Cartwright, Application for Reconsideration [2025] PBRA 244 (12 November 2025) [2025] PBRA 244

PBRA
Cartwright, Application for Reconsideration [2025] PBRA 244 (12 November 2025)
[2025] PBRA 244 · 2025-10-10
[1]This is an application by Cartwright (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision of an oral hearing dated the 23 September 2025 as a result of which a Panel of the Parole Board declined to direct the release of the Applicant. Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration, whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)), or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).[3]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)).[4]I have considered the application on the papers. These are a dossier, containing 496 pages, which includes closing written submissions by the Applicant’s representative submitted to the panel on behalf of the Applicant after the conclusion of the oral hearing, the Decision of the panel, and in a separate document, the Application for Reconsideration. Request for Reconsideration[5]The application for reconsideration is dated the 10 October 2025. The application is not lodged on the appropriate form but is a typed-up series of submissions. It is an eligible application.[6]The grounds for seeking a reconsideration are as follows: - · That the decision was procedurally unfair in that “ express procedures laid down by law were not followed .” · That the Applicant was not given a fair hearing, and that; · The decision was irrational.[7]The application relies upon the following authorities: Pearce [2022] EWCA Ciy 4 and the Guidance issued to Panels by the Parole Board in respect of prisoners who maintain their innocence. In this context the Applicant further contends that the panel placed too much weight and insufficient caution on certain allegations against the Applicant, failing to apply the approach set out in Pearce and the Guidance to Panels when considering “allegations.” The application also cites the case of Wallace [2020] PBRA 202 . This case deals with the failure to direct an oral hearing but identifies what may amount to “procedural unfairness”: see below. Thus, the Applicant contends that in all the circumstances the panel decision was “irrational.”[8]I note that the Applicant’s closing submissions to the panel did not invite the panel to have regard to the case of Pearce . Background[9]The Applicant was born on the 25 February 1980 and is now aged 45. The Applicant was convicted of sexual offences committed against his stepdaughter (AE), a girl under the age of 13, between 30 April 2012 and the 30 April 2015. It appears that there were five specific allegations of rape reflecting conduct in those years. The Applicant was convicted on each count.[10]The Applicant was aged between 32 and 35 when he committed the offences and aged 36 when he was convicted by the jury and when he was sentenced, on the 26 January 2017. The Applicant has always maintained his innocence.[11]The brief details of the offending are that in December 2015 the victim’s mother, from whom the Applicant had been separated, contacted police reporting that her daughter had disclosed that she had been sexually abused over the previous years in question, from when she was aged five until she was aged 10. The complaint was that AE had been raped on five occasions and the five counts of the indictment, reflecting the events over five years were considered by a jury who convicted the Applicant. It is not clear if the allegations were specimen counts.[12]The Applicant was married to AE’s mother and therefore at the time of the sexual abuse, he was in loco parentis. The events complained of took place within the home the Applicant shared with AE’s mother and AE. Invariably the Applicant was alone in the house with AE and each allegation of Rape involved unprotected sexual intercourse.[13]The Applicant received an extended determinate sentence of particular concern of 16 years imprisonment with an extended licence period of one year.[14]The Applicant’s Parole Eligibility Date was the 25 January 2025. His Conditional Release Date is in January 2033, and his Sentence Expiry Date is in January 2034. The Relevant Law[15]The Panel correctly sets out in its decision letter the test for release. The only issue for the Panel was whether the Applicant met the test for release.[16]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended by the Parole Board (Amendment) Rules 2022) (the Parole Board Rules) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,(b) that it is irrational and/or(c) that it is procedurally unfair.[17]This is an eligible case, and the application was made in time. Irrationality[18]The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses Ltd -v- Wednesbury Corporation 1948 1 KB 223 , by Lord Greene, in these words:
“ if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere”
. The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality.[19]In R(DSD and others) -v- the Parole Board 2018 EWHC 694 (Admin) a Divisional Court applied this test to Parole Board hearings in these words, at para 116, stating that:
“the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. ”
[20]A fortiori, the proposition applies to a decision by a panel not to release a prisoner.[21]In R (on the application of Wells) -v- Parole Board 2019 EWHC 2710 (Admin )

the judge set out what he described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law which was:

“to test the decision maker’s ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel’s expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied”
. This test was adopted by a Divisional Court in the case of R (on the application of the Secretary of State for Justice) -v- the Parole Board 2022 EWHC 1282 (Admin) .[22]As was made clear by Saini J this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. Saini J held that the interpretation of and application of the Wednesbury test in Parole hearings, as explained in DSD, was binding upon him.[23]It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the Panel who heard the witnesses.[24]Further while the views of the professional witnesses must be carefully considered by a panel deciding on release, the Panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses.[25]It is possible to argue that mistakes in findings of fact made by a decision maker result in the final decision being irrational, but the mistake of fact must be fundamental. The case of E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] QB 1044 sets out the preconditions for such a conclusion:
“ there must have been a mistake as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter; the fact or evidence must have been "established", in the sense that it was uncontentious and objectively verifiable; the appellant (or his advisors) must not have been responsible for the mistake; and the mistake must have played a material (though not necessarily decisive) part in the tribunal's reasoning.”
See also R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2003] AC 295 , which said that in order to establish that there was a demonstrable mistake of fact in the decision of the panel, an Applicant will have to provide “ objectively verifiable evidence ” of what is asserted to be the true picture. Procedural unfairness[26]Procedural unfairness means that there was some procedural impropriety or unfairness resulting in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed, and therefore producing a manifestly unfair, flawed, or unjust result. These issues (which focus on how the decision was made) are entirely separate to the issue of irrationality, which focusses on the actual decision.[27]In summary, an Applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under rule 28 must satisfy me that either:(a) express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision;(b) they were not given a fair hearing;(c) they were not properly informed of the case against them;(d) they were prevented from putting their case properly;(e) the panel did not properly record the reasons for any findings or conclusion; and/or(f) the panel was not impartial.[28]The overriding objective is to ensure that the Applicant’s case was dealt with justly.[29]In this case the Applicant relies only upon Grounds (a) and (b), citing the case of Wallace (supra) . The submission is that the decision made by the panel which declined release was procedurally unfair to the Applicant and irrational.[30]Other grounds of appeal which may be considered as part of the process of Reconsideration are as follows (below) but these are not relied upon by the Applicant. Nevertheless, I remind myself that I should consider whether, having reviewed the evidence, the panel decision and the submissions of the Applicant, there was or was not, in this case, an error of law. Error of law[31]An administrative decision is unlawful under the broad heading of illegality if the panel: a) misinterprets a legal instrument relevant to the function being performed; b) has no legal authority to make the decision; c) fails to fulfil a legal duty; d) exercises discretionary power for an extraneous purpose; e) takes into account irrelevant considerations or fails to take account of relevant considerations; and/or f) improperly delegates decision-making power.[32]The task in evaluating whether a decision is illegal is essentially one of construing the content and scope of the instrument conferring the duty or power upon the panel. The instrument will normally be the Parole Board Rules, but it may also be an enunciated policy, or some other common law power.[33]In this case the Applicant submits that the panel misunderstood the Guidance issued by the Parole Board when considering the risk associated with prisoners who maintain their innocence and in cases where a panel has to examine previous misconduct.[34]In this context the Applicant submits that the panel failed to apply the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Pearce , when considering previous allegations: in this case allegations of domestic violence and/or alleged coercive or controlling behaviour in other relationships.[35]Finally, for the purposes of this application, I remind myself that i n Oyston [2000] PLR 45 , at paragraph 47 Lord Bingham said: “ It seems to me generally desirable that the Board should identify in broad terms the matters judged by the Board as pointing towards and against a continuing risk of offending and the Board's reasons for striking the balance that it does…..the letter should summarise the considerations which have in fact led to the final decision. It would be wrong to prescribe any standard form of Decision Letter, and it would be wrong to require elaborate or impeccable standards of draftsmanship. ". Reconsideration as a discretionary remedy[36]It is settled law that Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy. That means that, even if an error of law, irrationality, or procedural unfairness is established, the Reconsideration Member considering the case is not obliged to direct reconsideration of the panel’s decision.[37]The Reconsideration Member can decline to make such a direction having taken into account the particular circumstances of the case, the potential for a different decision to be reached by a new panel, and any delay caused by a grant of reconsideration. That discretion must of course be exercised in a way which is fair to both parties. Current parole review[38]The Applicant has now served over 8 years of the sentence imposed at the Sheffield Crown Court in January 2017. The Applicant’s case was referred to the Parole Board on 9 April 2024, when he was aged 44. The panel was asked to consider whether the Applicant met the statutory Public Protection for release.[39]The panel hearing was by conference video link and had to be adjourned briefly before it was concluded on 11 September 2025. The panel comprised an Independent Member who was the Chairman, and an Independent Member and a Judicial Member, who were the co-panellists. The panel considered a dossier which contained 468 pages of evidence, including closing submissions from the Applicant’s representative.[40]The panel received oral evidence from the Prison Offender Manager (POM); the Community Offender Manager (COM); the Applicant, and , the Prison based Forensic Psychologist (described as FPiT).[41]At the conclusion of the hearing there was a short adjournment because the panel wished to receive the evidence of a meeting and the conversation between the Applicant and his mother which had, it appears, been video recorded. In the closing submissions the Applicant points out that he submitted the recording and argues that the recording does not portray the Applicant in a bad light; “ angry, aggressive, or coercive .” The panel considered the recording. The Panel decision adds in the concluding paragraphs that they were “ exercised ” by the nature of a meeting between the Applicant’s mother and the COM’s Senior Probation Officer (SPO) and a conversation between the Applicant and his mother which was recorded. The panel cites in the decision words stated by the Applicant referring to his newly allocated COM, which they noted, in the decision, as a matter of concern:
“ She clearly doesn't want to work with me… This woman shouldn't have been allowed to come in…” ”…the SPO should have seen that she’d done it maliciously to keep me in prison .”
An N-Delius entry was made, and the information appears in the dossier at pp 462-465. It is very critical of the Applicant.[42]The Applicant addresses the material in his closing submissions to the panel which the panel considered. The reply on behalf of the Secretary of State (the Respondent)[43]On the 23 October 2025, the Respondent lodged representations by letter to the Parole Board. The letter stated that “ the COM’s evidence relied heavily upon previous allegations, any preference for this should be explicitly set out.”[44]There was a further paragraph to the letter which indicated that “ the PPG had contacted the COM, and she had submitted a reply. In her response the COM made reference to an opinion she had expressed at the hearing and referred to her “assessment” which was based on “previous allegations of domestic abuse .”[45]This information did not form part of the evidence leading to the decision of the panel, but it clearly refers to evidence of the assessment of the Applicant’s risk made by the COM and the comments which were recorded. I will deal with this in the discussion - below.[46]The decision I have arrived at is based entirely on the evidence considered by the panel and not on further evidence, as submitted above. Discussion[47]The panels’ decision is 16 pages long and the consideration of the evidence and the panel’s findings extends to over 14 pages. In my judgement it provides a detailed and careful analysis of the evidence the panel heard. The record and review of the evidence of the witnesses extends to over six of the 14 pages, accurately, it seems, reflecting the evidence heard and reviewing the risk the Applicant presents. The panel then goes on to conduct a detailed analysis of the evidence of the risk assessments, from each of the witnesses. In my judgement the panel made an extensive and careful review of the evidence in the case and clearly arrived at conclusions based upon the evidence received. Where appropriate, if it was necessary to express an opinion the panel did so, giving proper weight to competing arguments and approaching, with caution, any finding they needed to make.[48]As I have said, the Applicant’s representative lodged written closing submissions which were considered by the panel and were commented upon in the decision. but the submissions did not invite the panel to make any specific findings of fact in relation to the Applicant’s reported behaviour within relationships. There was no invitation to consider the case of Pearce. I have, nevertheless, in the light of the submissions made by the Applicant within his written application that the decision be reconsidered, examined the panel’s findings with the case of Pearce in mind (see below).[49]In the written reports before the panel the POM and the FPiT both supported the Applicant’s release. I note that the written report from the POM indicated that the Applicant’s risks lay mainly in intimate relationships. The reports, and their evidence, was that there was no need for further core risk reduction work to be undertaken. It was a matter which the panel carefully considered because the Applicant, as he maintained his innocence, had been unable to undertake any formal risk reduction interventions.[50]The position of the COM was different. Her conclusions differed from the POM and the FPiT. This appears to have brought about the meeting the Applicant had and his complaints about the COM which were recorded and which I have referred to already.[51]It is a matter of record that in April 2025 the panel was notified that there had been a change of COM. In July there was yet another change, when the new COM (S) was then assigned to the case. When S considered the risk assessments they arrived at a different conclusion to the other professional witnesses. They did not support the release of the Applicant.[52]S’s report was only served on the 29 August, just two weeks before the case was heard. This seems to have upset the Applicant. In their report the COM explains that the Applicant had contacted them after receiving it and was clearly discontented by their findings, particularly with regard to his behaviour with previous partners. S had reviewed the information in the OASys reports about intimate partner violence (IPV/DV) and had added details of incidents which had been previously referred to in outline but not investigated in any detail. In short there were several reported incidents, said to be three in 2007 and one in 2013 but apart from on one occasion when the Applicant was bound over by the local Magistrates to keep the peace for an alleged assault on his partner there had been no formal court hearing and/or previous finding of fact. S explored these matters in more detail and, whilst not determinative of their final assessment of the level of risk the Applicant presented it did give them cause for concern.[53]Having reviewed the overall risk presented by the Applicant the COM had concluded that they could not support his application for release in part because of his “ controlling behaviour .”[54]The issue was considered by the panel. Within the decision there are many references about the Applicant’s behaviour in the context of relationships.[55]However, having considered the full decision in my judgement the panel examined with great care the various references they had seen in the reports and evidence they had heard about IPV/DV and controlling behaviour. I note that the panel did not formally say:
“We find as a fact that…”
However, the panel did form a judgement based upon the evidence they had seen and heard about.[56]The Applicant contends that the panel should have made specific findings of fact in relation to these episodes and contends that they did not follow the guidance set out in Pearce .[57]As the Applicant takes the view that the panel should have considered the case of Pearce , and the fresh Guidance issued by the Parole Board in consequence of the decision, I have revisited the judgement and, in particular, the summary of their Lordships conclusions at para 87 et seq.[58]The judgement at this point reviews the decisions of the Administrative Court in R(Morris ) v Parole Board 2020 [EWHC} 711 (McGowan J) and the observations of Stanley Burnton LJ in R (McGetrick) v Parole Board [2012] 1 WLR 2488 where he states that:
“ It is essential to bear in mind that it is not the function of the board to find a prisoner guilty or innocent of any offence or other misconduct. Its function is to assess the risk that would be created if the prisoner is released on licence. For tha t purpose, the board must take into account hearsay and other evidence of misconduct or criminal offences on the part of the prisoner…. The weight, if any, to be given to that evidence is a matter for the Board .”
[59]The Supreme Court summarised their conclusions and stated that there was “ no general legal rule that in making a risk assessment the Board must adopt a two stage process of making findings of fact on the balance of probabilities and then treating only those matters on which it is made findings of fact as relevant to the assessment of risk ”. Later, the Court added: “If, as may often be the case despite its efforts to obtain the needed information, the Board is not able to make such a finding, it should investigate the facts to make findings as to the surrounding circumstances of the allegation which may or may not point to behaviour by the prisoner which is relevant to the assessment of risk”.[60]The panel, in its decision, refers to these incidents on several occasions, principally at paragraph 1.6. where they state as follows (having summarised the evidence of IPV/DV):
“ We particularly noted these matters because, while not directly relating to the index offences, it considers them to be evidence of controlling and coercive behaviour towards adults, which mirrors the nature of the index offending with the child. It also has implications for the ability of intimate partners to protect any children in a relationship. The panel also noted the Applicants propensity to duplicity because of his admission to engage in two intimate relationships at the same time .”
[61]In my judgement, the panel properly examined the details of the IPV/DV evidence following the advice of the Supreme Court and placed appropriate weight on the evidence in a holistic assessment of the risk the Applicant presented.[62]Maintaining Innocence : The closing submissions invited the panel to consider the Guidance issued by the Parole Board in cases where a prisoner maintains his innocence. The panel acknowledged its obligation so to do, and they commented on this issue in the course of their judgement. They stated:
“ The assessment of risk for an offender who maintains innocence of the index offence is always more difficult for a panel than cases where guilt is accepted, because it precludes an investigation into the precise circumstances of the offence, the offender’s mindset and motivation at the time that he committed the offence and an investigation as to what if anything has changed in the offenders attitude and schemas since the offence was committed. The panel was fully cognisant of the fact that maintenance of innocence of itself is not a reason to deny an offender progression, but it does make it more difficult for an offender to demonstrate he or she has changed. When maintenance of innocence is present, the panel must look for other factors to support progression. The panel found very limited such factors.”
[63]In my judgement, when taken as a whole, the panel approached this difficult aspect of the case by applying the guidance issued by the Parole Board and making appropriate allowances as they assessed the risk presented by the Applicant.[64]There is no evidence that the panel placed “disproportionate weight on [the Applicant’s] failure to admit the offence, as submitted ”. The panel appears to have taken a balanced approach to the issue giving due weight to the views of the professional witnesses and the evidence of the Applicant, with no suggestion that they were seeking to penalise him. The Applicant is not considered “ineligible” for parole, as suggested in the application. It is true that there has to be an approach which is case specific. In my judgement the panel approached their task with care. They considered carefully the difficulties presented by a prisoner who maintains his innocence and made due allowance. They arrived at an appropriate conclusion having regard to all the evidence and the views of the professionals.[65]Irrationality . As I have noted above the panel’s decision is detailed and wide ranging. There was a dispute between the professional witnesses about whether the Applicant could be safely managed under the proposed Risk Management Plan. In the decision the panel carefully reviewed the details of the plan and the views of the witnesses. The panel concluded by saying that:
“ Different recommendations of the professionals were noted. As it has disagreed with those of the POM and the FPiT, preferring instead the evidence of the COM, it is incumbent upon the panel to explain why it has done so. Put simply, and with due respect, it does not think that the POM and the FPiT have fully recognised the implications of [the Applicant’s] lack of understanding of his risks, the persistent chronicity of IPV, [the Applicant’s] failure to address risk around either the IPV or his sexual offending, the underdeveloped, or possibly non-existent, coping skills or strategies, and his manipulative behaviour. It is argued by the POM and FPiT that [the Applicant] could undertake the Building Choices programme after release, but this ignores the lack of internal controls currently absent and the programme’s likely availability in the early stages of the licence period. The panel understands the offending for which he was convicted was intrafamilial and context specific. However, it also considers [the Applicant] to have been both secretive and predatory and that he may endeavour to find ways of offending, by being manipulative with those supervising him.”
[66]There are two further paragraphs which review the evidence and the differences of the witnesses’ views finally endorsing the view of the COM by stating as follows: “ The panel very carefully weighed the evidence in coming to this conclusion ”.[67]In my judgement the panel’s decision is a careful review of the evidence it heard. The decision carefully weighs up the different views of the professional witnesses, and it does not arrive at a decision which can in any respect be regarded as irrational. This is a case which invites the Reconsideration Panel to take a different view of evidence which a panel saw and heard after which they made proper findings of fact with balanced arguments as the conclusion they had arrived at. It would be quite wrong for the Reconsideration Panel to interfere with such a decision. Decision[68]Thus, for the reasons I have given, I do not consider that the decision was irrational or procedurally unfair, nor do I take the view that there was, in this case an error of law, and accordingly the application for reconsideration is refused. Nick Coleman 12 November 2025