49 Fletton Fields, Peterborough PE2 9DW CAM/00JA/HMB/2018/0001

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY)
Case No CAM/00JA/HMB/2018/0001
Between
James Michael Turner and Naomi Marie TurnerApplicantSally MowforthRespondent
Before
David S Brown FRICS (Chair)Bruce M Edgington (Judge)Nat Miller BScDate 26 November 2018Hearing 2018-11-21Property: 49 Fletton Fields, Peterborough PE2 9DWType of application: Application by tenants for a rent repayment order where there has been no conviction of the landlord and no imposition of a financial penalty on the landlord by the local authority – Section 41 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016

DECISION

The Tribunal is not satisfied that a specified offence has been committed by the Respondent and so does not make a Rent Repayment Order.

REASONS

[1]Mr and Mrs Turner state that they were tenants of the Property of which Mrs Mowforth was the landlord. 2[2]They say that on 15th October 2017 Mrs Mowforth served a section 21 of the Housing Act 1988 (“the 1988 Act”)) notice on them and they allege that(a) it was an unlawful notice and(b) as a result of the notice they vacated the Property and(c) the Respondent therefore committed an offence under section 1(2), (3) and (3A) of the Protection From Eviction Act 1977 (the PFEA”).[3]The alleged offence is an offence specified in section 40 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (“the 2016 Act”) and so Mr and Mrs Turner are applying for a rent repayment order (“RRO”) in the sum of £6,900.[4]It is of assistance to set out the chronology of the relevant events as follows – 1/3/16 First assured shorthold tenancy (“AST”) began 1/3/17 Tenancy became a statutory periodic tenancy 21/4/17 Mrs Turner filed for an IVA 5/17 Mr and Mrs Turner were asked to sign a new AST agreement. They said they would sign it after their wedding. 30/7/17 Mrs Turner told Mrs Mowforth about the IVA and asked for a reference letter. Mrs Mowforth provided a reference letter. 10/8/17 Turners had not signed the new agreement. Mrs Mowforth asked Mrs Turner to produce her and Mr Turner’s passports to William H Brown. 17/8/17 Mrs Mowforth asks Mrs Turner if they can get together to do an inventory check. Mrs Turner states that they need the deposit back to pay to William H Brown. 22/8/17 Mrs Mowforth told William H Brown to start the tenancy from 1st October. 15/10/17 Mrs Mowforth served notice to quit. 21/10/17 Mrs Mowforth agreed to the Turners vacating on 11/11/17. 27/10/17 Mrs Mowforth contacted by Brookdale for a reference and about them coming to view the house. Asked Mrs Turner when they would be moving. Mrs Turner replied moving on 11th November. 29/10/17 Mrs Turner said Brookdales had already been and she had told them about the notice to quit and reasons for it and they were aware of Turner’s financial situation. 11/11/17 Mr and Mrs Turner vacated. The Law[5]Section 41 of the 2016 Act provides that a tenant or local housing authority may apply to the Tribunal for a rent repayment order (“RRO”) against a person who has committed an offence to which Chapter 4 of that Act applies (“a relevant offence”). The seven relevant offences are listed at section 40(3) and include eviction or harassment of occupiers under sections 1(2), 1(3) or 1(3A) of the PFEA.[6]The Tribunal may make an RRO if it is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that a landlord has committed a relevant offence, whether or not the landlord has been convicted – section 43(1). Where the application is made by a tenant, 3 section 43(3) provides that the amount to be paid under the RRO is to be determined in accordance with section 44.[7]Section 44 specifies that for the alleged offence the amount must relate to rent paid by the tenant in respect of the period of 12 months ending with the date of the offence.[8]The amount to be repaid must not exceed the rent paid in respect of that period less any relevant universal credit paid to any person in respect of rent under the tenancy during that period.[9]The Tribunal must, in particular, take into account(a) the conduct of the landlord and the tenant,(b) the financial circumstances of the landlord, and(c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of a relevant offence.[10]Section 1 of the PFEA deals with unlawful eviction and harassment of an occupier. The relevant subsections are -(1) In this section “residential occupier”, in relation to any premises, means a person occupying the premises as a residence, whether under a contract or by virtue of any enactment or rule of law giving him the right to remain in occupation or restricting the right of any other person to recover possession of the premises.(2) If any person unlawfully deprives the residential occupier of any premises of his occupation of the premises or any part thereof, or attempts to do so, he shall be guilty of an offence unless he proves that he believed, and had reasonable cause to believe, that the residential occupier had ceased to reside in the premises.(3) If any person with intent to cause the residential occupier of any premises— (a) to give up the occupation of the premises or any part thereof; or (b) to refrain from exercising any right or pursuing any remedy in respect of the premises or part thereof; does acts likely to interfere with the peace or comfort of the residential occupier or members of his household, or persistently withdraws or withholds services reasonably required for the occupation of the premises as a residence, he shall be guilty of an offence. (3A) Subject to subsection (3B) below, the landlord of a residential occupier or an agent of the landlord shall be guilty of an offence if— (a) he does acts likely to interfere with the peace or comfort of the residential occupier or members of his household, or (b) he persistently withdraws or withholds services reasonably required for the occupation of the premises in question as a residence, and (in either case) he knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, that that conduct is likely to cause the residential occupier to give up the occupation of the whole or part of the premises or to refrain from exercising any right or pursuing any remedy in respect of the whole or part of the premises. 4 (3B) A person shall not be guilty of an offence under subsection (3A) above if he proves that he had reasonable grounds for doing the acts or withdrawing or withholding the services in question. The Applicants’ Case[11]Ian Duncan of Legal Road Limited has provided a witness statement on behalf of Mr and Mrs Turner. He outlines the law relating to RROs under the 2016 Act and confirms that they were tenants of the Property from 1st March 2016 until 11th November 2017. As Mr. Duncan did not attend the hearing, the Tribunal accepted the ‘statement’ as a submission on the law.[12]He refers to the fact that the section 21 notice served by Mrs Mowforth gave less than 2 months’ notice and so, he says, contravened section 21(4ZA) of the 1988 Act.[13]He also refers to the fact that the notice did not comply with section 215(1) of the Housing Act 2004 Act (“the 2004 Act”) because, at the time when the notice was served, the tenancy deposit was not being held in accordance with an authorised scheme and Mrs Mowforth had not given Mr and Mrs Turner information regarding the authorised scheme, as required by section 213 of that Act.[14]In view of the above omission, Mr Duncan asserts that the section 21 notice was unlawful and directly caused Mr and Mrs Turner to give up possession and so constituted a criminal offence under section 1(2), (3) and (3A) of the PFEA, which began on 15th October and ended 0n 11th November 2017. An offence of “eviction or harassment of occupiers” is a specified offence under section 40(3) of the 2016 Act and so Mr and Mrs Turner are entitled to apply for an RRO.[15]Mr Duncan suggests that the Tribunal should order Mrs Mowforth to pay all of Mr and Mrs Turner’s Tribunal fees and legal costs.[16]Mr and Mrs Turner have each provided a witness statement duplicating each other’s evidence. They state that they rented the Property from Mrs Mowforth as from 1st March 2016 at a rent of £575 per month and paid her a tenancy deposit of £575. From 1st March 2017 they remained in the Property under a statutory periodic tenancy.[17]On 30th July 2017, at their request, Mrs Mowforth provided them with a reference letter confirming that she wished to continue letting the Property to them but at a rent of £775 per month.[18]On 15th October 2017, Mrs Mowforth delivered a section 21 notice to them demanding that they vacate the Property by 10th December. They state that Mrs Mowforth led them to believe that she was within her rights to evict them and they were obliged to leave the Property or face the legal consequences and costs. Mrs Turner subsequently emailed Mrs Mowforth to say that they could move out by 11th November.[19]Thereafter there was disagreement between the parties about deductions that Mrs Mowforth proposed to make from their deposit. We explained at the 5 hearing that issues relating to the deposit and the dilapidations claimed are not within our jurisdiction.[20]Mr and Mrs Turner refer to the statutory provisions set out by Mr Duncan in his statement and request the Tribunal to make an RRO in the sum of £6,900 being 12 months’ rent paid by her and her husband.[21]At the hearing, Mr Malik handed in a skeleton argument. This basically sets out the timetable of relevant events and repeats the references to the relevant statutes. He asserts that Mrs Mowforth has committed offences under section 1(1), (2), (3) and (3A) of the Protection From Eviction Act, beginning on 15th October and ending on 11th November 2017.[22]He refers to the Pre-Action Protocol and CPR44.11 and makes an application for costs. The Respondent’s Case[23]Mrs Mowforth, in her witness statement, states that she met Mr Turner in January 2016 and agreed to let the Property to him and Mrs Turner. She allowed them into the Property early so that they could carry out some decorating and move some effects from the flat that they were vacating as they had an issue of mould there. She says that the formal tenancy began on 28th February 2016 and confirms that the rent was £575 per month, which she says was lower than the market rent as Mr and Mrs Turner were saving for their wedding.[24]Mrs Mowforth confirms that she was paid a deposit of £575 and says that Mr and Mrs Turner were aware that she had retained it and not registered it in a recognised tenancy deposit scheme because of various issues with her health and her mother, who was in palliative care.[25]A formal tenancy agreement was prepared and signed and Mrs Mowforth arranged to let Mr and Mrs Turner have a copy. The Turners moved into the Property and confirmed that they were happy with its condition.[26]Mrs Mowforth states that in July 2017 she was not aware that Mrs Turner’s IVA had been filed on 21st April 2017.[27]After her mother died in April 2017, Mrs Mowforth was finding it difficult managing the Property and engaged William H Brown Property Management to take it over. She asked Turners to sign a new tenancy agreement so that she could lodge the deposit with a Deposit Agency. Mrs Turner informed her that they would sign the new agreement after their wedding. Mrs Mowforth understands that they were married in June or July; before then they were reminded to provide William H Brown with ID and sign the new agreement. They still had not done so by July.[28]On 30th July, Mrs Turner called at Mrs Mowforth’s house and informed her that due to the cost of the wedding and Mr Turner’s gambling debts she had filed for an Individual Voluntary Arrangement and Mr Turner had filed for bankruptcy. Mrs Turner said she required a letter to the company handling 6 her IVA as all expenses had to be proved and she asked for a letter of reference, which Mrs Mowforth provided on 30th July.[29]A copy of that letter is exhibited in the bundle. It is addressed “To whom it may concern” and confirms that Mrs Mowforth is the Owner/Landlord of 49 Fletton Fields and wishes to continue to rent the property to Mrs N Turner for £775 per month. It explains that the rent is to be increased because of recent Peterborough City Council rulings and the cost of employing a managing agent and adds, “Mrs Turner has always been a good tenant and I would like to continue this professional relationship with her continuing to reside at the property.”[30]Having been reminded again to sign the new agreement in August 2017, Mrs Turner provided ID to William H Brown and requested the new agreement to commence on 31st August. She subsequently sent an email suggesting commencement in October. Mrs Mowforth asserts that Turners were at that time dealing with Brookdale Property Management and looking at alternative accommodation.[31]Mrs Mowforth states that there was no reason for the notice to quit to be served, it was simply served due to the request that she had received from Mr and Mrs Turner. She does not believe that it caused the Turners any undue harassment or distress or inconvenience as they had specifically requested the document to enable them to move into another property.[32]When the Turners requested to move out early, on 11th November, she had no objection as she was genuinely trying to help them. After that date there was an exchange of text messages regarding her proposed deduction from the deposit.[33]Mrs Mowforth denies that any offence was committed by her as a result of the notice being served. She believes that this application for an RRO is an opportunistic attempt by the Turners to get money from her when she had sought to help them from the outset. She is not a professional landlord; this is the only property rented by her. The Turners never raised any queries about the deposit until after they left the Property.[34]Mr Ryan handed in a skeleton argument at the hearing. He also refers to the timetable of events and the relevant statutes.[35]Mr Ryan asserts that an offence under section 1(2) of the PFEA is only committed if the act or acts complained of have the character of an eviction: R v Yuthiwattana [1984] 80 Cr App Rep 55 (CA), and that an offence under section 1(3) is concerned with acts of harassment done with specific intent to harass an occupier so as to cause them either to give up the premises or to refrain from exercising some right in respect of the premises: R v Burke [1990] 2 All ER 385 (HL), R v Phekoo [1981] 3 All ER 84 (CA). An offence under section 1(3A) is similarly concerned with acts of harassment when the landlord knew or had reasonable cause to believe that these acts would be likely to cause a residential occupier to give up the occupation.[36]The matters alleged by Mr and Mrs Turner do not come close to founding a case of unlawful eviction, Mr Ryan says. The sending of a section 21 notice 7 cannot, without more, found any tenable basis for alleging that such an offence has been committed.[37]The sending of the s.21 notice did not deprive anyone of their occupation, it simply does not have the character of an eviction. The notice on its face states that if the tenant does not leave the dwelling the landlord must obtain an order for possession from the court, which he cannot do before the notice to quit has expired. It advises a tenant who does not know if he has any right to remain in possession to obtain legal advice. In this case Mr and Mrs Turner gave up possession before the expiry of the notice period.[38]On 17.10.17, a few days after the notice was sent, Mrs Turner emailed Mrs Mowforth saying, “I’m sorry my previous message may have come across the wrong way. I didn’t mean to sound like I was picking fault or that we are ungrateful. James and I are extremely grateful for the improvements on the house and for what you have done for us. I was just trying to see where we would stand with the return of our deposit to work out our finances and just hoped that these wouldn’t be taken into consideration. Apologies if I have caused offence.”[39]Mr Ryan asserts that this shows that sending the notice was not an unlawful eviction, the Turners simply wanted to move out due to their financial situation. There was no harassment of Mr and Mrs Turner, on the contrary, the relationship was a friendly one. It also shows that, in sending the notice, Mrs Mowforth did not have any intention of causing the Turners to give up their occupation, nor did she know that the notice would be the likely cause of their giving up occupation, rather it was at the request of the Turners, who were moving to less expensive accommodation in response to Mrs Mowforth having to increase the rent.[40]Mr Ryan submits that the Tribunal cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mrs Mowforth has committed any offences under section 1 of the PFEA and should dismiss the application and make an order for Mr and Mrs Turner to pay Mrs Mowforth’s costs.[41]The effect of the defective notice is that a court would not grant a possession order. The notes for the tenant on the form of notice make this clear. The Hearing[42]At the beginning of the hearing, Mr and Mrs Turner were not in attendance. Mr Malik was expecting them to attend. He was given an opportunity to contact them by telephone and informed us that he had been able to contact Mr Turner who said they had been told by their former legal adviser that they need not attend. He asked for an adjournment.[43]Mr Ryan objected to an adjournment. He pointed out that the case management Directions Order clearly stated that witnesses must attend the hearing. In addition, the letter sent by the Case Officer to Adams Solicitors on 28th September asked for avoid dates including those of essential witnesses. He added that Mrs Mowforth had cancelled a trip to the USA to be here. He asked for the case to be dismissed or struck out. 8[44]Mr Malik was instructed to ascertain whether Mr or Mrs Turner could attend later that morning. Neither of them could.[45]We asked Mr Malik if, given that(a) we have statements from Mr and Mrs Turner,(b) and the basic facts of the case are agreed and(c) the issues are of a legal nature, would it be unfair for us to continue with the hearing and receive evidence from Mrs Mowforth, whom he would have an opportunity to cross examine. He considered that it would not be unfair and did not object to the hearing proceeding in that way.[46]Mr Ryan objected to the admission of the witness statements from Mr and Mrs Turner as they were not present to give evidence. He accepted that the basic facts were not in dispute and were outlined in the initial application.[47]These are civil proceedings, although one function of the hearing is to determine whether or not Mrs Mowforth has committed a criminal act or acts, and an applicant in civil proceedings clearly has a duty to attend the hearing to present their case. It is very doubtful that a legal adviser would inform the applicants that they need not attend.[48]We were satisfied that Mr and Mrs Turner were aware of the hearing and their legal adviser was aware of the date. The basic facts were agreed. Mr Malik was able to represent Mr and Mrs Turner in cross examining Mrs Mowforth and addressing the legal issues and did not object to us proceeding. We therefore decided to proceed.[49]We explained that our jurisdiction in this case is to determine whether or not Mrs Mowforth has committed a specified offence and, if so, to decide whether or not to make an RRO. We have no jurisdiction to deal with the issues relating to the deposit.[50]We expressed the view that subsections (2), (3) and (3A) of the PFEA were alternatives and asked Mr Malik to identify which subsection Mr and Mrs Turner relied upon. He said all three.[51]Mrs Mowforth gave her evidence. She confirmed the contents of her witness statement.[52]She said that she had served the notice to quit at the request of the Turners. Several days before the notice was served, Naomi Turner had asked for one to give to the management company of the new cheaper premises they wanted to rent. She hand delivered the notice. That was the whole reason for the notice.[53]She said that Mrs Turner had told her about Brookdales, the agents, about two weeks before the notice and Brookdales had contacted her and had told her that Mrs Turner had said they were leaving because the property was to be sold. She had been trying to get Mr and Mrs Turner to sign a new tenancy agreement but they kept making excuses. The messages show that she was trying to help them.[54]Mrs Mowforth knew she had made a mistake with the deposit. She was instructing a managing agent and they were going to take over the management when Mr and Mrs Turner signed a new tenancy agreement. 9[55]In summing up, Mr Ryan expressed the view that the three subsections of section 1 of the PFEA are alternatives.[56]He referred to the tone of the emails between Mrs Mowforth and Mrs and Mrs Turner, which remained friendly, even on 15th October, the date when the notice had been served. There is nothing to indicate that Mr and Mrs turner felt under pressure, the indications are that they had already decided to move. The messages include an exchange on 27.10.17 where Mrs Mowforth asked Mrs Turner when they were moving and if they were going to pay November rent, Mrs Turner replying that they were moving on 11th November and Mrs Mowforth agreeing to that and only requiring rent up to that date.[57]Mrs Mowforth wrote the reference letter on 30th July at the request of Mrs Turner who said they needed it to explain the increase in rent. On the notice to quit Mrs Mowforth had hand written a note that it was issued due to inability to secure landlord insurance because of Mrs Turner’s IVA. Section 1(2) does not apply because there must be an intention to unlawfully deprive the occupier and so there would have to be mens rea. The Turners were moving out anyway. Mrs Mowforth knew that they were in touch with Brookdales before the notice was served. Discussion and Decision[58]It is for the Applicants to satisfy us, beyond reasonable doubt, that a specified offence has been committed.[59]The offences set out in the three subsections of section 1 of the PFEA are alternatives. There cannot be a conviction for a single act under all three. We accept Mr Ryan’s argument that subsections (3) and (3A) relate to harassment of an occupier. The reference to “the peace and comfort” of occupiers supports this interpretation.[60]We do not agree with Mr Ryan that service of a defective notice to terminate a tenancy cannot be an offence under subsection (2) because it does not have the character of an eviction. R v Yuthiwattana concerned a “locking out” by a landlord and the Court’s decision must be read in that context. This is an entirely different situation. Service of a defective notice to quit is clearly unlawful. Whether such notice deprives or attempts to deprive the occupier of possession is a question of fact in each case, irrespective of the fact that actual possession can only be obtained by a court order.[61]It is common ground between the parties that the notice served by Mrs Mowforth was defective because it did not give the requisite two months’ notice and it was served when the deposit had not been dealt with in accordance with an authorised scheme.[62]The evidence shows that there was a good, friendly relationship between the parties up to and after the service of the notice to quit. Mrs Mowforth impressed us as an honest and reliable witness. Her evidence is that she was aware that Mr and Mrs Turner were moving out anyway and she served the 10 notice at their request. She was aware of their contacts with Brookdales some two weeks before the notice was served.[63]Mrs Mowforth sent a message to Mrs Turner at 12.08 on 15th October to say that she had ‘put the paperwork (the notice to quit) through the door’ and had expected Mrs Turner to be in. The reference to ‘the paperwork’ indicates that Mrs Turner would have known what the paperwork was. At 12.29 Mrs Turner replied apologising for not answering the door because she did not hear Mrs Mowforth; she made no complaint or comment or any mention of the notice to quit. The messages which followed on 27th October concerning moving date and rent for part of November are similarly friendly in tone, and that tone continued through messages on 29th October, with no mention of or comment about the notice.[64]It is inconceivable that a tenant who had unexpectedly received a notice to quit ‘out of the blue’ would react in such a way, especially one who felt pressured into moving out unwillingly at short notice. This evidence supports Mrs Mowforth’s account that the notice was served at the request of Mr and Mrs Turner.[65]Mr and Mrs Turner’s repeated prevarication in signing the new tenancy agreement before this supports the assertion that they were not intending to remain at the Property.[66]Furthermore, no reason has been suggested why Mrs Mowforth would wish to rid herself of Mr and Mrs Turner as tenants in October when she had written in July that “Mrs Turner has always been a good tenant and I would like to continue this professional relationship with her continuing to reside at the property”.[67]Finally, on the question of statements of evidence, Mrs. Mowforth, in her statement dated 18th October 2018, sets out her case including the circumstances of what happened before and after the ‘service’ of the notice to quit and the assertion that Mr. Turner had filed for bankruptcy. In their statements in the bundle dated 30th October 2018 (the dates are on pages 116 and 149), i.e. after Mrs. Mowforth’s statement, neither Mr nor Mrs Turner refute anything she has said in this regard.[68]We conclude that Mrs Mowforth did not unlawfully deprive or attempt to deprive Mr and Mrs Turner of their occupation of the Property, they were leaving anyway and had informed Mrs Mowforth of this. Therefore, no offence was committed and no RRO can be made.[69]We would add that if subsections (3) and (3A) could apply, there was no offence under those subsections for the same reason. Costs[70]We pointed out to Mr Malik that the CPR do not apply to proceedings of this Tribunal and that our costs regime is under Rule 13 of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 and is limited to cases where a party has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings. We asked if he wished to continue with 11 the application and seek to persuade us that Mrs Mowforth had acted unreasonably in defending or conducting these proceedings. He did not.[71]Mr Ryan raised the issue of a cost order in favour of Mrs Mowforth because Mrs and Mrs Taylor had made serious allegations and had not come anywhere near proving them. In addition, they had failed to attend the hearing. We pointed out that if we found in favour of Mr and Mrs Turner a costs application would not be justified and that it would be better to wait for our decision and then make a costs application if appropriate.[72]On the issue of costs, there is guidance from the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) in the case of Willow Court Management (1985) v Alexander [2016] 0290 UMUT (LC) which the parties will find helpful. D S Brown FRICS (Chair) © CROWN COPYRIGHT 12 ANNEX - RIGHTS OF APPEAL[1]If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the Regional office which has been dealing with the case.[2]The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the Regional office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application.[3]If the application is not made within the 28 day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed despite not being within the time limit.[4]The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal, and state the result the party making the application is seeking. --- decision_2.pdf --- 1 First-tier Tribunal Property Chamber (Residential Property) Case reference : CAM/00JA/HMB/2018/0001 Property : 49 Fletton Fields, Peterborough, PE2 9DW Applicant : Sally Mowforth Respondents : James Michael Turner and Naomi Marie Turner Applications :(1) For an order that the Respondents’ representatives do pay the Applicant’s wasted costs pursuant to section 29(4) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007(2) For an order that the Respondents do pay the Applicant’s costs pursuant to rule 13 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 (“rule 13”) Application date : 19th December 2018 Tribunal : Judge Edgington Nat Miller BSc ____________________________________________ DECISION _________________________________ Crown Copyright © Both applications are refused STATEMENT OF REASONS[1]On the 21st November 2018, the Tribunal heard an application by the Respondents, Mr. and Mrs. Turner, for a rent repayment order. The Applicant, Mrs. Mowforth, was the Respondents’ landlady and on the 15th October 2017, she served a Notice to Quit on the Respondents. It was an unlawful notice in that it only gave one month’s notice rather than the two months which were required. 2[2]The Respondents alleged that as a result of the unlawful notice, they vacated the property and the Applicant was therefore guilty of an offence under sub- sections 1(2), (3) and (3A) of the Protection From Eviction Act 1977.[3]The Respondents therefore asked the Tribunal to make a rent repayment order in the sum of £6,900 as the offence is specified in section 40 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016.[4]As is alleged, the Respondents failed to turn up at the hearing but this did not create any extra expense because counsel for the Respondents agreed to proceed with the hearing in their absence.[5]The Tribunal refused to make the rent repayment order (“RRO”) stating that “We conclude that Mrs. Mowforth did not unlawfully deprive or attempt to deprive Mr. and Mrs. Turner of their occupation of the Property, they were leaving anyway and had informed Mrs. Mowforth of this. Therefore, no offence was committed and no RRO can be made”.[6]A Procedural Chair made a further directions order giving time limits for the submission of representations and stating that the Tribunal would deal with the decision on the basis of the evidence filed and any written representations made. It was said that if either party wanted an oral hearing, one would be arranged. No application for an oral hearing has been made.[7]The Tribunal has received a detailed letter dated 15th February 2019 from Legal Road Ltd. on behalf of the Respondents setting out the terms of a complaint against their former solicitors and counsel. The letter does not seek permission to appeal the Tribunal’s main decision but asks for an unspecified extension of time to make representations on this costs application only. As the Tribunal is not making any costs order, it does not consider it appropriate or necessary to delay this decision any further. The application for a wasted costs order[8]This application is in a letter from the Applicant’s solicitors, Hegarty LLP. All they say is that they are asking for such an order to be made.[9]The power to make such an order is concerned with the conduct of a “legal or other representative” of a party, and not the conduct of the party themselves. It is a distinct power which should not be confused with the power under rule[13]The Respondents were represented by counsel at the hearing who behaved entirely properly throughout. For example, he accepted that his clients should have been in attendance and did not pursue his application for an adjournment.[10]Hegarty LLP do not make any allegations against the solicitors or counsel representing the Respondents. All the allegations are against the Respondents themselves. Accordingly, the Tribunal has no hesitation in refusing a wasted costs order. 3 The application for an order under rule 13(1) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Property Chamber) Rules 2013[11]Such an order can only be made “if a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings” before this Tribunal.[12]The allegations are that the Respondents(a) “have acted unreasonably in bringing an application with overall limited prospects of success” and(b) “failed to attend the hearing as was required of them”.[13]The Tribunal, in its decision, said that if an application for costs under rule 13(1) was to be made, reference should be made to the leading case on the subject, namely Willow Court Management Co. Ltd. v Alexander plus 2 other cases [2016] UKUT 0290 (LC). The Applicant’s solicitors have referred to that case but they have not quoted from it or set out the criteria which must be applied.[14]In the main case dealt with by the Upper Tribunal in Willow Court, the management company lost and the other party felt that costs should be awarded under rule 13. The First-tier Tribunal agreed and made the order. In allowing the appeal against that order, the Upper Tribunal said: “61. In reaching its conclusion on costs we consider that the Tribunal erred in two important respects. Firstly, it accorded too much weight to the fact that the Management Company lost at the substantive hearing. Secondly it applied a standard of unreasonableness which fell well below the threshold that we consider to be applicable in these cases[62]Although in some cases, the fact that a party has been unsuccessful before the Tribunal in a substantive hearing might reinforce a view that there has been unreasonable behaviour, that failure cannot be determinative on its own. The residential property division of the First-tier Tribunal is a costs shifting jurisdiction by exception only and parties must usually expect to bear their own costs...”[15]The first thing to be determined is the nature of the alleged unreasonable conduct. Willow Court confirmed that the definition of unreasonable conduct is still, in essence, that set out by the then Master of the Rolls in Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205. At pages 232 and 233 in that judgment, ‘unreasonable’ is said to be “conduct which is vexatious, designed to harass the other side rather than advance the resolution of the case, and it makes no difference that the conduct is the product of excessive zeal and not improper motive. But cannot be described as unreasonable simply because it leads in the event to an unsuccessful result”.[16]In this case, the Applicant served an unlawful Notice to Quit and the Respondents did vacate. If that had been done on purpose with a view to 4 obtaining early vacant possession, the Tribunal would probably have made the RRO.[17]Accordingly, there was a case to answer and the Respondents were represented throughout by solicitors and counsel whose conduct has not been criticised by those representing the Applicant. There is nothing in this application to suggest that the conduct of the Respondents themselves in the proceedings satisfied the Ridehalgh test.[18]In these circumstances, the rule 13 application is refused. ............................................. Regional Judge Edgington 20th February 2019 ANNEX - RIGHTS OF APPEAL i. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the Regional office which has been dealing with the case. ii. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the Regional office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application. iii. If the application is not made within the 28 day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed despite not being within the time limit. iv. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal, and state the result the party making the application is seeking. 1 First-tier Tribunal Property Chamber (Residential Property) Case reference : CAM/00JA/HMB/2018/0001 Property : 49 Fletton Fields, Peterborough, PE2 9DW Applicant : Sally Mowforth Respondents : James Michael Turner and Naomi Marie Turner Applications :(1) For an order that the Respondents’ representatives do pay the Applicant’s wasted costs pursuant to section 29(4) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007(2) For an order that the Respondents do pay the Applicant’s costs pursuant to rule 13 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 (“rule 13”) Application date : 19th December 2018 Tribunal : Judge Edgington Nat Miller BSc ____________________________________________ DECISION _________________________________ Crown Copyright © Both applications are refused STATEMENT OF REASONS[1]On the 21st November 2018, the Tribunal heard an application by the Respondents, Mr. and Mrs. Turner, for a rent repayment order. The Applicant, Mrs. Mowforth, was the Respondents’ landlady and on the 15th October 2017, she served a Notice to Quit on the Respondents. It was an unlawful notice in that it only gave one month’s notice rather than the two months which were required. 2[2]The Respondents alleged that as a result of the unlawful notice, they vacated the property and the Applicant was therefore guilty of an offence under sub- sections 1(2), (3) and (3A) of the Protection From Eviction Act 1977.[3]The Respondents therefore asked the Tribunal to make a rent repayment order in the sum of £6,900 as the offence is specified in section 40 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016.[4]As is alleged, the Respondents failed to turn up at the hearing but this did not create any extra expense because counsel for the Respondents agreed to proceed with the hearing in their absence.[5]The Tribunal refused to make the rent repayment order (“RRO”) stating that “We conclude that Mrs. Mowforth did not unlawfully deprive or attempt to deprive Mr. and Mrs. Turner of their occupation of the Property, they were leaving anyway and had informed Mrs. Mowforth of this. Therefore, no offence was committed and no RRO can be made”.[6]A Procedural Chair made a further directions order giving time limits for the submission of representations and stating that the Tribunal would deal with the decision on the basis of the evidence filed and any written representations made. It was said that if either party wanted an oral hearing, one would be arranged. No application for an oral hearing has been made.[7]The Tribunal has received a detailed letter dated 15th February 2019 from Legal Road Ltd. on behalf of the Respondents setting out the terms of a complaint against their former solicitors and counsel. The letter does not seek permission to appeal the Tribunal’s main decision but asks for an unspecified extension of time to make representations on this costs application only. As the Tribunal is not making any costs order, it does not consider it appropriate or necessary to delay this decision any further. The application for a wasted costs order[8]This application is in a letter from the Applicant’s solicitors, Hegarty LLP. All they say is that they are asking for such an order to be made.[9]The power to make such an order is concerned with the conduct of a “legal or other representative” of a party, and not the conduct of the party themselves. It is a distinct power which should not be confused with the power under rule[13]The Respondents were represented by counsel at the hearing who behaved entirely properly throughout. For example, he accepted that his clients should have been in attendance and did not pursue his application for an adjournment.[10]Hegarty LLP do not make any allegations against the solicitors or counsel representing the Respondents. All the allegations are against the Respondents themselves. Accordingly, the Tribunal has no hesitation in refusing a wasted costs order. 3 The application for an order under rule 13(1) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Property Chamber) Rules 2013[11]Such an order can only be made “if a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings” before this Tribunal.[12]The allegations are that the Respondents(a) “have acted unreasonably in bringing an application with overall limited prospects of success” and(b) “failed to attend the hearing as was required of them”.[13]The Tribunal, in its decision, said that if an application for costs under rule 13(1) was to be made, reference should be made to the leading case on the subject, namely Willow Court Management Co. Ltd. v Alexander plus 2 other cases [2016] UKUT 0290 (LC). The Applicant’s solicitors have referred to that case but they have not quoted from it or set out the criteria which must be applied.[14]In the main case dealt with by the Upper Tribunal in Willow Court, the management company lost and the other party felt that costs should be awarded under rule 13. The First-tier Tribunal agreed and made the order. In allowing the appeal against that order, the Upper Tribunal said: “61. In reaching its conclusion on costs we consider that the Tribunal erred in two important respects. Firstly, it accorded too much weight to the fact that the Management Company lost at the substantive hearing. Secondly it applied a standard of unreasonableness which fell well below the threshold that we consider to be applicable in these cases[62]Although in some cases, the fact that a party has been unsuccessful before the Tribunal in a substantive hearing might reinforce a view that there has been unreasonable behaviour, that failure cannot be determinative on its own. The residential property division of the First-tier Tribunal is a costs shifting jurisdiction by exception only and parties must usually expect to bear their own costs...”[15]The first thing to be determined is the nature of the alleged unreasonable conduct. Willow Court confirmed that the definition of unreasonable conduct is still, in essence, that set out by the then Master of the Rolls in Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205. At pages 232 and 233 in that judgment, ‘unreasonable’ is said to be “conduct which is vexatious, designed to harass the other side rather than advance the resolution of the case, and it makes no difference that the conduct is the product of excessive zeal and not improper motive. But cannot be described as unreasonable simply because it leads in the event to an unsuccessful result”.[16]In this case, the Applicant served an unlawful Notice to Quit and the Respondents did vacate. If that had been done on purpose with a view to 4 obtaining early vacant possession, the Tribunal would probably have made the RRO.[17]Accordingly, there was a case to answer and the Respondents were represented throughout by solicitors and counsel whose conduct has not been criticised by those representing the Applicant. There is nothing in this application to suggest that the conduct of the Respondents themselves in the proceedings satisfied the Ridehalgh test.[18]In these circumstances, the rule 13 application is refused. ............................................. Regional Judge Edgington 20th February 2019 ANNEX - RIGHTS OF APPEAL i. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the Regional office which has been dealing with the case. ii. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the Regional office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application. iii. If the application is not made within the 28 day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed despite not being within the time limit. iv. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal, and state the result the party making the application is seeking. 1 First-tier Tribunal Property Chamber (Residential Property) Case reference : CAM/00JA/HMB/2018/0001 Property : 49 Fletton Fields, Peterborough, PE2 9DW Applicant : Sally Mowforth Respondents : James Michael Turner and Naomi Marie Turner Applications :(1) For an order that the Respondents’ representatives do pay the Applicant’s wasted costs pursuant to section 29(4) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007(2) For an order that the Respondents do pay the Applicant’s costs pursuant to rule 13 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 (“rule 13”) Application date : 19th December 2018 Tribunal : Judge Edgington Nat Miller BSc ____________________________________________ DECISION _________________________________ Crown Copyright © Both applications are refused STATEMENT OF REASONS[1]On the 21st November 2018, the Tribunal heard an application by the Respondents, Mr. and Mrs. Turner, for a rent repayment order. The Applicant, Mrs. Mowforth, was the Respondents’ landlady and on the 15th October 2017, she served a Notice to Quit on the Respondents. It was an unlawful notice in that it only gave one month’s notice rather than the two months which were required. 2[2]The Respondents alleged that as a result of the unlawful notice, they vacated the property and the Applicant was therefore guilty of an offence under sub- sections 1(2), (3) and (3A) of the Protection From Eviction Act 1977.[3]The Respondents therefore asked the Tribunal to make a rent repayment order in the sum of £6,900 as the offence is specified in section 40 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016.[4]As is alleged, the Respondents failed to turn up at the hearing but this did not create any extra expense because counsel for the Respondents agreed to proceed with the hearing in their absence.[5]The Tribunal refused to make the rent repayment order (“RRO”) stating that “We conclude that Mrs. Mowforth did not unlawfully deprive or attempt to deprive Mr. and Mrs. Turner of their occupation of the Property, they were leaving anyway and had informed Mrs. Mowforth of this. Therefore, no offence was committed and no RRO can be made”.[6]A Procedural Chair made a further directions order giving time limits for the submission of representations and stating that the Tribunal would deal with the decision on the basis of the evidence filed and any written representations made. It was said that if either party wanted an oral hearing, one would be arranged. No application for an oral hearing has been made.[7]The Tribunal has received a detailed letter dated 15th February 2019 from Legal Road Ltd. on behalf of the Respondents setting out the terms of a complaint against their former solicitors and counsel. The letter does not seek permission to appeal the Tribunal’s main decision but asks for an unspecified extension of time to make representations on this costs application only. As the Tribunal is not making any costs order, it does not consider it appropriate or necessary to delay this decision any further. The application for a wasted costs order[8]This application is in a letter from the Applicant’s solicitors, Hegarty LLP. All they say is that they are asking for such an order to be made.[9]The power to make such an order is concerned with the conduct of a “legal or other representative” of a party, and not the conduct of the party themselves. It is a distinct power which should not be confused with the power under rule[13]The Respondents were represented by counsel at the hearing who behaved entirely properly throughout. For example, he accepted that his clients should have been in attendance and did not pursue his application for an adjournment.[10]Hegarty LLP do not make any allegations against the solicitors or counsel representing the Respondents. All the allegations are against the Respondents themselves. Accordingly, the Tribunal has no hesitation in refusing a wasted costs order. 3 The application for an order under rule 13(1) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Property Chamber) Rules 2013[11]Such an order can only be made “if a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings” before this Tribunal.[12]The allegations are that the Respondents(a) “have acted unreasonably in bringing an application with overall limited prospects of success” and(b) “failed to attend the hearing as was required of them”.[13]The Tribunal, in its decision, said that if an application for costs under rule 13(1) was to be made, reference should be made to the leading case on the subject, namely Willow Court Management Co. Ltd. v Alexander plus 2 other cases [2016] UKUT 0290 (LC). The Applicant’s solicitors have referred to that case but they have not quoted from it or set out the criteria which must be applied.[14]In the main case dealt with by the Upper Tribunal in Willow Court, the management company lost and the other party felt that costs should be awarded under rule 13. The First-tier Tribunal agreed and made the order. In allowing the appeal against that order, the Upper Tribunal said: “61. In reaching its conclusion on costs we consider that the Tribunal erred in two important respects. Firstly, it accorded too much weight to the fact that the Management Company lost at the substantive hearing. Secondly it applied a standard of unreasonableness which fell well below the threshold that we consider to be applicable in these cases[62]Although in some cases, the fact that a party has been unsuccessful before the Tribunal in a substantive hearing might reinforce a view that there has been unreasonable behaviour, that failure cannot be determinative on its own. The residential property division of the First-tier Tribunal is a costs shifting jurisdiction by exception only and parties must usually expect to bear their own costs...”[15]The first thing to be determined is the nature of the alleged unreasonable conduct. Willow Court confirmed that the definition of unreasonable conduct is still, in essence, that set out by the then Master of the Rolls in Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205. At pages 232 and 233 in that judgment, ‘unreasonable’ is said to be “conduct which is vexatious, designed to harass the other side rather than advance the resolution of the case, and it makes no difference that the conduct is the product of excessive zeal and not improper motive. But cannot be described as unreasonable simply because it leads in the event to an unsuccessful result”.[16]In this case, the Applicant served an unlawful Notice to Quit and the Respondents did vacate. If that had been done on purpose with a view to 4 obtaining early vacant possession, the Tribunal would probably have made the RRO.[17]Accordingly, there was a case to answer and the Respondents were represented throughout by solicitors and counsel whose conduct has not been criticised by those representing the Applicant. There is nothing in this application to suggest that the conduct of the Respondents themselves in the proceedings satisfied the Ridehalgh test.[18]In these circumstances, the rule 13 application is refused. ............................................. Regional Judge Edgington 20th February 2019 ANNEX - RIGHTS OF APPEAL i. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the Regional office which has been dealing with the case. ii. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the Regional office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application. iii. If the application is not made within the 28 day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed despite not being within the time limit. iv. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal, and state the result the party making the application is seeking. 1 First-tier Tribunal Property Chamber (Residential Property) Case reference : CAM/00JA/HMB/2018/0001 Property : 49 Fletton Fields, Peterborough, PE2 9DW Applicant : Sally Mowforth Respondents : James Michael Turner and Naomi Marie Turner Applications :(1) For an order that the Respondents’ representatives do pay the Applicant’s wasted costs pursuant to section 29(4) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007(2) For an order that the Respondents do pay the Applicant’s costs pursuant to rule 13 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 (“rule 13”) Application date : 19th December 2018 Tribunal : Judge Edgington Nat Miller BSc ____________________________________________ DECISION _________________________________ Crown Copyright © Both applications are refused STATEMENT OF REASONS[1]On the 21st November 2018, the Tribunal heard an application by the Respondents, Mr. and Mrs. Turner, for a rent repayment order. The Applicant, Mrs. Mowforth, was the Respondents’ landlady and on the 15th October 2017, she served a Notice to Quit on the Respondents. It was an unlawful notice in that it only gave one month’s notice rather than the two months which were required. 2[2]The Respondents alleged that as a result of the unlawful notice, they vacated the property and the Applicant was therefore guilty of an offence under sub- sections 1(2), (3) and (3A) of the Protection From Eviction Act 1977.[3]The Respondents therefore asked the Tribunal to make a rent repayment order in the sum of £6,900 as the offence is specified in section 40 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016.[4]As is alleged, the Respondents failed to turn up at the hearing but this did not create any extra expense because counsel for the Respondents agreed to proceed with the hearing in their absence.[5]The Tribunal refused to make the rent repayment order (“RRO”) stating that “We conclude that Mrs. Mowforth did not unlawfully deprive or attempt to deprive Mr. and Mrs. Turner of their occupation of the Property, they were leaving anyway and had informed Mrs. Mowforth of this. Therefore, no offence was committed and no RRO can be made”.[6]A Procedural Chair made a further directions order giving time limits for the submission of representations and stating that the Tribunal would deal with the decision on the basis of the evidence filed and any written representations made. It was said that if either party wanted an oral hearing, one would be arranged. No application for an oral hearing has been made.[7]The Tribunal has received a detailed letter dated 15th February 2019 from Legal Road Ltd. on behalf of the Respondents setting out the terms of a complaint against their former solicitors and counsel. The letter does not seek permission to appeal the Tribunal’s main decision but asks for an unspecified extension of time to make representations on this costs application only. As the Tribunal is not making any costs order, it does not consider it appropriate or necessary to delay this decision any further. The application for a wasted costs order[8]This application is in a letter from the Applicant’s solicitors, Hegarty LLP. All they say is that they are asking for such an order to be made.[9]The power to make such an order is concerned with the conduct of a “legal or other representative” of a party, and not the conduct of the party themselves. It is a distinct power which should not be confused with the power under rule[13]The Respondents were represented by counsel at the hearing who behaved entirely properly throughout. For example, he accepted that his clients should have been in attendance and did not pursue his application for an adjournment.[10]Hegarty LLP do not make any allegations against the solicitors or counsel representing the Respondents. All the allegations are against the Respondents themselves. Accordingly, the Tribunal has no hesitation in refusing a wasted costs order. 3 The application for an order under rule 13(1) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Property Chamber) Rules 2013[11]Such an order can only be made “if a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings” before this Tribunal.[12]The allegations are that the Respondents(a) “have acted unreasonably in bringing an application with overall limited prospects of success” and(b) “failed to attend the hearing as was required of them”.[13]The Tribunal, in its decision, said that if an application for costs under rule 13(1) was to be made, reference should be made to the leading case on the subject, namely Willow Court Management Co. Ltd. v Alexander plus 2 other cases [2016] UKUT 0290 (LC). The Applicant’s solicitors have referred to that case but they have not quoted from it or set out the criteria which must be applied.[14]In the main case dealt with by the Upper Tribunal in Willow Court, the management company lost and the other party felt that costs should be awarded under rule 13. The First-tier Tribunal agreed and made the order. In allowing the appeal against that order, the Upper Tribunal said: “61. In reaching its conclusion on costs we consider that the Tribunal erred in two important respects. Firstly, it accorded too much weight to the fact that the Management Company lost at the substantive hearing. Secondly it applied a standard of unreasonableness which fell well below the threshold that we consider to be applicable in these cases[62]Although in some cases, the fact that a party has been unsuccessful before the Tribunal in a substantive hearing might reinforce a view that there has been unreasonable behaviour, that failure cannot be determinative on its own. The residential property division of the First-tier Tribunal is a costs shifting jurisdiction by exception only and parties must usually expect to bear their own costs...”[15]The first thing to be determined is the nature of the alleged unreasonable conduct. Willow Court confirmed that the definition of unreasonable conduct is still, in essence, that set out by the then Master of the Rolls in Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205. At pages 232 and 233 in that judgment, ‘unreasonable’ is said to be “conduct which is vexatious, designed to harass the other side rather than advance the resolution of the case, and it makes no difference that the conduct is the product of excessive zeal and not improper motive. But cannot be described as unreasonable simply because it leads in the event to an unsuccessful result”.[16]In this case, the Applicant served an unlawful Notice to Quit and the Respondents did vacate. If that had been done on purpose with a view to 4 obtaining early vacant possession, the Tribunal would probably have made the RRO.[17]Accordingly, there was a case to answer and the Respondents were represented throughout by solicitors and counsel whose conduct has not been criticised by those representing the Applicant. There is nothing in this application to suggest that the conduct of the Respondents themselves in the proceedings satisfied the Ridehalgh test.[18]In these circumstances, the rule 13 application is refused. ............................................. Regional Judge Edgington 20th February 2019 ANNEX - RIGHTS OF APPEAL i. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the Regional office which has been dealing with the case. ii. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the Regional office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application. iii. If the application is not made within the 28 day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed despite not being within the time limit. iv. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal, and state the result the party making the application is seeking.