Hicks, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 102 (08 May 2026) [2026] PBRA 102

PBRA

Hicks, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 102 (08 May 2026)

[2026] PBRA 102 · 2026-03-26

[1]This is an application by Hicks (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision of an oral hearing panel, dated 26 March 2026, who declined to direct his release.

[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended by the Parole Board (Amendment) Rules 2025) (the Parole Board Rules) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,

(b) that it is irrational and/or

[3]I have considered the application on the papers. These are the decision, the dossier (amounting to 301 numbered pages) and submissions on the Applicant's behalf. I have also listened to portions of the recording of the oral hearing. Request for Reconsideration

[4]The application for reconsideration is dated 13 April 2026.

[5]The Applicant challenges the decision on the basis of irrationality. The details of this challenge are included the section titled Discussion below. Background

[6]The Applicant was convicted of a range of sexual offences on 02 February 2023. These included inciting a girl under 13 to engage in sexual activity, engaging in sexual communication with a child, multiple attempts for both of those offences, and making indecent images of children.

[7]The index offending took place over a period of 10 years, when the Applicant was between 21 and 31 years of age. He accepted contacting thousands of females and up to 100 girls. He would purport to be of school age and attempt to engage in sexual communication and incite the victims to engage in sexual acts. When arrested, he was found to be in possession of a large number of indecent images of children.

[8]The Applicant has engaged with professional support in custody, completing Horizon (an accredited psychological intervention for adult men with sexual convictions) in 2023. He was deemed unsuitable for the HSP (Healthy Sex Programme) and moved to open conditions in February 2024. No concerns have been raised around his custodial conduct. Current parole review

[9]The Secretary of State for Justice (the Respondent) referred the Applicant's case to the Parole Board in December 2024 to consider whether he should be released. An MCA member of the Parole Board directed his case to an oral hearing in April 2025.

[10]The case proceeded to an oral hearing on 26 February 2026, before a panel of three independent members. The panel heard evidence from a stand-in for the Prison Offender Manager (POM), the Community Offender Manager (COM) and a prison psychologist. Following the hearing, the panel adjourned to obtain additional information concerning the risk management plan, the Sexual Harm Prevention Order and the prosecution sentencing note. The Applicant was legally represented throughout the proceedings. The Relevant Law Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)

[11]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).

[12]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)). Irrationality

[13]The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses Ltd -v- Wednesbury Corporation 1948 1 KB 223 by Lord Greene in these words:

" if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere"

. The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality.

[14]In R(DSD and others) -v- the Parole Board

2018 EWHC 694

(Admin) a Divisional Court applied this test to Parole Board hearings in these words at para 116:

"the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. "

[15]In R(on the application of Wells) -v- Parole Board

2019 EWHC 2710

(Admin) Saini J set out what he described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law which was "to test the decision maker's ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel's expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied)". This test was adopted by a Divisional Court in the case of R(on the application of the Secretary of State for Justice) -v- the Parole Board

2022 EWHC 1282

(Admin).

[16]As was made clear by Saini J this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. The interpretation of and application of the Wednesbury test in parole hearings as explained in DSD was binding on Saini J.

[17]It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the panel who heard the witnesses.

[18]Further while the views of the professional witnesses must be properly considered by a panel deciding on release, the panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses.

[19]It is possible to argue that mistakes in findings of fact made by a decision maker result in the final decision being irrational, but the mistake of fact must be fundamental. The case of E v Secretary of State for the Home Department

[2004] QB 1044

sets out the preconditions for such a conclusion:

" there must have been a mistake as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter; the fact or evidence must have been "established", in the sense that it was uncontentious and objectively verifiable; the appellant (or his advisors) must not have been responsible for the mistake; and the mistake must have played a material (though not necessarily decisive) part in the tribunal's reasoning."

See also R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions

[2003] AC 295

, which said that in order to establish that there was a demonstrable mistake of fact in the decision of the panel, an applicant will have to provide " objectively verifiable evidence " of what is asserted to be the true picture. Reconsideration as a discretionary remedy

[20]Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy. That means that, even if an error of law, irrationality, or procedural unfairness is established, the Reconsideration Member considering the case is not obliged to direct reconsideration of the panel's decision. The Reconsideration Member can decline to make such a direction having taken into account the particular circumstances of the case, the potential for a different decision to be reached by a new panel, and any delay caused by a grant of reconsideration. That discretion must of course be exercised in a way which is fair to both parties. The reply on behalf of the Secretary of State

[21]The Respondent made no representations. Discussion

[22]As noted by the authorities, when considering a challenge to a decision on the ground of irrationality it is not for me to substitute my view for that of the oral hearing panel who had the opportunity to hear and see the witnesses. I should only interfere with the panel's decision should I conclude that no reasonable panel could have reached that conclusion.

[23]The legal representative for the Applicant has presented their submissions in a narrative format, outlining the evidence that was heard, then going through the decision paragraph by paragraph, highlighting individual points that they suggest were assessed incorrectly or should have been given more or less weight. No overarching grounds of challenge are formulated.

[24]This type of approach is generally unproductive. Unless individual conclusions on specific parts of the evidence are being challenged as irrational in and of themselves (and if so, this should be clearly articulated and argued), the decision needs to be considered in its totality.

[25]I will attempt to address the individual points raised by the Applicant, before going on to consider how they impact the overall conclusion of the panel. Ground 1- Disproportionate weight given to the sentencing judge's views

[26]This relates to the Panel's assessment of the Applicant's motivation for his offending and how this differed between the sentencing judge and other professionals. This also includes a suggestion that the comments of the COM around the Applicant obtaining sexual satisfaction from his offending were taken out of context.

[27]This is fundamentally a disagreement with the evaluative judgement of the panel. The panel was entitled to reach those conclusions, particularly in light of other conclusions around sexual arousal at the time of the offending, which are described in greater detail below. Ground 2- No weight given to risk reduction work

[28]It is contended that the panel has placed no weight on the risk reduction work completed by the Applicant during his sentence. No reasoning is given to support this ground of challenge, and the logic of the submission appears to be circular; the panel did not direct release therefore it must not have acknowledged this work.

[29]The decision clearly identifies the risk reduction that has been completed by the Applicant. However, based on the previously noted conclusions around motivation, it was reasonably open to the panel to conclude that sexual attraction to children had not been adequately explored through such work and required further exploration. Ground 3- Relationship status disclosures

[30]The Applicant takes issue with a comment made in the decision relating to disclosure of his relationship status. This appears to relate to an issue which arose in the hearing where the Applicant indicated that his partner was intending to move in with him. The COM had not been aware of this prior to the hearing.

[31]It is highlighted that the COM did not view this as a deliberate withholding of information, nor did he view it as an issue. That may be the case, however, the panel is entitled to take a different view. Considering the significance of such a step, it is clearly open to the panel to have raised concerns about why this had not been discussed with the COM at an earlier juncture. Again, this is a disagreement with the panel's assessment. I am satisfied that the assessment was reasonable to make. Ground 4- Risk levels and warning signs

[32]This concerns the panel's divergence from the psychologist's assessment of the Applicant's risk of sexual violence. The psychologist assessed this to be 'low', and the panel considered this to be an underestimation based on the extended period over which he offended and the lack of testing of his internal controls/factors. The submissions highlight the work the Applicant has done in custody and evidence of internal factors he uses to manage risk from the witnesses. As always, management of risk in a custodial environment, even in open conditions, is different to the community. There is nothing approaching irrationality in concluding his risk of sexual violence was higher than 'low' and that it was unknown whether his internal controls/factors had developed sufficiently.

[33]Equally, the panel's assessment that warning signs would rely to an extent on the Applicant's own insight and openness is a self-evident point and no proper dispute can be taken with it. Ground 5- Residence plans/device access

[34]This is an argument around the panel's consideration of the proposed plan for release to the Applicant's mother's address. The argument is progressed on a number of sub-grounds.

[35]Firstly, issue is taken around the comments made by the panel concerning the fact that the Applicant had resided at his father's address during the commission of the index offence and familial support had not stopped him offending at that time. I could see no part of the decision which suggested this would raise his risk as suggested in the submissions, rather, this was addressing the adequacy of the plan which was supported by professionals. It is clearly a point that could reasonably have been made.

[36]Secondly, the submissions discuss access to internet enabled devices. The panel raised concerns that the Applicant could potentially access his parent's devices and this may be difficult to monitor. It is suggested on the Applicant's behalf that this concern is misplaced, and licence conditions and the Sexual Harm Prevention Order (SHPO) would cover this possibility. It was also suggested he would be unlikely to jeopardise everything in his life or risk his parent's being arrested by doing so.

[37]I was not convinced that the rationale given was entirely accurate. Whilst the SHPO does prohibit the use of such devices unless certain conditions are met, and allows for inspection of these devices, that does not clearly allow for examination of devices owned by his parents. In my view, a reading of the terms of the SHPO leads to a conclusion that police would require evidence of the Applicant using any device before it could lawfully be examined. This could create the possibility of illicit device usage and therefore in those circumstances, significant reliance would be placed on the Applicant's internal controls. As the panel previously noted, there was uncertainty about the development of these.

[38]A minor point was raised around YouTube usage. I do not think anything turns on this point, which is ultimately consumed by the wider point concerning access to the internet and monitoring of that. Ground 6- The Applicant's partner

[39]It is submitted that the panel erred in considering that the Applicant's partner was vulnerable. I consider this argument misplaced. The Panel did not conclude that the Applicant's partner was vulnerable. Rather, they highlighted that little was known about the relationship and there were concerns that there had not been sufficient investigation about whether she could be vulnerable, particularly noting her sister was against the relationship. This is an uncontroversial point. Ground 7- General progression

[40]There is a general argument made that the panel disregarded evidence of progress and offence focussed work when considering the risk management plan. It is submitted that the Applicant has made genuine change and there is no evidence of concerns since then. The argument is developed by disputing the panel's conclusion that the Applicant's progress was based on his own account of his offending and that they lacked confidence he had addressed core risk factors. It is suggested that this is factually untrue.

[41]Both of these points come back to the panel's assessment of the Applicant's motivation for his offending, and how this has been assessed by professionals. The Panel addresses this point at 1.9 and 1.11 of the decision. I have listened to the recording of the hearing and following repeated questioning from all three panellists, the Applicant eventually accepted that he was sexually aroused by children during his offending, although he had maintained a position he did not generally find children sexually attractive. Considering how the Applicant's case has been assessed by professionals, particularly around sex addiction and the Applicant seeking shock value, this was a very important piece of evidence, opening the possibility that there were risk factors which had not been fully explored. The panel made that point at 4.2, where they indicate they did not have confidence that core risk factors, including a sexual interest in children, had been addressed. I am satisfied that this was a conclusion that was reasonably open to the panel in light of the evidence given by the Applicant.

[42]It is further submitted that the COM and psychologist indicated that a sexual interest in children is irrelevant and would not have changed the risk reduction work undertaken. In any event, it would not impact how the COM would manage the Applicant in the community.

[43]Even if those points are accepted, and there would be no difference in treatment or management, a sexual interest in children is evidently relevant to the Applicant's insight, internal controls and ability to discuss risk with professionals, which are crucial in assessing his current level of risk and his manageability in the community.

[44]As an aside, I have also considered whether there is an argument suggesting fundamental mistake of fact, relating to the panel's conclusions on the Applicant's progress and addressing core risks. The submission that this is factually untrue cannot be sustained. It relates to the core evaluative judgement of the panel and is not an uncontentious and objectively verifiable fact, as required in E (see paragraph 19 above).

[45]The final submission is that more weight should have been given to the views of the COM who was confident he could manage the Applicant and was eminently experienced. Once again, this is a dispute over the weight given to evidence. As throughout the submissions, there is no development of an argument about why the panel's decision-making process was flawed, or where there is a breakdown in the logical flow of their conclusions from the issues they identified. It is simply asserted that they should have given more weight to evidence favouring the Applicant.

[46]I note the suggestion that the panel has taken a 'morally agreeable' or 'easy' decision in declining to direct the Applicant's release. That comes very close to suggesting the panel's decision was made for improper purposes or not on the basis of the evidence. For clarity, I completely reject that suggestion. There is a clear evidential basis for the decision that was made. Conclusions

[47]Having considered the entirety of the arguments on the Applicant's behalf, none of them individually, in combination with each other, or as a whole, come close to sustaining a challenge of irrationality. Decision

[48]For the reasons I have given, I do not consider that the decision was irrational and accordingly the application for reconsideration is refused. John Marley 08 May 2026