Hall, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 37 (13 February 2026) [2026] PBRA 37

PBRA

Hall, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 37 (13 February 2026)

[2026] PBRA 37 · 2026-12-02

[1]This is an application by Hall (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision of an oral hearing panel dated 02 December 2026 not to direct his release.

[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended by the Parole Board (Amendment) Rules 2025) (the Parole Board Rules) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,

(b) that it is irrational and/or

[3]I have considered the application on the papers. These are: · The oral hearing decision (the decision) · Reconsideration representations drafted by the Applicant's solicitor and dated 10 December 2025 · The dossier, which currently consists of 287 numbered pages. Request for Reconsideration

[4]The Applicant challenges the decision not to direct his release on the basis that it contained errors of facts and errors of law.

[5]The Applicant has presented his application on the basis that these errors occurred in two distinct approaches by the panel: · The panel erred in making conclusions around the Applicant's history of intimate partner violence (IPV). · The panel erred in understanding the evidence of the prison psychologist in relation to the triggers for the Applicant's offending.

[6]Errors of fact are not a distinct ground of reconsideration under the Parole Board Rules, however, I have approached this aspect of the application as a species of irrationality. Background

[7]The Applicant was convicted in 2016 for rape and other sexual offences against his daughter, between 2011 and 2013, when she was aged 11 to 13 years old. He received a sentence for offenders of particular concern of 19 years, comprising of an 18-year custodial element, and a one-year extended licence period.

[8]The Applicant was 51 years old when he was sentenced. He had a limited record of previous offending, but no convictions of a similar nature.

[9]Of relevance to this application is a reported conviction from 1995, for an assault against an ex-partner. This is not recorded in the Applicant's criminal record, but he accepts he was in fact convicted, although he denies having committed any such assault. Current parole review

[10]The Applicant is now 61 years of age. His case was referred to the Parole Board by the Secretary of State (the Respondent) in July 2024, to consider whether his release should be directed.

[11]The case proceeded to oral hearing via videoconference on 26 November 2025. The panel consisted of three independent members. It heard evidence from the Applicant, his Prison Offender Manager, his Community Offender Manager and a prison forensic psychologist. The Applicant was legally represented throughout the proceedings, and his representative had the opportunity to question witnesses and make submissions on the Applicant's behalf. The Relevant Law

[12]The panel correctly sets out in its decision dated 2 December 2025 the test for release. Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)

[13]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).

[14]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)). Irrationality

[15]The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses ltd -v- Wednesbury Corporation 1948 1 KB 223 by Lord Greene in these words " if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere". The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality.

[16]In R(DSD and others) -v- the Parole Board

2018 EWHC 694

(Admin) a Divisional Court applied this test to Parole Board hearings in these words at para 116 "the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. "

[17]In R(on the application of Wells) -v- Parole Board

2019 EWHC 2710

(Admin) Saini J set out what he described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law which was "to test the decision maker's ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel's expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied)". This test was adopted by a Divisional Court in the case of R(on the application of the Secretary of State for Justice) -v- the Parole Board

2022 EWHC 1282

(Admin).

[18]As was made clear by Saini J this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. The interpretation of and application of the Wednesbury test in Parole hearings as explained in DSD was binding on Saini J.

[19]It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the panel who heard the witnesses.

[20]Further while the views of the professional witnesses must be properly considered by a panel deciding on release, the panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses. Error of law

[21]An administrative decision is unlawful under the broad heading of illegality if the panel: a) misinterprets a legal instrument relevant to the function being performed; b) has no legal authority to make the decision; c) fails to fulfil a legal duty; d) exercises discretionary power for an extraneous purpose; e) takes into account irrelevant considerations or fails to take account of relevant considerations; and/or f) improperly delegates decision-making power.

[22]The task in evaluating whether a decision is illegal is essentially one of construing the content and scope of the instrument conferring the duty or power upon the panel. The instrument will normally be the Parole Board Rules, but it may also be an enunciated policy, or some other common law power. Other

[23]It is possible to argue that mistakes in findings of fact made by a decision maker result in the final decision being irrational, but the mistake of fact must be fundamental. The case of E v Secretary of State for the Home Department

[2004] QB 1044

sets out the preconditions for such a conclusion:

" there must have been a mistake as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter; the fact or evidence must have been "established", in the sense that it was uncontentious and objectively verifiable; the appellant (or his advisors) must not have been responsible for the mistake; and the mistake must have played a material (though not necessarily decisive) part in the tribunal's reasoning."

See also R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions

[2003] AC 295

, which said that in order to establish that there was a demonstrable mistake of fact in the decision of the panel, an Applicant will have to provide " objectively verifiable evidence " of what is asserted to be the true picture. Reconsideration as a discretionary remedy

[24]Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy. That means that, even if an error of law, irrationality, or procedural unfairness is established, the Reconsideration Member considering the case is not obliged to direct reconsideration of the panel's decision. The Reconsideration Member can decline to make such a direction having taken into account the particular circumstances of the case, the potential for a different decision to be reached by a new panel, and any delay caused by a grant of reconsideration. That discretion must of course be exercised in a way which is fair to both parties. The reply on behalf of the Secretary of State

[25]The Respondent offers no representations in response to the application. Discussion Ground 1

[26]The Applicant contends that the panel must have made findings of fact concerning at least one of two points; comments about violence and controlling behaviour in the judge's sentencing remarks, and/or comments made in a victim personal statement (VPS). It is further suggested that this involved an error of law in failing to follow R (on the application of Pearce and another) v Parole Board for England and Wales

[2023] UKSC 13

, with respect to making determinations of facts.

[27]It is further suggested that the panel misunderstood the judge's sentencing remarks to relate to the victim's mother rather than the victim.

[28]The Applicant also submits that as a result of these alleged errors, the panel has made findings of fact with respect to the Applicant being domestically abusive since 1995, and that these matters impacted the panel's decision making with respect to this referral. Judge's sentencing remarks

[29]The Applicant's submissions concerning the judge's sentencing remarks are misplaced. It is clear from the decision that the judge's sentencing remarks, and the panel's understanding of them, related to the victim. The relevant portions of the decision deal with these matters as follows:

"1.24. The panel asked [the Applicant] about the allegations of violence and controlling behaviour described in the Victim Personal Statement, towards [the victim's] mother. He denied this to be true and could not account for why this would be alleged. The panel further asked [the Applicant] about the comment in the Judge's Sentencing Remarks when considering the category of harm, stating: "

I agree that this is a category 1A because of the severe psychological harm to which I have referred and is evident in the victim impact statement, the fact that there was not only a prolonged period of time, over two years, when this was happening, but also, there were threats of violence and indeed, some violence "1.25. [The Applicant] denied being violent towards [the victim] in any way and denied making any threats of violence during the course of his sexual offending. The panel asked how [the Applicant] secured [the victim's] compliance during his sexual assaults/rapes of her; he told the panel that she "froze". He denied making threats or perpetrating violence to secure her compliance. When asked if [the victim] told/asked [the Applicant] to stop, he said "I don't think so off the top of my head"."

[30]I am satisfied that the panel clearly grasped the distinction between what had been included in the VPS, which related to the victim's mother, and the violence and threats of violence commented upon by the sentencing judge, which related to the victim. Having considered this, it was open to the panel to conclude that the use of violence and threats of violence in the commission of his index offending against his daughter, had wider relevance to his risk of using violence in other domestic contexts, including violence against intimate partners, particularly in light of the Applicant's previous conviction for assaulting an ex-partner, which evidenced a pattern of similar offending.

[31]In any event, the suggestion that the panel should have considered the sentencing remarks in the context of Pearce is misplaced. These were findings of a judge following a criminal trial and sentencing exercise. If the Applicant had any dispute about the basis on which he was being sentenced, including whether he had used violence or threats of violence to facilitate his offences, this should have been raised at the time, for example by way of a Newton hearing. It was not for the panel in this case to go beyond the judge's findings. The victim personal statement

[32]I am satisfied that the panel's approach to the comments in the VPS was appropriate. As stated in Pearce , a panel can take into account such allegations if it is concerned that there is a serious possibility they may be true, without having made a determination on their truth. In light of the previous conviction, and the use of violence/threats of violence, this was not an unreasonable step to take, particularly as the panel have made their conclusions on a tentative basis.

[33]The submission that the panel has made a finding of fact that the Applicant has been domestically abusive to his partner since 1995, is without merit. At no point does the panel explicitly make such a determination, and the panel's considerations around IPV and domestic abuse are stated with a significant degree of circumspection.

[34]I am also satisfied that the panel took reasonable steps in assessing the allegations made in the VPS. Pearce does not necessarily require a panel to make a determination, and whether it was necessary to do so needs to be considered in light of what was practicable in the circumstances. The Applicant was asked about the VPS and was able to deny the allegations. Any further exploration of the matter was likely to require oral evidence and involve a significant amount of additional time; in my view, that approach, would have been disproportionate, considering the other information available to the panel, and the ultimate weight given to the issue.

[35]Whilst it would have been beneficial for the panel to set out their approach to these allegations in greater detail, I do not consider that undermines my wider conclusions.

[36]In any event, if I am wrong on the panel's approach to these allegations, I am content that the final conclusion, concerning the potential for risk factors related to IPV, could be sustained without the VPS being considered. The Applicant had already been convicted of IPV. Furthermore, the sentencing judge concluded he had used violence and threats of violence against his daughter to commit his index offences. Whilst not IPV in the strict sense of that term, it was violence used against a family member to obtain compliance for other offending and is clearly relevant to the wider question.

[37]As a result of these conclusions, I find no merit in the Applicant's first ground of challenge. Ground 2

[38]The Applicant's second ground of challenge relates to the panel's approach to professional evidence around his insight into his risk. The Applicant does not identify a specific conclusion of the panel in the decision but instead suggests that this should be inferred from other comments. The Applicant submits the panel has concluded that professionals only offered one explanation for his offending, the death of his mother, and in particular, focuses on the panel's assessment of the forensic psychologist's evidence in that regard.

[39]That submission is not tenable on the face of the decision. The panel made the following observation on the forensic psychologist's evidence:

"1.18. [The forensic psychologist] further elaborated on her view. She told the panel that sex was a big part of [the Applicant's] life, and he equates sex with intimacy. She stated that whilst there were stressors in [the Applicant's] life at the time, and sex was a way of distracting himself from those stressors, the function of his offending was for sexual gratification. She described [the victim] as being an "easy victim". [The forensic psychologist] told the panel that it is her view there is no evidence [the Applicant] has a sexual preference for children, yet he has evidenced a capacity to be sexually aroused by children."

[40]The panel clearly took into account the forensic psychologist's views on the wider triggers for the Applicant's offending. Equally, the panel had considered the dossier including the psychological risk assessment. There is no evidence to say this was disregarded. The panel has not made an error of fact in this regard.

[41]Whilst this would be sufficient to address this ground of appeal, it is useful to go on to consider the panel's reasoning on why there was a lack of understanding around the Applicant's offending behaviour.

[42]The panel's considerations around the importance of the Applicant's mother's death are clearly articulated at 1.20 and 1.21 of the decision. The Applicant's position was his offending began after his mother's death, which was contradicted by the fact his offending had begun around 8 months before this occurred.

[43]The Applicant highlights that he gave evidence around wider insight during discussion with the forensic psychologist and when questioned by his legal representative during the hearing. However, that does not take away from the fact that 9 and a half years after being convicted, the Applicant was still presenting his mother's death as a trigger for his offending, a position which could not be true. This is evidently a significant factor in assessing the Applicant's insight into his offending, and a significant factor in assessing whether professionals could fully understand his motivations and triggers.

[44]As noted above, the panel is not bound by professional assessment. It had clearly identified an issue with the Applicant's account which went to the level of understanding around the triggers for his offending.

[45]I am satisfied this ground of appeal has no merit. The panel was aware professionals had offered a variety of suggestions around the triggers for the Applicant's offending and did not make any error of fact in this regard. Equally, the panel's conclusions around the lack of understanding of the Applicant's triggers and offending behaviour, are perfectly reasonable conclusions, taking into account the Applicant's own position, and do not come close to being irrational. Decision

[46]For the reasons I have given, I do not consider that the decision was irrational or contained errors of law, and accordingly the application for reconsideration is refused. John Marley 13 February 2026