Hoult, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 29 (06 February 2026) [2026] PBRA 29

PBRA
Hoult, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 29 (06 February 2026)
[2026] PBRA 29 · 2025-12-15
[1]This is an application by Hoult (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision of an oral hearing panel dated 15 December 2025 not to direct his release.[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended by the Parole Board (Amendment) Rules 2025) (the Parole Board Rules) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,(b) that it is irrational and/or(c) that it is procedurally unfair. This is an eligible case, and the application was made in time.[3]I have considered the application on the papers. These are: · The decision. · The dossier, now running to 479 pages. · The application for reconsideration. · The recording of the hearing. Request for Reconsideration[4]The application for reconsideration is dated 5 January 2026.[5]The Applicant has submitted that the decision not to direct his release was procedurally unfair and irrational, on the basis of seven distinct grounds. These grounds are addressed in the Discussion section below. Background[6]On 30 March 1998 the Applicant was convicted of five counts of rape, indecent assault on a female and false imprisonment. On each of the counts of rape he received a life sentence, with concurrent determinate sentences on the other matters.[7]The offending occurred against two female victims, the first his estranged partner, and the second, a taxi driver, previously unknown to the Applicant.[8]The Applicant's tariff expired in 2006, and he was initially released from custody in July 2012. He was recalled in February 2016 after allegations of assault against his then partner. The allegation was subsequently withdrawn, and the Applicant maintains he was falsely accused.[9]The Applicant was transferred to open conditions in July 2021 and has been there since that time.[10]At the time of the index offending the Applicant was 23 years old. He is now 51 years old. Current parole review[11]The Applicant's case was referred to the Parole Board by the Secretary of State for Justice (the Respondent) in September 2024 to consider whether or not his release should be directed.[12]The case proceeded to an oral hearing on 28 November 2025, before a two-member panel, which heard evidence from the Applicant, the Prison Offender Manager (POM), two current Community Offender Managers (COMs), and a previous COM. The Applicant was legally represented throughout the hearing.[13]The professionals in the case supported release. The Relevant Law Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)[14]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).[15]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)). Irrationality[16]The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses ltd -v- Wednesbury Corporation 1948 1 KB 223 by Lord Greene in these words " if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere". The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality.[17]In R(DSD and others) -v- the Parole Board 2018 EWHC 694 (Admin) a Divisional Court applied this test to Parole Board hearings in these words at para 116 "the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. "[18]In R(on the application of Wells) -v- Parole Board 2019 EWHC 2710 (Admin) Saini J set out what he described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law which was "to test the decision maker's ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel's expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied)". This test was adopted by a Divisional Court in the case of R(on the application of the Secretary of State for Justice) -v- the Parole Board 2022 EWHC 1282 (Admin).[19]As was made clear by Saini J this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. The interpretation of and application of the Wednesbury test in Parole hearings as explained in DSD was binding on Saini J.[20]It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the panel who heard the witnesses.[21]Further while the views of the professional witnesses must be properly considered by a panel deciding on release, the panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses. Procedural unfairness[22]Procedural unfairness means that there was some procedural impropriety or unfairness resulting in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed and therefore, producing a manifestly unfair, flawed, or unjust result. These issues (which focus on how the decision was made) are entirely separate to the issue of irrationality which focusses on the actual decision.[23]In summary an Applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under rule 28 must satisfy me that either:(a) express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision;(b) they were not given a fair hearing;(c) they were not properly informed of the case against them;(d) they were prevented from putting their case properly;(e) the panel did not properly record the reasons for any findings or conclusion; and/or(f) the panel was not impartial.[24]The overriding objective is to ensure that the Applicant's case was dealt with justly. Other[25]It is possible to argue that mistakes in findings of fact made by a decision maker result in the final decision being irrational, but the mistake of fact must be fundamental. The case of E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] QB 1044 sets out the preconditions for such a conclusion:
" there must have been a mistake as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter; the fact or evidence must have been "established", in the sense that it was uncontentious and objectively verifiable; the appellant (or his advisors) must not have been responsible for the mistake; and the mistake must have played a material (though not necessarily decisive) part in the tribunal's reasoning."
See also R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2003] AC 295 , which said that in order to establish that there was a demonstrable mistake of fact in the decision of the panel, an Applicant will have to provide " objectively verifiable evidence " of what is asserted to be the true picture.[26]Omitting to put information before a panel is not a ground for procedural unfairness, as has been confirmed in the decision on the previous reconsideration application in Williams [2019] PBRA 7 . This is the case even where the information, had it been before the panel, would have been capable of altering its decision, or prompting the panel to take other steps such as putting the case off for an oral hearing where the new information and its effect on any risk assessment could be examined. This is because procedural unfairness under the Rules relates to the making of the decision by the Parole Board, and when making the decision the panel considered all the evidence that was before them. There was nothing to indicate that further evidence was available or necessary, and so there was nothing to indicate that there was any procedural unfairness. Reconsideration as a discretionary remedy[27]Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy. That means that, even if an error of law, irrationality, or procedural unfairness is established, the Reconsideration Member considering the case is not obliged to direct reconsideration of the panel's decision. The Reconsideration Member can decline to make such a direction having taken into account the particular circumstances of the case, the potential for a different decision to be reached by a new panel, and any delay caused by a grant of reconsideration. That discretion must of course be exercised in a way which is fair to both parties. The reply on behalf of the Secretary of State[28]The Respondent has offered no representations. Discussion Ground 1- Evidence of security information taken out of context[29]The Applicant suggests there was an error at paragraph 2.4 of the decision, when the panel considered a security entry which suggested the Applicant insisted his POM speak to his wife on the phone about a parole decision. The panel does not reference an entry in the dossier at p289, where the POM at that time was happy to discuss the matter with his wife.[30]Having considered paragraph 2.4, I am satisfied this is primarily descriptive of aspects of the evidence, rather than contributing to the panel's assessment of risk. The panel notes at the bottom of the same paragraph, that professionals did not consider the security entries to be relevant to risk. Equally, the panel does not reference the incident elsewhere in the decision, nor mention the incident in its conclusions. Ground 2 - Evidence of call monitoring[31]The Applicant suggests that the panel's observations at paragraph 2.10 of the decision, concerning phone call monitoring and the Applicant's response to questioning by the POM is incorrect.[32]I have listened to the recording (44:30 onwards) and the panel's observations at 2.10 are accurate.[33]The Applicant's submissions that the panel's conclusion on this matter is an assumption is entirely without merit. Ground 3 - Evidence of errors in decision letter[34]The Applicant takes issue with two points in the decision. Firstly, the use of the term ' safe place' , where it is suggested that he did not use the term.[35]The distinction being drawn is minor; the thrust of the point is accurate. If the Applicant's wife needs space, she goes to her room. The panel's description is an accurate representation of the Applicant's response.[36]Secondly, the Applicant takes issue with how the panel have described how he dealt with a previous incident around his wife's Facebook account at paragraph 2.13. The panel concluded he had not explained how this was resolved; the Applicant contends he had done so.[37]I listened to the recording (at 2:06:30). The Facebook account incident is being discussed, and he is asked how he resolved it. He replies, " I can't remember off the top of my head ." No explanation of how the incident was resolved is given.[38]I am satisfied the panel's observations at 2.13 accurately reflected the Applicant's response. Ground 4 - Evidence of panic alarm and contingency plan[39]The Applicant raises a number of points about the panel's conclusions on the evidence given around the contingency plan: · The panel did not explore why the contingency plan was developed. · The details of the contingency plan were developed due to the restrictions on the Applicant with regards to residence. · Both the Applicant and his wife approached the police following the incident which led to recall.[40]Whatever the reason for the contingency plan being developed, it was considered an important part of the risk management plan by the COM. Equally, what happened at the time of the previous recall is of minimal relevance to how the proposed contingency plan would function. The panel was entitled to make a considered assessment of how it would function in practice and how it would help mitigate risk. Having done so, they concluded that it placed an onus on the Applicant's wife to remove herself from conflict, which raised genuine concerns around the suitability of the address. This was a logical concern based on the wider aspects of the case. Ground 5 - Evidence of meeting the Applicant and his wife[41]The Applicant suggests the panel made an error in concluding that the Applicant's wife had only discussed the relationship with professionals in the presence of the Applicant. He presents evidence that individual meetings have occurred, and suggests the panel failed to ask professionals whether these meetings had occurred. This is essentially a claim of mistake of material fact.[42]The information provided by the Applicant's representative from the COM is as follows:
"Yes, most recent home visit was joint, with them both at home, and with both myself and POM (who had not previously met [the Applicant's wife]). I have spoken to [her] and been to home without [the Applicant] there, and seen him alone without her too. Multiple times. Also met and spoken with her daughter and son in law."
[43]In considering this ground I have taken into account the principles in E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] QB 1044 , as noted above. I have also considered the case of Hall-Chung [2025] EWHC 1879 (Admin) , where these principles have recently been applied in the context of parole and a reconsideration decision.[44]In applying the test, I make the following observations and conclusions: · The panel proceeded on the basis that the Applicant's wife had not had the opportunity to discuss the relationship with professionals without the Applicant being present. · Considering the information presented by the Applicant from the COM in his application, that was factually incorrect. It is unclear why the COM did not raise the point in the hearing, and I make no criticism of the panel in this regard. · I consider this information to be uncontentious and objectively verifiable; the information comes from a professional witness and is unambiguous. · Whether the Applicant or his advisors were responsible for the mistake is more nuanced. It appears that the Applicant was aware that his wife had met with professionals without him being present. It is unclear whether this had been communicated to his representative. However, on a plain reading of the words in E , I cannot conclude the Applicant, or his representative, was responsible for the mistake. Whilst they may not have corrected the mistake, they did not create the mistake, for instance by supplying inaccurate information to the panel, and as such, cannot bear responsibility. · I consider the mistake did play a material, if not decisive, role in the panel's reasoning. In coming to this conclusion, I note that it is included in the list of factors the panel had concerns about at paragraph 4.4. More significantly, at paragraph 2.15, the panel states the following: " Of significant concern to the panel is that in regard to discussion about the relationship, [the Applicant's wife] appears not to have had the opportunity to discuss this without the presence of [the Applicant]. Therefore, the panel is not reassured about the assessment of the relationship." (My emphasis).[45]As a result of these conclusions, I have determined that there was a mistake of material fact, and as a result, the decision can be considered to be irrational in a public law sense.[46]Whilst reconsideration is a discretionary remedy, and it is open to me to not grant the application, I do not consider that to be appropriate in this case. When considering the last limb of the test in E , I have already concluded the mistake played a material role in the panel's reasoning. In those circumstances, I consider denying the application would be unfair and must be granted. Ground 6 - Evidence of release address concerns[47]The Applicant suggests that based on the panel's concerns around accommodation and the Applicant living with his wife, they should have made directions prior to the hearing around alternative accommodation or considered adjourning the case to allow such accommodation to be sourced.[48]The panel heard wider evidence around accommodation, including evidence from the POM and COM about other options having been explored, including independent accommodation.[49]I note that the Applicant's legal representative did not raise any point about adjournment during or after the hearing, despite the panel clearly raising issues about the proposed accommodation plans.[50]Whilst it may be the case that an adjournment could have been directed, and other panels may have taken this course of action, a failure to do so is not automatically irrational or procedurally unfair. The panel heard the evidence around the accommodation plans, which needs to be considered in light of the wider concerns around controlling/coercive behaviour, and whilst raising concerns, clearly concluded they had sufficient information to proceed. I am satisfied that course of action was one a reasonable panel could take, and this ground of challenge fails. Ground 7 - Safeguarding concerns[51]The Applicant suggests that the test for release has been incorrectly assessed by the panel's reference to safeguarding concerns around the Applicant's wife. It is further suggested that MAPPA (Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements) agreed the home address was suitable for Release on Temporary Licence (ROTLs), and considering no issues had arisen on those ROTLs, the Applicant's wife was clearly safeguarded.[52]The reference to safeguarding concerns was in a list of factors the panel took into account. At no point does the panel conflate the statutory test for release with a test concerning safeguarding. I am satisfied that the panel applied the correct test.[53]Considering this ground from another position, it may also be suggesting that the panel's conclusions on safeguarding were in error, because other professionals had come to different conclusions. I am satisfied that point has no merit. The fact that other professionals made different assessments is not binding on the panel. There is a clear rationale given for their conclusions, which cannot be faulted. Decision[54]Accordingly, having found there to be a mistake of material fact, as defined in the case of E , I conclude that the decision was irrational. I do so solely on the basis of ground 5 of the Applicant's application. I find no procedural unfairness or irregularity. The application is therefore granted, and the case should be reviewed by a fresh panel by way of an oral hearing. John Marley 06 February 2026