Frayne, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 1 (02 January 2026) [2026] PBRA 1

PBRA
Frayne, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 1 (02 January 2026)
[2026] PBRA 1 · 2025-11-24
[1]This is an application by Frayne (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision of an oral hearing panel of the Parole Board (the panel) dated the 24 November 2025 not to direct his release.[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended by the Parole Board (Amendment) Rules 2025) (the Parole Board Rules) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,(b) that it is irrational and/or(c) that it is procedurally unfair. This is an eligible case, and the application was made in time.[3]I have considered the application on the papers. These are the written dossier in the case, the panel's written decision dated 24 November 2025 and the Applicant's application for reconsideration dated 27 November 2025. Request for Reconsideration[4]The grounds for seeking a reconsideration are as follows: Irrationalitya. The panel was in conflict with the professional witnesses who supported the Applicant's release and did not believe that a period in open conditions would be necessary. The panel " rejected these recommendations without introducing new evidence or demonstrating why the risk management plan would not manage risk effectively" .b. The panel " over-emphasised long-term risk" had " acknowledged that risks were not imminent ... yet concluded that risks could not be managed in the longer term" .c. The panel " relied upon unsubstantiated assumptions" and inferred a " sexual motivation and control in the recall offence despite the psychologist's assessment and the accepted basis of plea that [the Applicant's] belief was that the female was 20 years old... ". The panel had agreed no " core risk reduction work" was required and its "assumptions were not supported by evidence...". Procedural Unfairnessd. The panel failed to give adequate weight to evidence of change and did not balance this properly against any concerns it had.e. " The panel questioned [the Applicant's] account of the recall offence without corroborating evidence, despite police documents and sentencing remarks being available to the contrary". Error of Lawf. The panel "... misapplied the Codified Public Protection Test by placing undue weight on long term risk without any evidential basis for any such risks presenting more than a minimal risk of serious harm." Background[5]On 17 March 1998, the Applicant, at the age of 20, received a life sentence following his conviction at trial for an offence of murder. The sentencing court set a minimum term of 10 years before his release could be considered by the Parole Board. The Applicant reached that eligibility date on 12 June 2007. In the same sentencing exercise, the Applicant received determinate sentences of detention for offences of robbery and s18 GBH. He was also convicted of perverting the course of justice and conspiring to pervert the course of justice.[6]The Applicant and his associate had committed a robbery at a jewellery store. During that robbery, the owner of the store was killed. The Applicant's co-defendant had a knife which he used to repeatedly stab a male passer-by who was coming to the aid of the owner of the store. The co-defendant had used the same knife on the store owner, causing his death.[7]On 12 June 2007, the day his minimum term of the life sentence expired, the Applicant was released on licence. He remained on licence until his recall to custody on 28 November 2016.[8]On 21 June 2017, the Applicant received a fifteen-month custodial sentence for possession of a bladed article and a one-month concurrent sentence for an offence of criminal damage. It was these offences that led to his recall to custody in November 2016. These offences were committed in a domestic context when the Applicant damaged another man's car.[9]The Applicant was released for a second time on 2 February 2018 and was recalled to custody on 16 April 2021.[10]The Applicant's second recall followed allegations of child exploitation and running a brothel. He had been found at a property with a 16-year-old girl. It was reported that the girl was located by the police at the property following concerns being raised by the landlord that the premises were being used as a brothel. The Applicant was also located at the address, and he had rented the property for a week through Airbnb.[11]The Applicant was also charged with offences of violence alleged to have been committed against his partner but was acquitted of these matters at trial in November 2022.[12]On 21 August 2023, the Applicant was sentenced to ten months in custody for an offence of causing prostitution for gain. He pleaded guilty on a basis of plea which was that he believed the girl to be 20 years old and had not met her until after her sixteenth birthday. He accepted that he expected money to be paid to him by the girl but in his view, this was to reimburse him for rent.[13]In his written representations for the Parole review, the Applicant stated that he met the female via social media, that she had been interested in making money through sex work and that he had helped her with this. The basis of plea was included in the written evidence in the dossier and confirmed that the Applicant had been present when the female was ' entertaining a client' and that he was aware the premises he was present at were being used for the purposes of prostitution.[14]The panel's review of his case was the third review by the Parole Board since his recall to custody in 2021. At the second review in October 2023 (the 2023 panel) the case was concluded based on the written evidence and without an oral hearing. The 2023 panel did not direct release or recommend that the Applicant be transferred to an open prison. The 2023 panel accepted that further offence focussed work needed to be completed in custody. It noted that the Applicant had " yet again committed offences for financial gain... " and "... there would need to be exploration of the sexual element to the offending and other risk factors associated with it...".[15]Following this, the Applicant completed an accredited course to address his decision making. A prison psychologist considered that " all relevant core risk reduction work ... " had been completed and supported re-release. In his interview for the report produced by the prison psychologist, the Applicant had maintained that the recall offence was committed for financial gain, and he claimed to have no sexual attraction to or sexual contact with the girl.[16]At an oral hearing on 16 September 2025, the panel heard evidence from the Applicant, his Prison Offender Manager, his Community Offender Manager, and from the prison psychologist. The panel also considered the written dossier in the case.[17]The Applicant told the panel that the 16-year-old girl had asked him to put her in contact with another woman who was using " Only Fans ". He claimed that the girl "chased" him to rent the Airbnb and that she had been a willing participant. The panel noted that the Applicant was to receive 70 percent of the money made by the girl and the prison psychologist accepted that given that they were not splitting the money 50:50, there could have been more of an element of control than the Applicant had suggested.[18]After hearing oral evidence, the panel adjourned for further evidence to be produced, specifically details about the offences that led to the Applicant's second recall to custody.[19]That information included details of what the Applicant said to the police when he was arrested, including that he had been in a relationship with the girl for two-three months, but it had not " built up to sex" . Information provided to the police by the 16-year-old girl was included in the additional information. The panel also had sight of the sentencing remarks in the case. The judge noted that the Applicant had pleaded guilty on a basis that had been accepted by the Prosecution. The judge noted that when the police knocked on the door of the property, the Applicant answered and told them that only he and his girlfriend were present. The judge noted that the 16-year-old girl had reported that she had been offering sexual services at the property and that the Applicant had given her money to open an account that allowed her to advertise those services.[20]Following the receipt of further evidence, the Applicant produced closing written submissions in which he stated that his risk would be no more than minimal if he were to be released, that all witnesses supported his release, that the prison psychologist did "... not consider that intervention for sexual behaviour is appropriate ... [the Applicant] has not engaged in sexual violence. There is no evidence of sexual preoccupation with children. The offending was for acquisitive gain as opposed to being for sexual gratification ... Neither party disclosed sexual relations with each other ..." , and the Applicant had believed that the girl was 20 years old, which was accepted by the Prosecution in his basis of plea.[21]The panel then issued its written decision on 24 November 2025. It did not direct the Applicant's release but did recommend to the Secretary of State (the Respondent) that the Applicant be progressed to an open prison.[22]In its written decision, the panel identified concerns that the Applicant, " when in his 40s ... considered it appropriate to exploit a young female. He has a pattern of relationships with much younger and/or vulnerable females which the panel considered indicated that emotional congruence with teenage girls, albeit of the age of consent, may be another area of risk ..." .[23]The panel doubted the likely effectiveness of the risk management plan produced by Probation and believed that there would be significant benefits of a move to an open prison.[24]The panel stated:
"The index offence was a very serious matter and though an escalation in [the Applicant's] behaviour, was part of an emerging pattern of harmful offending. [The Applicant] has shown that he is able to make progress in custody and is able to sustain that for a significant amount of time when he is in the community. However, he has on both his releases returned to harmful behaviour. In the first he committed a weapons offence and in the second he committed an offence of causing prostitution for gain in which he exploited a vulnerable female. The second recall in particular goes directly to the core risk factors of a criminal lifestyle and financial gain which also underpinned the index offence. Whilst [the Applicant's] risks may not be imminent, when he does offend he returns to harmful behaviour. When considering release, the panel's concern is not just the immediate future but also [the Applicant's] longer term risk of causing serious harm as the Codified Public Protection Test does not have a temporal element. He is yet to develop a robust and stable resettlement plan that would allow him to move away from a criminal lifestyle ... "... The panel noted very carefully the recommendations for release from the professionals and does not go against these lightly. However it noted that their assessments are based on [the Applicant's] account of the recall offence and accept his claim that the female was a willing participant. That has not been corroborated and the panel was concerned that, even if she were, it still did not take account of the significant age difference between him and her or evidence of his intentional control over her given he was taking the majority of her earnings. It agreed with professionals that [the Applicant's] risks could be managed in the short term but, for the reasons above, did not consider that they could be managed in the longer term. It noted that the psychologist and Community Offender Manager thought that were [the Applicant] to be recalled, it would be for further offending for financial gain and the Community Offender Manager did not consider that he had a boundary as to what he may do to obtain money . For these reasons, the panel did not accept the recommendations of the professionals ..."
. The Relevant Law[25]The panel correctly sets out in its written decision dated 24 November 2025 the test for release and the issues to be addressed in making a recommendation to the Secretary of State for a progressive move to open conditions. Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)[26]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).[27]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)). Irrationality[28]The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses Ltd -v- Wednesbury Corporation 1948 1 KB 223 by Lord Greene in these words:
" if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere"
. The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality.[29]In R(DSD and others) -v- the Parole Board 2018 EWHC 694 (Admin) a Divisional Court applied this test to Parole Board hearings in these words at para 116:
"the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. "
[30]In R(on the application of Wells) -v- Parole Board 2019 EWHC 2710 (Admin) Saini J set out what he described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law which was "to test the decision maker's ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel's expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied)". This test was adopted by a Divisional Court in the case of R(on the application of the Secretary of State for Justice) -v- the Parole Board 2022 EWHC 1282 (Admin) .[31]As was made clear by Saini J this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. The interpretation of and application of the Wednesbury test in parole hearings as explained in DSD was binding on Saini J.[32]It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the panel who heard the witnesses.[33]Further while the views of the professional witnesses must be properly considered by a panel deciding on release, the panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses. Procedural unfairness[34]Procedural unfairness means that there was some procedural impropriety or unfairness resulting in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed and therefore, producing a manifestly unfair, flawed, or unjust result. These issues (which focus on how the decision was made) are entirely separate to the issue of irrationality which focusses on the actual decision.[35]In summary an Applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under rule 28 must satisfy me that either:(a) express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision;(b) they were not given a fair hearing;(c) they were not properly informed of the case against them;(d) they were prevented from putting their case properly;(e) the panel did not properly record the reasons for any findings or conclusion; and/or(f) the panel was not impartial.[36]The overriding objective is to ensure that the Applicant's case was dealt with justly. Error of law[37]An administrative decision is unlawful under the broad heading of illegality if the panel: a) misinterprets a legal instrument relevant to the function being performed; b) has no legal authority to make the decision; c) fails to fulfil a legal duty; d) exercises discretionary power for an extraneous purpose; e) takes into account irrelevant considerations or fails to take account of relevant considerations; and/or f) improperly delegates decision-making power.[38]The task in evaluating whether a decision is illegal is essentially one of construing the content and scope of the instrument conferring the duty or power upon the panel. The instrument will normally be the Parole Board Rules, but it may also be an enunciated policy, or some other common law power. Other[39]It is possible to argue that mistakes in findings of fact made by a decision maker result in the final decision being irrational, but the mistake of fact must be fundamental. The case of E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] QB 1044 sets out the preconditions for such a conclusion:
" there must have been a mistake as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter; the fact or evidence must have been "established", in the sense that it was uncontentious and objectively verifiable; the appellant (or his advisors) must not have been responsible for the mistake; and the mistake must have played a material (though not necessarily decisive) part in the tribunal's reasoning."
See also R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2003] AC 295 , which said that in order to establish that there was a demonstrable mistake of fact in the decision of the panel, an Applicant will have to provide " objectively verifiable evidence " of what is asserted to be the true picture.[40]In Oyston [2000] PLR 45 , at paragraph 47 Lord Bingham said:
" It seems to me generally desirable that the Board should identify in broad terms the matters judged by the Board as pointing towards and against a continuing risk of offending and the Board's reasons for striking the balance that it does. Needless to say, the letter should summarise the considerations which have in fact led to the final decision. It would be wrong to prescribe any standard form of Decision Letter and it would be wrong to require elaborate or impeccable standards of draftsmanship. "
[41]Omitting to put information before a panel is not a ground for procedural unfairness, as has been confirmed in the decision on the previous reconsideration application in Williams [2019] PBRA 7 . This is the case even where the information, had it been before the panel, would have been capable of altering its decision, or prompting the panel to take other steps such as putting the case off for an oral hearing where the new information and its effect on any risk assessment could be examined. This is because procedural unfairness under the Rules relates to the making of the decision by the Parole Board, and when making the decision the panel considered all the evidence that was before them. There was nothing to indicate that further evidence was available or necessary, and so there was nothing to indicate that there was any procedural unfairness.[42]R (on the application of Pearce and another) (Respondents) v Parole Board of England and Wales (Appellant) [2023] UKSC 13 addresses how the Parole Board should consider allegations. In summary, paragraph 87 of the judgment:
"87. We summarise our conclusions as follows: "(i) There is no general legal rule that in making a risk assessment the Board must adopt a two-stage process of making findings of fact on the balance of probabilities and then treating only those matters on which it has made findings of fact as relevant to the assessment of risk. "(ii) The Board's task is to address whether the safety of members of the public requires that the prisoner should remain confined. In so doing, the Board must have regard to the consequences of its decision on the interests of the prisoner, and the hardship he may suffer if he no longer needs to be confined in order to protect the public. "(iii) There is no rule of substantive fairness, akin to a legitimate expectation, which requires the Board to have regard only to found facts in its assessment of risk. "(iv) What procedural fairness requires of the Board in its impartial performance of its statutory remit is determined by the statutory terms of that remit and the wider legal context of the common law. "(v) If weight is to be given to an allegation of criminal or other misbehaviour in the risk assessment, the Board should first attempt to investigate the facts to enable it to make findings on the truthfulness of the allegation. If, as may often be the case despite its efforts to obtain the needed information, the Board is not able to make such a finding, it should investigate the facts to make findings as to the surrounding circumstances of the allegation which may or may not point to behaviour by the prisoner which is relevant to the assessment of risk. "(vi) In some circumstances, however, the Board may not be able to make findings of fact as to the truth of an allegation either because of an inability to obtain sufficiently reliable evidence or because it would be unfair to expect the prisoner to give an answer to the allegation when he is facing criminal or prison disciplinary proceedings in relation to that allegation. "(vii) In such circumstances the Board, having regard to public safety, may take into account the allegation or allegations and give it or them such weight as it considers appropriate in a holistic assessment of all the information before it, where it is concerned that there is a serious possibility that those allegations may be true. But the Board must proceed with considerable caution in this exercise because of the consequences of its decision on the prisoner. Procedural fairness requires the Board to give the prisoner the opportunity to make submissions about how the Board ought to proceed. There may be circumstances where, because of the inadequacy of the information available to the Board, it concludes that it should not take account of an allegation at all. There may also be circumstances where the information is less than would be desired but the allegation causes sufficient concern as to risk that the Board treats it as relevant. Its assessment of the weight to be attached to an allegation is subject to the constraints of public law rationality. "(viii) Thus, a failure to make findings of fact where it was reasonably practicable to do so or an irrational reliance on insubstantial allegations could be a ground of a successful public law challenge."
Reconsideration as a discretionary remedy[43]Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy. That means that, even if an error of law, irrationality, or procedural unfairness is established, the Reconsideration Member considering the case is not obliged to direct reconsideration of the panel's decision. The Reconsideration Member can decline to make such a direction having taken into account the particular circumstances of the case, the potential for a different decision to be reached by a new panel, and any delay caused by a grant of reconsideration. That discretion must of course be exercised in a way which is fair to both parties. The reply on behalf of the Secretary of State[44]On 15 December 2025, the Respondent confirmed that he would not be submitting any representations. Discussion Irrationality[45]The Applicant's grounds for irrationality are that the panel did not agree with the professional witnesses who supported release, did not explain why the risk management plan would not manage the Applicant's risk, " over-emphasised " long-term risk, inferred a sexual motivation to the recall offence and made " assumptions ... [which] were not supported by evidence ...".[46]I am not persuaded by these submissions.[47]The panel was entitled to look at the totality of the behaviour of the Applicant in the events leading to his recall and further conviction. It was fair and appropriate for the panel to consider aspects of that behaviour and its relevance, if any, to the Applicant's likely level of risk to the public if he were to be released.[48]The reconsideration mechanism is not a process whereby the judgement of the panel when assessing risk and allegations can be lightly interfered with. Nor is it a mechanism for substituting my view with that of the panel unless, of course, it is manifestly obvious that there are compelling reasons for interfering with the decision of the panel. In my determination the panel's rationale for reaching its conclusions in this case, which included its concerns about the Applicant's behaviour, are soundly based upon evidence and reasonable and rational.[49]The Applicant may disagree with the panel's assessment, but it does not lead to a finding of irrationality. When a panel makes a decision contrary to the opinions and recommendations of professional witnesses it is important that the panel explains clearly its reasons for doing so. Its stated reasons should also be sufficient to justify its conclusions (see Wells above). In this case I am satisfied that the panel explained its reasons for not adopting the views of the professional witnesses in this case, much of which I have set out in the background to the case (above). For that reason, I do not find that the panel's decision was irrational. Procedural Unfairness[50]There is little to these submissions that establishes any likely procedural unfairness. In adjourning the case following oral evidence, the panel stated, " Having received oral evidence, the panel came to the view that it needed further information about the offence which led to recall, specifically an independent account of that offence. It discussed this with [the Applicant's] legal representative who did not object to the review being adjourned for this ...".[51]Prior to issuing its written decision, the panel took account of written closing submissions from the Applicant who at no point argued that further oral evidence should be heard. It cannot now be claimed that there was some sort of procedural unfairness in that the panel heard the Applicant's oral evidence prior to receiving further written evidence about the offence leading to recall. The Applicant was offered an opportunity to comment on matters after this further material was produced, he took the opportunity to do so, and the panel took his submissions into account.[52]In terms of the submission that the panel failed to give adequate weight to evidence of change, there is little to this. It is in reality a ground based on an allegation of irrationality and not procedural unfairness. The panel set out, in detail, its reasons for the assessment that it made of the Applicant's case, and this included reference to progress made by the Applicant in custody. There is nothing to this ground. Error of Law[53]I do not accept that the panel "... misapplied the Codified Public Protection Test ... " in this case. The conclusion in the written decision sets out clearly why the panel determined that the test for release was not met and it made appropriate reference to the Codified Public Protection Test. The Applicant may feel that his risk to the public is no more than minimal, but the panel was entitled to disagree, and it was appropriate for it to consider the risk to the public in the longer term. Decision[54]For the reasons I have given, I do not consider that the decision was irrational, procedurally unfair or that there has been an error of law. Accordingly, the application for reconsideration is refused. Robert McKeon 02 January 2026