PSB) of the Jamaica Constabulary force (JCF). 43 police officers have been arrested on charges of misconduct with one conviction, and 40 cases against officers are currently before the courts. Since its inception PSB's anti-Corruption Division has been pursuing an aggressive anti-corruption drive aimed at ensuring incidents of police misconduct were dealt with promptly and with transparency. (Jamaica Information Service 1 June 2006)"

"We have not had a witness who is on the programme and who remains on the programme, injured, killed or hurt in any way"

"Approximately 32% of all homicides in Jamaica are reprisal-based, and women are increasingly targeted as informers."

"practicable for claimants who may have a well-founded fear of persecution in one area to relocate to other parts of Jamaica where gang violence is less prevalent and where they would not have a well-founded fear and, except where the circumstance of an individual claimant indicate otherwise, it would not be unduly harsh to expect them to do so."

"… there is a general sufficiency protection available to victims of domestic violence through enforcement of legislative provisions and availability of governmental and non-governmental advice, and legal aid and counselling. There is no evidence to suggest that involvement of the abuser with a criminal gang would prevent the claimant from gaining protection although consideration needs to be given to the individual circumstances of an applicant's claim."

"… practicable for claimants [at risk of domestic violence] to relocate to other parts of Jamaica to escape domestic violence and except where the circumstances of an individual claimant indicate otherwise, it would not be unduly harsh to expect then to do so."

"Both the Jamaica Observer and the Jamaica Gleaner report that national security minister Phillips said Operation Kingfish has so far cost the country approximately $50 million. 'In addition we have been getting assistance from our international partners in the form of personnel, equipment, training and intelligence which we estimate to be approximately $150 million'…"

"ACP Hinds also achieved much success this year ahead of Operation Kingfish. Many who were weary of another crime-fighting task force subjected Operation Kingfish to intense criticism upon its formulation. Close to the end of the year, however, the success of Operation Kingfish has silenced most critics …"

"… indicat[ing] clear deficiencies in the initiatives by the Jamaican government and also chronic institutional weaknesses of the Jamaican police force and the contrast in strength of the typical Jamaican criminal gangs. Criminal networks in Jamaica continue to act with almost compete impunity in inflicting reprisals upon persons who have offended them. A report by Mr Sobers of 25 May 2004 refers to the impotence of the Jamaican state to provide protection and that there does not currently exist in Jamaica any reasonable system of protection (paragraph 11(7))."

"12.6 Against this quantitative and qualitative background, the Jamaican government has had little success in reducing crime levels despite numerous announcements of plans and initiatives to deal with the problem. In summary the government has invested far more in militaristic solutions than intelligence driven solutions, with predicable results. Further, the government routinely announces new initiatives against crime, none of which have proved effective. The overall ineffectiveness of the police is perhaps reflected by the significant expression of the private security industry in Jamaica over the past decade according to the Economic and Social Survey in Jamaica (ESSJ) 2004, the number of private security officers is close to double the number of available police officers. Private security is extremely expensive. It does not represents a feasible option for [the appellant], a person of limited means. In my experience abuse of power and unprofessionalism in the police reflects a cultural norm, which is supported by a deeply entrenched pattern of impunity."

"Social and cultural traditions perpetuate violence against women including spousal abuse. Violence against women was widespread, but many women were reluctant to acknowledge or report abusive behaviour, leading to wide variations in estimates of its extent."

"I see no basis for supposing [the appellant's] relocation to other areas in Jamaica would ultimately eliminate a well-founded fear of persecution by either a persistent abuser [her fear of F] or a criminal gang [F's associates and members of the rival gang who assaulted her]."

"In my opinion, the elimination of specific gang leaders, while a positive development, does not necessarily indicate the dismantling of the gangs temporarily under their control. The information coming from the police themselves suggests that gangs like the One Order are still very much in operation. The social and political contexts that led to the formation of these gangs has not changed, and arguably had worsened in many communities. … These communities are significantly conditioned by garrison politics [he cites the Kerr Report on Political Tribalism, 1997 and the Report of National Committee on Crime and Violence, October 2001] and an interconnected (and powerful) drug culture. Jamaica's elevated crime levels generally owe a lot to the foregoing factors, together with others, such as protracted economic hardships which have denied many citizens the opportunity to earn a livelihood or to have a meaningful existence. In a relatively poor country, illicit income from the drug trade and extortion (of business/the construction industry) contribute substantially to the 'economics' of garrison communities. In the Jamaica context the cocktail of violent crime, garrisonism and these illicit activities is inordinately powerful."

"[t]he chronic institutional weakness of the Jamaican police force and the contrasting strength of organised criminality in Jamaica points to a balance of power that does not favour the Jamaican authorities."

"Criminal gangs narco/criminals in Jamaica continue to act with almost complete impunity in inflicting (or threatening to inflict) 'reprisals' on young persons who 'offend' them. The infliction of reprisals may be permitted merely by a perception that the victims are a threat to their activities. The problems associated with organised crime are deeply entrenched in the Jamaican polity, and are unlikely to be resolved in the short term."

"Gang violence is not confined to garrison communities. At present, the crime situation in several areas of Montego Bay (St James), as well as Mountain View, Red Hills Road (both in the KMA) is deteriorating. The places in question are in the inner-city but they are not garrison communities as described in my previous report. As with organised crime everywhere, the casualties of gang violence are typically going to be those who are either directly or indirectly involved with the gang. In that respect, gang violence is naturally going to be limited to areas where gangs do operate. However, gangs operate in nearly all urban centres in Jamaica; and a place like Montego Bay has between sixteen and eighteen operational gangs (according to the Minister of National Security – December 1, 2006). In effect, gang violence could be said to be "limited" to inner-city urban areas in Jamaica. That suggests that violence is a feature of every parish and of every centre of employment in the society."

"she said that she wishes she were dead but does not think of suicide 'because I love my daughter too much'."

"She does not really take to psychiatry and a therapeutic approach that would help is ideally one of being in an appropriate environment and an environment which would assist her in going through a process of spontaneous recovery. This occurs when a PTSD patient feels that she is in a safe place and for her not be in the UK would be much more favourable in terms of the prognosis of her PTSD than if she were sent to Jamaica, where a fairly rapid deterioration would be, with respect, quite likely."

"In effect, gang violence could be said to be 'limited' to inner-city urban areas in Jamaica. That suggests, he says, that" violence is a feature of every parish and of every centre of employment in the society"

"Notwithstanding systemic sufficiency of state protection in the receiving state, a claimant may still have a well-founded fear of persecution if he can show that the authorities know or ought to know circumstances particular to his case giving rise to his fear, but are unlikely to provide the additional protection his particular circumstances reasonably require; Osman. "

"…what is critical is a combination of a willingness and ability to provide protection to the level that can reasonably be expected to meet and overcome the real risk of harm from non-state agents. What is reasonable protection in any case depends, therefore, on the level of the risk, without that protection for which it has to provide"

"Residents of Jamaica may benefit from various Social Security and Welfare provisions, which are aimed at specific target groups. Those provisions include Public Assistance services for the aged, the disabled and the destitute, the Food Stamp Programme for those nutritionally at risk, and the Kerosene Programme targeting poor familiars following the removal of the subsidy on domestic kerosene …"