Uthayakumar, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 150 (08 July 2026) [2026] PBRA 150

PBRA
Uthayakumar, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 150 (08 July 2026)
[2026] PBRA 150 · 2026-05-08
[1]This is an application by Uthayakumar (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision of an oral hearing, dated 8 May 2026, declining to direct his release.[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended by the Parole Board (Amendment) Rules 2025) (the Parole Board Rules) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,(b) that it is irrational and/or(c) that it is procedurally unfair. This is an eligible case, and the application was made in time.[3]I have considered the application on the papers. These are as follows: · The dossier, totalling 861 pages. · The decision. · The submissions on the Applicant's behalf by his legal representative.[4]Having considered the papers, I further directed that I be supplied with the recording of the hearing and two body worn video (BWV) clips that had been supplied to the panel and witnesses on the day of the hearing. I have watched the BWV clips and listened to a substantial proportion of the recording of the hearing, including the Applicant's evidence around the recall, both before and after the BWV being supplied, the discussions around the impact of the evidence, and the evidence of the psychologist and Community Offender Manager (COM). Request for Reconsideration[5]The application for reconsideration is undated.[6]The grounds for seeking a reconsideration are presented in six grounds, alleging a mix of irrationality and procedural unfairness. The specifics of these grounds are addressed in the discussion section below. Background[7]The Applicant was convicted of attempted wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm, possession of bladed article and criminal damage on 7 March 2019, receiving an extended determinate sentence of 11 years, comprising of an eight year custodial element and three years extended licence.[8]The index offence involved an attack on a shopkeeper in a newsagent. The Applicant entered the store with a co-defendant and struck the victim multiple times with a metal pole and causing significant damage to the shop.[9]The Applicant has a significant history of offending, including previous convictions for violence.[10]The Applicant was released from custody on 04 October 2024 and recalled on 27 December 2024. He had been arrested for a range of offences related to the taking of a car and possession of cannabis. He was ultimately not prosecuted for these matters, but they are central to this application and are explored further below. Current Parole Review[11]The Applicant's case was referred to the Parole Board to consider whether he should be released from custody. His case was directed to an oral hearing in May 2025. His case was originally listed for 29 October 2025 but was adjourned on the day so that a psychological risk assessment could be obtained.[12]The Applicant's oral hearing took place on 17 March 2026, before a two-member panel, with a psychologist chair. The panel had access to a dossier of 861 numbered pages and heard evidence from the Prison Offender Manager (POM), the prison psychologist, the COM and the Applicant. The Applicant was legally represented during the hearing.[13]During the hearing the panel raised a query around BWV from the Applicant's recall. This was produced very quickly by the police and was able to be viewed by the panel and the witnesses during a break in the hearing. The Relevant Law[14]The panel correctly sets out in its decision the test for release. Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)[15]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).[16]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)). Irrationality[17]The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses ltd -v- Wednesbury Corporation 1948 1 KB 223 by Lord Greene in these words:
" if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere"
. The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality.[18]In R(DSD and others) -v- the Parole Board 2018 EWHC 694 (Admin) a Divisional Court applied this test to Parole Board hearings in these words at para 116:
"the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. "
[19]In R(on the application of Wells) -v- Parole Board 2019 EWHC 2710 (Admin) Saini J set out what he described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law which was "to test the decision maker's ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel's expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied)". This test was adopted by a Divisional Court in the case of R (on the application of the Secretary of State for Justice) -v- the Parole Board 2022 EWHC 1282 (Admin).[20]As was made clear by Saini J this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. The interpretation of and application of the Wednesbury test in parole hearings as explained in DSD was binding on Saini J.[21]It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the panel who heard the witnesses.[22]Further while the views of the professional witnesses must be properly considered by a panel deciding on release, the panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses. Procedural unfairness Procedural unfairness means that there was some procedural impropriety or unfairness resulting in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed and therefore, producing a manifestly unfair, flawed, or unjust result. These issues (which focus on how the decision was made) are entirely separate to the issue of irrationality which focusses on the actual decision. In summary an applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under rule 28 must satisfy me that either:(a) express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision;(b) they were not given a fair hearing;(c) they were not properly informed of the case against them;(d) they were prevented from putting their case properly;(e) the panel did not properly record the reasons for any findings or conclusion; and/or(f) the panel was not impartial. The overriding objective is to ensure that the applicant's case was dealt with justly. Error of law[26]An administrative decision is unlawful under the broad heading of illegality if the panel: a) misinterprets a legal instrument relevant to the function being performed; b) has no legal authority to make the decision; c) fails to fulfil a legal duty; d) exercises discretionary power for an extraneous purpose; e) takes into account irrelevant considerations or fails to take account of relevant considerations; and/or f) improperly delegates decision-making power.[27]The task in evaluating whether a decision is illegal is essentially one of construing the content and scope of the instrument conferring the duty or power upon the panel. The instrument will normally be the Parole Board Rules, but it may also be an enunciated policy, or some other common law power. Other[28]It is possible to argue that mistakes in findings of fact made by a decision maker result in the final decision being irrational, but the mistake of fact must be fundamental. The case of E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] QB 1044 sets out the preconditions for such a conclusion:
" there must have been a mistake as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter; the fact or evidence must have been "established", in the sense that it was uncontentious and objectively verifiable; the appellant (or his advisors) must not have been responsible for the mistake; and the mistake must have played a material (though not necessarily decisive) part in the tribunal's reasoning."
See also R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2003] AC 295 , which said that in order to establish that there was a demonstrable mistake of fact in the decision of the panel, an Applicant will have to provide " objectively verifiable evidence " of what is asserted to be the true picture.[29]In Oyston [2000] PLR 45 , at paragraph 47 Lord Bingham said:
" It seems to me generally desirable that the Board should identify in broad terms the matters judged by the Board as pointing towards and against a continuing risk of offending and the Board's reasons for striking the balance that it does. Needless to say, the letter should summarise the considerations which have in fact led to the final decision. It would be wrong to prescribe any standard form of Decision Letter, and it would be wrong to require elaborate or impeccable standards of draftsmanship. "
Reconsideration as a discretionary remedy[30]Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy. That means that, even if an error of law, irrationality, or procedural unfairness is established, the Reconsideration Member considering the case is not obliged to direct reconsideration of the panel's decision. The Reconsideration Member can decline to make such a direction having taken into account the particular circumstances of the case, the potential for a different decision to be reached by a new panel, and any delay caused by a grant of reconsideration. That discretion must of course be exercised in a way which is fair to both parties. The reply on behalf of the Secretary of State (The Respondent)[31]The Respondent offered no representations. Discussion[32]As previously noted, the Applicant has pleaded six grounds in his application. Ground 1: Material factual inaccuracies and misunderstanding of facts[33]This ground relates to several areas where the Applicant suggests the panel have misunderstood the evidence or made factual mistakes.[34]The first area concerns inaccuracies around age, chronology and sentence details. Whilst the Applicant accepts these are individually minor, he submits that these inaccuracies as a whole, raise legitimate concerns over the panel's understanding of the evidential record.[35]The Applicant does not specifically identify each of the inaccuracies or where the panel has made the errors in the decision. In any event, as noted in E , any mistake of fact must have played a material, though not decisive, part in the panel's reasoning. There is no evidence that any errors, as there may be, come close to this threshold.[36]The Applicant also challenges comments made about his interaction with his legal representatives throughout the review and comments made about him not previously challenging police accounts.[37]With respect to the comments around his legal representatives, there are SHRFs within the dossier, dated 10 September and 26 September 2025. Both of these documents record that the Applicant had sent personal representations which had not been routed through his legal representatives. The Panel was entitled to note this, particularly in the wider context of the position they had taken around possible personality issues. Whether the Applicant had not discussed these submissions with his legal representatives beforehand is less clear, but I am not satisfied that this is properly categorised as a factual inaccuracy. In any event, the Applicant has not demonstrated how this materially impacted the decision.[38]Similarly, with respect to the challenges to the police evidence, the panel notes that he had denied culpability for offending but had not raised specific dispute about contents of the police statements. Having considered the submissions this is accurate. The previous submissions deny further offending and deny any escape attempt, but do not address the points raised in the police statements and by the panel in the decision around giving a false name and addresses. I am satisfied that there is no factual inaccuracy here.[39]Taking these matters as a whole, I am satisfied that any factual errors are minor, and do not reach the threshold for irrationality through error of fact. Ground 2: Failure to properly engage with relevant professional evidence[40]The Applicant submits that the panel failed to properly engage with the professional evidence around his progression and its conclusions around insight, responsibility and remorse cannot be reconciled with that evidence.[41]It is important to highlight that this is not an appeal, nor a merits challenge. To evidence irrationality the Applicant must show that no reasonable or sensible panel could have come to that conclusion. Similarly, a panel is not bound by the assessments or conclusions of professionals, as long as it clearly lays out its rationale for reaching different conclusions.[42]The panel clearly set out why they reach their conclusions. They relied upon the evidence the Applicant gave about his offending, including aspects where he minimised his role or culpability. Equally, their assessment of the recall identifies similar such behaviours. Having heard the evidence, the panel was entitled to give these matters appropriate weight considered against the professional reports.[43]The Applicant also raises issue with why the panel gave preference to oral evidence given after the BWV was produced on the day. This is properly addressed in the following ground. Ground 3: Procedural unfairness arising from the late introduction and reliance upon BWV evidence[44]The Applicant submits that both the introduction of the BWV and reliance upon it rendered the proceedings procedurally unfair. He suggests that once it became clear that the evidence was materially affecting professional opinion, it was necessary to adjourn to allow updated expert analysis.[45]With respect to the introduction of the evidence, there are no formal rules of evidence in parole proceedings. The panel is entitled to consider any evidence that is presented, within the general constraints of relevance to the issues involved and appropriate weight being given. The BWV was clearly highly relevant to the Applicant's recall and there can be no challenge to the panel seeking the evidence and considering it.[46]As regards the purported requirement for an adjournment, this is more nuanced. The panel does note however, that after hearing that professionals had changed their views, and after consultation with his legal representative, the Applicant wished to continue the hearing and did not seek an adjournment.[47]Notwithstanding that point, the panel had the option to adjourn the hearing, even with the Applicant wishing to proceed. Whether an adjournment is required when new evidence is introduced on the day of the hearing will be entirely fact specific. Clearly certain types of evidence would necessitate an adjournment, for example highly technical or expert evidence, or evidence which is voluminous. Such evidence would require careful consideration which would not be realistically possible in the context of an ongoing hearing. However, other types of evidence, which do not require extensive consideration or analysis, could be introduced fairly.[48]The evidence in question in this case is two pieces of BWV. Both run to just under four minutes. They show a police dog locating the Applicant, his initial arrest and his interactions with police in the immediate aftermath. The evidence is not complex or lengthy and is clear in what it shows.[49]The psychologist and COM change their professional views after observing the incident and give evidence around their reasons for doing so. Both state that they had placed less weight on the recall in their initial reports having spoken with the Applicant. Having seen the footage, which undermined the Applicant's credibility, they changed their views.[50]I am satisfied that viewing the evidence on the day was sufficient to allow the professional witnesses to resile from their previously stated opinions, based as they were, on the Applicant's discredited account.[51]The Applicant's argument on this point also relates to the wider assessment of him in light of the evidence, by the same witnesses. For instance, would this matter have changed the psychological formulation presented by the prison psychologist. Whilst there is a stronger argument that an adjournment and further interviews etc. would have been required in this context, the question I must ask is whether it was necessary, in the circumstances, for such an approach to be taken.[52]When considering their conclusion, a panel will take into account a range of evidence. There are cases where certain evidence is effectively determinative or is clearly the dominant factor in the assessment to be made. In such circumstances there will be no requirement to seek additional evidence, if the panel is satisfied it is unnecessary to so, taking into account the weight placed on the dominant evidence. This is a perfectly legitimate approach, as long as the evidence in question is sufficiently significant.[53]The decision makes it clear that the panel placed significant weight on the recall incident, having concluded on the balance of probabilities that the Applicant had been untruthful, had been in the vehicle and had been driving it. I am satisfied that the evidence related to his recall was, if not determinative, clearly the dominant evidential factor in the decision to be made. The panel could legitimately conclude that it was unnecessary to obtain further assessments.[54]As noted in ground two, the Applicant also raises issue with why the panel gave preference to oral evidence given after the BWV was produced on the day, as compared to the written professional assessments prepared before the hearing.[55]Having considered the panel's conclusions, I can see no error in their approach. Having made the conclusions they did, and with the professionals having stated they had relied on the Applicant's account in preparing their assessments, it was clearly proper to place minimal weight on them.[56]In any event, I am not satisfied that the panel placed any significant weight on the professional views. Whilst the decision states that the panel considered the opinions from the professionals after watching the BWV to be 'more reliably informed', it is not clear that the panel relied upon this to any extent. The panel had heard the Applicant's evidence and watched the BWV for themselves. They could safely have given much less weight to the reports in those circumstances. Ground 4: Irrational findings of fact concerning the alleged vehicle involvement[57]The Applicant submits that it was irrational that the panel concluded he had been in and driven the stolen vehicle.[58]I am satisfied that this ground is unsustainable.[59]The panel clearly lay out their rationale in assessing the allegations as per Parole Board guidance, in light of Pearce [2023] UKSC 13 : · The Applicant was tracked from the car by a police dog; · He was found in a dead-end alleyway, where he had no reason or excuse to be in; · He lied to police at the scene about living in the vicinity; · There were no other persons found in the area after the police search These matters also need to be seen in light of the panel's conclusions around the Applicant's evidence more generally, which they found to be wholly unconvincing.[60]Whilst there were evidential gaps concerning the vehicle, the test applied in considering allegations in Parole Board proceedings, is the balance of probabilities. The panel needed to be convinced that it was more likely than not that the Applicant had been in and driven the vehicle. On the evidence that was available to them, they could safely do so.[61]I am also satisfied that in making this conclusion, the panel clearly explained their rationale and provided more than sufficient reasoning to justify it. Ground 5: Improper reliance upon previous Parole Board decisions relating to a different sentence[62]The Applicant suggests the panel impermissibly attached weight to previous Parole Board decisions and treated historical findings as determinative of present risk, rather than evaluating the contemporary evidence themselves. Such findings are not specifically highlighted by the Applicant, rather the point is made on a general basis.[63]This argument has no merit. There is no temporal bar on the consideration of evidence in a parole hearing. In fact, there is a requirement for panels to adequately consider a prisoner's history, which may include previous offending, previous sentences and previous parole proceedings.[64]To the extent that the panel rely on previous findings from parole proceedings, they have done so appropriately. The Applicant's offending history and how he has been assessed in the past are clearly factors which can be relevant to current risk. Ground 6: Irrationality[65]This appears to be a catch all submission, including arguments made in the preceding grounds, including the following: · Ignoring professional recommendations; · Preferring opinions in oral evidence after the BWV was introduced; · Drawing adverse conclusions despite evidence around offence-focused work and other interventions; · Relying on disputed allegations; · Discounting evidence favourable to release, interpreting disputed evidence adversely and drawing speculative conclusions without adequate explanation.[66]The majority of these points have been addressed in my previous conclusions. To the extent that they have not, I am satisfied that there is no irrationality in the panel's decision. The panel has assessed the evidence fairly and explained their conclusions throughout the decision. The fact that the panel do not place weight on evidence favourable to the Applicant, and give weight to evidence unfavourable to him, does not prove irrationality when it has been done after a proper assessment. There is a clear evidential basis for each of the panel's conclusions, and these as a whole, justify the decision to decline to direct the Applicant's release. Decision[67]For the reasons I have given, I do not consider that the decision was irrational or procedurally unfair and accordingly the application for reconsideration is refused. John Marley 08 July 2026